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1.1 What are complex demonstratives? 
Complex demonstratives have been among the concerns of philosophers and linguists since 
the first theories of reference were developed. Expressions like “this cat”, “that table”, “these 
elephants” or “those people” are the result of combining a bare demonstrative such as “this” 
or “that” with a nominal, thus yielding a syntactically more complex expression. In spite of 
this complexity, they share many semantic features with their bare counterparts, i.e., with 
singular terms like “this” and “that”. This similarity has led many philosophers to assimilate 
the former as a special case of the latter: bare demonstratives have been regarded as 
paradigmatic cases of singular referring terms since the work of Bertrand Russell (1911, 
1918, 1948), and complex demonstratives, to a great extent, also seem to fit this schema. 
Thus, it is usual to conceive phrases of the form “that F” as singular terms whose only 
contribution to the proposition expressed is an individual; the role of the nominal “F”, in turn, 
is simply to secure the appropriate referent.   
David Kaplan’s groundbreaking work (1977, 1978, 1989) laid the ground for a 
treatment of complex demonstratives along the lines of direct reference, on the model of 
other indexicals. Although he never stated a semantics for these expressions, he did devise 
an artificial operator, “dthat”, whose syntactic features closely resembled those of complex 
demonstratives, and which he intended as a device of direct reference. “Dthat”-terms 
eventually proved inadequate as a formal counterpart of complex demonstratives, but 
Kaplan’s general approach to indexicality did turn out to be extremely fruitful, and it was 
adapted for the particular case of complex demonstratives by authors like David Braun (1994, 
2008a), Emma Borg (2000) and Nathan Salmon (2002). On these theories, the sole 
contribution of a complex demonstrative to the proposition expressed is just like that of any 
other indexical, namely an individual, and the role of the nominal is to a great extent 
analogous to the descriptive part of the meaning of expressions like “he”, “she”, or “that”. 
This means that a sentence like (1) below expresses a singular proposition, i.e., a content that 
incorporates an individual among its constituents. In terms of Russellian structured 
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propositions, this content could be represented as (1a), where a is some individual satisfying 
“being a man with a hat”:  
(1) That man with the hat is bald 
(1a) <a, being bald> 
This in turn means that the noun phrase attached to the complex demonstrative in (1) 
contributes nothing to the truth-conditions of an utterance of this sentence. Its role is rather 
to restrict the range of possible referents for the demonstrative, much like the feminine and 
singular Φ-features of the pronoun “she” help secure an appropriate referent but play no 
further role once this individual has been selected.  
This way of dealing with complex demonstratives has become standard and, perhaps 
because of its intuitiveness, it is commonly assumed with little to no discussion. Other 
theories (cf. Dever 2001; Corazza 2002b, 2003; García-Carpintero 2006) depart from the 
Kaplanian orthodoxy in important respects, but they nevertheless manage to retain many of 
its central tenets. This traditional picture of complex demonstratives, however, is not 
uncontroversial, and it has come under attack during the last two decades. Many of the 
problems spotted in the core of the traditional theory have to do with the role attributed to 
the nominal and the right way to capture the singularity of the content of these expressions 
in an intensional semantics – similar tensions concerning the semantics of “dthat” were 
already noted by Kaplan himself in his own writings (1989). From a more empirical point of 
view, the recent literature has provided a vast amount of examples showing that complex 
demonstratives display non-deictic uses that do not fare well with the directly referential 
view.  
All these problems led many authors to abandon the traditional approach to complex 
demonstratives and to propose alternative accounts in which they were treated on the model 
of quantifiers. For instance, Stephen Neale (1993), Jeffrey King (1999, 2001, 2008a, 2008b), 
and Ernst Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (2000) developed theories in which complex 
demonstratives are understood as quantifiers with a rigidifying element that accounts for 
many of the intuitions of rigidity that we usually have about these expressions. The debate 
between these and the above-mentioned authors is therefore somewhat analogous to the 
dispute between advocates of a quantificational treatment of definite descriptions, along the 
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lines proposed by Russell (1905), and those favoring a view of these expressions as singular 
terms, following the lead of Gottlob Frege (1891/1981a, 1892/1981b) and Peter Strawson 
(1950). Additionally, other authors working on the semantics of complex demonstratives 
have proposed alternative approaches that, in spite of not modelling them as quantifiers, have 
nevertheless abandoned direct reference and most of the analogy between complex 
demonstratives and the Kaplanian picture of indexicals. This is the case of Craige Roberts 
(2001), Paul Elbourne (2008) and Ethan Nowak (2014, 2019a, 2019b), among others. These 
theories and the quantificational ones are meant to handle all the data that the traditional 
approach is prima facie unable to deal with.  
This dissertation is concerned with the semantics and, to a lesser extent, the syntax and 
pragmatics of complex demonstratives. And my aim is to defend the philosophical 
orthodoxy: my basic claim will be that, essentially, Kaplan and his followers got things right, 
and that none of the evidence cited by the authors championing quantificational and other 
non-traditional approaches to complex demonstratives justifies abandoning the traditional 
treatment. Namely, I will be arguing that the idea that complex demonstratives work as in 
the Kaplanian model of indexicals is essentially right, and that all the alleged counterevidence 
against a directly referential treatment of these expressions can be accounted for by means 
of the same mechanisms that explain the non-deictic uses of any other singular term, such as 
personal pronouns. Furthermore, I shall adduce new evidence strongly suggesting that 
complex demonstratives are better understood as indexical singular terms.  
This defense of the traditional approach to complex demonstratives is structured in 
three parts. Section 2 provides an overview of the debate: I sketch the main motivations and 
tenets of the two main views in dispute, and I explain and develop the challenges that the 
defenders of quantificational accounts have posed to the traditional stance. Section 3 is the 
core of this essay: after introducing a couple of independently motivated adjustments into the 
traditional theories, I argue that these are able to tackle all the problematic counterevidence; 
namely, I show that, once we take into account some rather standard and well-established 
assumptions about natural language, the problems at issue vanish. Specifically, the required 
assumptions are two: a) that natural language has the expressive power of full object-
language quantification over times and worlds, and b) that, pace Kaplan (1977), natural 
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language contains hyperintensional operators – what Kaplan himself called “monsters”. I 
shall show that, once these two issues are taken into account, none of the challenges under 
discussion poses a serious threat to treating complex demonstratives as singular terms. My 
diagnosis will be that each of the non-deictic readings of these expressions can either be 
explained by the presence of a hyperintensional operator or be reduced as an instance of a 
problematic type of anaphora that occurs whenever there is co-variation without c-
commanding – I shall explain all these notions in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4. And, importantly, 
these phenomena always result in non-deictic uses of any indexical, not just complex 
demonstratives. I also discuss some crosslinguistic evidence that favors such treatment 
(section 3.3.5.3) and connect my results to recent debates on notions like direct reference, 
singularity and Millianism (section 3.3.2) 
Before continuing, let me state two caveats about my account. The first caveat is a 
worry: does it really matter whether complex demonstratives should be treated as quantifiers 
or as singular terms? There are two reasons why it may prima facie seem that it does not. On 
the one hand, many authors have dealt with both kinds of expressions on very similar lines; 
as a paradigmatic case, the father of modern semantics, Richard Montague (1974), gave the 
semantic type of quantifiers to all words traditionally considered as singular terms, and yet 
made very accurate predictions regarding their behavior. At least prima facie, the fact that 
singular terms can be modeled as if they were quantifiers seems to downplay the claims made 
here. On the other hand, even if some real difference between quantifiers and singular terms 
is in play, one may wonder why the problematic cases cannot be dealt with as cases of 
ambiguity. For instance, one could borrow Keith Donnellan’s (1966) terminology and claim 
that complex demonstratives have both referential and attributive uses.  
These worries are relevant and cannot be put aside; I shall address them, respectively, 
in sections 3.4.1 and 2.3 below. Let me sketch, for the moment, a brief response to each. I 
think there are important reasons, related to interpretability and raising, that can be adduced 
for rejecting Montague’s suggestion that singular terms be given the semantic type of 
quantifiers. But, even if this idea were right, it does not undermine the claims made here: it 
simply means that there are many ways to model singular terms, and it does not entail that 
there are no differences between both kinds of expressions. My point is rather that, when it 
comes to phenomena like ellipsis, anaphora, cancellability, inference or indirect discourse, 
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complex demonstratives pattern together with proper names, indexicals and other 
expressions traditionally considered as singular terms, instead of belonging to the same 
category as “all men”, “some people” or “most kids”. As for the second of these worries, the 
discussion in section 2.3, which essentially follows Nowak (2014), presents some 
crosslinguistic evidence showing that the problematic cases cannot be regarded as instances 
of ambiguity. To my knowledge, few defenders of a directly referential account have payed 
the due attention to this counterevidence.  
The second caveat has to do with an important distinction between three notions that 
are central to this dissertation: singularity, direct reference and rigid designation. The 
aforementioned tension in Kaplan’s writings has to do with these notions, and particularly 
with the collapse of direct reference and rigid designation in an intensional framework. 
Furthermore, I believe that many of the arguments offered against the traditional view are 
flawed because they do not pay the due attention to the distinction between these three 
notions. Namely, these arguments follow a certain pattern: some author comes up with an 
example of a complex demonstrative that does not designate rigidly, infers that it cannot be 
directly referential either, and then she concludes that it cannot be a singular term, henceforth 
justifying a quantificational treatment. But the second step of the inference is unjustified: as 
I explain in section 3.3.2, and as many authors (cf. Salmon 2006a, 2006b) have stressed, the 
fact that a term displays non-referential uses does not entail that it should not be treated pretty 
much as in the Kaplanian model of indexicals, i.e., as a context-dependent singular term that 
is not sensitive to modal quantification. And, just to make it clear, what I intend to vindicate 
here is not direct reference, but singularity and indexicality; after all, my account makes 
extensive use of Kaplanian monsters, which are usually thought to be incompatible with 
direct reference. As we shall see, singularity and direct reference come apart in many 
expressions, perhaps paradigmatically in variables and personal pronouns.  
Finally, the reader should bear in mind that, although my discussion concerns complex 
demonstratives in general, my focus will be on singular complex demonstratives, i.e., on “this 
F” and “that F” rather than “these F” and “those F”. Throughout this dissertation I will expand 
my framework in order to cover plural complex demonstratives, but the semantics provided 
for these expressions should be understood rather as an initial hint, a suggestion that certainly 
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should be amended in order to cover more problematic cases. Since my aim is to defend that 
complex demonstratives should be understood on the model of pronouns, the differences 
between “that F” and “those F” may be thought of as analogous to those between “I” and 
“we” – meaning that any complications that plural pronouns may raise should be treated 
analogously.  
Before we proceed, it is convenient to introduce some notation and to briefly state the 
framework from which I will be working, i.e., that of formal semantics in the generative 
tradition. This task is carried out in the next subsection. 
 
1.2 Some methodological remarks 
Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning. A well-established field within this discipline 
is compositional semantics, which studies how the meaning of complex expressions is 
derived from the meanings of its component parts, as opposed to lexical semantics, which 
focuses on the primitive items of the lexicon. In order to model meanings, compositional 
semantics makes extensive use of model-theoretical tools and other resources from 
mathematical logic; for this reason, it is also often referred to as “formal semantics”. In spite 
of being primarily concerned with complex expressions, formal semanticists have also made 
attempts to employ their tools for characterizing the meaning of some primitive expressions, 
particularly of those expressions that play a grammatical role, such as pronouns, logical 
connectives and verbal morphology. 
Semantics in this sense can be seen as a continuation of the tradition initiated by Frege 
for the study of formal languages, subsequently adapted by Montague for the study of natural 
language and currently incorporated as another field of generative grammar by the likes of 
Barbara Partee. The framework I will be using in this dissertation is basically an intensional 
version of the standard theory as presented in Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer’s textbook 
(1998), which models the meanings of expressions by associating each of them with an 
abstract object, usually a function defined by means of typed lambda calculus. This 
dissertation presupposes familiarity with this system, so I will not elaborate on it much 
further; let me just sketch a brief reminder of the notions employed. In this framework, the 
input to semantic interpretation are syntactic trees, and the meanings of complex expressions 
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are calculated by means of functional application, i.e., by saturating a function with an 
argument. Let us see an example: 
(2) 
S 
   Mary  sings 
 
The semantic value of a proper name like “Mary” is an individual, namely Mary 
herself; using ⟦ ⟧ as the function assigning to each expression its semantic value, we may 
simply say that ⟦Mary⟧ = Mary. On the other hand, the semantic value of “sings” can be 
modeled as a function ranging over objects and returning one truth-value or another – truth 
or falsity – depending on whether they sing: ⟦sing⟧ = λx. x sings. In turn, the semantic value 
of the whole sentence is a truth-value, and it is obtained by saturating the function denoted 
by “sings” with an appropriate argument, i.e., with Mary. Thus, (2) is true if Mary sings and 
false if she does not: ⟦Mary sings⟧ = 1 iff Mary sings, and 0 otherwise. Let us formulate an 
official definition of this principle (Heim & Kratzer 1998: 49): 
FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (FA) (to be revised): If α is a branching node 
and {β, γ} the set of its daughters, then α is in the domain of ⟦ ⟧ if both β and γ 
are and ⟦β⟧ is a function whose domain contains ⟦γ⟧. In that case, ⟦α⟧ = ⟦β⟧(⟦γ⟧). 
This system is extensional, i.e., semantic values of expressions are objects and sets of 
objects (or their characteristic functions); paradigmatically, sentences simply denote truth-
values. Intensional frameworks relativize these extensions to several parameters, notably 
possible worlds, among others; for instance, on the standard intensional semantics by Heim 
& von Fintel (2011), which builds on and expands Heim & Kratzer (1998), extensions are 
relative to a possible world and an instant of time. Since these two are the same arguments 
that intensions take in Kaplan’s framework, which will be extensively discussed throughout 
this dissertation, let me settle for these parameters and define intensions as functions from 
times and worlds to extensions. So let us from now on refer to any tuple i = <wi, ti> consisting 
of a time and a world as a “circumstance”, where wi and ti are, respectively, the world and 
the time of i. Thus, ⟦p⟧i represents the extension of expression p in circumstance i; abstracting 
over the circumstance yields the intension of the expression: λi. ⟦p⟧i. Let us also adopt an 
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additional principle for dealing with expressions that require combining with an intension, 
such as modal operators and propositional attitude verbs (Heim & von Fintel 2011: 11): 
INTENSIONAL FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (IFA): If α is a branching 
node and {β, γ} the set of its daughters, then, for any circumstance i: if ⟦β⟧i is a 
function whose domain contains λi. ⟦γ⟧i, then ⟦α⟧i = ⟦β⟧i (λi. ⟦γ⟧i) 
This principle ensures that, whenever one of the nodes requires combining with the 
intension of an expression, it will be fed the appropriate value; every other expression (logical 
operators, the usual predicates, etc.) may just employ a variant of FA as their combination 
principle: 
FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (FA): If α is a branching node and {β, γ} the 
set of its daughters, then α is in the domain of ⟦ ⟧i if both β and γ are and ⟦β⟧i is 
a function whose domain contains ⟦γ⟧i. In that case, ⟦α⟧i = ⟦β⟧i (⟦γ⟧i). 
Another option is to use only IFA and to adapt the lexical entries of every item so as to 
work with intensions all the way (we could devise, e.g., intensionalized versions of “all” and 
“or”). For simplicity’s sake, I opted for using this mixed system. The reader should bear in 
mind three provisos about this framework. 
The first proviso is that every now and then, and for purely expository reasons, I will 
be switching from this intensional setting to a system employing structured propositions, 
much like Kaplan (1977) himself does. The reason for doing this is that these systems are for 
the most part equivalent, and representing propositions as structured entities provides a 
simpler and clearer way to state certain claims. Secondly, I shall eventually introduce further 
parameters alongside instants of times and possible worlds; namely, the values to which 
extensions will be relativized are those of Kaplan (1977): a context, an assignment function, 
a world and a time. These will be introduced in section 2.1.1. In the third place, my use of 
this system is temporary: in section 3.3.1.2 I will drop it in favor of an extensional one, for 
reasons that shall become clear in that very section.  
Finally, it is worth saying a word about the inputs to semantic interpretation, i.e., 
syntactic trees. The common assumption in the generativist tradition is that surface structures 
of sentences like “Mary sings”, or trees representing these sentences annotated with syntactic 
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categories, are not yet an appropriate input. There is a further layer of syntactic analysis in 
which these sentences undergo several transformations related to structural disambiguation 
and determination of quantifier scope; the output of these transformations is a fully 
disambiguated logical form (LF) (May 1977, 1985; Chomsky 1986, 1995/2015; Hornstein 
1995). These syntactic constructs contain everything that is interpretable and nothing else, 
and they are the inputs to the semantic operations. They are usually represented as syntactic 
trees, although for typographical reasons I will often employ simpler constructs, occupying 
a single line in the body of the text, whenever the syntactic relations among the constituents 
of an LF are either obvious or irrelevant. 
So far this was the basics for setting the framework employed in this dissertation. 
Throughout the following sections I will introduce some additional terminology and state a 
few other methodological remarks whenever necessary. Let us now, then, move on and set 






2 The two approaches 
This section is devoted to introducing the central tenets of the two main views in dispute. I 
begin by presenting the directly referential account of indexicals introduced by Kaplan and 
the way it was subsequently adapted for dealing with complex demonstratives. Then I present 
the criticisms and positive proposals advanced by the advocates of quantificational accounts, 
focusing mainly on the theories by Lepore and Ludwig (2000) and King (2001). Finally, I 
devote a brief subsection to arguing that this counterevidence cannot be dealt with as a case 
of ambiguity, as many champions of the directly referential view do. 
Just for the ease of exposition, let me introduce a label for each of these approaches. 
From now on I shall use the obvious term, “quantificational theories”, for referring to 
proposals that treat complex demonstratives as a special kind of quantifiers; these are 
discussed in section 2.2. As for the Kaplan-inspired theories, however, the label is not so 
obvious. In principle, all the proposals I will be discussing in section 2.1 can be appropriately 
called “direct reference theories”, but this label should be used cautiously, for my own 
approach is a variant of these views and yet, as I stated above, I do not intend to vindicate 
direct reference nor rigid designation, but only singularity and indexicality. The discussion 
in section 3.3.2.2 should make clear that a system like mine, which makes extensive use of 
Kaplanian monsters, is not as incompatible with the notion of direct reference as it might 
prima facie appear to be; let me therefore settle for this label, notwithstanding the fact that 
its appropriateness is a matter of debate.  
 
2.1 The classical account: direct reference theories 
In this subsection I explain the central ideas of directly referential approaches to the 
semantics of complex demonstratives. These theories regard these expressions as just another 
kind of pronoun whose only role is to select an individual from the context, and most of them 
are in some way or another based on Kaplan’s (1977, 1978, 1989) influential – though 
diverging – proposals. They also have a strong intuitive appeal. Being directly referential 
amounts to contributing an object to the proposition expressed, which means that the 
semantic value of such expressions cannot be altered once it has been fixed. This inability to 
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be affected by, say, modal and temporal operators is a trademark of direct reference, and it 
can be used for testing whether an expression should be treated as such. Consider the 
following contrasts: 
(3) The first man in space could have been American 
(3a) Yuri Gagarin could have been American 
(4) The president of China will visit Japan 
(4a) Xí Jìnpíng will visit Japan 
Sentences (3) and (4) display an ambiguity that their counterparts  (3a) and (4a) lack. 
(3) may be read either as a claim about Gagarin’s nationality or as a stating the possibility 
that the United States got advantage over the Soviet Union in the Space Race. Similarly, (4) 
can be understood either as a claim about Xí – namely, that there is a moment in the future 
in which he will visit Japan, perhaps when he is not the president of China anymore – or as 
a purely general claim to the effect that in the future there will be a president of China that 
will visit Japan. These readings are respectively called de re and de dicto, and only the former 
is available for sentences containing directly referential terms such as the proper names in 
(3a) and (4a). This is so because temporal and modal operators like “will” or “could” operate 
on propositions, and the contribution of a directly referential term to the proposition 
expressed is just an object. Quantifiers, in general, exhibit differences in scope that directly 
referential terms are not subject to; e.g., sentences (5)-(7) all display ambiguities of this sort:1 
(5) Every book in store could have been sold 
(6) Most kids in this school will someday meet Obama 
(7) John believes that a European city has a population of over 20 million people 
                                                          
1 Just for the sake of clarification, let me state each of the readings available for these sentences. Much like (4) 
above, (5) can mean either that every book x currently in store is such that there is a possibility that x has been 
sold (perhaps in another store) or that there is a possible world w such that all the books the store contained in 
w, which need not coincide with the actual ones, were sold. (6), on the other hand, may mean either that the 
majority of kids currently in this school will someday meet Obama – say, because they will become politicians 
– or that Obama is planning to visit the school and most of the kids then in school will meet him (the latter 
reading says nothing about the kids currently in school). Both readings of (7) attribute to John a false belief, but 
one of these beliefs is de re (John could believe of London, Rome or Lisbon that they are more populated than 
they actually are) and the other one is de dicto (John could believe that the European population is less disperse 
than it actually is).  
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Indexicals are special in this respect: even though they have some sort of descriptive 
meaning, they also display a behavior akin to that of proper names when it comes to matters 
of scope. For example, a sentence like (8) exhibits the usual ambiguities, yielding both a 
contradictory and a contingent reading. For a sentence like (8a), however, only the latter 
reading is available, in spite of the descriptive meaning of “I” being roughly like that of “the 
speaker”: 
(8) The speaker could be not speaking 
(8a) I could be not speaking 
To put it otherwise, and in Kaplan’s words, “indexicals always take primary scope” 
(Kaplan 1977: 510); as we shall see later, his framework is meant to capture these facts about 
indexicality.  
At least prima facie, complex demonstratives neatly fit the pattern of indexicals, i.e., 
they have a descriptive content that helps fix the referent, but this content cannot be affected 
by external operators. Sentences like (9)-(10) do not display the aforementioned ambiguities: 
(9) That bald man could have had hair 
(10) Tomorrow that married woman will be single 
These sentences have no contradictory reading: “bald man” and “married woman” take 
wide scope over the intensional operators “could” and “tomorrow”, and remain therefore 
opaque to modal or temporal quantification. To be sure, (9) is not expressing the possibility 
that a certain man display at once the mutually exclusive properties of being bald and having 
hair; rather, it says of an actually bald man that he could have had hair. Similarly, (10) does 
not state that tomorrow a woman will be both married and single, but rather that a woman 
who today is married is becoming single by tomorrow. Something similar occurs when 
complex demonstratives are placed under the scope of attitude verbs; e.g., there is no reading 
of (11) in which Mary is attributed a contradictory belief: 
(11) Mary believes that that bald man has hair 
Analogous remarks can be made with respect to issues like inference, analyticity and 
cancellability. Finally, I would like to discuss two additional kinds of evidence that have been 
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somehow passed over in the semantic literature. These are anaphora and ellipsis 
(Higginbotham 1988): 
(12a) Laura hates the man sitting by her side, but Julia loves him 
(12b) Laura hates that man sitting by her side, but Julia loves him 
(13a) Laura hates the man sitting by her side, and Julia does too 
(13b) Laura hates that man sitting by her side, and Julia does too 
There is a stark contrast between (12a)-(13a) on the one hand, and (12b)-(13b) on the 
other. There are two different ways to resolve the anaphora in (12a): Julia may love the man 
sitting by Laura’s side or the man sitting by her own. These two readings are called 
respectively “strict” and “sloppy”, and only the former is available for (12b): it can only mean 
that Julia loves the man sitting by Laura’s side. Analogously, the ellipsis in (13a) can be 
resolved by attributing to Julia the property of hating the man sitting by Laura’s side or the 
one sitting by her own, but only the former, strict reading is available for (13b). These facts 
call for an explanation and a prima facie plausible hypothesis is that complex demonstratives, 
in spite of being syntactically complex determiner phrases, are nevertheless not quantifiers 
but a special type of pronouns. This hypothesis suggests itself insofar as ellipses and 
anaphoras are subject to both sloppy and strict resolutions when their antecedent is a 
quantified phrase, as in (14)-(15), but only strict readings are available when such antecedent 
is a pronoun, as in (16)-(17): 
(14) Laura despises every man she knows, and Julia does too 
(15) Laura despises most men that she knows, but Julia loves them 
(16) Laura hates him, and Julia does too. 
(17) Laura hates him, but Julia loves him 
Directly referential theories constitute an attempt to explain this kind of evidence. 
These proposals treat complex demonstratives on the model of pronouns, usually in 
connection with theories of indexicality and context-dependence in general. Views of this 
kind are often assumed as standard with little to no discussion (see e.g. Schiffer 1981, 
Recanati 1993, Prosser 2012 and Perry 2017), and they are a natural extension of Kaplan’s 




2.1.1 Kaplan and the “dthat” operator 
Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives (LD) (1977) was intended as a model of the functioning 
of natural language indexicals, and particularly of their intensional properties. He famously 
distinguished two different sorts of meaning, namely character and content; the latter is, 
simply, the customary truth-conditional contribution of an expression to the proposition 
expressed, whereas the former is a function from contexts to contents, i.e., a rule for 
determining the content that each expression receives depending of the context in which it is 
being interpreted.  The most distinctive feature of indexicals is that their character is given 
by a non-constant function: they are the only expressions whose content (intension) varies 
from context to context.  
Let us state these notions formally. Contents may be thought of either as intensions or 
as structured entities, and indeed I shall set aside the differences between these two notions 
use them interchangeably, simply as synonymous with “content”. Intensions, in Kaplan’s 
system, are functions from circumstances to extensions, where each circumstance is as above. 
Character, in turn, ranges over contexts and returns contents, where each context c is a tuple 
<ac, lc, wc, tc> consisting of an agent, a location, a possible world and a time. These parameters 
determine, respectively, the content of the indexicals “I”, “here”, “actually” and “now”. Thus, 
extensions are threefold relativized: they depend on a context c, a possible world w and a 
time t. In addition, and as usual in model-theoretic settings, they are also relative to a structure 
M and an assignment function g; the former can be deemed irrelevant, since natural-language 
semantics always works with a fixed structure, but the latter is important for modeling the 
behavior of variables. Assignments, just like contexts, are parameters that generate content 
(namely, the content of variables), so let me follow the later Kaplan (1989: 591) and treat 
them as just another parameter of context.2 Thus, let each context c contain, in addition to 
the above-mentioned parameters, an assignment function gc.  
                                                          
2 The idea is not uncontroversial. Michael Glanzberg and Jeffrey King (2020: 22-24) have extensively argued 
against the idea that contexts should determine assignment functions – at least if we understand these functions 
as the object that is shifted by quantifiers. 
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An obvious terminological decision is to employ ⟦p⟧c, i for representing the extension 
of the expression p at context c and circumstance i. Abstracting over the relevant parameters 
yields the other two layers of meaning: λi. ⟦p⟧c, i is the content that p receives at c, and λc. λi. 
⟦p⟧c, i is simply its character. Just to shorten the notation, let me use “⟦p⟧” for the character 
of p and “⟦p⟧c” for the content of p at c. Let us adapt FA and IFA above consequently: 
FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (FA): If α is a branching node and {β, γ} 
the set of its daughters, then, for any context c and any circumstance i: α is in 
the domain of ⟦ ⟧c, i if both β and γ are and ⟦β⟧c, i is a function whose domain 
contains ⟦γ⟧c, i. In that case, ⟦α⟧c, i = ⟦β⟧c, i (⟦γ⟧c, i). 
INTENSIONAL FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (IFA): If α is a branching 
node and {β, γ} the set of its daughters, then, for any context c and any 
circumstance i: if ⟦β⟧c, i is a function whose domain contains λi. ⟦γ⟧c, i, then 
⟦α⟧c, i = ⟦β⟧c, i (λi. ⟦γ⟧c, i) 
Indexicals, on this model, are directly referential expressions, i.e., their contribution to 
the proposition expressed (to content) is just an object. Here are some sample lexical entries: 
⟦I⟧ = λc. λi. ac 
⟦here⟧ = λc. λi. lc 
Modal and temporal operators are intensional, i.e., they are functions of content, which 
entails that they cannot affect the content of indexicals once it has been fixed. This yields the 
right results when it comes to modeling the behavior of indexicals in intensional contexts; 
e.g., it straightforwardly accounts for the contrast between (8a) and (8b). On one of its 
readings, (8a) says that there is a possible world w such that the speaker of w is not speaking 
in w, which is contradictory; the reason why (8b) does not have such reading is that we do 
not need to look for speakers across possible worlds: all we need to do in order to assess its 
truth in a context c is to see whether there is some world w such that a certain object, ac, is 
not speaking in w. In structured terms, we could say that (8a) and (8b) express, respectively, 
contents like those in (8c) and (8d):  
(8c) <Possibly, <the speaker, not speaking>> 
(8d) <Possibly, <ac, not speaking>> 
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This means that, as far as content is concerned, indexicals are not different from proper 
names. Similarly, “here” just picks out an object and remains opaque to modal quantification: 
(18) Anywhere you go, I will remain here 
Things are similar, although not entirely analogous, with “actually” and “now”. 
Intuitively speaking, they also work as directly referential terms: they pick out a certain 
object, and once this value is fixed they are insensitive to the circumstance in which they are 
being assessed. Consider, e.g., the following examples (Prior 1968; Crossley & Humberstone 
1977): 
(19) It is possible for everything that is actually red to be shiny 
(20) Someday everyone now alive will be dead 
What (19) is stating is not that there is a possible world w such that, for every x, if x is 
red in w, then x is shiny in w; the redness of the objects in w is irrelevant, for the only thing 
that matters is whether they are red in the actual world. Neither is it stating that for every 
actually red object x there is a possible world w such that x is shiny in w: rather, we want all 
the actually red things to be shiny together in a single world. Similar remarks hold for (20). 
This is to say that “actually” and “now” should always be able to, so to put it, “refer back” 
to the initial world and time, regardless of the parameters at which we are assessing the 
sentence (see section 3.3.1.2 for a more detailed discussion), and this is so achieved by 
treating them as intensional operators. For example, “actually” shifts the world of evaluation 
to a designated world, namely that of the context, and so does “now” for times – thus, they 
are on a par with “possibly”, “necessarily” and “someday”: 
⟦actually⟧ = λc. λi. λp. p(<wc, ti>) = 1 
⟦now⟧ = λc. λi. λp. p(<wi, tc>) = 1 
(Here, p is a variable for propositions.) These lexical entries account neatly for the 
above sentences: 
⟦It is possible for everything that is actually red to be shiny⟧c, i = 1 iff there is a world 
w accessible from wi such that, for all x such that x is red in wc, x is shiny in w. 
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⟦Someday everyone now alive will be dead⟧c, i = 1 iff there is a day t occurring after 
ti such that, for all x such that x is alive in tc, x is dead in t. 
Thus, Kaplan’s semantics yields the right result regarding one of its main tenets: the 
inability of indexicals to be affected by intensional operators. Once their content has been 
established, it is fixed once and for all.  
However, the thesis of the impossibility of indexical shift is not yet established, for it 
requires a further assumption. Recall that the content of an indexical depends on context; this 
means that any operators shifting this parameter may still result in an indexical failing to pick 
out any individual. Let us devise such an operator. Let C be the class of contexts, let I be the 
class of circumstances, let P: I→{1, 0} be the class of propositions, and let H: C→P be the 
class of sentential characters. In that case, we may define the following operator: 
⟦In some contexts⟧ = λc ∈ C. λi ∈ I. λh ∈ H. Ǝk ∈ C (h(k)(i)=1) 
On this unconventional reading, “in some contexts” is, of course, a context-shifter: “In 
some contexts p” yields truth in a context c and a circumstance i iff there is some context k 
such that “p” is true in k and i. Just to make it clear, let us see what happens when we embed 
a sentence like (21a) under the scope of the monster we just devised, as in (21b): 
(21a) I am tired 
(21b) In some contexts I am tired 
When assessed in a context c, (21a) expresses a content having to do with ac, namely 
the proposition that ac is tired. However, ac has no role to play in determining what is said by 
the unconventional reading of (21b); in other words, the indexical in this sentence fails to 
pick out an individual. This can be seen more clearly if we represent the contents of these 
two sentences in structured terms, as in (21c) and (21d), respectively (cf. Rabern & Ball 
2019: 402-403): 
(21c) <ac, being tired> 
(21d) <<the agent, being tired>, being true in some contexts> 
This means that the contribution of “I” to what is said by (21b), as opposed to (21a), is 
not an object, and this is in tension with the idea that indexicals are directly referential. In 
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order to prevent this from happening, Kaplan took advantage of the fact that (21a) does not 
have this unconventional reading and established a thesis that is sometimes read as a 
prohibition: namely, that English (and presumably any other language) does not contain any 
expression able to shift the context parameter. Since context is the argument of character, 
shifting this parameter amounts to operating on character; this means that operators of this 
kind, if they existed, would be hyperintensional. These were dubbed “monsters” by Kaplan, 
since they were speculated not to exist in natural language, despite their conceivability.  
In practice, this prohibition amounts to saying that every operation in natural language 
can be defined as a function of content. Notice, e.g., that (21b) is not yet interpretable with 
the rules FA and IFA above. We still require a further principle: 
HYPERINTENSIONAL FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (HFA): If α is a 
branching node and {β, γ} the set of its daughters, then, for any context c and 
circumstance i: if ⟦β⟧c, i is a function whose domain contains λc. λi. ⟦γ⟧c, i, 
then ⟦α⟧c, i = ⟦β⟧c, i (λc. λi. ⟦γ⟧c, i) 
So Kaplan’s thesis is that HFA is not necessary. Monsters operate on character, which 
is a semantic value that generates content, i.e., there is no way back from the latter to the 
former. If monsters are allowed, there will be meaning operations that may fail to be definable 
in terms of content, in which case we need to apply HFA. Kaplan’s ban on monsters has 
consequences regarding central notions of semantics such as compositionality,3 and, even 
though it has been hotly contested on empirical grounds (e.g. by Schlenker 2003 and Anand 
& Nevins 2004), it is not an entirely empirical matter: it will always depend on which system 
you employ, i.e., on whether you choose to place a shiftable parameter within the context or 
within the circumstance. This discussion will be reprised in section 3.3.2.1. 
                                                          
3 See Westerståhl (2012), Rabern (2013) and McCullagh (2018). Compositionality is normally understood as 
the idea that the meaning of a complex expression must be a function of the meaning of its subexpressions 
(Carnap 1947; Pagin & Westerståhl 2010a); when there are several layers of meaning involved, 
compositionality may be asked for each of them – e.g., one may wonder whether on Frege’s system the sense 
of a sentence is a function of the sense of its component subexpressions. The above-mentioned authors show 
precisely that: prohibiting monsters entails that every operation can be defined as a function of content, i.e., that 
Kaplan’s semantics is compositional at this level of meaning. Monsters are incompatible with compositionality 
of content, but they are nevertheless character-compositional (see Westerståhl (2012) and Briciu (2018) for 
proofs). See Gimeno-Simó (manuscript) for discussion on this incompatibility. 
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Thus, Kaplan’s prohibition somehow downplays the relevance of character. Content is 
equivalent to what is said – the object of assertion and thought – and it is also the level of 
meaning at which compositional operations apply. Once this is acknowledged, character 
becomes rather ancillary, as defining semantic operations in terms of it turns out to be idle, 
redundant. Insofar as it does not play any role in the compositional semantics proper, 
characters could be even regarded as something alien to meaning, as if they were nothing but 
mere rules of use.4 There is, however, an important notion that is defined in terms of 
character: logical consequence. In LD, validity is understood as truth in virtue of character, 
meaning that a sentence is valid iff it is true in all contexts. In turn, Kaplan defines truth in a 
context as follows:5 a sentence p is true in a context c iff it is true at c and ic, where ic is the 
circumstance <wc, ic> – i.e., the circumstance privileged by c. Logical consequence is defined 
analogously: p is a consequence of q iff the former is true in all contexts in which the latter 
is. Validity and logical consequence are interesting for natural-language semantics insofar as 
they are often seen as formal counterparts to the semi-technical notions of analyticity and 
inference. For example, in LD “It is raining” and “It is raining now” are consequence one of 
each other, and sentences like “I exist” or “I am here now” are valid6 even though they are 
not necessary truths (i.e., “I necessarily exist” is not valid).  
So far this was the basics of Kaplan’s framework. Let us see now how it can be adapted 
for dealing with complex demonstratives. Although LD does not say anything about these 
expressions, it does contain an artificial operator that bears many similarities with them: 
“dthat”. It is unclear whether it was originally intended as a formal counterpart of complex 
demonstratives or rather as a purely artificial device designed for philosophical purposes, but 
at any rate Kaplan intended it to be directly referential. His idea was to provide an expression 
that combines with a singular term and turns it into a device of direct reference, meaning that 
its sole contribution is an object. For example, definite descriptions are often thought of as 
                                                          
4 See García-Carpintero (2000: 111-112) for some discussion. 
5 One of the basic tenets of modern relativist frameworks is precisely the rejection of this notion of validity in 
favor of another one in which the truth of a sentence cannot be determined just by assessing it in a context. See 
McFarlane (2003), Predelli & Stojanovic (2008), Predelli (2011) and Gimeno-Simó (2019). 
6 The validity of the “I am here now” and “I exist” depends on a further restriction that Kaplan imposes on 
contexts: in every structure M for LD, every context c in M must be proper, i.e., ac exists and she is located at 
lc in wc and tc. This property of contexts has been criticized as an extra-logical requirement that therefore should 
have no relevance concerning questions of meaning (Predelli 1998a, 1998b, 2004, 2005a). 
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singular terms,7 but they are not directly referential, i.e., they contribute a descriptive content 
instead of an object: 
(22) The president of Spain is tall 
(22a) <<The, president of Spain>, being tall> 
“Dthat” was devised in order to turn these singular terms into directly referential 
expressions. The idea is that, when attached to a definite description, the combined 
expression will contribute just an object to the proposition expressed, namely the object 
satisfying the description:  
(22b) Dthat (the president of Spain) is tall 
(22c) <Pedro Sánchez, being tall> 
Needless to say, (22a) and (22c) are not true in the same circumstances. The latter 
expresses a singular proposition about Sánchez, and its truth does not depend on the result of 
any presidential election. The former, on the contrary, does depend on contingent features 
about Spanish politics, but need not take Sánchez into consideration – e.g., it was false in 
1996, when José María Aznar was appointed. The idea is, then, that the descriptive content 
attached to “dthat” should work pretty much like a demonstration, i.e., something that helps 
fix the referent but plays no truth-conditional role8 (Kaplan 1977: 521). It provides, then, a 
very intuitive way to deal with complex demonstratives: (22b) may just be a formal rendering 
of “That president of Spain is tall”.  
It remains to be shown how this idea can be implemented, i.e., the mechanism by means 
of which (22b) can come to express (22c). Kaplan’s first suggestion (1977) was to treat 
“dthat” as a rigidifier, i.e., an expression that turns a definite description into a rigid 
designator. This is achieved by means of the following syncategorematic lexical entry: 
                                                          
7 For reasons I mention elsewhere (Gimeno-Simó 2020a), I prefer to treat these expressions as quantifiers, 
following Russell (1905) and Neale (1990a). I will be using the quantificational model in the positive part of 
this dissertation, but none of the claims made here depend essentially on this treatment.   
8 There is a close analogy between this idea and the notion of “reference fixed by description” (Evans 1979). 
See Corazza (2002a) and Predelli (2015) for a discussion on the connection between “dthat” and these ideas.  
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⟦dthat (the F)⟧ = λc. λi. ⟦The F⟧c, ic, where ic is as above, i.e., the circumstance 
consisting of the world and time of c: <wc, tc>. 
This yields the right results when it comes to matters of rigidity. Namely, an utterance 
of (22b) made now in the actual world is true exactly in the same circumstances as “Pedro 
Sánchez is tall” – roughly, it means the same as “the current actual president of Spain is tall”. 
This makes the circumstance i irrelevant for assessing its truth, i.e., the term becomes a rigid 
designator that happens to pick out Sánchez at every circumstance. The results are therefore 
anti-Fregean, as intended.  
Let us see an example of the anti-Fregeanism of this proposal. Let me follow Kaplan’s 
informal suggestions and regard bare demonstratives as just a special case of “dthat”. More 
concretely, let us treat demonstrations in a manner akin to the description appended to the 
term, so that a bare occurrence of “that” is, simply, synonymous with “dthat (the thing I am 
demonstrating)”. Thus, an everyday utterance of “that is red” may be rendered as (23): 
(23) dthat (the thing I am demonstrating) is red 
Of course, the descriptive meaning appended to “dthat” does not make the term 
circumstance-dependent. Rendering “that” in this manner has the result that it is a rigid 
designator, insensitive to the circumstance of evaluation. Namely, (24), or its formal 
rendering (24a), comes out as false: 
(24) Necessarily, I am demonstrating that 
(24a) □ I demonstrate dthat (the thing I am demonstrating) 
This is so because, even though the truth of this sentence in a context c requires that ac 
be demonstrating the referent of “dthat” in wc, she is not required to do so in every possible 
world. Namely, (24) is true iff, for every w, ac is demonstrating in w whatever she 
demonstrates in wc. This is obviously false. The operator “dthat” keeps the demonstration 
anchored to the world of the context instead of the circumstance of evaluation.  
This account, however, is still not entirely satisfactory: Fregeanism is still not entirely 
ruled out. The intensional setting in which these ideas are formulated, together with the fact 
that “dthat” is a rigid designator, obscures an important difference that Kaplan himself had 
highlighted just a few sections before: namely, the distinction between direct reference and 
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rigid designation. And “dthat” is still not a directly referential term. Structured propositions 
may help us see the difference; consider (25a-b): 
(25a) 3 is a natural number 
(25b) The n such that n > 0 and n2 = 9 is a natural number 
These two express exactly the same intension: the set of circumstances i such that 3 is 
a natural number in i. But they express different structured propositions: 
(25c) <3, being a natural number> 
(25d) <<The, λn. n > 0 & n2 = 9>, being a natural number> 
Belief, knowledge, desire and the like are a matter of propositions, which means that 
structured contents provide a more fine-grained way to represent the objects of these 
attitudes: someone without much mathematical background may believe (25c) and not (25d), 
just like most people believe that snow is white without thereby believing that snow is white 
and there is no one-to-one correspondence between natural and real numbers.9 The greater 
fineness of grain provided by structured propositions can be used for showing that, contrary 
to Kaplan’s intended result, Sánchez is still not a component of the proposition expressed by 
(22b), i.e., that it still does not express (22c) (repeated below). Rather, its content is 
something like (22d): 
(22c) <Pedro Sánchez, being tall> 
(22d) <<the, actual current president of Spain>, being tall> 
This is to say that “dthat (the president of Spain)” is a rigid designator only by accident. 
It does not grab Sánchez and takes him across possible worlds in order to see how things are 
with him there; rather, it goes to a possible world w and sees whether whoever has a certain 
property (“being the president of Spain in the world of the context”) also satisfies “being tall” 
in w. In Kaplan’s terminology, we may say that “the n such that n > 0 and n2 = 9” and “dthat 
                                                          
9 This, in turn, raises well-known problems of excessive fineness of grain. Arguably, “Laura loves Julia” should 
express the same proposition as “Julia is loved by Laura”, but this need not be so in a structured setting. See 
Collins (2013, §3), King (2013, 2019) and Pickel (2018). 
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(the actual president of Spain)” are obstinately rigid, yet not directly referential terms. Kaplan 
himself expressed his own concerns in the following passage: 
“The representation of content as a function from possible worlds does not allow 
us to distinguish between a directly referential expression and one that is merely 
obstinately rigid. Both cases are represented by the same function, a constant 
function. [...] Could anyone have confused them? [...] Could I have? Yes. [...] If 
“dthat” is an operator, and if the description, which constitutes the operand and 
thus syntactically completes the singular term, induces a complex element into 
content, then the correct way to describe “dthat” is as a rigidifier. Complete dthat-
terms would be rigid, in fact obstinately rigid. In this case the proposition would 
not carry the individual itself into a possible world but rather would carry 
instructions to run back home and get the individual who there satisfies certain 
specifications” (Kaplan 1989: 579-580) 
Kaplan offered no formal amendment of this treatment, but he did make some 
suggestions for a directly referential treatment of “dthat” in his casual remarks. These are 
occasionally cryptic and not always consistent, and may lead to several diverging 
interpretations. Many of these options have been explored by Stefano Predelli (2019), 
building on Kaplan’s hints; specifically, Predelli identified at least four possible treatments 
for “dthat” that Kaplan might have had in mind. Let us see what these are.  
Kaplan’s first “dthat” is simply the above-mentioned operator, which as we have 
already mentioned is not directly referential. On another possible treatment, which Predelli 
dubs “Kaplan’s second “dthat””, every context provides an object serving as the semantic 
value for an occurrence of “dthat F”, under the condition that this object is the only one 
satisfying the descriptive content designated by “F”. Further constraints might be added here, 
but in principle a lexical entry like this one should suffice (Predelli 2019: section 2): 
⟦dthat (the F)⟧ = the function f such that, for any c, f(c) = ⟦the F⟧c, ic 
Apparently, a problem with this lexical entry is that it still does not reflect syntactic 
structure, i.e., it contradicts a tenet that Bryan Pickel (2018) has regarded as central for 
modern defenders of structured propositions, and which he dubs the “Mirroring Thesis”: the 
idea that the structure of the proposition expressed should be a perfect reflection of the 
syntactic structure of the sentence employed. This is a very strong thesis, and its motivations 
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are rather unclear, but many authors are willing to keep it,10 and Kaplan himself seems to 
endorse it in some passages. The above lexical entry, in which “dthat” is semantically simple 
although syntactically complex, contradicts this thesis; arguably, that is the reason why 
Kaplan insists that, on the intended interpretation, ““dthat” is a syntactically complete 
singular term that requires no completion by an operand” (Kaplan 1989: 580-581).  
This leads us to what Predelli dubs “Kaplan’s third “dthat””. Here the term is 
syntactically simple and its role is to select an object, but this selection is mediated by another 
element of context, namely a linguistic one: a definite description. We may think of each 
context c as containing a definite description dc, and then we may provide the following 
lexical entry (Predelli 2019: section 3): 
⟦dthat⟧ = the function f such that, for any c, f(c) = ⟦dc⟧c, ic 
Thus, Kaplan’s insistence that the character of “dthat” is incomplete and must be filled 
with a description may be understood as the more familiar idea of saturation: the description 
is simply the argument for the character of “dthat”. Notice, however, that there is a certain 
tension here: syntactically, the description is not a part of “dthat”, and indeed it does not play 
any semantic role, but it still appears within syntax. At least prima facie, it is not clear at all 
whether this is a right way to vindicate the idea that the structure of a proposition should 
mirror the syntactic structure of the sentence used to express it. This treatment certainly 
makes “dthat”, qua expression, compatible with this idea, since its contribution is just as 
simple as its syntax, but the sentences containing “dthat” will always turn out to be 
syntactically more complex than the propositions they express, since they contain a 
semantically inert definite description. Let us illustrate this concern by means of an example. 
Basically, a sentence like (26a) would express a singular proposition like the one in (26b), 
where a is some object: 
(26a) dthat (the F) is G 
(26b) <a, being G>, 
                                                          




Here, “dthat” meets the appropriate criteria: it is syntactically simple and, additionally, 
its propositional contribution is as simple as it should be, basically an object a. However, it 
is also clear that (26a) is syntactically more complex than it should, for the definite 
description “the F” contributes nothing to (26b). A possible solution is to remove these 
descriptions from syntax altogether, while another one is to distinguish several syntactic 
levels. The latter treatment paves the way towards what Predelli calls “Kaplan’s fourth 
“dthat””.  
The idea is that the definite description should be made to work pretty much like an 
apposition, i.e., something that may appear within syntax but is absent from semantics. It is 
thus analogous to a pointing with a finger, “like a whispered aside or a gesture” (Kaplan 
1989b: 581). The definite description attached to “dthat” should function, so to say, as an 
indication of the context in which “dthat” is to be interpreted, namely a context containing a 
certain object or definite description instead of a different one. We may think of it as 
something analogous to Φ-features, in the sense that “she” may be thought of as a 
syntactically simple term whose feminine features play no semantic role, but do restrict the 
set of contexts in which the sentence is appropriately employed. In Kaplan’s own words,  
“it is irrelevant how x gets its value, how the assignment is made […] the mechanism 
by which a value is assigned to a demonstrative, how a particular demonstration 
demonstrates its object, is extralinguistic and thus off-the-record” (Kaplan 1989b: 
571-2).   
This is the idea behind Kaplan’s fourth “dthat”. The above-mentioned tension can be 
resolved if we distinguish two different languages: the usual language L of logical syntax 
and a new language SF of semantic form identical to L except that it contains no occurrences 
of “dthat (the P)”, where P is any property. Instead, SF contains a simple term “dthat”. Thus, 
the two languages only differ in that L’s version of “dthat” is syntactically incomplete and 
combines with definite descriptions, whereas on SF it is syntactically simple. Now we may 
let contexts consist of the usual parameters – agent, location, world and time – plus an 
additional one, sc, which should serve as argument for SF’s “dthat”: for all c, the content of 
“dthat” at c is just sc. The assignment of contents for expressions in L is dependent on the 
semantics for SF: for each expression e of L, the content of e in context c is the content that 
e* receives at c*, where e* is the expression of SF that results from substituting any 
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expression of the form “dthat (the P)” in e for “dthat”, and c* is the context <ac, lc, wc, tc, 
sc*>, where sc* is the only x satisfying ⟦the P⟧c, ic.  
This semantics involves operating on contexts, a kind of operation that Kaplan was not 
particularly fond of, but at least it vindicates a version of the main tenet of modern structured 
propositionalism: the semantic structure of the propositions expressed mirrors the syntactic 
structure of the sentences of SF employed to express them. I do not endorse the Mirroring 
Thesis and, indeed, I believe it may lead to severe problems, such as those noted in footnote 
9; for these reasons, the semantics of complex demonstratives that I will end up adopting 
(section 3.2) will be formulated in a manner similar to Kaplan’s second dthat.  
Kaplan’s views on “dthat” are ambivalent, not always crystal-clear, and at some points 
inconsistent. They have nevertheless inspired a whole range of views that may safely be 
regarded as spiritual successors of Kaplan’s directly referential take on demonstratives in 
general. The next subsection is devoted to the most prominent of these approaches: character-
theories.  
 
2.1.2 Character theories 
Character theories or c-theories (the label is due to Predelli 2001) provide the most natural 
way to deal with complex demonstratives in Kaplanian terms. Their distinctive feature is to 
regard the descriptive phrase attached to a complex demonstrative as a contribution to the 
character, rather than the content, of the expression. The three main proponents of these 
theories are David Braun (1994, 2008a), Emma Borg (2000) and Nathan Salmon (2002). 
Their accounts are not equivalent and yield slightly different predictions, but the lexical 
entries they provide are pretty similar. Essentially, they deal with complex demonstratives 
by adding a demonstratum parameter dc for each context c and providing the following lexical 
entry (Braun 1994: 209, Borg 2000: 242, Salmon 2002: 523-524): 
(27) For every context c, “that F” refers in c to an object α iff 
i) α is the demonstratum of c and 
ii) α satisfies F in wc and tc 
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This entry is formulated in a deliberately vague manner, for as we shall see these 
authors differ subtly regarding some specific details, particularly when it comes to condition 
(27i). For example, Braun’s inclusion of a demonstratum among the parameters of context is 
likely a matter of simplicity, for he explicitly rejects this idea in other work (Braun 1996; his 
reasons are discussed in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). Salmon’s (2002) demonstrata, in turn, are 
obtained in an indirect way, for what his contexts contain is a demonstration that, together 
with the world of the context, selects an appropriate referent – his reasons not to include the 
demonstratum as part of the context are similar to Braun’s. Borg also talks of demonstrations 
instead of demonstrata, although her formalism does not make it clear whether they should 
be part of the context. Demonstrata and demonstrations are, at any rate, arguments for 
character in all of these theories, and I am conceiving contexts in the same manner the later 
Kaplan did, i.e., as a package containing every parameter that may be relevant for character, 
so let me work with this lexical entry and with its simplified version of condition (27i). This 
is, in fact, the condition that has been subject to most of the criticisms that these theories have 
received (Predelli 2012a, Nowak 2019b; see section 3.1 below), but let us first see the virtues 
of accounting for complex demonstratives on these terms.  
Since they treat complex demonstratives as directly referential terms, these theories 
straightforwardly account for the facts about opacity exemplified by sentences like (9)-(11) 
(repeated below). Namely, the descriptive meaning “F” of a phrase of the form “that F” 
contributes to the character of the term, with the result that operators on content are blind to 
it:  
(9) That bald man could have had hair 
(10) Tomorrow that married woman will be single 
(11) Mary believes that that bald man has hair 
As stated above, (9) and (10) do not display any reading in which they are 
contradictory, and (11) cannot be used for attributing to Mary any inconsistent belief. This is 
equivalent to saying that the descriptive part of the “that”-terms is opaque to the modal and 
temporal quantification performed by words like “could”, “tomorrow” and “believe”. These 
expressions take content as their argument, and they are therefore blind to the character of 
the expressions under their scope, with the result that “bald” and “married” cannot serve as 
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their arguments. To put it in slightly different words, the contribution of “bald man” to “that 
bald man” is just analogous to the contribution of “agent” to “I”. Thus, the propositions 
expressed by (9)-(10) are as singular as they can be: that α could have had hair and that 
tomorrow β will be single, for some contextually salient individuals α and β. Any differences 
in scope are therefore irrelevant, and there is no way that these contents can come out as 
contradictory. Similarly, (11) attributes to Mary belief in a singular proposition, rather than 
a general content: she believes of a certain individual, γ, that he has hair. 
On the other hand, character does have a role when it comes to matters of analyticity 
and inference, and character theories get things right in this case too: 
(28) That spy is a spy 
(29)  a. All dentists are paid more than all doctors 
b. Therefore, that dentist is payed more than all doctors  
Sentences like (28) are analytic, and arguments like that in (29) strike us as immediately 
valid.11 These facts are easily accommodated by character theories. Take (28): at any context 
c in which it is interpretable, dc has the property of being a spy in wc and tc; it is therefore 
straightforward that dc is a spy at any pair c, ic in which (28) is interpretable – i.e., true in 
virtue of character. Things are similar regarding (29). Let k be a context making the premise 
true. If this is so, then it is the case that in the circumstance ik every dentist is paid more than 
any doctor. In order for the whole argument to be interpretable at k, dk has to be a dentist in 
ik. Therefore ik is a circumstance in which dk is payed more than any doctor. This suffices for 
making the conclusion true at any context in which the argument is interpretable.  
These theories also yield good results regarding sentences that are equivalent in terms 
of content. Consider, for instance, a context c such that dc = Mata Hari. In such context, (28a)  
and (28b) below express exactly the same content as (28), which means that they will display 
                                                          
11 Later on, Braun (2008: 70, footnotes 20-24) regretted the idea that (28) and (29) should be regarded as logical 
truths, although he acknowledged that any logic of demonstratives formulated in Kaplanian terms would count 
them as such. I personally have a strong intuition that these should be counted as analytic truths, but it is easy 
to adapt c-theories in order to count these sentences as non-valid: all we need is to adopt a relativist notion of 
logical consequence (cf. MacFarlane 2003, Predelli & Stojanovic 2008, Predelli 2012b). 
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the same behavior under modal operators. But the theory still counts them as non-analytic 
truths: 
(28a) Mata Hari is a spy 
(28b) That woman is a spy 
This is as it should be. Similarly, “that dentist” and “Mata Hari” may have the same 
content in certain contexts, but substituting the conclusion of (29) for a sentence with the 
same content may result in an invalid argument: 
(30) a. All dentists are paid more than all doctors 
b. Therefore, Mata Hari is payed more than all doctors 
Finally, two sentences like (28c-d) may receive the same content in a certain context, 
but only the latter is self-contradictory (i.e., false in all contexts):  
(28c) Mata Hari is not a spy 
(28d) That spy is not a spy 
As Borg (2000: 238-241) has stressed, these facts about analyticity and entailment 
show one thing: the nominal attached to the noun phrase has a semantic role to play. The data 
from section 2.1.1 are compatible, and in fact very naturally fitting, with what may be 
regarded as an extremely Millian view, namely one in which the nominal (say, “spy” in (28) 
and (28d))  plays no semantic role whatsoever. This kind of theory is tentatively defended, 
for example, by Larson and Segal (1995), who speculate that the role of the nominal is merely 
pragmatic, a clue for settling who the intended referent might be. This would 
straightforwardly explain the facts about opacity illustrated by the above-mentioned data 
(how could the nominal be affected by, say, intensional verbs, if its contribution is non-
semantic, and therefore not different from a pointing gesture?), but it cannot accommodate 
the data about analyticity and entailment, which are of semantic nature too. Character theories 
do explain both kinds of data: by relegating the semantic role of the nominal to the 
hyperintensional level, they are able to explain why intensional verbs are unable to affect it, 
but in turn they yield the right predictions about truth in virtue of meaning. 
So far the main virtues of character theories. There is, however, a prima facie 
reasonable objection that could be raised to them. Recall that one of the main motivations of 
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a structured view of propositions, of which c-theorists like Braun and Salmon are notable 
proponents, is to provide a way to distinguish the meaning of logically equivalent expressions 
such as “2+2=4” and “it is either raining or not raining”. The objection goes like this: unless 
further adjustments are made, character theories are unable to distinguish the meaning of, 
say, (31a) and (31b): 
(31a) That man plays saxophone 
(31b) That man who is either talking to Bush or not talking to Bush plays saxophone 
The proposition expressed by (31a) and (31b) is the same at any context, i.e., they are 
indistinguishable in terms of content. But, importantly, they are so in terms of character too: 
character is usually conceived of as a function from contexts to contents and, of course, the 
character of “that man” is given by just the same function as the character of “that man who 
is either talking to Bush or not talking to Bush”. Thus, character theories yield the result that 
the meanings of (31a-b) are indistinguishable: they do not just express the same structured 
proposition, but they also share a single character. If adherents of structured propositions 
wish to distinguish the meaning of logically equivalent sentences, it seems they have a reason 
for rejecting the distinctive lexical entry of character theories of complex demonstratives. 
Structured propositionalists should prima facie feel more attracted to other theories. 
Take, for instance, Mark Richard’s (1993) account, in which the contribution of a complex 
demonstrative to the proposition expressed is twofold: they contribute not just an object, but 
also the descriptive content designated by the NP attached to the “that”-phrase. This makes 
it possible to establish the required distinction. Namely, (31a) and (31b) express respectively 
something like (32a) and (32b): 
(32a) <dc, <<being a man> & <playing saxophone>>> 
(32b) <dc, <<being a man> & <talking or not talking to Bush> & <playing 
saxophone>>> 
Of course, such theory has important drawbacks. Richard’s proposal suffers from 
problems related to intensionality, as on his account propositions like (32a) and (32b) serve 
as arguments for modal operators, with the result that (9)-(11) end up with contradictory 
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readings – a wrong prediction. But, in principle, his theory has the advantage that he is able 
to distinguish the meaning of (31a-b).  
But things are not so bad for character theories, for this alleged defect can be easily 
solved. Indeed, Braun’s theory of complex demonstratives was initially presented as a way 
to illustrate the need for structured characters (Braun 1994), an idea that Borg (2000: 242-
243) also endorses. Basically, the idea is to conceive character as a structured entity rather 
than as a function; for example, a sentence like “I am tired” may express the following 
structured character: 
(33) <I, being tired> 
In turn, this character can be fed a context c and return the corresponding proposition: 
namely, the result of assessing each of the two components of (33) in c: 
(34a) <I(c), being tired (c)>, which is equivalent to  
(34b) <ac, being tired> 
Similarly, the characters of (32a) and (32b) can be given as two distinct structured 
entities, i.e., as (35a) and (35b) respectively: 
(35a) <<that, being a man>, being tired> 
(35b) <<that, <being a man> & <talking or not talking to Bush>>, being tired> 
The fact that these two characters are different does not prevent them from expressing 
the same proposition at any context c, namely (35c): 
(35c) <dc, being tired> 
This means that character theories can easily adapt themselves so as to capture all the 
relevant differences of meaning. They also vindicate a version of the Mirroring Thesis, for 
clearly the characters in (35a-b) reflect the syntactic structure of (34a-b). So far, so good.  
This is not the end of the story, however. These theories have been subject to a great 
deal of criticism. In section 2.2 we will review the objections that they have received from 
defenders of quantificational theories, and in 3.1 I shall present some further challenges that 
have been raised to them. As we shall see, all these criticisms can be avoided if we simply 
drop requisite (27i) from the lexical entry of demonstratives – my own solution will rely on 
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a version of c-theories that dispenses of this condition. But, before proceeding, let me briefly 
mention another, closely related class of directly referential approaches: what Eros Corazza 
(2002b, 2003) calls multiple proposition theories. 
 
2.1.3 Multiple proposition theories 
The approaches that I am grouping under the label “multiple proposition theories”, or mp-
theories for short, share most of their theoretical assumptions with c-theories; in particular, 
they also model complex demonstratives as context-dependent singular terms. The main 
difference is the way they explain the most characteristic traits of complex demonstratives, 
such as opacity to modal operators or the inferential properties exemplified in (29)-(30): 
instead of relegating the descriptive meaning of the term to the level of character, they treat 
its contribution as fully propositional but occurring in a different proposition. Here is a 
generic way to state the lexical entry typical of mp-theories (cf. Dever 2001: 306, Corazza 
2003: 269): 
(36) For every context c, “that F is G” expresses two propositions: 
i) dc is G 
ii) dc is F 
For example, an utterance of (1) in a context k would express both that dk is bald and 
that dk is a man with a hat. The main idea behind mp-theories is that the nominal of the 
demonstrative, which serves as the mode of presentation of the object, has the same role as 
an apposition. Appositive sentences like (37) below are usually taken to express two 
propositions, namely (37a) and (37b) (cf. Neale 1999): 
(37) Aristotle, disciple of Plato, was fond of dogs 
(37a) <Aristotle, being fond of dogs> 
(37b) <Aristotle, being a disciple of Plato> 
Dever (2001: 305-306) and Corazza (2003: 269) analogize their respective approaches 
to this treatment of sentences containing appositives. On their view, the two following 
sentences are equivalent: 
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(38a) That woman with the red hat is Jane’s sister 
(38b) That, who is a woman with a red hat, is Jane’s sister 
In a context having Mary as its demonstratum, both sentences would express the 
following two propositions: 
(38c) <Mary, being Jane’s sister> 
(38d) <Mary, being a woman with a red hat> 
This way of dealing with complex demonstratives shares many of the virtues of c-
theories. Notice, for example, that the descriptive content of the demonstrative, in spite of 
being communicated at the propositional level, is nevertheless opaque to modal operators. 
For instance, an utterance of (9) in some context c would express the propositions in (9a-b): 
(9) That bald man could have had hair 
(9a) <Possibly, <dc, having hair>> 
(9b) <dc, being bald> 
This means that (9) cannot attribute contradictory properties to the demonstratum of 
the context. Notice, in particular, that the descriptive content of the demonstrative is entirely 
opaque to propositional attitude verbs; consider the propositions expressed by (11) in a 
context k, namely (11a-b) 
(11) Mary believes that that bald man has hair 
(11a) <believing, <Mary, <dk, having hair>>> 
(11b) <dk, being bald> 
As above, a comparison with appositives may help here. It is clear that, in the following 
sentence, the appositive material plays no role in characterizing Mary’s beliefs, but only those 
of the speaker: 
(39) Mary believes that Julia, a lovely person, is despicable 
By treating the descriptive meaning of the demonstrative in this way, mp-theories get 
the facts about opacity right, just like c-theories do. There are, however, important differences 
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between both approaches when it comes to issues of inference and analyticity. For example, 
it is easy to check that mp-theories need not count (28) as an analytic truth: 
(28) That spy is a spy 
C-theories counted this sentence as true in every context in which it was interpretable, 
but, from the point of view of mp-theories, all this sentence does is to express a contingent 
proposition twice: 
(28a) <dc , being a spy> 
(28b) <dc , being a spy> 
Of course, this result is not inevitable: (28) could still count as analytic if we attributed 
to (28b) a different role – arguably a presuppositional one.  Things are similar, although 
slightly more complex, when it comes to the validity of (29), but at any rate neither Dever or 
Corazza would count it as valid.12 Be it as it may, the validity of these inferences is something 
that not even c-theorists take for granted (see footnote 11), and therefore cannot constitute an 
argument, or at least not a knockdown one, against the multipropositional approach.  
Mp-theories, in fact, seem to enjoy a certain advantage over c-theories insofar as they 
are able to vindicate what Dever (2001: 292) calls “semantic innocence”: the idea that the 
semantic behavior of an expression should be the same regardless of the linguistic context it 
is inserted in. According to Dever, the reason why c-theories cannot vindicate semantic 
                                                          
12 On Dever’s system, the argument in (29), repeated below, is equivalent to the argument in (29’): 
(29) a. All dentists are payed more than all doctors 
b. Therefore, that dentist is payed more than all doctors  
(29’)  a. All dentists are payed more than all doctors 
b. Therefore, 
b’. That is payed more than all doctors 
b’’. That is a dentist 
This inference is clearly non-valid; I believe, however, that it is compatible with Dever’s tenets to acknowledge 
the possibility that (29b’’) does not fall under the scope of “therefore” but, rather, constitutes an extra premise 
for the whole argument (i.e., that (29b’’) is something communicated by any fragment of discourse containing 
“that dentist”, and this includes the argument in (29)).  
On Corazza’s view, the truth of (29b) does not depend on the truth of (29b’’); the latter is part of the connotation 
of the term, but nevertheless plays no inferential role (Corazza 2002b, 2003; cf. the theory of description names 
in Corazza 2002a). This means that (29) is logically equivalent to (29*) 
(29*)  a. All dentists are payed more than all doctors 
b*. Therefore, that is payed more than all doctors 
Of course, this is not valid either.  
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innocence is that, on their view, the contribution the nominal of a complex demonstrative 
makes to the proposition expressed is not its customary content; for example, “man” 
contributes its content to the proposition expressed by (40), but it contributes something 
different altogether to (1): 
(1) That man with the hat is bald 
(40) A man with a hat came home 
Since c-theories treat the contribution of “man” as something that varies depending on 
whether or not the word is part of the nominal of a demonstrative, they fail to vindicate 
semantic innocence. Of course, the contribution that “man” makes in mp-theories is the same 
regardless of the linguistic environment it is found in. I shall briefly address this critique in 
section 3.3.2. 
Not all multipropositional approaches fit the schema presented in (36). A very similar 
theory, from a different framework, is developed by Manuel García-Carpintero (2006), 
although he does not use the label “direct reference” for his own approach, but rather one 
that might prima facie seem to be at odds with the notion of direct reference: “Neo-
Fregean”.13 The rationale behind this label is that, on his proposal, the meaning of a complex 
demonstrative like “that spy” features two items: its official content in a context (an object) 
and an additional sense-like element, namely a reference-fixing token-reflexive 
presupposition like the following: 
(41) This token of “that spy” refers to whatever spy is most salient when it is uttered 
Thus, the proposal differs from the mp-theories so far discussed in two important 
respects. In the first place, the descriptive proposition associated with the demonstrative 
differs from the one determined by clause (36ii) in that it is not asserted, but presupposed, in 
the pragmatic sense of presupposition advocated by Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974, 1978; see 
also Glanzberg & Siegel (2006) for a thorough study of this notion applied to the particular 
case of complex demonstratives). Additionally, this presupposition plays a metalinguistic 
role: it does not merely describe the object as being this or that way, it also determines who 
                                                          
13 See García-Carpintero (2018) for the compatibility of Fregeanism and Millian approaches. 
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the referent of the term is. It is therefore something more akin to a Fregean sense, i.e., an 
aspect of the meaning of the expression that serves for uniquely presenting the referent.  
García-Carpintero’s framework is not meant to work only for complex demonstratives: 
it is part of a broader semantic theory that covers indexicals in general (García-Carpintero 
1998) along with many other expressions, including proper names (García-Carpintero 2000, 
2018). It is, in fact, part of a relatively common view of indexicals as token-reflexive 
expressions, as in the theories developed by María de Ponte, Kepa Korta or John Perry (cf. 
Perry 1998, 2017; Korta & Perry 2011; Korta & de Ponte 2015; de Ponte et al 2020). These 
theories can be seen as another kind of multi-propositional approach to indexicals in general, 
for they claim that sentences containing indexicals can convey both their official content and 
their utterance-bound “reflexive truth-conditions”; in fact, Corazza (2003: 268) analogizes 
his own account to Perry’s.  
In the Stalnakerian framework endorsed by García-Carpintero, a sentence like (28), or 
at least its variant “that spy is a spy, if it exists”, can have a necessary diagonal proposition. 
Given that any utterance of this sentence is associated with the token-reflexive content in 
(41), every world compatible with the propositions that both speakers take for granted in 
uttering (28) will be a world in which the referent of that particular token of “that spy” refers 
to a spy. Therefore the official content expressed by (28) in a world w will always be true 
when assessed in w – in other words, the diagonal proposition associated with this sentence 
will be a necessary one.14 Although García-Carpintero’s primary concern in his 2006 essay 
is not analyticity but apriority, these two notions are so closely related that the argument 
could be adapted in order to count (28) as an analytic truth. 
Mp-theories share many of the virtues of c-theories. Both approaches treat complex 
demonstratives as context-dependent singular terms whose descriptive meaning does not 
contribute anything to the truth-conditions of the (official) proposition associated with the 
utterance, thus providing an elegant account of their behavior in intensional environments. 
                                                          
14 As García-Carpintero acknowledges, this assumption needs an extra requirement: contra Stalnaker (2006), 
he argues that, when trying to determine the official content expressed by a sentence when uttered in a certain 
world, we should keep metalinguistic facts fixed. Otherwise we could include in the common ground worlds in 
which complex demonstratives are associated with a completely different reference-fixing presupposition, and 
therefore (28) could not have a necessary diagonal proposition. 
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This also allows both families of directly referential theories to present a unified account of 
complex demonstratives and other indexical expressions: both mp-theories and c-theories 
can be seen as special cases of broader accounts of indexicality. In spite of these virtues, 
directly referential theories have been subject to a great deal of criticism, which has led many 
authors to develop alternative approaches, often advocating for quantificational views of 
demonstratives. In the next section I analyze the counterevidence traditional accounts are 
prima facie unable to accommodate.  
 
2.2 Quantificational theories 
Quantificational accounts of complex demonstratives treat these expressions on the model of 
Generalized Quantifiers or “GQ” (Mostowski 1957, Lindström 1966, Montague 1974, 
Barwise & Cooper 1981). This is in fact a very natural step to be taken once some difficulties 
in the core of directly referential theories have been spotted, and it is backed by syntactic 
evidence. In addition, it has an important historical antecedent, namely the parallel debate 
between Russell and the Frege-Strawson tradition concerning definite descriptions (see 
Gimeno-Simó 2020a for an overview). Let us briefly remind the reader about the core tenets 
of GQ theory. 
Quantification is one of the central topics of natural-language semantics. Its main 
concern is the proper way to model the meaning of determiners such as “every”, “a”, “none”, 
“most”, “few” or “some”, although quantification is in fact involved in the meaning of nearly 
every other expression. Interest on the topic can be traced back to the early days of semantic 
theory, when Gottlob Frege (1879/1931, 1891/1981a) investigated the logical properties of 
sentences which superficially displayed a subject-predicate form in spite of having a radically 
different form from a logical point of view. E.g., the inferential properties displayed by 
quantified sentences like (43) are very different from those of sentences involving singular 
terms, like (42) (further examples may be found in Heim & Kratzer 1998: §6; and Pietroski 
2008): 
(42) Lingens is married and Lingens is single 
(43) Some people are married and some people are single 
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Assuming “single” to be synonymous for “non-married”, (42) is self-contradictory, but 
(43) is not, despite sharing the same grammatical form. Similarly, the inference in (44) is 
valid, whereas the one in (45) is not: 
(44)  Laura came yesterday morning 
Therefore, Laura came yesterday 
(45)  Nobody came yesterday morning 
Therefore, nobody came yesterday 
All these properties led to the conclusion that quantifiers, despite sharing many 
syntactic properties with singular terms, deserved a different treatment. Later on, Russell 
(1905) famously included phrases containing the determiner “the” among the class of 
quantified expressions, which he called “denoting phrases”. 
It is clear, however, that the quantifiers “Ǝ” and “Ɐ” from first-order logic are 
insufficient for modeling the meaning of natural language determiners. These two might be 
regarded as the formal counterpart of “some” and “all”, and it is also possible to translate 
sentences containing “the” into formulae containing only Tarskian quantifiers, but natural 
language is host to many other determiners whose translation into first-order language is just 
too complex to expect any sort of systematicity. Take, for instance, “most”: 
(46) Most Europeans like football 
If we attempt to translate (46) into a suitable first-order logic counterpart, we are at a 
loss. Let us devise a quantifier MOST such that MOSTx (Px) is true if the majority of the 
elements in the domain have the property P. It is clear that neither of the two most plausible 
candidates for translating (46) captures its truth-conditions: 
(46a) MOSTx (Ex & Fx) 
(46b) MOSTx (Ex → Fx) 
Clearly, (46a) does not capture the intended meaning: what (46) states is not that most 
elements of the domain have both the property of being European and liking football. (46b)  
is not appropriate either, for (46) does not mean that it is true of most elements of the domain 
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that, if they are European, they like football.15 It seems, then, that quantification in natural 
language should be dealt with by different means.  
Cases like this one led to the rejection of the Tarskian quantifiers and the subsequent 
development of GC theory. On this framework, quantifiers are understood as higher-order 
properties that combine with two predicates in order to return truth-values. Let us devise 
some sample lexical entries for some well-known and already mentioned determiners: 
(47) ⟦All⟧ = λc. λi. λP. λQ. Ɐx (Qx in i → Px in i) 
(48) ⟦Some⟧ = λc. λi. λP. λQ. Ǝx (Qx in i & Px in i) 
(49) ⟦The⟧ = λc. λi. λP. λQ. Ǝx (Qx in i & Ɐy (Qy in i → x=y) & Px in i) 
As these entries show, determiners combine with two predicates rather than with an 
open formula. This grants them the flexibility required for dealing with determiners like 
“most”; let us see how. Using “|P|” for representing the cardinality of any set P, and 
employing a loose although convenient terminology which equates sets with their 
characteristic functions, “most” can be modeled as follows: 
(50) ⟦Most⟧ = λc. λi. λP. λQ. |Pi∩Qi| ≥ |Pi – Qi| 
(Where “Pi” designates the set of objects that have property P in circumstance i).  
So far this was the basics of GC. But, before we continue, it is worth saying a word 
about the semantic type of quantifiers. Disregarding intensionality, the standard theory (Heim 
& Kratzer 1998) acknowledges the existence of two basic types: type e for individuals and 
type t for truth-values. E.g., proper names and indexicals have semantic type e, whereas 
sentences have type t. In addition to these basic types, there are infinitely many derivative 
ones. For instance, predicates have type <e, t>: they are functions ranging over objects and 
returning truth-values (e.g., “sing” is a predicate that takes Mary, Jack or John as arguments 
and returns truth if they are singing and falsity otherwise). More generally, if σ and τ are 
                                                          
15 In order to see more clearly why (46b) does not capture the meaning of (46), consider a domain consisting of 
a European who does not like football and two Asians who do like it. (46b) is true in this domain, but, assuming 




semantic types then <σ, τ> is a semantic type too, where <σ, τ> is the set of functions from 
objects of type σ to objects of type τ.16 
On this model, quantifiers are higher-order predicates, i.e., they take properties as 
arguments and return truth-values. Thus, the meaning of “all men” is given by a function that 
combines with properties like being mortal or being bald and yields truth or falsity. This 
makes <<e, t>, t> its semantic type. Consequently, determiners like “all” combine with two 
properties, which means that they are of a rather complicated type: <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>>>.  
These types are interesting because they allow us to rephrase the debate in more precise 
terms. A prima facie plausible way to frame the dispute is in terms of semantic types: direct 
reference theories treat complex demonstratives as expressions of type e, whereas 
quantificational approaches model them as having type <<e, t>, t>. Thus, adherents of the 
former theories hold that complex demonstratives are like proper names or indexicals, 
whereas the rival view treats them as similar to “a man”, “most children” or “no woman”. 
Analogous remarks hold for the parallel debate about definite descriptions: Russellians 
model these expressions as quantifiers of type <<e, t>, t>, whereas Fregeans treat them as 
singular terms of type e.17 In fact, Kaplan’s first “dthat”, essentially a rigidified definite 
description, could be regarded as an example of a quantificational approach to complex 
                                                          
16 As Pietroski (2018) has noted, a principle like this one results in a massive overgeneration of semantic types 
for natural-language expressions. The vast majority of these types are not present in any language, and they are 
not plausibly expected to appear. Although I basically agree with Pietroski’s concerns, I will be using the 
standard terminology throughout this dissertation. I believe that most of what I say here can be adapted to a 
more psychologically plausible theory.  
17 Just for the sake of illustration, let us see a paradigmatic example of the type of lexical entry favored by each 
of the two theories. A typically Fregean lexical entry may be found in Heim & Kratzer (1998: 85): 
 λP<<e, t>, e>: Ǝx (Px & Ɐy (Py→x=y). ιx (Px = 1) 
And a typically Russellian entry may be found in Neale (1990a: 45), who adapts the original one by Whitehead 
and Russell (1927, def. *14.01) to the framework of GQ theory: 
“The F is G” is true iff |F – G| = 0 & |F| = 1 (where “F” and “G” are, respectively, the set of objects 
satisfying the predicates “F” and “G” 
The latter lexical entry is syncategorematic, but it is very easy to formulate it lambda notation, which will 
simplify the comparison: 
λP<<e, t>, e>. λQ<<e, t>, e>. Ǝx (Px & Ɐy (Py→x=y) & Qx) 
These lexical entries are very clear about the main tenets of the two theories: Fregeans treat definite descriptions 
as singular terms that presuppose the existence of an object satisfying the description, whereas the role that 
Russellians attribute to this descriptive content is that of restricting the domain of quantification, just as in any 
other quantifier. See Gimeno-Simó (2020a) for a thorough comparison.  
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demonstratives, in case we adopted a Russellian view of definite descriptions.18 The idea that 
complex demonstratives are nothing but actualized Russellian definite descriptions was, 
indeed, entertained by Stephen Neale (1993: 107-109).  
Let us illustrate the debate by means of an example. Consider (1), repeated below: 
(1) That man with the hat is bald 
According to the directly referential theorist, “being bald” denotes a function ranging 
over objects, and “that man with the hat” denotes an individual. (1) is true if that function 
assigns truth to the individual in question and false otherwise. Quantificational theories argue 
that the roles are reversed: “that man with the hat” denotes a higher-order function that is to 
be saturated by another function, namely the one denoted by “being bald”. These two kinds 
of theories yield slightly different prediction which may be used for checking which of them 
is on the right track.  
Do they? There is an important objection that can be made to this idea: namely, that all 
singular terms can be given the type of quantifiers. E.g., we could devise lexical entries of 
type <<e, t>, t> for “Mary” or for “I”: 
⟦Mary⟧ = λc. λi. λP. P(Mary) = 1 
⟦I⟧ = λc. λi. λP. P(ac) = 1 
Thus, singular terms can be modeled as if they were quantifiers. One could, in fact, 
suppose that this is the right way to treat them, rather than just an option – as stated in the 
first chapter, this was the postulate endorsed by Montague (1974). There are two reasons for 
supposing that <<e, t>, t> is a more appropriate type for these expressions. On the one hand, 
this way of modeling singular terms allows us to unify all noun phrases under a single 
semantic type. On the other, giving singular terms the type of quantifiers is sometimes 
inescapable, for they might appear in constructions like the following: 
(51) Mary and all her friends came to the party 
In order to interpret a sentence like (51) we must give both components of the NP, 
“Mary” and “all her friends”, the same semantic type. It is however not feasible to treat “all 
                                                          
18 Kaplan embraces a Fregean approach to definite descriptions in his formal system (Kaplan 1977: 545), 
although the adoption of this view or the Russellian one is largely irrelevant for his purposes.  
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her friends” as a term of type e (what object could serve as the semantic value of such 
expression?), so the only option left is to employ the above lexical entry in which Mary is 
given the type of a quantifier: 
(51a) λP. P(Mary) = 1 & Ɐx (λy. y is a friend of Mary → Py = 1) (λz. z came to the 
party) 
Since it is necessary that singular terms be sometimes given the type of quantifiers, a 
natural step is to generalize to the worst case and suppose, as Montague did, that this is always 
their type. And, at least prima facie, the availability of this option downplays the relevance 
of the debate between quantificational and referential theories: if singular terms are just 
quantifiers of a special kind, it seems that adherents of quantificational theories have already 
won the match.  
But this is not the end of the story. As Barbara Partee (Partee 1987, Partee & Rooth 
1983) has stressed, it is in fact more empirically adequate to assume that expressions have a 
default semantic type but might undergo type-shifting under certain, well-defined 
circumstances. This is indeed the standard assumption: the usual denotation of proper names 
is of type e, but they undergo type-shifting in constructions like (51). On the other hand, and 
as I mentioned in the introduction, the fact that singular terms can be given the semantic type 
of quantifiers does not mean they are not singular terms anymore: it simply means that 
singular terms can be modeled in different ways. 
Contrary to the assumption made above, the distinctive feature of quantificational 
theories is not that they give complex demonstratives the type <<e, t>, t>, for defenders of 
directly referential theories may do so too. Rather, they are characterized for giving these 
expressions a lexical entry which in no way resembles the two entries for “Mary” and “I” we 
provided above – this shall become clear in our discussion of King’s account. 
Quantificational approaches to complex demonstratives were first suggested by Taylor 
(1980), Barwise and Cooper (1981), Keenan and Stavi (1986) and Neale (1993), although 
these proposals are rather sketchy and were made as a proper part of a more general theory 
of determiners and quantification. The two most developed and widely discussed 
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quantificational theories are those by King (1999, 2001) and Lepore and Ludwig (2000). Let 
us see what their main tenets are.  
 
2.2.1 King’s theory 
Jeffrey King (1999, 2001, 2008a, 2008b) pioneered quantificational approaches to the 
semantics of complex demonstratives; his is probably the most discussed theory. In a well-
known book he presents two different sets of counterevidence against directly referential 
approaches. In the first place, complex demonstratives do not share their syntax with 
pronouns but with determiner phrases, which gives us reason to believe that they belong to 
the same semantic category as the expressions of the latter kind. In the second place, and 
more relevantly, complex demonstratives have non-deictic uses that seem hard to 
accommodate for directly referential views of the semantics of these expressions. He goes 
on to develop an alternative account that suits both the syntactic and semantic 
counterevidence. In this section we shall see first what each of these two kinds of 
counterevidence consists of, and later on we will review King’s positive proposal.  
 
2.2.1.1 Syntactic counterevidence to direct reference 
Although the focus of King’s work is on the semantics of complex demonstratives, he also 
argues that syntax provides further support for treating them as quantifiers. Basically, he 
shows that complex demonstratives behave just like any other quantifier regarding weak 
crossover effects (WCO) and antecedent contained deletion (ACD). Let us see what each of 
these phenomena amount to.  
WCO (Chomsky 1976, 1981; Jacobson 1977) is a well-studied phenomenon in natural 
language, and it has to do with some apparent violations of Binding Theory that quantifiers 
are subject to. This dissertation is addressed to philosophers, so let me briefly state the basics 
of Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981 and much subsequent work), not just in order to illustrate 
the relevant phenomena but also in order to introduce some notions that, although well-




(52) *Mary1 loves her1 
(53) *She1 loves Mary1 
(54) OK Mary1 loves herself1 
(55) *Herself1 loves Mary1 
(56) OK Mary1 loves her2 
(57) OK She1 loves Mary2 
(58) *Mary1 loves herself2 
(59) OKHer1 mother loves Mary1 
(60) OK Mary1 loves her1 mother 
Sentences (52) and (53) are ill-formed: “Mary” cannot be co-referential with “her” and 
“she”. On the contrary, co-reference between the name and a reflexive pronoun is perfectly 
acceptable as it appears in (54), but it is still unacceptable in (55).  Interestingly, dropping 
the co-indexing fixes (52)-(53): we may use them for stating that Mary loves, or is loved by, 
some other salient female, as in (56)-(57). (58), on the other hand, contrasts with the latter 
two in not allowing the pronoun to co-refer with the proper name. Finally, co-reference is 
also perfectly acceptable in (59)-(60), in contrast with (52)-(53).  
Binding Theory constitutes an attempt to explain these and other facts. It is committed 
to a distinction between three kinds of expressions, namely anaphors, pronouns and referring 
expressions or r-expressions, which display very different binding patterns. Anaphors are 
expressions like “herself” or “himself”, which necessarily inherit their referent19 from 
another element of the sentence; pronouns, in turn, are expressions like “he” or “she”, whose 
value may be obtained either anaphorically or exophorically; r-expressions, on the contrary, 
comprise a very wide category of noun phrases whose value never depends on another 
element of the sentence. Thus, e.g., proper names are paradigmatic cases of r-expressions, 
but this category also includes other noun phrases that cannot be seen as referential from a 
                                                          
19 Saying that they “inherit a referent” is entirely inaccurate from a semantic point of view, for “herself” and 
“himself” are normally thought not to be referential expressions at all, but rather bound variables. Similarly, 
notions like “binding” and “referring expressions” are employed very differently in Binding Theory and in 
semantics. I will be using this loose terminology throughout this section, just for the ease of exposition.   
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semantic point of view, such as quantifiers (“a cat”). All these facts are captured by the three 
principles of Binding Theory (I will be employing the extremely simplified version of these 
principles found in Carnie’s (2013: §5) handbook; for present purposes, the notion of 
“binding domain” may be just identified with the clause, and all the other relevant notions 
are explained below): 
Binding Principle A: an anaphor must be (syntactically) bound in its binding domain 
Binding Principle B: a pronoun must be free in its binding domain 
Binding Principle C: an r-expression must be free 
The notion of binding employed here is related to, but different from, the semantic 
notion of binding; in this section I will be using “binding” for referring to the syntactic notion, 
but throughout the rest of the dissertation it shall refer to the semantic one unless otherwise 
specified. Essentially, an expression α syntactically binds another expression β iff α c-
commands β and α and β are co-indexed. “Being free” is defined simply as being non-bound. 
Thus, the above principles may be seen as a constraint on co-indexing. C-commanding, on 
the other hand, is a central syntactic notion that, in short, may be summarized thus: given a 
sentence s, a constituent α of s c-commands another constituent β iff α does not contain β as 
a sub-constituent and the smallest phrase containing α also contains β. These notions shall 
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Neither of these trees are entirely accurate, but they will do for our purposes. Let us 
consider the DP “a dog” in each of these two sentences. In order to see what its area of c-
command is, let us apply the definition above: it c-commands every constituent β of the 
sentence such that a) β does not contain “a dog” as a constituent and b) β is a constituent of 
the smallest phrase containing “a dog”. The smallest phrase containing “a dog” in (61a) is 
the DP “a dog biting its own tail”, which means that “a dog” c-commands every constituent 
of this phrase that, in turn, is not a constituent of “a dog”. In other words, it c-commands the 
AP node and every other node under it. Thus, it c-commands “its” and it may bind it. In 
(61b), on the other hand, the smallest constituent containing “a dog” is “saw a dog”, and this 
means that the pronoun “it” lies beyond its scope of c-commanding.  
We have now an explanation at hand for accounting for the facts in (52)-(60). In (52) 
“Mary” c-commands “her”, and they are co-indexed; this means that the former binds the 
latter, thus contradicting Principle B – hence its ungrammaticality. The reasoning is similar 
in the case of (53): “Mary” is an r-expression that should be free in virtue of Principle C,20 
but it is bound by “her”. The ungrammaticality of (55), in contrast with (54), may be 
explained thus: in the latter “herself” is bound by “Mary”, thus abiding by Principle A, 
whereas in the former it is the other way around, i.e., “herself” binds “Mary” and it is not 
bound by any other expression, which contradicts both principles A and C. A similar 
explanation is available for (58). On the other hand, none of the three principles is violated 
by (56)-(57), where proper names and pronouns are not co-indexed and therefore not bound. 
(59) is probably the most interesting case: here “her” and “Mary” are co-indexed (i.e., co-
                                                          
20 Copulative verbs constitute an exception to this principle: “he1 is John1” is entirely felicitous. This detail may 
be set aside for present purposes.  
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referential), yet neither of them c-commands the other. This means that both of them are free, 
as required by principles B and C.  
Sentence (60), however, seems to contradict this theory: “Mary” and “her” are co-
indexed and, at least prima facie, the former c-commands the latter. If so, “her” is bound by 
“Mary”, which violates Principle B: 
(60a) 
 
However, this sentence seems perfectly acceptable: it is possible to employ (60) for 
stating that Mary loves her own mother. The solution to this puzzle lies in the classical idea 
that quantifiers, in the mapping from Superficial Structure (SS, known as Spell-Out since the 
advent of minimalism) to LF, may undergo movement. This kind of operation is known as 
Quantifier Raising (QR), and it consists in moving the quantifier outside the clause, leaving 
behind a movement trace that is interpreted as a variable and adding an extra node containing 
a lambda abstractor binding that variable (cf. Heim & Kratzer 1998: §7). Thus, as shown in 
the tree below, “her” and “Mary” do not c-command each other, and so they may be co-
indexed without violating any of the Binding Principles: 
(60b) 
 
Thus, this sentence allows for a co-referential reading to the effect that Mary’s mother 
is such that Mary loves her. Quantifiers, in general, are subject to movement operations that 
proper names or pronouns are unable to perform (although some authors have questioned this 
idea; see e.g. Larson & Ludlow (1993)). QR is responsible for a number of phenomena, such 
as the scope ambiguities displayed by (3)-(8) above, and it is available for any quantifier:  
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(62) OK Mary1 loves all her1 friends 
(63) OK She1 loves a friend of hers1 
Again, the two quantifiers in these sentences are able to rise from the object position 
to a place where the pronoun they contain does not bind nor is bound by the r-expression or 
the pronoun in the subject position. Thus, none of the constraints imposed by the Binding 
Principles is violated. Let us see now another prediction of the theory: 
(64) *His1 mother loves [every man]1 
In this sentence, the pronoun “his” cannot co-vary with the expression in the object 
position, the quantifier “every man”. This is in stark contrast with (59), where “her” does 
display co-variation with the object of the sentence. The explanation for this contrast lies in 
the fact that a quantifier like “every man” undergoes QR in the transition to LF: in the 
traditional terminology, it “crosses over” the pronoun “his” to a position where it c-
commands it. This means that, if they are co-indexed, the pronoun “his” ends up bound by 
the quantifier, thus contradicting Principle B. This is precisely what WCO consists of. King’s 
main point is that complex demonstratives pattern together with quantifiers in this respect: 
(65) *His1 mother loves [that man with a goatee]1 
If “that man with a goatee” worked like a pronoun or a proper name, we would expect 
this sentence to be well-formed, just like (59). But, according to King, it is not: “his” cannot 
co-refer with “that man with a goatee”; thus, (65) appears to work in analogy with (64), where 
the phrase in the object position is a quantifier. 
Now, this evidence has been highly contested. In the first place, and as even King 
(2001: 176, footnote 19) acknowledges, co-reference in (65) is not entirely unacceptable, and 
in some contexts it may even seem natural – we shall see some examples below. Furthermore, 
King himself (2001: 176, footnote 20) also provides a counterexample to the idea that 
complex demonstratives are systematically subject to WCO effects: namely, the complex 
demonstrative in (66a) below admits a co-varying reading as much as the singular terms in 
(66b) and (66c) do: 
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(66a) Someone who liked her1 asked [that woman wearing a red jacket]1 to dance 
(66b) Someone who liked her1 asked Mary1 to dance 
(66c) Someone who liked her1 asked her1 to dance 
King responds to his own objection by claiming that, even though the complex 
demonstrative in (66a) is not subject to WCO effects, no quantifier would be so in 
constructions of this kind:  
(66d) Someone who liked her1 asked [the woman wearing a red jacket]1 to dance 
Similarly, co-indexing with a definite description also seems acceptable, to a certain 
extent, in a sentence like (65): 
(65a) His1 mother loves [the man with a goatee]1 
King claims that, to the extent that (65a) does not sound any worse than (65), we have 
no reason to think that complex demonstratives are not quantifiers – as long as we maintain 
a quantificational account of definite descriptions, of course. 
An important thing to be noticed is that King’s claims are not crosslinguistically 
supported: the counterpart of (65) in other languages sounds perfectly fine under a co-
referential reading. But, even focusing our attention on English, Daniel Altshuler (2006) 
provided several answers to this challenge. Co-referential readings of (65) can be brought to 
saliency by shifting the nuclear stress to other places of the sentence (as indicated by 
capitalization): 
(67) Mary: The mother of that man with a goatee hates her only son 
John: That’s not true. His mother LOVES that man (with a goatee) 
(68) Mary: That man’s wife loves another man, right? 
John: No way! His wife loves that man 
The fact that these readings can be easily brought to salience suggests that they are 
always available, although perhaps, for some reason, not entirely salient. Additionally, 
Altshuler also notes that co-reference is entirely acceptable when the complex demonstrative 
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is understood as an epithet. For instance, in conversation (67) John could have perfectly 
uttered (69) as a response: 
(69) His mother loves THAT LITTLE BASTARD 
Furthermore, the judgements of grammaticality regarding this kind of sentences are not 
always consistent; in the following example, due to Johnson and Lepore (2002), the co-
referential reading is the most natural one: 
(70) Its collar is chocking that dog 
All these arguments show that the evidence concerning WCO effects is, at least, 
inconclusive. Let us move on and discuss the second kind of syntactic evidence for a 
quantificational treatment of complex demonstratives: antecedent contained deletion (ACD). 
This phenomenon can be illustrated by means of King’s own example: 
(71) Tiger birdied every hole that Michael did 
ACD has to do with how to resolve ellipses like the one in (71). Usually, VP ellipses 
are resolved by attributing to the second subject the very same property that the first one is 
attributed: a sentence like “Mary walks and so does John” is true iff John has the same 
property that Mary has, i.e., that of walking; to put it in loose terms, “did” stands for another 
VP. However, this procedure is unavailable in the case of (71), for attributing to Michael the 
very same property that is predicated of Tiger leads to a problem of infinite regress:  
(71a) Tiger birdied every hole that Michael birdied every hole that Michael 
birdied… 
Of course, this is wrong. Richard May (1985) noticed this problem and set out a way 
to solve it, one that has to do with QR (see also Hornstein 1995). Namely, his idea is that VP 
ellipsis is resolved only after quantifiers have been pertinently raised. The result of raising 
the quantifier in (71) is given below (“t1” is a movement trace that is to be interpreted as a 
variable):  
(71b) [Every hole that Michael did] λ1. Tiger birdied t1 
58 
 
Now it is possible to substitute “did” for the appropriate VP: namely, “birdied t1”. The 
trace is to be interpreted as a variable bound by “that”, which works as an object-language 
lambda abstractor: 
(71c) [Every hole that1 Michael birdied t1] λ1. Tiger birdied t1 
This predicts the right truth-conditions for (71): for every x such that x is a hole and 
Michael birdied x, Tiger has the property of birding x. Of course, this process presupposes 
that quantifiers are able to raise, for otherwise this analysis would be impossible. Now 
consider King’s example: 
(72) Tiger birdied that hole that Michael did 
The ellipsis in this sentence has to be resolved in exactly the same manner as the ellipsis 
in (71). In order to do so, we must assume that “that hole that Michael did” is able to raise, 
for otherwise we would end up with the above-mentioned problem of infinite regress. The 
fact that this expression should raise is taken by King as proof of its quantificational nature. 
By contrast, he argues, ACD is impossible when singular terms are involved: 
(73a) #Copp flunked Holmes, who Jubien did 
(73b) #Copp flunked Holmes, who Jubien did 
Altshuler (2006), however, has also called into question the idea that these facts require 
that complex demonstratives be quantifiers. In the first place, notice an important difference 
between (72) and (73a-b): in the former, the elided VP occurs in a restrictive relative clause, 
whereas in the latter it does so in an appositive one. King claims that the reason why he chose 
examples (73a-b) is that they are “the nearest examples [to (72)] involving referring 
expressions”, but Altshuler, following Safir (1984), has argued that they are not. Namely, 
proper names are sometimes able to be modified by relative clauses, and these are subject to 
ACD; consider an utterance of (74) below in a scenario involving two men named “Edward”: 
(74) Are you accusing Edward who she agreed to date or Edward who she wouldn’t? 
Many singular terms are susceptible to this kind of modification: 




If an uncontroversial singular term like a proper name is able to undergo ACD, it seems 
we have good reasons for thinking that what is going on in (72), whatever it might be, is not 
due to the quantificational status of the demonstrative. Rather, Altshuler suggests that what 
ACD is actually related to is the appositional or restrictive nature of the elided material, as 
the example below shows: 
(73c) #Copp flunked every man, who Jubien did 
The fact that (73c) is ungrammatical indicates that the infelicity of (73a-b) is not due 
to not having employed a quantifier. Similarly, the grammaticality of (74)-(75) is indicative 
that quantifiers are not the only expressions that can be subject to ACD. These facts suggest 
that May’s argument should be revised, and that it cannot be used for showing that the 
complex demonstrative in (72) is quantificational. If the infelicity of (73a-b) and the 
acceptability of (72) were due to the quantificational or singular nature of the expressions 
involved, we would expect (73d) to be grammatical, just like (72), but it is not:   
(73d) *Copp flunked that man, who Jubien did 
Thus, the data by Altshuler strongly suggest that, whatever is going on in ACD, it has 
to do with restrictive and appositive relative clauses, rather than with quantifiers and singular 
terms. In fact, the very idea that the phenomenon of ACD constitutes evidence for QR has 
been recently called into question by experimental data (Jacobson & Gibson 2014).  
Thus, the syntactic evidence appealed to by King is dubious. But there is, in fact, yet 
another answer that can be raised against his arguments: namely, that syntax does not always 
reveal semantics. It is undoubtedly true that complex demonstratives are syntactically 
complex expressions consisting of a determiner and a nominal, and it is therefore no surprise 
that their syntactic behavior resembles that of other expressions of the same form, such as 
quantifiers. However, as Johnson and Lepore (2002) point out, none of this should be 
conclusive about their semantics. One reason for doubting that their syntax should be 
revelatory about their semantic properties is that complex demonstratives are syntactically 
realized very differently in several languages: they are determiner phrases in English, but the 
word “that” works as an adjective, instead of as a determiner, in ancient Latin, Attic Greek 
and Japanese, just to mention some examples. In spite of this diversity, complex 
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demonstratives display more or less the same semantic properties in all these languages; it is 
therefore doubtful that showing that they are determiner phrases should be conclusive about 
their alleged quantificational nature. Usually, the combination of determiners and nominal 
yields quantifiers as a result, and this is taken by King as evidence that complex 
demonstratives can be understood as quantifiers. But combining an adjective and a noun can 
result in a complex demonstrative too, and this does not show that complex demonstratives 
denote the sort of things that this kind of combinations usually denote, namely properties. 
Things are even more dramatic in languages like Spanish, where “this” and “that” can 
function either as an adjective or as a determiner: 
(76a) Aquel hombre lleva sombrero 
That man wears hat 
“That man wears a hat” 
(76b) El hombre aquel lleva sombrero 
The man that wears hat 
“That man wears a hat” 
(76a-b) are semantically identical for any Spanish speaker, yet “that” plays very 
different syntactic roles in each of them: it is a determiner in the former and a mere adjective 
in the latter. I shall discuss these examples in section 2.2.2; for the moment, I believe that we 
can put the syntactic evidence aside for a moment and focus on the best case for King: the 
semantic counterevidence to a referential treatment of complex demonstratives.  
 
2.2.1.2 Semantic counterevidence to direct reference: QI, NS, Bach-Peters, NDNS, bound 
variable readings, anaphora 
The semantic counterevidence presented by King constitutes the most important part of his 
rebuttal of direct reference theories. In his 2001 book he presented four sorts of data that 
advocates of a directly referential approach are prima facie unable to accommodate, and 
showed that his own account is able to handle them neatly. In this section we shall see what 
these four kinds of counterevidence consist of, and we will review a couple of additional 
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types of counterexamples that King and other authors discuss in later work. These six types 
of counterevidence constitute the main taxonomy of counterexamples that I will be 
employing throughout this dissertation.  
The most important class of non-deictic uses of complex demonstratives consists of 
what King calls “quantification in” uses (“QI” for short), a term most likely borrowed from 
Kaplan (1968). Consider the following examples: 
(77) Every queen cherishes that cleric who crowned her 
(78) Every skier remembers that first black diamond run they skied 
QI uses occur when the complex demonstrative contains some pronoun bound by an 
external quantifier. Needless to say, the problem here is that the complex demonstratives in 
these sentences do not pick out a unique individual: (77) and (78) do not express singular 
propositions, but rather perfectly intelligible general thoughts. It is therefore doubtful that the 
semantic value of the complex demonstratives they contain can be given by an object.  
Just to make it clear, let us see the predictions that standard c-theories make about QI 
sentences. Setting aside the details in condition (27i), the above lexical entry can be 
formulated thus,21 where dc represents the demonstratum of some context c: 
(79) ⟦that⟧ = λc. λi. λP<s,<e, t>>: P(ic)(dc) = 1. dc 
Such entry yields undeniably wrong predictions regarding QI. For example, it would 
make (77) above true in a context c iff a certain individual, dc, is cherished by every queen, 
under the presupposition that dc did all the crownings in the circumstance ic of the context. 
Braun (2008a) argues that these are in fact the truth-conditions of this sentence, but he tries 
to explain our intuitions of non-rigidity by appealing to Gricean principles. This idea, 
however, seems unconvincing: our use of QI-sentences for conveying general thoughts is too 
                                                          
21 This lexical entry is not entirely fair to some specific details endorsed by some c-theorists. For example, 
Braun (1996) and Salmon (2002) are very explicit in rejecting that demonstrata (or sequences of demonstrata) 
be part of the context (although Braun (1994, 2008a) does include them there, presumably for simplicity’s sake). 
Additionally, (79) predicts that sentences containing a complex demonstrative of the form “that F” should not 
be interpretable in contexts in which there is no demonstratum or where the demonstratum does not satisfy “F”, 
but this only fits Borg’s (2000) and Salmon’s (2002) theory, for Braun’s (2008a) insists that, in these cases, the 
sentence is interpretable but the proposition it expresses is a gappy one. Besides, the intensional formulation of 
(79) does not fit the structured propositionalist framework that Salmon (1986) and Braun (1994) and argue for 
at length – Borg (2000) tentatively endorses this view of propositions, too.  
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systematic to be deemed a matter of pragmatics. No matter how much background you 
provide for interpreting (77) or (78), the truth-conditions predicted by standard c-theories are 
still highly unlikely. Mp-theories would achieve similar results, for they would predict that 
(77) expresses two propositions: that every queen cherishes dc, and that dc crowned every 
queen. 
A second kind of alleged counterevidence comes from what King calls “narrow scope 
readings” (from now on “NS”). In these uses, the complex demonstrative contains a 
quantifier, and if this quantifier takes wide scope over the demonstrative, then the latter fails 
to pick out any individual: 
(80) That professor who brought in the biggest grant in each division will be honored 
(81) That senator with the most seniority on each committee is to be consulted 
These two sentences have two readings. One of them is unproblematic for directly 
referential theories: there is a certain professor who brought in the biggest grant in all the 
divisions, and that particular professor will be honored – and mutatis mutandis for (81). There 
is, however, a problematic and more natural reading to the effect that, for each division x, 
that professor y such that y brought in the biggest grant in x will be honored. Here, the 
complex demonstrative takes narrow scope (hence the name of this kind of uses), with the 
result that no individual can serve as its semantic value: 
(80a) [Each division] λ1.  That professor who brought in the biggest grant 
in t1 will be honored. 
(81a) [Each committee] λ1. That senator with the most seniority on t1 is to 
be consulted 
It is immediately obvious that NS-readings are simply a special case of QI, the only 
difference being that in usual QI cases what is bound is a pronoun whereas in NS uses it is a 
movement trace. This is something that King himself acknowledges (2001: 173, footnote 9), 
and, indeed, he seems to have simply dropped the category in later essays. Let us therefore 
treat NS-readings as a subcategory of QI, which means that accounting for the latter 
straightforwardly accommodates the former. 
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The third kind of counterevidence comes from variants of Bach-Peters sentences (Bach 
1970): 
(82a) Every friend of yours who studied for it passed that exam she was dreading 
(82b) That friend of yours who studied for it passed some exam she was dreading 
Bach-Peters sentences are characterized by the fact that they contain two referentially 
co-dependent expressions: in order to interpret “it” in (82a), one must first secure the 
reference of “that exam she was dreading”, but this demonstrative is in turn being quantified 
into by an external quantifier, “every friend of yours who studied for it”, for whose correct 
interpretation we must first secure the reference of “it”. In short: the character of the complex 
demonstrative depends on the character of “it” and vice versa. Things become even more 
dramatic for sentences containing two complex demonstratives instead of just one: 
(82c) That friend of yours who studied for it passed that exam she was dreading 
Anaphoric relations, then, may become problematic for theorists of direct reference. 
Indeed, King himself shows, in a later essay (2008b), that anaphoric uses of complex 
demonstratives also constitute an important source of counterevidence for a directly 
referential treatment of these expressions:  
(83) [A student]1 was sitting in the library. [Another student]2 was sitting across 
from her1. [That student]2 had a logic book. 
To see King’s challenge, consider the following scenario. Imagine that “that student”, 
in context c, picks out Mary. In that case the three sentences in (83) could be true together in 
any circumstance in which Mary has a logic book and there are two students sitting together 
in the library, regardless of whether Mary is or is not any of these students – she could be at 
home or in another country and yet (83) would be true. 
It is tempting to try to explain all this counterevidence by means of some syntactic-
semantic story that somehow turns a directly referential term into a non-directly referential 
one – say, by means of context-shifting. After all, all these cases seem to involve some sort 
of quantification into the complex demonstrative or some other kind of anaphoric dependence 
on other elements of the sentence. But the fourth kind of counterexamples that King cites in 
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his 2001 book (and the fifth category of counterevidence so far) relies not just on semantic 
issues, but also on epistemological intuitions. It consists of cases in which the speaker 
demonstrates nothing and intends to refer to no particular object, which is why Kings calls 
them “no demonstration no speaker reference readings (NDNS)”. Here, the complex 
demonstrative does not designate rigidly the same individual across possible worlds, i.e., it 
does not express a singular proposition. Imagine, for instance, that a couple of days after a 
very difficult exam you overhear a fellow student claiming that there is someone who got the 
maximum score on it. Reflecting on your own about the difficulty of the exam, you utter: 
(84) That student who scored one hundred on the exam is a genius 
Intuitions might be fuzzy, but prima facie it seems that the semantic profile of the 
complex demonstrative in (84) is not that of a rigid designator. If you are not sure about it, 
try embedding it under the scope of an attitude verb: 
(84a) Greg believes that that student who scored one hundred on the exam is a 
genius 
If Greg uttered (84), (84a) would correctly describe his belief. It seems, then, that Greg 
does not hold a belief towards a singular proposition; rather, he believes something on purely 
general grounds. Notice, in fact, that there is a stark contrast between (84a) and (11) (repeated 
below): 
(11) Mary believes that that bald man has hair 
Although intuitions are far from being conclusive, the literature on the topic seems to 
point towards the idea that (84a), as opposed to (11), does seem to have a de dicto reading, 
i.e., one in which the complex demonstrative is not opaque to modal quantification. I shall 
come back to this issue in sections 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.5.2. 
King presents yet another example that might be used in order to illustrate NDNS-uses. 
Imagine a paleontologist expressing her admiration for the hominid who first mastered the 
use of fire:  
(85) That hominid who discovered how to start fire is a genius 
Again, (85) seems to express a purely general thought. Imagine Homey was the first 
hominid to master fire in the actual world, and try assessing the content expressed by (85) at 
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a world w in which Homey is a genius, but the first hominid to gain control over fire was not 
particularly lucid and did so only by accident. (85) seems intuitively false in w, which means 
that the complex demonstrative “that hominid who discovered how to start fire” does not 
have the modal profile of a rigid designator. And an important thing to have in mind is that, 
unlike the previous cases, there appears to be no anaphora nor binding in (84) and (85). 
NDNS uses of complex demonstratives also include an important sub-class: complex 
demonstratives under modals (Maclaran 1982; Roberts 2002, 2003; Nowak 2014):  
(86) Although it’s clear that we need someone to dig us out of the hole we are in, I 
doubt Dany is that hero 
(87) Michelin is hoping to find ten new tire inspectors. These new employees would 
be required to work the night shift for three weeks  
(88a) Amy is looking for that boy who makes her heart beat faster, her stomach 
flutter and her mind wander 
(88b) Every girl is looking for that boy who makes her heart beat faster, her stomach 
flutter and her mind wander  
The truth of sentences (86)-(88b) does not require the existence of any particular 
individual; it seems, then, that a notion like direct reference is helpless when it comes to 
accounting for their semantics. In general, complex demonstratives can be anchored to 
counterfactual situations, which produces NDNS uses. And, even though the above examples 
seem to involve anaphoric dependence of some sort, Nowak (2014) provides examples of 
this kind which at least prima facie do not even require anaphora: 
(89) If Gore had won the election, he would definitely have embraced that elector 
who cast the deciding vote 
An example like (89) shows that modal anchoring can appear without requiring any 
sort of apparent anaphora (although, as we shall see in section  3.1.2, there is anaphora, albeit 
not exactly of the kind Nowak had in mind in his discussion). 
Finally, King (2008a, 2008b) also cites cases in which complex demonstratives appear 
to function as bound variables – a phenomenon which, to my knowledge, was first noticed 
by Evans (1977a: 491). Here is an example of it:  
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(90) [Every student] λ1. t1 has a professor who thinks [that student]1 is smart 
Notice that there is an important difference between QI uses and bound variable uses. 
In the former case, the complex demonstrative contains a bound variable, but in the latter it 
is the demonstrative itself that is bound. A different mechanism must be in play, then.  
In sum, we have six main types of counterevidence that seem to play against c-theories: 
QI uses, NS readings, Bach-Peters sentences, anaphoric uses, NSDS uses (including cases of 
modal anchoring) and bound variable uses. NS readings are actually just a special case of QI, 
so in all we have five types of counterexamples. I shall discuss all of them one by one in 
section 3.3 in order to show that the alleged counterevidence poses no real threat to character 
theories. In a nutshell, my argument can be summarized in three steps: a) it is no surprise that 
binding and QI generate non-deictic uses; b) anaphoric uses of complex demonstratives are 
actually a special case of what Evans (1977a, 1977b, 1980) called “E-type anaphora”, which 
generates non-referential uses of any pronoun; and c) all these types of counterevidence can 
be shown to be just a special case of QI, binding or anaphoric uses, or a combination of these. 
Thus, the threat that this counterevidence poses for c-theories is not greater than the challenge 
that E-type anaphora and bound uses of simple pronouns pose for direct reference. I take 
these analogies between pronouns and complex demonstratives as evidence that the latter 
should be treated in the same manner as the former.  
 
2.2.1.3 King’s three alternatives 
The inability of standard referential theories to account for the counterevidence in the 
previous sections led King to the conclusion that quantificational accounts constitute a more 
promising approach to the semantics of complex demonstratives. Alternatively, defenders of 
direct reference could argue that complex demonstratives are actually ambiguous expressions 
that display both referential and attributive readings, to echo Donnellan’s (1966) distinction. 
Ambiguity theories, however, are per se not very attractive, for they involve, among other 
disadvantages, complicating the lexicon (see the discussion in section 2.3), which is why 
King rejects them (King 2001, §5). Instead, he sets out to provide a unified theory able to 
handle both deictic and non-deictic data. Throughout his work he presented three distinct 
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theories; let me briefly review each of them, just in order to see what is at stake – i.e., in order 
to see what a quantificational theory should look like.  
King’s first proposal for a quantificational treatment of complex demonstratives (King 
1999) modeled these expressions pretty much as if they were rigidified definite descriptions, 
a treatment he later on regretted (King 2001). His theory differs from Kaplan’s (1977) and 
Neale’s (1993) in important respects, and it is worth discussing it in order to see how its flaws 
were amended by later work – as he himself acknowledges, it was only intended as a rough 
sketch of what a quantificational account should look like, and not as a fully developed 
theory. However, before discussing King’s first theory it is worth introducing a feature 
common to all three of his accounts: the role of speaker intentions. 
King follows the later Kaplan (1989) in acknowledging a very relevant role to 
intentions, and in particular speaker intentions, in determining the value of demonstratives in 
a context; namely, they are what ultimately settles what this value is – other issues that may 
seem important in this respect, such as gestures, are relevant only insofar as they reveal the 
intentions of the speaker. But, importantly, on King’s view speaker intentions do not always 
pick out objects. Namely, he distinguishes two kinds of intentions a speaker may have: 
perceptual intentions and descriptive intentions. The former are the usual, object-oriented 
intentions in which the speaker intends to talk about some particular individual she is 
acquainted with, whereas the latter, by contrast, do not require acquaintance of any sort: they 
are cases in which the speaker intends to speak about whoever uniquely satisfies a certain 
property (for the sake of illustration, I may want to say something about the first child born 
in the 22nd century).  
Importantly, both kinds of intentions determine properties. This is straightforward in 
the case of descriptive intentions: each of them is associated to the property used for 
individuating some object, such as being the first child born in the 22nd century or the second 
referee of my next paper. Perceptual intentions, on the other hand, also determine properties: 
if my perceptual intention is oriented, say, towards Angela Merkel, then I may obtain the 
associated property, namely that of being identical to Angela Merkel. Let us call properties 
68 
 
of the latter kind haecceitistic,22 to borrow Kaplan’s (1976) expression. Thus, insofar as each 
use of a complex demonstrative is associated with an intention, it can be paired with a 
property, haecceitistic or not. Distinct occurrences of demonstratives in a sentence may be 
associated with different intentions, and this fact is stressed by King as one of the crucial 
differences between complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, namely the one that 
allows two distinct complex demonstratives to refer to distinct objects in spite of occurring 
in the same context. King (2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2020) employs the label “supplementive” for 
referring to expressions of this kind, which require something besides a context (e.g., an 
intention) in order to determine a content; for the sake of simplicity, I shall assume at most 
one occurrence of a demonstrative per sentence.  
In all of King’s three theories, complex demonstratives take as argument a 
contextually-determined property.23 Just for the sake of terminological uniformity, let me 
treat these properties on a par with other parameters of context, i.e., let each Kaplan-style 
context c be supplied with a property Rc in addition to the usual parameters of world, time 
and agent (King does not include locations because they are irrelevant for the purposes at 
hand, and I will be omitting them too, not just in this section but during the rest of this 
dissertation).24 Formally, properties are functions from circumstances to sets of individuals 
or, alternatively, from circumstances to functions from individuals to truth values. King’s 
first theory, which I shall dub “K1”, treats contextually determined properties on a par with 
the descriptive meaning of the demonstrative: if I utter “that man is tall” while my intentions 
                                                          
22 This label is employed by King in a later essay (King 2008a), although he talks of haecceitistic intentions 
instead of properties. Haecceitistic intentions, of which the perceptual ones are a proper subset, are intentions 
able to determine what I am calling “haecceitistic properties”. 
23 Strictly speaking, the argument that “that” takes in King’s three systems is not a property, but rather what he 
calls a “propositional frame”. Some of these propositional frames have the form of an open formula, and 
therefore they can be quantified into. This is the natural way to proceed, given King’s endorsement of a 
structured propositionalist framework and the fact that, in his formal system, variables contribute themselves to 
the proposition expressed (King 2001: 164). Much like King himself, I shall stick to the use of the word 
“property” for simplicity’s sake, and also because this is the term that authors discussing King’s system usually 
employ. 
24 King does not formulate his theories on these terms, but the translation is rather straightforward, given his 
assumptions. I am not entirely sure whether he would endorse treating properties on a par with agents, locations 
and the like, but my rephrasing does not affect the predictions his theories make. In his formal system (King 
2001: 165), King does not include these properties as part of the context; rather, he assumes that there is a 
function f mapping each context to one of these properties. This is not entirely equivalent to incorporating the 
properties directly into context as I am doing here, for the fact that f is a function means that there is a further 
requirement in order for the translation to be equivalent: namely, that for any two contexts c and k, if ac = ak, tc 
= tk and wc = wk, then Rc = Rk. See also the discussion below.  
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are addressed towards, say, Muhammad Ali, then the properties of being a man and being 
identical to Muhammad Ali play exactly the same role. This is reflected in the 
syncategorematic semi-technical lexical entry that King provides for “that” in K1: 
(91) For any context c, a sentence of the form “That F is G” expresses the following 
proposition: F and Rc’s unique instance in ic is P 
This might become clearer by discussing the above example. If I utter “that man is tall” 
while pointing at Muhammad Ali, we might assume that the designated property of that 
context is, simply, that of being identical to Muhammad Ali. Consequently, I will have 
expressed the following proposition: that the unique object satisfying in ic the properties of 
being a man and being identical to Muhammad Ali also satisfies being tall. Of course, this 
resembles the semantics of definite descriptions and other quantifiers, rather than that of 
indexicals. The only difference is that complex demonstratives are context-dependent, but 
that aside they are pretty much like any other generalized quantifier. More specifically, and 
to put it in King’s terms, a complex demonstrative has four slots, two of which have to be 
filled with contextually-determined parameters, but the output of this process is a generalized 
quantifier, i.e., a two-place relation between properties, just like the lexical entries (47)-(50) 
above.  
Let us see this in more detail. Essentially, King’s K1 hold that the context-independent 
meaning of “that” is given by the frame in (92a) below, whereas (92b), on the other hand, 
represents the propositional contribution of “that” in some random context c:  
(92a) __ and __’s unique instance in __ is __ 
(92b) __ and Rc’s unique instance in ic is __ 
Of course, (92b) is not different from the entries for “all”, “some” or “most”: it requires 
completion by two properties in order to return a truth-value. And, just like in the case of 
every other quantifier, these two properties are obtained from the nominal attached to the 
demonstrative and from the predicate of the sentence in which it is inserted. This similarity 
can be further stressed if we formulate the lexical entry in more precise terms, employing the 
Kaplanian terminology that I will be using throughout this dissertation: 
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(93) ⟦that⟧ = λc. λi. λP. λQ. Ǝx (Rc(ic, x) = 1 & P(ic, x) = 1 & Ɐy ((Rc(ic, y) = 1 & 
P(ic, y) = 1) → x=y) & Q(i, x) = 1) 
This is a rigidified definite description as much as Kaplan’s first “dthat”: the 
contextually determined property and the property determined by the nominal attached to the 
complex demonstrative are both assessed in the world of the context. Its quantificational 
status becomes clear through the fact that it expresses a relation between two properties.  
Sometimes the contextually-determined property can be redundant with respect to the 
demonstrative, i.e., the property intended by the speaker and the one attached to the complex 
demonstrative may be identical. These cases typically result in NDNS-uses. Consider, for 
example, an utterance of (84), repeated below, in the scenario that we provided for illustrating 
this sentence, i.e., one in which the speaker has no clue about who the student who got the 
maximum score might be: 
(84) That student who scored one hundred on the exam is a genius 
Arguably, the speaker’s intention here is descriptive: she wants to say something about 
whoever happens to be the student who scored one hundred on the exam. This means that the 
contextually-determined property is identical to the property attached to “that”, i.e., being a 
student who scored one hundred on the exam. This, according to King, accounts for the non-
deictic reading that the complex demonstrative in (84) displays. Namely, (84) expresses the 
following proposition: 
(84b) λi. The unique individual satisfying being a student who scored one hundred 
in ic and being a student who scored one hundred in ic is a genius in i 
It is clear that (84b) accounts for the idea that (84) is not about any individual in 
particular. However, it also reveals what King regards as a fatal flaw of K1: namely, the strict 
rigidity that (93) imposes. The reasoning is analogous to the above discussion on the way 
Kaplan’s first “dthat” dealt with (22b): if Mary happens to be the student who actually scored 
one hundred, (84b) will be true at any world w in which Mary is a genius, even if she failed 
that particular exam in w. But, King claims, this does not fit our intuitions towards (84), 
which should be true at any world in which there is a unique student who scored one hundred 
and is a genius, regardless of Mary’s deeds in that world. The flaw becomes more evident if 
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we consider QI uses; for example, (77) expresses the following proposition in K1 (assuming 
that speaker intentions are also redundant): 
(77a) λi. [Ɐx: x is a queen in i] (x cherishes in i the unique individual who is a cleric 
and crowned x in ic and is a cleric and crowned x in ic) 
In order to see why (77a) does not capture the right reading of (77), try assessing the 
truth-conditions of this sentence at some random circumstance i. It yields truth iff every 
queen in i cherishes the cleric that crowned not at i but at ic. This means that (77a) is too 
rigid. Intuitively, (77) should be true at any circumstance i such that every queen in i cherishes 
the cleric that crowned her in i – i.e., the complex demonstrative shouldn’t be different from 
a definite description.  
King’s second theory, which I shall dub “K2”, is devised to account fix these flaws. It 
only requires slightly modifying K1 by dropping the rigidity requirement. Modifying (92a-
b) accordingly, we may say that “that” expresses now a three-place relation between 
properties with no slot for the circumstance, as in (92c). The second slot is filled with the 
property privileged by the context, yielding as a result a two-place relation like the one in 
(92d): 
(92c) __ and __ unique instance is __ 
(92d) __ and Rc unique instance is __ 
In our terminology, we may state it thus: 
(93a) ⟦that⟧ = λc. λi. λP. λQ. Ǝx (Rc(i, x) = 1 & P(i, x) = 1 & Ɐy ((Rc(i, y) = 1 & P(i, 
y) = 1) → x=y) & Q(i, x) = 1) 
This is, essentially, a context-dependent (but non-rigid) definite description; in fact, in 
those cases in which the intentions of the speaker are redundant it will just be a definite 
description. Thus, K2 straightforwardly accommodates our intuitions towards (77) and (84). 
In addition, our intuitions of rigidity regarding canonical deictic uses of complex 
demonstratives can still be preserved in K2, for, recall, perceptual intentions usually 
determine the property of being identical to some object (what I called a “haecceitistic 
property”). Imagine an utterance of (94) below in a context c in which I am pointing at Angela 
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Merkel. Arguably, Rc is, simply, λi. λx. x = Angela Merkel, and therefore K2 predicts that 
(94) expresses the proposition in (94a): 
(94) That woman with a coat looks sympathetic  
(94a) λi. The unique individual x such that x is a woman in i and x is identical to 
Angela Merkel in i looks sympathetic in i 
Of course, this is as rigid as it should be: no matter in which circumstance i you assess 
(94a), its truth will always require Merkel to look sympathetic in i. In general terms, complex 
demonstratives accompanied by a perceptual intention will always be rigid, whereas those 
accompanied by descriptive intentions will be equivalent to definite descriptions.  
This solves the complications K1 was faced with, but, as a drawback, K2 suffers from 
converse problems: namely, it allows too much descriptive content to be assessed at the 
circumstance of evaluation. Imagine, again, that I utter (94b) while gesturing towards Merkel. 
K2 predicts that my utterance will have the truth-conditions in (94c): 
(94b) Emmanuel believes that that woman with a coat is sympathetic 
(94c) λi. in all circumstances j compatible with Emmanuel’s beliefs, the unique 
object that instantiates being a woman with a coat in j and being identical to Merkel 
in j is sympathetic in j 
In order to see why these truth-conditions are wrong, consider a scenario in which, 
while it is true that Emmanuel believes that Angela Merkel is a sympathetic person, he is not 
aware that she is wearing a coat today. Of course, in such scenario it is still correct to employ 
(94b) for reporting Emmanuel’s belief, but (94c) predicts that it shouldn’t, for it requires 
Emmanuel to believe that Merkel is wearing a coat. More dramatically, K2 predicts that a 
sentence like (11), repeated below, should have a contradictory reading: 
(11) Mary believes that that bald man has hair 
These and analogous considerations led King to reject K2 as an appropriate theory for 
complex demonstratives. 
The theory King finally settles for may be called “K3”. This theory differs from the 
two previous ones in requiring that intentions determine, for each context c, two different 
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things: a property Rc and a higher-order predicate Jc operating on pairs of properties and 
returning a singleton consisting of the only object (if any) satisfying both properties in a 
certain circumstance. Let us state this in King’s semi-formal terms. The context-independent 
meaning of “that” in K3 is the following four-place relation: 
(92e) __ and __ are __ in an object x and x is __ 
The main difference from K1 and K2 lies in the argument for the third slot, for it is to 
be filled with the above mentioned higher-order property Jc: 
(92f) __ and Rc are Jc in an object x and x is __ 
But, importantly, for each context c there are only two possible kinds of higher-order 
properties for which “Jc” may stand: either “being jointly instantiated in ic” or, simply, “being 
jointly instantiated”. Thus, given a certain context c, there are only two possible context-
dependent meanings that “that” may express: 
(92g) __ and Rc are jointly instantiated in ic in an object x and x is __ 
(92h) __ and Rc are jointly instantiated in an object x and x is __ 
I.e., whether the complex demonstrative is rigid or circumstance-dependent will 
depend on which of the two higher-order predicates is salient in the context of utterance. In 
Kaplanian terminology, we may state it thus: each context c should contain a property Rc and 
a higher-order predicate Jc, where Jc may be identical to either J1 or J2: 
J1 = λi. λP. λQ. λx. (P(ic, x) = 1 & Q(ic, x) = 1 & Ɐy ((P(ic, y) = 1 & Q(ic, y) = 1) → 
x=y) 
J2 = λi. λP. λQ. λx. (P(i, x) = 1 & Q(i, x) = 1 & Ɐy ((P(i, y) = 1 & Q(i, y) = 1) → 
x=y) 
Let me call contexts containing J1 and J2 “J1–type contexts” and “J2–type contexts”, 
respectively – of course, there is not a single J1, since each J1-type context will contain a 
different one; let me simplify things by talking of J1 simpliciter.  The lexical meaning of 
“that”, in turn, is given by the following function: 
(95) ⟦that⟧ = λc. λi. λP. λQ. Ǝx (Jc(i, P, Rc, x) = 1 & Q(i, x) = 1) 
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This lexical entry can yield the right predictions about most of the data in section 
2.2.1.2, although, as we shall see, it can do so only under an assumption that strikes me as 
dubious at the very least. Let us see how it handles NDNS-uses. Arguably, these are cases in 
which the speaker intentions are descriptive and, additionally, the context contains J2. For 
example (and assuming redundant intentions, as above), “that” would express the following 
content in the context we provided for (84): 
(84d) __ and being a student who scored one hundred are jointly instantiated in an 
object x and x is __ 
Or, in our terminology, 
(84e) λi. λP. λQ. Ǝx (x is a student who scored one hundred in i & P(i, x) = 1 & Ɐy 
(y is a student who scored one hundred in i & P(i, y) = 1) → x=y) & Q(i, x) = 1) 
Filling the two property slots P and Q with the two arguments with which “that” 
combines in (84) yields the following proposition: 
(84f) λi. Ǝx (x is a student who scored one hundred in i & x is a student who scored 
one hundred in i & Ɐy (y is a student who scored one hundred in i & y is a student 
who scored one hundred in i) → x=y) & x is a genius in i) 
Thus, the user of the complex demonstrative in (84) could have employed a definite 
description and it wouldn’t have made any truth-conditional difference. Let us see now how 
K3 handles canonical deictic uses. In our example involving Angela Merkel, K3 requires that 
the speaker have a perceptual intention and that the context’s higher-order property be J1. 
Here is the truth-conditional contribution of “that” in such context: 
(94d) λi. λP. λQ. Ǝx (x is identical to Angela Merkel in ic & P(ic, x) = 1 & Ɐy (y is 
identical to Angela Merkel in ic & P(ic, y) = 1) → x=y) & Q(i, x) = 1) 
Of course, this is rigid, but, importantly, it also makes the descriptive meaning of the 
demonstrative (“F” in “that F”) context-dependent rather than circumstance-dependent. Here 
is the proposition expressed by (94) in that context: 
(94e) λi. Ǝx (x is identical to Angela Merkel in ic & x is a woman with a coat in ic 
& Ɐy (y is identical to Angela Merkel in ic & y is a woman with a coat in ic) → x=y) 
& x looks sympathetic in i) 
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These truth-conditions are intuitively right, and in fact K3 also yields good predictions 
for a sentence like (94b). Namely, embedding (94e) under an attitude verb yields the result 
that “that woman with a coat” works pretty much as if it were a directly referential term, for 
it is still anchored to the context: 
(94f) λi. for all circumstances j compatible with what Emmanuel believes in i, Ǝx (x 
is identical to Angela Merkel in ic & x is a woman with a coat in ic & Ɐy (y is 
identical to Angela Merkel in ic & y is a woman with a coat in ic) → x=y) & x looks 
sympathetic in j) 
These truth-conditions require Merkel to wear a coat in the actual circumstance, but do 
not require Emmanuel to believe that she is doing so. For all these reasons, King (2001) 
settles for K3.  
Now, there are important problems with this theory, and in particular with its reliance 
on higher-order properties like J1 or J2. In the first place, the idea that these are determined 
by speakers’ intentions seems prima facie objectionable: intentions are usually thought of as 
something agents consciously entertain, and therefore the object of an intention is something 
they should in principle be able to consciously access. But, arguably, average people have no 
conscious access to J1 and J2 nor to some non-formal version thereof. Of course, King could 
respond that this kind of properties model what intentions determine, rather than being 
actually intended by speakers. This is an idea that King has argued for in other places. Let 
me sketch a possible response that is consistent with the view of the role of intentions that 
King has defended in later essays. 
In discussing the role of intentions in determining a scale for gradable adjectives, King 
(2014a, 2020) agrees with Michael Glanzberg (2012) that ordinary speakers are unlikely to 
have intentions about functions from the meaning of an adjective to a degree in a relevant 
scale. In his own words, “exotic, highly abstract or mathematically sophisticated entities are 
ruled out as semantic values of a supplementive in the mouths of ordinary speakers” (King 
2014a: 108). Of course, this rules out that they may have intentions about J1 or J2 either. King 
responds to this challenge by arguing that it is nevertheless possible to obtain the 
sophisticated abstract objects in a systematic manner from the intentions of speakers: given 
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an ordinary intention, it is possible to determine a value that, although it is unlikely to be 
intended by a speaker, can nevertheless be obtained on the basis of that very intention. As he 
puts it, “make sure the objects of speakers’ intentions really are things they can have 
intentions about and that hearers can have beliefs about [...] Call these the objects of the 
intentions. Then make sure the objects of intentions determine the semantic values assigned 
to the supplementives in context in some manner or other” (King 2014a: 110). Judging from 
these informal remarks, it is plausible that he would regard J1 and J2 as objects that cannot be 
intended by ordinary speakers but may nevertheless be systematically determined on the 
basis of their intentions. 
King formulates this response when discussing gradable adjectives, but he intends his 
claims to hold for intentions in general, including of course those associated with complex 
demonstratives. I find this response rather convincing, so let us assume it works. Even so, 
notice that K3 does not, per se, block readings such as (84b), (77a) or (94c). Here is the 
reason: it is possible to find J1–type contexts containing properties like those determined by 
descriptive intentions and, similarly, one can devise J2–type contexts containing the kind of 
properties associated with perceptual intentions. I.e., it is possible to find contexts like the 
following: 
c1 = <ac, wc, tc, J1, being a student who scored one hundred on the exam> 
c2 = <ac, wc, tc, J2, being identical to Angela Merkel> 
An utterance of (84) in c1 would result in a reading equivalent to (84b), i.e., a reading 
that is truth-conditionally identical to the one directly referential theorists predict. I do not 
regard this as a problem for King’s theory, for arguably it is not implausible to attribute such 
reading to this sentence, but, given King’s assumptions on the matter, rigidity does prove 
fatal when it comes to QI-readings like (77a). On the other hand, the existence of contexts 
like c2 poses an even more fundamental threat for K3: assessing (94b) in c2 yields as a result 
the proposition in (94c), which as we have already seen is wrong.25 
                                                          
25 King does discuss cases in which the descriptive meaning of complex demonstratives seems to fall under the 
scope of attitude verbs (King 2001: §3, particularly pp. 109-116), but the evidence he cites seems to me dubious 
and, at any rate, explainable by other means. I present and discuss this alleged counterevidence in sections 
3.3.5.2 and 3.4.2.1. 
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So King needs some way of preventing the existence of contexts like c1 and, more 
importantly, c2. One possible way to do this is by incorporating into the semantics a principle 
like the following (for the sake of discussion, assume at most one occurrence of a complex 
demonstrative per sentence): 
INTENTIONAL PAIRING: for any context c, if ac’s intentions in c are perceptual 
then Jc = J1, and if they are descriptive then Jc = J2 
Arguably, a principle like this one does not pertain to semantics proper, but rather to 
the metaphysics of contexts, understanding these not as abstract objects but rather as actual 
settings in which real actions – utterances – take place. King himself justifies a restriction 
like this one as follows: 
“Because the speaker intends to talk about b and is using the predicate `F' to pick 
out b in the context of utterance in such a case [when she employs a complex 
demonstrative accompanied by a perceptual intention], the speaker intends to 
express a proposition that tracks b across worlds and times, regardless of its 
possession of the property expressed by `F' at those worlds and times. This is why 
the speaker's intentions determine the property of being jointly instantiated in w, t 
in such cases. [...] But now consider a case in which a speaker uses a `that' phrase 
but has a descriptive intention instead of a perceptual one [...] since the speaker 
has no individual in mind in such a case, he does not intend to express a proposition 
that tracks a particular thing across worlds and times regardless of its possession 
of the property expressed by `F'. His intention seems to be to claim that something 
uniquely jointly instantiates the property expressed by `F' and a property 
determined by his descriptive intention (King 2001: 46-47) 
I agree that this is probably the case in most occasions, but this strikes me as a 
pragmatic justification rather than a semantic one. And, to use Kaplan’s catchy phrase, one 
should take good care to distinguish the “vagaries of use” from the “verities of meaning” 
(Kaplan 1989: 585; see also Predelli 2004, 2005a, 2013). This is to say that facts having to 
do with empirical regularities unrelated to meaning, such as, say, the fact that usually 
speakers are located at the same place from which they are talking, should bear no effect on 
one’s semantic theory, which is meant to model logical properties of language proper, such 
as entailment and validity.  
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However, Kaplan himself incorporated into his logic restrictions that have nothing to 
do with meaning properly speaking. For example, one of his semantic clauses states that the 
agent of a context must be always located at the time, place and world of the context (Kaplan 
1977: 544). This restriction turned out to be indispensable for validating some truths which 
he regarded as analytical, such as “I am here now” or “I exist” (see Predelli 1998a, 1998b, 
2008, 2013 for criticisms); it might therefore seem that building a principle like 
INTENTIONAL PAIRING directly into the semantics is not entirely unreasonable. But, as 
we shall see now, such incorporation is not quite telling, for by doing so we would end up 
with some undesirable consequences. Namely, we would come dangerously close to counting 
sentences like (96) as valid (i.e., analytic): 
(96) If this man is tired, then I have an intention 
Let us see why (a similar point is discussed in section 3.1). If we wish to incorporate 
INTENTIONAL PAIRING into the semantics, we need to make it by means of some sort of 
restriction on the set of contexts that can be employed for interpreting our sentences. This is 
pretty much like the restriction that, as we mentioned in the previous paragraph, Kaplan 
implemented in his system in order to prevent sentences from occurring in certain contexts 
which would contradict his theses; similarly, King needs to rule out contexts like c1 or c2 as 
improper. And this is, in fact, what he does in his formal system. In his semantics, Rc and Jc 
are not part of the context; rather, he incorporates into his semantics a couple of functions f 
and h mapping each context to a property and to either J1 or J2, respectively (see footnote 24). 
King’s version of INTENTIONAL PAIRING is equivalent to the following principle: for 
any object b and context c, if f(c) is the property of being identical to b, then h(c) = J1; 
otherwise, h(c) = J2 (King 2001: 165). Thus, King ensures that each context will be paired to 
a suitable pair of property and higher-order property. Before discussing the consequences of 
this principle, let me translate it into the framework we are employing here.  
The natural way to translate this into our system is, simply, to incorporate Rc and Jc 
directly into the context and to state that, for any context c and object b, if Rc is the property 
of being identical to b, then Jc = J1, and otherwise Jc = J2 – so far the difference is just 
terminological. However, the fact that f and h are functions means that we still need a further 
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restriction. In our terminology, what this means is that, if there is a context like, say, c3, then 
contexts like c4 or c5 cannot exist: 
c3 = <Carnap, @, t, being identical to Otto Neurath, J1> 
c4 = <Carnap, @, t, being identical to Otto Neurath, J2> 
c5 = <Carnap, @, t, being identical to Ruth Marcus, J1>, 
where “t” stands for, say, 9AM of the 2nd of April of 1947. What this amounts to is 
this: given an agent, a time and a world, her intentions can only determine a property and 
either J1 or J2. In more general terms, it requires adopting a principle like the following:  
INTENTION DETERMINATION: for any two contexts c and k, if ac = ak, tc = tk 
and wc = wk, then Rc = Rk and Jc = Jk  
By means of these two principles it is possible to achieve the results King wants. 
INTENTION DETERMINATION entails that the existence of contexts like c3, c4 and c5 is 
mutually exclusive. INTENTIONAL PAIRING, in turn, does not leave any room for contexts 
like c1, c2 and c4. The latter suffices for blocking undesirable readings like (84b) and (94c), 
and the former ensures that, given a context, a complex demonstrative can only receive one 
reading. So far, so good. 
However, in order for these two principles not to seem entirely ad hoc, King should 
find a way to justify them, for clearly they do not track semantic properties.  They might be 
very reasonable when it comes to accounting for the regularities of actual contexts of use, 
but, precisely because of this, what these restrictions deal with is a contingent matter that 
depends on how the world happens to be. This is not a matter of meaning, much less a matter 
of logic, and it is therefore doubtful that these principles should be incorporated into the 
semantics of a language. In fact, if these principles were really a matter of semantics, it is not 
clear why King’s theory should be any different from the ambiguity theories that we 
mentioned above and that King himself criticizes. By relying on J1 and J2, he is basically 
stating something like this: “if the speaker intends to talk about someone in particular, then 
the descriptive meaning of the demonstrative is context-dependent, and circumstance-
dependent if she doesn’t”. This strikes me as a disjunction in disguise. It is in fact not too 
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different from stating something like “if a use of a complex demonstrative is referential, then 
it should refer to the demonstratum of the context and, if not, it should have the semantics of 
a definite description”.26  
Indeed, King is well aware that a principle like INTENTION DETERMINATION is 
“a matter of fact”:  
“I note that we don't allow a bunch of different fs and hs here. We take it to be a 
matter of fact which properties are determined by an agent a’s intentions at w, t 
for all contexts <a, w, t>, and (the particular) f and h encode these facts.” (King 
2001: 166; I adapted the terminology) 
It is clear, then, that restricting contexts by means of this kind of principles is on a par 
with Kaplan’s restriction to proper contexts. King’s function f, or our equivalent principle of 
INTENTION DETERMINATION, is meant to “encode the fact” that, given an occurrence 
of a complex demonstrative, the intention relevant for determining its value in that context 
can be known simply by finding who the utterer is and in which world and time the utterance 
took place.27 And INTENTIONAL PAIRING, equivalent to King’s function h, is in turn 
devised to track the fact that an agent’s intentions are always this or that way. But, clearly, 
none of these are logical facts. They belong, perhaps, to the metaphysics of utterances, which 
is related to, but distinct from, the study of meaning. In Kaplan’s own words,  
“It is important to distinguish an utterance from a sentence-in-a-context. The 
former notion is from the theory of speech acts, the latter from semantics. 
Utterances take time, and utterances of distinct sentences cannot be simultaneous 
(i.e., in the same context). But in order to develop a logic of demonstratives we 
must be able to evaluate several premises and a conclusion all in the same context. 
We do not want arguments involving indexicals to become valid simply because 
there is no possible context in which all the premises are uttered, and thus no 
possible context in which all are uttered truthfully” (Kaplan 1977: 522). 
                                                          
26 An ambiguity theory along these lines is developed by Georgi (2012; cf. his lexical entries in pp. 372-373). 
King thoroughly criticizes this kind of approaches (2001: §5).  
27 A similar point was made by David Lewis (1980): an agent, time and world should suffice for determining 
every other parameter of context.  
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Or, to borrow Kaplan’s own example, one should make sure her logic does not rule out 
the possibility that sentences like (97) may be true at some contexts, even though they may 
never be employed truly: 
(97) I say nothing 
The reason why Kaplan’s system does not count (97) as a logical contradiction is that 
it might be assessed in contexts c such that ac is not speaking in wc and tc. Restricting the 
context in the appropriate manner could yield a different result, one that conflicts with our 
natural understanding of semantic and logical properties. INTENTION DETERMINATION 
and INTENTION PAIRING are not different from restrictions of this kind, i.e., constraints 
motivated by regularities and worldly conditions, instead of purely semantic features. In 
consequence, they may yield undesirable results; King’s system is dangerously close to 
counting (96) as analytic, given his commitments. 
I say “is dangerously close” because actually it does not. King does not state explicitly 
any clause to the effect that f and h should map contexts to the intentional object of the agent 
of the context in the world and time of the context, i.e., he does not state any principle 
equivalent to this one: 
WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS: For any context c, the objects of ac’s intentions 
in ic are Rc and Jc 
It is clear from the above passages that King, in his informal discussion, endorses this 
principle; it seems to be, in fact, what justifies the other two. However, he never incorporates 
it in his formal theory, and, without such principle, it is straightforward that there are contexts 
in which (96) is false – i.e., it is not valid. This means that King, on the one hand, blocks 
undesirable readings like (84b), (77a) or (94c) by means of INTENTION PAIRING and 
INTENTION DETERMINATION (his functions f and h), and on the other he manages not 
to count (96) as valid by never stating a principle like WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS as 
part of the semantics. So far the predictions are right, but one might wonder whether it is 
consistent to incorporate INTENTION PAIRING and INTENTION DETERMINATION 
into the semantics without thereby including WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS too.  I shall 
argue that it is not. 
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The main problem I see here is the role that King attributes to WORLD-BOUND 
INTENTIONS in informally justifying the other two principles. Because of this, it is hard to 
see how a semantics could incorporate INTENTION PAIRING and INTENTION 
DETERMINATION without, at the same time, including also the former, more basic 
principle. All three principles track non-logical worldly conditions, which means that they 
are formally on a par. And, in fact, the worldly conditions that WORLD-BOUND 
INTENTIONS tracks are the justification that King provides for INTENTION PAIRING and 
INTENTION DETERMINATION, meaning that it is more basic. In order to see this more 
clearly, let me introduce the facts tracked by each principle (assume, for the argument’s sake, 
that King is right and all these facts are real properties of actual contexts): 
Worldly fact v1: given an utterance u of a complex demonstrative, the property and 
the higher-order property that serve as arguments for the expression are always 
determined by the intentions of the utterer in the situation in which u takes place 
(this is tracked by WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS) 
Worldly fact v2: For any utterance u of a complex demonstrative d: if the property 
that d takes as argument is haecceitistic, then d will also combine with J1, and if the 
property that d takes as an argument is descriptive, then it must combine with J2 
(this is tracked by INTENTION PAIRING) 
Worldly fact v3: given an utterance u of a complex demonstrative by an agent in a 
world and time, there is only one possible property and only one higher-order 
property we can associate with u (this is tracked by INTENTION 
DETERMINATION) 
If we assume King’s arguments in the above passages, it seems that v1 is a necessary 
condition for both v2 and v3. For example, the truth of v2 requires three things: that a 
descriptive intention can only determine J2, that a haecceitistic intention can only determine 
J1, and that uses of complex demonstratives are always linked to an intention. If v1 were false 
(say, if the value of a complex demonstrative could be determined by something other than 
an intention, or if agents had different intentional capabilities), then we would have no reason 
to hold that v2 correctly represents any fact about complex demonstratives. And v3, in turn, 
also depends on a feature of intentions: namely, that an agent can only have one intention at 
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a time in a certain world.28 Thus v3 and, more importantly, v2, are relevant to the semantics 
of complex demonstratives only insofar as v1 is true. If it were false, v2 would be so too, and 
therefore INTENTION PAIRING would not be justified. And v3, in turn, requires the truth 
of v1 in order to enjoy a privileged status within the semantics of complex demonstratives, 
for, were it not for a certain (alleged) feature of intentions, we would have no reason to think 
that, given an agent, a world and a time, a complex demonstrative can only receive one value.  
In other words, without v1 it is impossible to justify the restrictions imposed by 
INTENTION PAIRING or INTENTION DETERMINATION. And, since WORLD-
BOUND INTENTIONS tracks the facts in v1, it is hard to see on what grounds it can be 
excluded from a semantics that does incorporate the other two. None of the three principles 
are logically justified, and the only thing that could be argued in their favor is that they 
represent how things in fact are. But WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS is indeed more basic 
than the other two, and this means that the latter can represent how things are only in case 
they are combined with the former. If WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS is excluded, the 
other two restrictions are not representing all the facts that are relevant to the use of complex 
demonstratives. This partial representation of how things are is what renders them on a par 
with ad hoc principles. Thus, anything that could justify the logical role that INTENTION 
PAIRING and INTENTION DETERMINATION play in King’s semantics should also 
justify incorporating WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS.  
What I intend to show is that King cannot have it both ways: either all three principles 
are included in K3, or none of them is. But then King is at an impasse. If none of the three 
principles are included, he is unable to achieve the right results, for he predicts readings like 
(84b), (77a) or (94c), which he wants to exclude from his semantics. And, on the other hand, 
if he includes all three principles then he ends up with undesirable consequences like, as we 
have already mentioned, counting (96) as valid. I think this constitutes an important dilemma 
for K3. If this theory is not intended as a theory of use, then one might wonder why 
                                                          
28 This assumption is far from uncontroversial, but I am granting it for the sake of King’s argument. Arguably, 
however, a speaker may associate different intentions to a single utterance. Consider, for instance, inscriptions 
like “Jesus loves you” addressed to several readers, cases of deliberately ambiguous sentences, etc. I may, for 
example, write a single e-mail stating “I will meet you at the usual spot” and send it to two different people 
(García-Carpintero 1998: 535; example attributed to Josep Macià).  
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INTENTION PAIRING and INTENTION DETERMINATION should play any prominent 
role in the semantics. And, if it is intended as a theory of use, then there is no reason not to 
incorporate WORLD-BOUND INTENTIONS, too. So far my criticism of King’s theory.  
Other authors have raised yet further objections against King’s system. For example, 
Braun (2008b) has pointed out that quantificational theories of complex demonstratives, and 
King’s in particular, yield wrong results when it comes to the interaction of complex 
demonstratives and modal operators. For instance, K3 predicts that sentences like (98) have 
a reading in which they come out as false, but arguably they are unquestionably true: 
(98) That man could have failed to exist 
Assume that the utterer of (98) has a perceptual intention towards Benny Goodman. 
Given that quantifiers are usually assumed to be able to take both narrow and wide scope (a 
fact that King clearly endorses), this sentence, when assessed in a context c, may be taken to 
express either of the two following propositions: 
(98a) Possibly, the individual that is a man in ic and identical to Benny Goodman in 
ic does not exist 
(98b) The individual that is a man in ic and identical to Benny Goodman in ic 
possibly does not exist 
The fact that Benny Goodman exists is a contingent matter, so (98) should be true 
simpliciter. Yet the ambiguity predicted by King’s theory entails that this sentence has a false 
reading: (98a). This reading is true iff there is a possible world w such that there is an 
individual in w who happens to be identical to Benny Goodman in wc and a man in wc, and 
who does not exist in w. So it is in fact not just false, but also self-contradictory: it instructs 
us to see whether the domain of quantification of w contains an individual satisfying the 
aforementioned properties, and to assign truth if that individual is absent from the domain of 
quantification of w. Of course, this problem could be solved if we assumed that quantifiers 
like “all” or “every” are not restricted to possible worlds (i.e., that the domain of individuals 
is constant29), perhaps pairing this assumption with treating existence as a predicate, as in 
                                                          
29 In fact, King (2001: 164) assumes a constant domain of individuals, although presumably he does so only for 
the sake of simplicity.  
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free logics, pretty much like Kaplan himself does (1977: 544). However, there are further 
modal problems that Braun raises to King’s account.  
One of these criticisms concerns non-redundant NDNS-uses. These are, recall, uses of 
a complex demonstrative of the form “that F” with a descriptive intention, with the additional 
requirement that, in the context c in which they occur, ⟦F⟧c ≠ Rc. Keeping with the above 
example, we could imagine that Greg, after learning that one student scored one hundred on 
the exam, engages in the following conversation with a fellow student:  
(99) Bob: I cannot believe that there could be someone able to score one hundred 
on the exam 
Greg: Well, that genius, if she exists, scored one hundred on the exam 
Since Greg is unaware of that student’s identity, it is reasonable to assume that, in this 
context k, Rk = scoring one hundred on the exam. This should be so, for Greg has no clue as 
to who that student might be, and that particular property is the only way of individuating 
her. As Braun argues, K3 predicts that Greg’s utterance in (99) expresses, in this context, a 
necessary truth: 
(99a) If there is a unique individual x such that x satisfies scoring one hundred on 
the exam and being a genius, then x satisfies scoring one hundred on the exam 
This is a highly undesirable consequence. Similarly, there are many contexts in which 
K3 would count the following examples as true, but arguably they should not be true in any 
context: 
(100) Necessarily, that table, if it exists, is red 
(101) Necessarily, that spy, if she exists, wears a blue hat 
Let c be a context such that Rc = being a red table. On a narrow scope reading, (100) 
expresses a necessary truth in c, but arguably it should not. A similar story can be told about 
(101). These problems, however, are not restricted just to non-redundant NDNS-uses; for the 
redundant ones can also be problematic. For instance, a sentence like (100a) is intuitively 
false, yet, in a context in which the intention of the speaker is redundant, it can be given a 
reading in which it expresses a true proposition, namely one equivalent to (100b): 
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(100a) It could not have been the case that that red table in Fred’s living room was 
completely green 
(100b) It is not possible that the red table in Fred’s living room is completely green 
An analogous case can be constructed for similar examples. Imagine, for example, an 
NDNS non-redundant use of (101a) in a context in which no spy is following me. Intuitively, 
the sentence is not true –  it may be false, it might express a gappy proposition or it may just 
be uninterpretable, but at any rate it cannot be true. However, and just as in all the other cases, 
King predicts that this sentence has a true reading, namely (101b): 
(101a) It could have been the case that that spy behind me wore a blue hat 
(101b) It is possible that there was a unique spy behind me and that she wore a blue 
hat 
These and many other modal objections30 led Braun to reject King’s and any other 
quantificational approach to complex demonstratives, for most of them predict scope 
                                                          
30 Braun (2008a) and Stanley (2002) raise yet another objection to King’s theory. I chose not to discuss it in the 
body of the text because it depends on controversial assumptions about structured propositions and the notion 
of aboutness, but let me discuss it here. The objection builds on Soames’ (2002a) argument against treating 
proper names as actualized definite descriptions in disguise. According to Soames, treating “Aristotle” as if it 
were equivalent to “the actual philosopher who wrote the Metaphysics” yields wrong results, for it would make 
the following sentence false: 
(a) It is possible to have beliefs about Aristotle without thereby having beliefs about the actual world 
But, arguably, (a) expresses a metaphysical possibility, and it is therefore true. This argument only holds in case 
the actual world is a constituent of the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence; in a non-structured 
framework, (b) and (c) are just equivalent: 
(b) I believe that Aristotle was fond of dogs 
(c) I believe that the actual philosopher who wrote the Metaphysics was fond of dogs 
However, in a structured framework the truth of (c) would require me to believe a structured content containing 
the actual world as a constituent, whereas the truth of (b) wouldn’t. Therefore, assuming contents are structured, 
proper names cannot be actualized definite descriptions – or, for that matter, they cannot be shortened forms of 
some “dthat”-term (see Corazza 2002a and Predelli 2015 for discussion). 
Stanley (2002) points out (although does not elaborate on the point and, in fact, the reconstruction of the 
argument is carried out by King himself) that a version of this idea may be employed as an objection to King’s 
account. Namely, (d) expresses a true metaphysical possibility, but King’s framework, in which perceptual 
intentions always give rise to structured contents containing the actual world as a constituent, predicts that it 
should come out as false: 
(d) It is possible to have beliefs about that man without thereby having beliefs about the actual world 
On King’s system, (d) would express (roughly) the following content: 
(e) <Being possible, having beliefs about [the x: <being a man in @, x>, <being identical to a in @, 
x>] without thereby having beliefs about @> 
Braun (2008b) raises a very similar objection. King’s (2008a) response is that (d) does express (e), which is 
contradictory, but appeals to the other reading (d) has (i.e., one in which the complex demonstrative takes wide 
scope over the modal operator) and argues that the latter is the more natural and salient reading.  
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ambiguities of this kind. King (2008a) responded to these criticisms by claiming two things. 
In the first place, the very same arguments can be constructed for any other quantifier, and 
therefore they show nothing about complex demonstratives in particular. Consider (102): 
(102) It could have been the case that someone who is actually here now failed to 
exist 
Just like (98), this sentence seems intuitively true in any context. However, any theory 
that treats “someone” as a quantifier predicts that it has a false reading, namely, one that 
instructs the hearer to find a world containing an individual that fails to be in the domain of 
quantification of that world. This leads King to the second part of his argument: he claims 
that the ambiguities that Braun criticizes are actually there, but they are very difficult to hear 
because complex demonstratives have a strong tendency to take wide scope. This also 
explains our intuitions towards (99)-(101). Of course, some contexts may bring to salience 
the hidden readings. 
However, Braun (2008c) points out that the difficulty in hearing a false reading for 
(102) is due to other factors. Consider the following contrast: 
(103a) It could have been the case that some man failed to exist 
(103b) It could have been the case that that man failed to exist 
It is clear that (103a) displays ambiguities that (103b) does not, and King has no way 
to explain this. Additionally, Braun argues that King’s judgment towards (102) is incorrect, 
and that the difficulty in hearing a false reading of this sentence is not due to pragmatic issues 
but, rather, due to the verbal morphology that the demonstrative contains (Braun credits 
Salmon for informally suggesting the idea). Namely, the verb “is” is in the indicative mood, 
whereas “failed”, on the contrary, is in the subjunctive. Verbal moods are usually taken to 
refer to possible worlds (see section 3.3.1.2), and indicative in particular picks out the actual 
world. It is therefore no surprise that only a wide scope reading can be heard. (103a), on the 
contrary, contains no verbal morphology, and a narrow scope reading is much easier to get. 
But, importantly, the same contrast does not surface when complex demonstratives are 
involved: (103b), which contains no verbal morphology, still displays only a de re reading. I 
shall come back to related issues later, for, as I argue in sections 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.5, the role 
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of verbal morphology in licensing and barring certain readings is even greater than Braun 
suggests. 
The exchange between Braun and King relies heavily on intuitions of modality that 
average speakers without philosophical background do not always share, and it is always 
possible to argue that the unnaturalness of most of the examples might be responsible for 
many of their judgments. For this reason, I would deem it inconclusive, although I shall come 
back to these issues in sections 3.3.5 and 3.4.2.1, where I argue that many of the ambiguities 
detected by King are dubious, and I suggest that the alleged narrow scope readings are better 
explained otherwise. Other critics of King’s account include Dever (2001), Salmon (2006a, 
2006b) and Nowak (2019a). I believe that the arguments I provided above, together with the 
ones by Braun and other critics, suffice for trying to find some alternative to King’s K3.  
 
2.2.2 Lepore & Ludwig’s approach 
The theory by Kirk Ludwig and Ernst Lepore (2000) is probably the second most developed 
quantificational account of complex demonstratives to date – as I already mentioned, other 
quantificational proposals are rather sketchy, and only suggested on the basis of syntactic 
uniformity with other determiner phrases. Their theory is, on my view, more elegant than 
King’s, although it may subject to more modal criticisms. An important point that they make 
in their paper is that their theory is crosslinguistically supported, although, as we shall see, 
the very same evidence they cite will ultimately turn against them. Let us see what they argue 
for. 
Essentially, their theory holds that complex demonstratives are determiner phrases with 
a rigidifying element. An important trait of their approach – one that may be in conflict with 
many theories of syntax – is that the occurrence of “that” within a complex demonstrative is 
still a simple demonstrative. These remarks may sound cryptic, but they can be made clear 
by means of an example. Consider the contrast between (104a-b): 
(104a) That is huge 
(104b) That man is huge 
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One might wonder what is the role of “that” in these two sentences. Average 
philosophers and linguists would treat “that” in (104a) as a context-dependent directly 
referential term. However, it is clear that the same story cannot be told about the “that” in 
(104b), for even advocates of direct reference need to say that what picks out an object in 
this sentence is not “that”, but rather “that man”. It seems, then, that directly referential 
theorists are committed to some sort of ambiguity theory: on some uses, the only role of 
“that” is to pick out an individual, whereas in others its functioning is more complex, because 
it needs to combine with a predicate before being able to select an object. This ambiguity 
theory is importantly different from the one we mentioned at the beginning of section 2.2.1.3, 
for it is not claiming that English contains a “that” for referential uses and another one for 
attributive uses; rather, it postulates a distinction between a determiner “that” and a simple 
pronoun “that”. This distinction is somewhat parallel to Kaplan’s second and third “dthat”.  
Albeit I believe that there are good reasons for thinking that these two “that” are in fact 
different lexical items (see below), ambiguity theories are in principle not quite attractive, 
which is why many authors have tried to provide a unified account of both roles of the term, 
reducing the pronoun as a special case of the determiner or vice versa. For example, King 
(2001, §4) suggested as a tentative hypothesis that bare “this” and “that” could be understood 
as quantifiers with a covert noun argument, and Elbourne (2008, §3.3; see also 2005) made 
a proposal along similar lines. Thus, both authors end up defending a version of the idea that 
“that” is always a definite determiner in need of completion by some arguments, pretty much 
like “the”. Other authors endorsing an unambiguous treatment of “that” as a determiner 
include Taylor (1980), Barwise and Cooper (1981) and Salmon (2002), who regard bare 
demonstratives as the result of combining “that” with a trivial property or, simply, as a 
product of ellision. Lepore and Ludwig take the opposite path: on their view, the only role of 
“that” is the pronominal one.31 Regardless of whether “that” is found isolated, as in (104a), 
or within a larger noun phrase, as in (104b), its only role is to pick out an object from the 
context, i.e., it always works as a singular referring term. According to them, any noun phrase 
                                                          
31 Lepore and Ludwig (2000: 215, footnote 22) credit Willard Van Orman Quine (1960: 163) with an early 
implementation of this idea, although they acknowledge that his purposes were different, for he was aiming to 
eliminate demonstratives by replacing them, rather than to provide an explanation of how they work.  
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of the form “that” receives the following semantic value (assume that each context c contains 
a demonstratum or referent dc):  
⟦that⟧ = λc. λi. dc 
So far this not different from theories of direct reference. The innovation Lepore and 
Ludwig introduce lies in the way they suggest “that” combines with the nominal in order to 
obtain complex demonstratives, which they claim are quantifiers with no explicit determiner. 
The LF for any expression of the form “that F is G” is given below, and it is to be interpreted 
by means of the syncategorematic lexical entry they postulate (the terminology employed is 
a mix between theirs and mine; I explain the relevant changes below): 
(105a) LF: “[That x: Fx] (Gx)” 
(105b) For all contexts c and circumstances i, ⟦[That x: Fx] (Gx)⟧c, i = 1 iff the c’ 
such that c’ differs from c at most in that gc’(“x”) = dc and ⟦Fx⟧c’, i = 1 is such that 
⟦Gx⟧c’, i = 1 
(105a-b) require some explanation. (105a) is a variant the typical form that all 
generalized quantifiers take in the classical theories of these expressions (cf. Sharvy 1969, 
Barwise & Cooper 1981, Higginbotham & May 1981, Neale 1990a; these authors often talk 
of “restricted quantifiers” instead). In these theories, every sentence of the form “DF is G”, 
where “F” and “G” are predicates and “D” is a determiner, receives an LF like the following: 
“[Dx: Fx] (Gx)”. The determiner, then, specifies some conditions that both formulae, “Fx” 
and “Gx”, need to satisfy in order for the whole sentence to be true: for example, “[All x: 
men (x)] (mortal (x))” is true under an assignment g iff every g’ such that g’ differs from g at 
most in the value it assigns to x and satisfies “x is a man” is such that g’ satisfies “x is 
mortal”.32 And (105b) is, essentially, a variant of this kind of lexical entries (the reason why 
I talk of contexts instead of assignments is, simply, that I am assuming that the assignment 
is part of the context). Of course, “that” is still a referring term in (105b); it is the whole 
expression “that F” which has quantificational status.  
                                                          
32 Here are some extra examples, just in case it was not clear enough: 
 “[Some x: men (x)] (mortal (x))” is true under an assignment g iff there is at least a g’ such that g’ 
differs from g at most in the value it assigns to x and satisfies “Fx” and “Gx” 
“[Most x: men (x)] (mortal (x))” is true under an assignment g iff the majority of g’ such that g’ differs 
from g at most in the value it assigns to x and satisfies “Fx” are such that g’ satisfies “Gx” 
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Thus, Lepore and Ludwig assume that complex demonstratives have the form of a 
generalized quantifier and that they might be interpreted accordingly, as (105b) makes clear. 
Notice, in fact, that (105b) entails that “that F is G” is equivalent to “[the x: Fx & x = that] 
(Gx)” (Lepore & Ludwig 2000: 215). There is, however, a fundamental difference between 
complex demonstratives and other generalized quantifiers, for, as we have already 
mentioned, “that”, on their theory, is not a determiner, but a referring term. Thus, every 
quantifier has the form “[Dx: Fx]”, but complex demonstratives are slightly different, for the 
determiner “D” is completely absent from the superficial form of (105a). As Lepore and 
Ludwig acknowledge, these are not the only determiner phrases with no overt determiner: 
for example, generic noun phrases like “whales” in “whales are mammals” are often assumed 
to be quantificational. 
In sum: “that” is always a referring term, yet on occasions it might combine with a 
nominal in order to return a quantified expression with no overt determiner. The result is a 
complex demonstrative, whose syntax is somewhat akin to that of, say, generics, and whose 
semantics is just like that of any other quantifier: a function from properties to truth-values. 
Thus, they avoid treating “that” as an ambiguous term. Of course, we are owed an explanation 
of how such combination is even possible, and in this respect what they offer is 
crosslinguistic evidence that demonstratives may undergo such kind of combinations in other 
languages. We have already mentioned one of their examples: 
(76a) Aquel hombre lleva sombrero 
That man wears hat 
“That man wears a hat” 
(76b) El hombre aquel lleva sombrero 
The man that wears hat 
“That man wears a hat” 
As stated above, Spanish may construct complex demonstratives in these two different 
yet semantically equivalent ways. Importantly, the complex demonstrative in (76b) contains 
an explicit determiner, yet it means exactly the same as (76a). This, Lepore and Ludwig 
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argue, strongly suggests that complex demonstratives are quantifiers: in Spanish, the 
determiner may remain covert or may raise to surface, whereas in English it is always covert. 
At the semantic level, however, they are identical. They even provide evidence from 
languages in which the use of the definite article is mandatory, i.e., languages in which the 
only grammatical form of complex demonstratives is the one displayed in (76b) – they 
mention Hungarian, Haitian Creole, Welsh, Dehu, Greek, Hebrew and Mandingo. In fact, 
English itself allows many combinations of determiner + demonstrative, whereas 
combinations of determiner + determiner (often) result in ungrammaticality: 
(106a) OKAll those people are funny 
(106b) #Some all people are funny 
(106c) #Every most people are funny 
According to Lepore and Ludwig, the facts in (106a-c) strongly suggest that the 
demonstrative “those” is not a determiner. 
As we shall see later, all these pieces of evidence are dubious. Let us first see the 
semantic problems their theory is subject to. One obvious inconvenient is that, insofar as they 
allow the descriptive meaning of complex demonstratives to be circumstance-dependent, and 
insofar as all uses of complex demonstratives are rigid, they predict that sentences like (77) 
and (94b) display readings they shouldn’t. For example, the lexical entry in (105b) predicts 
two possible readings for (94b) interpreted in a context in which dc = Angela Merkel: 
(94d) λi. The x such that x = Angela Merkel & x wears a coat in i is such that, in all 
circumstances j compatible with what Emmanuel believes in i, x is sympathetic in j 
(94e) λi. In all circumstances j compatible with what Emmanuel believes in i, the x 
such that x = Angela Merkel & x wears a coat in j is such that x is sympathetic in j 
The descriptive meaning of the demonstrative is circumstance-dependent, and this 
entails that, when the expression takes narrow scope, we get a reading like (94e). And this 
reading is equivalent to (94c): Emmanuel has to believe that Merkel is wearing a coat. 
Another wrong prediction concerns QI readings (Nowak 2014), for Lepore and Ludwig’s 
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theory is unable to get rid of rigidity.33 In a context whose demonstratum is William Howley, 
the truth-conditions their theory predicts for (77) are given below: 
(77c) λi. [Ɐx: x is a queen in i] (x cherishes in i the y such that y = William Howley 
and y crowned x in i) 
Of course, (77c) suffers from the very same problems that directly referential theorists 
were subject to: (77) should not be about William Howley nor about anyone in particular.  
The response of Lepore and Ludwig provide against the criticism concerning attitude 
reports is very similar to King’s: the implausible reading is available, although very difficult 
to hear, but it can be brought to light in certain contexts. For example, imagine that Merkel 
is actually wearing a jacket and Emmanuel knows it. I mistake Merkel’s jacket for a coat and 
utter (94b). Then my interlocutor – say, Giuseppe – may correct me by uttering (94f): 
(94f) No, Emmanuel does not believe that that woman with a coat is sympathetic, 
he believes that that woman with a jacket is sympathetic 
This, they argue, shows that the descriptive meaning of the demonstrative is not opaque 
to modal quantification. Now, it seems to me that this response is just wrong, for what is 
going on in this example strikes me as a clear case of metalinguistic negation (Horn 1985). 
Consider (107)-(110): 
(107) I did not meet a woman. I met my wife 
(108) We don’t like L.A. We love it 
(109) Fred does not regret failing the exam. He passed it 
(110) Mary has not stopped smoking. She has never smoked 
In (107)-(108), it is clear that the negation in the first sentence cannot be operating on 
the literal content of the sentence: if somebody meets her wife, she meets a woman, and 
anybody who loves L.A. also likes it. As for (109)-(110), the negation seems to be operating 
not on the literal content of the sentences but, rather, at the level of presupposition – i.e., it is 
denying the presuppositions triggered by “regret” and “stop” in these examples, namely that 
Fred failed the exam and that Mary used to smoke. The usual thesis for explaining what is 
                                                          
33 Their theory does make some good predictions about QI, though. See the discussion on sentence (132) below.  
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going on in these examples is a pragmatic one: namely, that “not” is not being used for 
denying the content of the sentences under its scope, but rather for correcting the choice of 
words. For example, saying something like “Tom likes L.A.” may lead the hearer to infer, 
through Grice’s maxim of quantity, that Tom merely likes, and does not love, the city; 
similarly, saying “Fred does not regret failing the exam” triggers a presupposition to the 
effect that Fred failed it. The utterer of (108)-(109) is, simply, suggesting a better way to put 
what her interlocutor intended to convey – hence the name “metalinguistic negation”.  
Here is a modified example that shows that what is going on in (94f) is better explained 
along the lines of metalinguistic negation. Imagine Merkel is in fact wearing a coat, but 
Emmanuel mistakenly thinks she is wearing a jacket. Again, I point at Merkel and utter (94b). 
It seems clear to me that a correction along the lines of (94f) does not make much sense in 
such scenario, even though Emmanuel does believe that Merkel is wearing a coat. In the other 
scenario, it made sense for Giuseppe to say something like that, because he was correcting, 
at the metalinguistic level, something false I conveyed by means of my utterance – namely, 
that Merkel was wearing a coat. But, in a scenario in which Merkel is wearing a coat, such 
correction is out of place, even if Emmanuel believes she is wearing a jacket.34 This shows 
that what Giuseppe is correcting in the former scenario is not my attribution of a belief to 
Emmanuel, but rather my own belief. Lepore and Ludwig mistakenly predict that (94f) 
should be right in the latter situation. Notice, in fact, that standard quantifiers do display 
ambiguities like the ones erroneously predicted by Lepore and Ludwig, i.e., ambiguities 
analogous to those in (94e-d): 
(94g) Emmanuel believes that a woman with a jacket is sympathetic 
If Emmanuel believes that Merkel is wearing a jacket and that she is sympathetic, but 
Merkel is in fact wearing no jacket, (94g) may have both a true and a false reading. The fact 
that things are different in the case of “that” is indicative that complex demonstratives are 
                                                          
34 Or, at least, it sounds no better than the following correction: 
- (Pointing at Clark Kent dressed as a civilian) “Lois Lane believes that he can fly” 
- “No, she believes that Superman can fly” 
This correction can make sense at some pragmatic level, but it is clear that what is being corrected here is not 
the content of the utterance.  
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not quantifiers; if they were so, they should be able to give rise to de dicto readings. In section 
3.4.2.1 I shall discuss an additional example they provide. 
An additional worry about Lepore and Ludwig’s account concerns the unorthodox 
syntax they make use of. My criticism here is essentially an elaboration of the critique that 
King (2001: 178-179, footnote 6) posed to their account, but let me first introduce a couple 
of syntactic notions just to make it clearer. For simplicity’s sake, let me frame the debate in 
terms of noun phrases instead of determiner phrases,35 i.e., assume that “all men”, “most 
people” or “some children” are the result of combining a determiner with a nominal N´. 
Borrowing some terminology from (early) X-bar theory (Chomsky 1970, Jackendoff 1977 
and much subsequent work) we may state the rules for generating noun phrases thus (a 
parenthetical indicates that the element is optional): 
(111a) NP → (D) + N´ 
(111b) N´ → (AP) + N´ or N´ + (PP) 
(111c) N´ → N + (PP) 
These are rules licensing the introduction of certain elements into a sentence 
(sentences, in turn, are governed by a rule like S → NP + VP). As (111a) states, noun phrases 
are composed of an optional determiner and an intermediate projection N´ (what I have been 
calling a “nominal” throughout this dissertation). (111b), in turn, means that an N´ licenses 
the introduction of another N´, optionally accompanied by either an adjectival phrase or a 
prepositional phrase. This rule may be iterated as many times as one wishes. And, as the last 
rule states, an N´ also licenses the introduction of a noun (the head of the noun phrase) 
optionally followed by a prepositional phrase, but this rule cannot be iterated (i.e., there can 
only be one head per phrase). Let us see an example of a derivation to see how it works: 
                                                          
35 King also formulates his argument in terms of noun phrases instead of determiner phrases. However, most 
authors in the generativist tradition (Stowell 1989, Chomsky 1995/2015, Sag et al 2003) follow Abney (1987) 
in holding that the head of what has been traditionally called an “NP” is actually a determiner, meaning we 
should talk of “DP” instead – they acknowledge that NP’s (phrases headed by a noun) exist, but what ultimately 
combines with a verb phrase (VP) in order to obtain a sentence is a DP. Others (cf. Bruening 2009) have argued 
against the DP hypothesis and in favor of maintaining the traditional notion. 
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NP → the N´ (by (111a)) 
the N´ → the small N´ (by (111b)) 
the small N´ → the small N´ with a nice cover (by (111b)) 
the small N´ with a nice cover → the small blue N´ with a nice cover (by (111b)) 
the small blue N´ with a nice cover → the small blue book of linguistics with a nice 
cover (by (111c)) 
These rules are able to generate virtually every noun phrase of English. But, as King 
points out, none of them is able to generate the kind of structures Lepore and Ludwig require. 
They need a rule like the following: 
(112) NP → NP + (N´) 
I.e., they need that a full-fledged noun phrase like “that” (which, on their view, is a 
referring term which can be employed on its own, with no accompanying syntactic material) 
be capable of combining with further noun phrases in order to generate a quantified 
expression (i.e., another noun phrase). The problem with (112) is that it massively 
overgenerates, for it licenses constructions like the following, where the main noun phrase 
results from the combination of a full-fledged noun phrase and an N´: 
(113a) #She good student is intelligent 
(113b) #John plumber came yesterday 
(113c) #The kid son of John came yesterday 
Of course, Lepore and Ludwig could respond that every X-bar rule overgenerates, and 
that all of them need some kind of qualification – say, by means of the Θ-criterion. In fact, 
there is a small range of expressions that do seem to follow the pattern of (112): 
(114a) OKYou guys are doing great 
(114b) OKWe Americans are a great nation 
However, this response seems unconvincing, for two reasons. In the first place, cases 
like (114a-b) are the exception rather than the norm; complex demonstratives display a 
systematicity that the expressions in these two sentences do not seem subject to. More 
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importantly, if we are willing to provide a plausible account of the semantics of “you guys” 
or “we Americans”, I doubt that the first hypothesis one would think of is that they are 
quantifiers. If complex demonstratives are to be assimilated with expressions of this kind, 
then whatever story could be told about “you guys” or “we Americans” should also work for 
“this guy” or “that American”. But, at least prima facie, the former seem as referential as 
“you” or “we”.36 
Let me discuss now some of the grammatical evidence that Lepore and Ludwig provide 
in favor of their theory. In the first place, the facts in (106a-c) are far from conclusive, for 
English does display combinations of determiner + determiner: 
(106d) All the leaves are brown 
Nobody doubts that “the” is a determiner, so the existence of sentences like (106d) 
undermines the idea that the well-formedness of (106a) is due to “those” being a pronoun. I 
do not have an account that explains the contrast between (106a) and (106d), on the one hand, 
and (106b-c) on the other, but plausibly it has to do with the definite status of the determiner 
(Barwise & Cooper 1981: 183-184). Namely, both “the” and “those” are definite, i.e., 
determiners employed for (loosely speaking) selecting a unique set of individuals (see 
Roberts 2003 and Elbourne 2005 for thorough characterizations of English definite noun 
phrases). It does not show that “that” is still a pronoun in (106a). 
This leads me to the next piece of evidence. In order for Lepore and Ludwig to be able 
to claim that (76a-b) constitute evidence in favor of their theory, they need to assume that the 
word “aquel” (“that”) appearing in these sentences is a pronoun; that would provide evidence 
                                                          
36 There is, however, an important source of evidence in favor of dealing with complex demonstratives in these 
terms: prosody. English monosyllabic determiners are usually non-tonic, i.e., they do not display syllabic stress. 
For example, determiners like “a” or “the” sound as if they were non-tonic syllables: 
(f) I found a cat (“a” is pronounced [ə]) 
(g) I found the cat (“the” is pronounced [δə]) 
When stress is put on the determiner, they may sound differently: 
(h) I did not find “some” cats. I found a cat (“a” is pronounced [eɪ]) 
(i) I did not find just some street cat. I found the cat (“the” is pronounced [δi]) 
The “this” and “that” found in complex demonstratives are exceptional in this respect, for they are most usually 
stressed in spite of being monosyllabic. And, importantly, this is also the case of the pronouns in (114a-b), 
which receive their usual pronunciation – i.e., they are stressed. Lepore and Ludwig do not consider this piece 




that their unorthodox syntax is found in other languages. They argue that the Spanish 
sentence (76b) is simply a version of (76a) in which the determiner raises to surface, and on 
the basis of these examples they argue that the same kind of structure can be found in English, 
even if the determiner is always covert in this language.  However, things are more complex, 
for the word “aquel” (“that”) in the Spanish examples is clearly not a pronoun. Let us see 
why. The first thing to notice is that Spanish, unlike English, marks an explicit distinction, at 
the morphological level, between “this/that” as a pronoun and “this/that” as a 
determiner/adjective. Consider the following examples, containing “esto/esta/este” (“this”): 
(115a) Esto es grande 
This is large 
(115b) Esta mesa es grande 
This table is large 
(115c) Este perro es grande   
This dog is large 
The demonstrative in (115a) is simple, whereas those in (115b-c) are complex. The 
important thing to bear in mind here is the gender inflection of the words. In the latter case 
the demonstratives must agree in gender with the noun they combine with, i.e., with “mesa” 
and “perro” (“table” and “dog”), whose grammatical gender is feminine and masculine, 
respectively. It is for this reason that the demonstratives in these examples take the forms 
“esta” (for the feminine) and “este” (for the masculine). On the other hand, the demonstrative 
in (115a) is simple, meaning that it has no noun to combine with, and therefore it cannot take 
any sort of inflection; instead, it takes a nowadays fossilized neutral gender termination “-o”, 
yielding “esto” as a result.37 The fact that “esta” and “este” are required to agree in gender 
with the noun they modify is indicative that they are not pronouns; “esto”, on the contrary, 
can be employed for referring to any object whatsoever regardless of grammatical gender: 
                                                          
37 Etymologically, Spanish “este”, “esta” and “esto” come from the Latin adjectival demonstratives “iste”, 
“ista” and “istud”, which were employed respectively for the masculine, feminine and neutral gender. In 
Spanish, as in most Romance languages, the latter gender was lost and the neutral words were assimilated into 
the masculine gender (e.g., the neutral Latin word “caelum”, “heaven” or “sky”, evolved into the masculine 
word “cielo” in Spanish). This does not mean that “esto” is masculine in Spanish; if it were so, it would take 
the termination “-e”. “Esto” is pretty much like a demonstrative version of the English pronoun “it”. 
99 
  
(115c) (Pointing at a table) OKEsto es grande 
    This is large 
Unlike “esto”, determiners do change their shape on the basis of grammatical gender 
requirements, which constitutes good evidence that the inflected “este” and “esta” in (115b-
c) belong to the latter class of expressions. Compare with other determiners: 
(116a) La mesa es grande 
The table is large 
(116b) El perro es grande 
The dog is large 
(116c) Algunas mesas son grandes 
Some tables are large 
(116d) Algunos perros son grandes 
Some dogs are large 
As (116a-b) show, the determiner “the” needs to agree in gender with the noun it 
combines with: it takes the form “el” when it is modifying a masculine term and “la” when 
it is followed by a feminine one, and exactly the same story can be told about 
“algunos/algunas” (“some”) in (116c-d). These facts show that the grammatical functioning 
of “este/esta” is analogous to that of determiners. Parallel arguments can be constructed to 
the effect that “aquel” (“that”) is an adjective, and not a pronoun in (76b). Consider the 
following example containing the bare demonstrative “aquello”: 
(117) Aquello es grande 
That is large 
Just as above, the demonstrative cannot be realized in its masculine form “aquel” when 
it is found isolated; instead, it must take the neutral fossilized inflection “-o”, resulting in 
“aquello” (although see the discussion below). By contrast, “aquel” in (76b) displays 
masculine inflection, as required by feature agreement with “man”. This strongly suggests 
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that “aquel” is an adjective and not a pronoun, for, in Spanish, adjectives are also required to 
agree in gender with the noun they modify: 
(118a) El hombre alto lleva sombrero 
The tall man wears (a) hat 
(118b) La mujer alta lleva sombrero 
The tall woman wears (a) hat 
The adjective “alto” (“tall”) takes the forms “alto” and “alta”, respectively, when it 
combines with a masculine and a feminine noun. This behavior parallels that of “aquel”. All 
these facts show that Spanish (76b) is not grammatically equivalent to Lepore and Ludwig’s 
proposal for understanding English “that”, i.e., it is not a case in which the noun combines 
with a pronoun and the determiner raises to surface. Similarly, (76a) is not the result of 
combining a pronoun and a noun: rather, it is a determiner phrase with an explicitly marked 
determiner. Thus, Lepore and Ludwig’s claims are not crosslinguistically supported, at least 
not by Spanish. If they want to find the kind of structure they need, they will have to look 
elsewhere.  
I believe, however, this point generalizes: it is a crosslinguistic fact that the 
construction of complex and simple demonstratives employs very different mechanisms and, 
more relevantly, different lexical items. As we have just seen, simple demonstratives are 
constructed in Spanish just like their English counterparts, i.e., by means of a pronoun, 
whereas the complex ones may be constructed either by means of a determiner or by means 
of an adjective.38 Arguably, the lexical items involved in each of these two processes, “esto” 
and “este/esta” respectively, are not just morphological variants of a single word: they may 
be regarded as different words. The very same phenomena are also attested in other Romance 
                                                          
38 As the data show, Spanish “este” can work either as a determiner or as an adjective. This seems to be an 
instance of a more general phenomenon, very common in Romance; for example, in most dialects of Catalan 
the following possessive phrases are completely interchangeable: 
(j) El meu pare 
The my father 
(k) Mon pare 
My father 
“My” works as an adjective in (j) and as a determiner in (k); the facts seem entirely analogous to those in (76a-
b). The interchangeability of these two roles is also found, although to a more limited extent, in Romanian and 
Occitan (data from Ledgeway 2012).  
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languages: Ledgeway (2012) cites Catalan, Occitan and Romanian as displaying the very 
same pattern as Spanish. On the other hand, Italian and Portuguese do not allow constructions 
like (76b), but the behavior of their respective equivalents of “that” in constructions like (76a) 
is definitely like that of determiners, in stark contrast with demonstrative pronouns. 
This is not something idiosyncratic to Romance languages, however. Japanese, for 
example, employs two different words for constructing demonstratives: “kore”, “sore” and 
“are”, corresponding to English “this”, “that” and the archaic “yon”, can only be employed 
on their own (i.e., as pronouns), whereas “kono”, “sono” and “ano” can only be used in 
combination with a nominal (that is, for constructing complex demonstratives). Mandarin 
Chinese provides an even more striking piece of evidence for these facts. In Mandarin, as in 
most Sinitic languages, determiners do not combine directly with a noun: such combination 
is (usually) mediated by so-called “classifiers”. Although Mandarin lacks most of the English 
determiners, this phenomenon can be exemplified by means of numerals and wh-determiners: 
(119a) Na ke pingguo? 
What CLAS. apple? (“ke” is a classifier for round things) 
 “Which apple?” 
(119b) Yi ge ren 
One CLAS. person (“ge” is a generic classifier) 
“A person” 
(119c) Ji ben shu? 
How many CLAS. books? (“ben” is a classifier for books) 
“How many books?” 
The important thing to bear in mind here is that the Mandarin words for “this” and 
“that”, “zhe” and “na” respectively, can take two grammatical functions: they may be 
employed on their own or they may accompany a noun. Of course, these two roles correspond 
to simple and complex demonstratives in English. And, relevantly, when they accompany a 
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noun they display a feature that strongly suggests that they are determiners: they are normally 
accompanied by a classifier.39 Consider the following Mandarin complex demonstratives: 
(120a) Zhe ge ren 
This CLAS. person 
(120b) Na ben shu 
That CLAS. book 
Pronouns do not combine with classifiers, which shows that “zhe” and “na” are playing 
an entirely different role in these examples. Speaking in more general terms, the fact that 
English does not mark an explicit distinction between pronominal “this” and “that” and their 
determiner counterparts, either at the lexical or at the morphological level, should not lead us 
to infer that they are the same lexical item. Chinese, Japanese and Romance languages do 
display this distinction. It is therefore implausible to assume a semantics like the one Lepore 
and Ludwig assume: the syntactic structure they need, in which the occurrence of “that” 
within a complex demonstrative is itself a referring term, would be almost unique to 
English.40 In sum, it appears to be a crosslinguistic fact that there are at least two kinds of 
demonstratives, summarized in the table below (see Diessel 1999 for a much more extensive 
classification): 
                                                          
39 Although the use of classifiers after a demonstrative is actually optional (Sun 2006: 159), they are normally 
not omitted.  
40 Complex demonstratives in some languages, like Tuscaoara (an almost extinct Iroquoian language spoken in 
Ontario, Canada), have been analyzed as the result of allowing pronouns to be juxtaposed to nominals (Mithun 
1987). However, in this language the nominal is only loosely attached to the pronoun, for its functioning is 
pretty much like an apposition. In this kind of languages, the demonstrative and the nominal can often be 
separated by intermediate constituents (Diessel 1999: 61), which is of course not the case of English. The idea 
that the “that” appearing in a complex demonstrative is still a pronoun would make English unique among its 
closely (and not so closely) related languages. 
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 A) Determiner and adjectival 
demonstratives 
B) Pronominal demonstratives 
Syntax They require an N´ in order to 
construct an NP (or another N´ in the 
case of adjectives). 
They constitute an NP on their 
own. 
Morphology They display Φ-featural agreement 
with their sister N´. 
They need not agree with the 
grammatical features of the name 
of the thing referred to. 
Examples Japanese: kono, sono, ano 
Mandarin: zhe+CLAS., na+CLAS. 
Spanish: este/a, ese/a, aquel/la 
Japanese: kore, sore, are 
Mandarin: zhe, na 
Spanish: esto, eso, aquello 
 
So Ludwig and Lepore’s thesis is that English has only type-B demonstratives. And, 
as we have already mentioned, Taylor (1980), Barwise & Cooper (1981), King (2001) and 
Elbourne (2005, 2008) settle for the opposite idea: English contains only type-A 
demonstratives, but the N´ they need to combine with is sometimes covert. And there is, of 
course, still a third possibility one might argue in favor of: namely, that English contains both 
types of demonstratives, although they display exactly the same superficial form regardless 
of their grammatical function, perhaps as a consequence of the impoverished inflectional 
system of English. Let me dub these three positions “pronominal thesis”, “adnominal thesis” 
and “dual thesis”, respectively.  
In order to argue in favor of the first of these theses, Lepore and Ludwig require the 
adoption of an unorthodox syntactic construction, one that is not easily found in other 
languages (as we have already seen, (76b) does not constitute evidence for their claims, for 
the demonstrative it contains is clearly type-A; I remain agnostic about the other languages 
they mention, albeit I suspect that they display similar distinctions). By contrast, the dual 
thesis does enjoy crosslinguistic support, simply because of the very existence of the required 
distinction. There are, however, a couple of arguments that might be employed for 
undermining the dual thesis. Let me briefly present them, for discussing these two problems 
will help me not just further criticize Lepore and Ludwig’s approach but, additionally, raise 
some doubts about the adnominal thesis.  
The first problem concerns the data employed. Namely, I did not mention a certain 
possibility: perhaps type-A demonstratives can occur on their own, i.e., with no 
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accompanying N´. This is in fact what happens in Spanish and Chinese, where it is possible 
to employ, say, “aquel” and “na ge” followed by no noun phrase. The following sentences 
are grammatical in both languages: 
(121a) Aquel es alto 
That-MASC. is tall 
“That (one) is tall” 
(121b) Na ge hen gao 
That CLAS. very tall 
“That (one) is tall” 
The existence of these cases may play in favor of Lepore and Ludwig. Let me construct 
an argument on their behalf:  while it is true that type-B demonstratives can never combine 
with nominals, the facts in (121a-b) show that type-A demonstratives do display pronominal 
uses. Once this is acknowledged, it is only natural to assume that they are, in fact, always 
pronominal, and that their combination into larger noun phrases proceeds by the mechanism 
they have described or some other way. And, of course, these arguments could hold for any 
language.  
This argument, however, is flawed, and the English translation I provided for (121a-b) 
is indicative of why it is so: the demonstratives in these sentences are complex and elliptical. 
This is, in fact, the reason why they can only be translated into English as “that one” instead 
of “that”: they require combination with a N´, but the N´ in these sentences is elided. Let me 
introduce a few syntactic notions in order to explain this. One of the tests for diagnosing 
syntactic constituency in English is the so-called “one-substitution test”: if a string of words 
can be replaced for “one” and the result is grammatical, then that string is a syntactic 
constituent of the sentence, and more concretely an N´. For example, the word “one” can 
substitute many of the constituents of the following sentence: 
(122a) The black dog with brown spots that I saw yesterday was very friendly 
(122b) The black one with brown spots that I saw yesterday was very friendly 
(122c) The one with brown spots that I saw yesterday was very friendly 
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(122d) The one that I saw yesterday was very friendly 
(122e) The black one was very friendly 
... 
I.e., “one” can replace “dog”, “black dog”, “black dog with brown spots”, “dog with 
brown spots that I saw yesterday”, etc. All these are N´. In other languages, however, the 
“one”-substitution test does not work, for the word “one” does not have this role. Instead, the 
test is, simply, N´-ellipsis. Consider the following sentences in German (extracted from 
Carnie 2013; “Ø” indicates an elision): 
(123a) Die schlanke Frau aus Frankreich isst Kuchen mit Sahne 
The thin woman from France eats cake with cream 
(123b) Die Schlanke Ø aus Frankreich isst Kuchen mit Sahne 
The thin Ø from France eats cake with cream 
(123c) Die Ø aus Frankreich isst Kuchen mit Sahne 
The Ø from France eats cake with cream 
(123d) Die Ø isst Kuchen mit Sahne 
The Ø eats cake with cream 
I.e., this test is more or less equivalent to the “one”-substitution test. The translation 
shows that, with the exception of (123d), the elided material in German should have been 
replaced for “one” had we been dealing with English: “the thin one from France”, “the one 
from France”, etc. Let us now go for the main point: Spanish and Mandarin pattern with 
German when it comes to diagnosing constituency, for both languages elide their respective 
N´ instead of replacing them for “one”. This suggests that the demonstratives in (121a-b) are 
complex demonstratives with an elided N´, an idea that is further confirmed by two facts. In 
the first place, (121a-b) do not sound entirely felicitous on their own, but they improve when 
some linguistic context is provided, particularly when an anaphoric antecedent for the 
demonstrative is available. In the second place, and more relevantly, the fact that they can 
only be translated into English as “that one” instead of “that” shows that the missing material 
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is elided, for ellipsis is the equivalent of “one”-substitution in Spanish and Mandarin. Thus, 
there are good reasons for thinking that the demonstratives in (121a-b) are complex, and 
therefore that “that” is not pronominal in these examples. They in fact constitute another 
source of counterevidence to Lepore and Ludwig’s idea that complex demonstratives in other 
languages can be the result of syntactically combining a pronominal demonstrative (an NP) 
with an N´. If it were so, then the hypothesis that “aquel” and “na ge” in (121a-b) are 
pronouns should be minimally plausible, but, given that they can only be translated into 
English as “that one”, the hypothesis does not even get off the ground.41 
On the other hand, I believe that these facts also offer compelling arguments against 
the adnominal thesis. Defenders of this approach hold, recall, that bare demonstratives are 
just complex demonstratives with some kind of covert argument. A straightforward way to 
state this thesis is that bare demonstratives are, simply, complex demonstratives with an 
elided nominal; as Salmon puts it, the “NP may be deleted to form a bare demonstrative” 
(Salmon 2002: 524). This idea is prima facie attractive, but it may turn to be problematic, for 
English does not usually allow eliding an N´ when it is attached to a determiner: as we have 
just seen, the N´ should be substituted for “one” instead. Thus, if the adnominal thesis were 
right we would expect all bare demonstratives to be realized as “that one”, instead of simply 
“that”. Clearly, this shows that bare demonstratives cannot be formed from eliding material 
from a complex demonstrative. To put it differently, if (124b) were the result of eliding the 
nominal “table” in (124a), then (124d) and (124f) should be equally grammatical.  
(124a) That table is huge 
(124b) That is huge 
(124c) The table is large 
(124d) #The is large 
                                                          
41 The New Basic Grammar of the Spanish Language (Real Academia Española 2009), a normative document, 
supports this idea. Paragraphs 1.9o and 1.9p of this work state that, even though some grammarians have 
traditionally dealt with “aquel” and “aquella” as ambiguous between a pronoun and a determiner, current trends 
find it much more empirically plausible to analyze bare “aquel” and “aquella” as the result of elision. See also 
the paragraphs 15.2e-h and 17.2b of the same work.  
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(124e) No table is large 
(124f) #No is large 
Let us nevertheless grant that English may allow eliding an N´ attached to a determiner 
(not an unreasonable idea, after all, for it may account for the grammaticality of sentences 
like “some came to the party”). Even so, the adnominal thesis would still find itself in trouble 
when it comes to accounting for the data in other languages. If type-B demonstratives are 
nothing but type-A demonstratives with a covert N´, then we should expect type-B 
demonstratives to display the same morphology as type-A demonstratives with an elided N´, 
i.e., if the adnominal thesis were right then a sentence like (117), repeated below, should be 
the result of eliding some kind of nominal material within the NP. But this cannot be so, for 
re-introducing the elided material results in ungrammaticality. (117) contains a bare 
demonstrative, and, as the facts in (117a-b) show, this demonstrative cannot be made 
complex by attaching a nominal to the pronoun: 
(117) OKAquello es grande 
That is large 
(117a) #Aquello armario es grande 
That wardrobe is large 
(117b) #Aquello puerta es grande 
That door is large 
This shows that a bare demonstrative cannot be the result of eliding material in a 
complex one. In fact, the process of elision yields very different results in Spanish. Namely, 
the determiner is still required to agree in gender with the elided noun: 
(117c) Aquel armario es grande  →  Aquel Ø es grande 
That wardrobe is large  →  That Ø is large (“That one is large”) 
(117d) Aquella puerta es grande  →  Aquella Ø es grande 
That door is large   → That Ø is large (“That one is large”) 
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Analogous facts hold for Mandarin demonstratives: the elision of an N´ requires that 
the classifier still be combinable with the noun. This evidence is non-conclusive, and it is 
always open for defenders of the adnominal thesis to argue that hidden arguments are in no 
way equivalent to elliptical material, yet I think it provides good evidence that the dual thesis 
is on the right track. 
Let me consider now a second argument, one that could be employed both by Lepore 
and Ludwig and by defenders of the adnominal thesis. It goes like this: the words in each of 
the two categories of demonstratives are just too similar to be regarded as different lexical 
items. How come that “ese” and “eso” are different words, in spite of looking so similar and 
having such closely related meanings? Isn’t it more plausible to regard them as the same 
word with a different morphology? How can the dual thesis explain the systematic way in 
which Japanese speakers transit from “kore” to “kono”, from “sore” to “sono” and from “are” 
to “ano”, given the similarity of the two sets of demonstratives? This is a fair worry, and in 
fact it appears to be the main motivation for seeking a unified semantics for type-A and type-
B demonstratives. In particular, the hypothesis that all these words are just morphological 
variants of a single word is attractive, and a theory formulated in those terms would be very 
elegant and simple. 
In the first place, the dual thesis is not incompatible with the idea that type-A and type-
B demonstratives are just morphological variants of the same word; the only extra 
requirement is that they should be, additionally, semantic and syntactic variants of the same 
word. But, even if this were implausible (say, if we wanted to individuate words by their 
semantics, and if therefore the idea of “semantic variants of a word” were self-contradictory), 
I believe that the systematicity described above can be explained by other means. Namely, it 
might just be a matter of etymology: perhaps type-A and type-B demonstratives are different 
words, but they derive from a common historical root, which explains why they look so 
similar; however, they eventually developed different, albeit closely related, meanings. Yet 
the defender of a unified semantics might object to all these options: if the lexical entries of 
type-A and type-B demonstratives were different, we should expect this variation to be 
encoded differently in other languages. This is to say, there should be languages in which 
type-A and type-B demonstratives looked so different that the hypothesis that they are 
morphological variants of the same word would sound wildly implausible.  
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This is, in fact, the case. Catalan, for example, employs two different sets of words for 
type-A and type-B demonstratives: “açò”, “això” and “allò”, corresponding respectively to 
“this”, “that” and “yon”, are pronouns and can only be employed on their own, whereas 
“aquest”, “aqueix” and “aquell”42 only have type-A uses, i.e., they require combination with 
a nominal (excluding elliptical uses). These two sets of demonstratives are etymologically 
related, but not plausibly psychologically so. The very same distinction can be found in 
Occitan. Similarly, the Mulam43 demonstratives “ni” and “hui” (“this” and “that”) can only 
be used as pronouns, whereas and “na:i” and “ka” are always adnominal (Wang & Zheng 
1993). There are good reasons, then, for regarding type-A and type-B demonstratives as 
different words: the meaning of type-A and type-B demonstratives is encoded in very 
different ways across various languages, some of which even use different stems for each of 
the two categories (which, of course, renders the hypothesis that they are morphological 
variants of the same word highly implausible). 
The English word “this” can be translated into other languages as two different words, 
and the appropriateness of one of the translations suffices for ruling out the other one. This 
suggests that English contains two different “this” (and mutatis mutandis for “that”). 
Consider a parallel case: one of the reasons why we know that English contains two distinct 
words “bank” is that they translate differently into other languages. The fact that type-A and 
type-B demonstratives also translate differently provides good reasons for thinking that these 
two kinds of words are different – perhaps it is right to regard them as homonyms, or perhaps 
as instances of a single, polysemous word. None of these facts constitute knockdown 
evidence against the adnominal thesis, but I believe that they do deal a fatal blow to defenders 
of the pronominal thesis. 
These considerations, together with the semantic counterevidence to Lepore and 
Ludwig’s account, suggest that we should seek some alternative approach to the syntax and 
semantics of complex demonstratives. Let me, however, discuss one final argument in favor 
                                                          
42 Pretty much like English, most Catalan dialects currently employ a system with just two distance levels for 
type-A demonstratives: “aqueix” is lost in most of the territory and often regarded as an archaism. However, 
most dialects in the Valencia area maintain the archaic system with three different levels, i.e., they preserve 
“aqueix”, although the word is often realized as “eixe” in this area.  
43 Mulam is a Daic language spoken by less than 100,000 people in Southern China. 
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of quantificational approaches to these expressions, and Lepore and Ludwig’s in particular. 
Namely, the very existence of a sentence like (76b) could be employed as evidence that 
complex demonstratives are, or can be, quantificational. Most philosophers (and a slight 
minority of linguists) would regard definite descriptions as quantified expressions. The fact 
that complex demonstratives can be introduced by an overt definite article may show that 
they are definite descriptions in disguise, and therefore quantified expressions. More 
generally, this yields plausibility to the ideas by Neale (1993), King (1999, 2001) and other 
philosophers and linguists who have treated complex demonstratives as a special type of 
definite description – or who have dealt with both kinds of expressions on a par, much like 
the early Kaplan (1977), Roberts (2002, 2003) and Elbourne (2005, 2008) did (even if these 
do not regard definite descriptions as quantificational).  
I do not think, however, that the presence of the definite article reveals that complex 
demonstratives are a special type of definite descriptions, much less that they are 
quantificational. Namely, the article in (76b) looks like a dummy determiner, i.e., one that is 
added there for syntactic reasons but plays no semantic role. English also contains dummy 
determiners; for example, the indefinite article accompanying a nominal predicate is usually 
thought to be semantically vacuous (Heim & Kratzer 1998: 61): 
(125a) Kaline is a cat 
(125b) Kaline is small 
The word “small” denotes the set of small things, and the word “cat” denotes the set of 
cats. If it is possible to predicate smallness of Kaline by means of a simple construction like 
(125b), then it should be possible to predicate catness by means of an analogous construction, 
but this results in ungrammaticality: 
(125c) #Kaline is cat 
These facts suggest that the “a” in (125a) is added only on the basis of syntactic 
considerations,44 i.e., it is required by grammar but need not play any role in the semantics. 
                                                          
44 Some could try to preserve the idea that “a” is not vacuous by arguing that it preserves its original meaning 
as a quantifier. I.e., it could be argued that (125a) is quantificational and that it means something like “a cat x 
is such that Kaline = x”. However, there are good reasons for thinking that the “a” is vacuous; namely, the 
predicates introduced by “a” can be conjoined with predicates with no explicit “a”: 
(125*) Kaline is small and a cat  
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In fact, many languages would employ a construction like (125c) instead of (125a). The 
presence of the definite article in (76b) strikes me as a special case of this phenomenon: a 
semantically vacuous determiner that is required by syntax. (76a) already contains a 
determiner, so no dummy is required. The fact that the dummy in (76b) takes the form of a 
definite probably has to do with the definiteness of the noun phrase. And, indeed, it is not the 
only use of a dummy definite in Spanish; for example, generic noun phrases, which can be 
expressed with no explicit determiner in English, require a definite article in that language: 
(126a) OKLas ballenas son mamíferos 
OKThe whales are mammals 
(126b) #Ballenas son mamíferos 
OKWhales are mammals 
Let me, indeed, discuss one final piece of crosslinguistic evidence, one that I regard as 
conclusive in showing that the presence of a definite article in (76b) is compatible with the 
status of the demonstrative as directly referential: the existence of (most probably dummy) 
definite articles accompanying proper names in many languages. This phenomenon is 
generalized in meridional dialects of German, ancient Greek, standard Catalan and some 
varieties of Spanish: 
(127a) Der Helga liebt die Elsa 
The Helga loves the Elsa  
“Helga loves Elsa” 
(127b) Ho Sōkratēs aphīketo 
The Socrates arrived 
“Socrates arrived” 
                                                          
The possibility of conjoining both kinds of predicates is indicative that they are of the same semantic type.  
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(127c) Demà dinaré amb en Jaume  
Tomorrow I will have lunch with the James 
“Tomorrow I will have lunch with James” 
(127d) La Sofía no ha venido 
The Sophie has not come 
“Sophie has not come” 
These examples show that determiners can appear alongside proper names. Does this 
show that such proper names are not directly referential expressions? Either the philosophical 
tradition (Kripke 1972) rests on an important mistake, or the determiners in these examples 
do not play their usual semantic role. And it seems prima facie plausible to assume, as above, 
that the definite articles in (127a-d) are semantically vacuous but required by syntax – 
perhaps noun phrases in these languages always need an explicit determiner. The lesson to 
be drawn from these examples is clear: the presence of a definite article in (76b) does not 
show that the complex demonstrative is a quantifier – it does not even show that it is not a 
referential term.  
So far my discussion of the crosslinguistic evidence and my criticism of Lepore and 
Ludwig’s system. Let us explore some alternative options.  
 
2.3 Donnellan’s way: are complex demonstratives ambiguous expressions? 
The discussion in the foregoing sections shows that both approaches to complex 
demonstratives have their own virtues and faults. Directly referential approaches 
straightforwardly accommodate the more indexical-like behavior of complex 
demonstratives, but they have trouble with QI-uses, NDNS-readings, Bach-Peters sentences, 
anaphora and bound variable uses. Quantificational approaches, on the other hand, are more 
capable of accommodating the latter kind of counterevidence, but as a drawback they are 
subject to an important number of modal challenges, including objections from attitude 
reports. These facts may lead some authors to entertain a hypothesis that is similar in spirit 
to Keith Donnellan’s (1966) proposal for understanding definite descriptions: namely, that it 
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is helpless to seek a unified semantics for complex demonstratives, for they display both 
referential and attributive uses. 
In a more semantically-oriented fashion, we may put this thesis thus: there is no single 
lambda term able to capture all uses complex demonstrative, i.e., these are ambiguous 
expressions. In addition to their prima facie unattractiveness, there are compelling reasons 
against ambiguity theories in general; for example, Grice’s Modified Ockham Razor 
prescribes not to modify senses without necessity (Grice 1978: 118-119), meaning that, other 
things being equal, simpler theories are to be preferred, and this includes not multiplying 
lexical entries unless it is strictly necessary. In addition to this methodological principle, there 
are further arguments that I have deliberately passed over in the foregoing debate. It is 
arguably more plausible to construct the referential/attributive distinction in the pragmatics; 
for example, NDNS-uses could be explained by appealing to Kripke’s (1977) distinction 
between speaker reference and semantic reference. Speakers may employ sentences 
containing non-referential terms for conveying singular propositions; for the sake of 
illustration, a definite description like “the president of the UK” can be used for (implicitly) 
communicating a singular proposition about Boris Johnson. Similarly, it is possible to regard 
complex demonstratives as referential terms and yet argue that a sentence like (84) can be 
employed for conveying a purely general thought. A response in pragmatic terms seems more 
compelling than one that postulates semantic ambiguity. 
Notwithstanding these reasons, ambiguity theories have been suggested, and even 
defended at length, by several authors, especially those on the referential side. Particularly, 
the most widely held ambiguity theory is that the semantic counterexamples provided by 
King (i.e., those I presented in section 2.2.1.2, and more specifically QI-uses) involve 
“stylistically altered definite descriptions rather than a genuine demonstrative” (Salmon 
2002: 522; 2006a: 446; 2006b: 272, footnote 11). This is to say that the “that” in these 
sentences is actually a different lexical item, an emphatic “the” of sorts. This idea has been 
endorsed by other defenders of directly referential approaches; compare the following 
passages:  
“I am inclined to hear ’that’ in these constructions [QI-uses] as having a distinct 
sense from the normal demonstrative use (the Oxford English Dictionary singles 
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out such a distinct use) and as serving rather as an emphatic form of definite 
description. [...] I will, therefore, assume that such examples make use of another 
word, homophonous with the demonstrative “that”, and treat them as outside the 
scope of my investigation.” (Dever 2001: 286) 
“Sentences like these [QI-uses], however, are rather awkward and may be viewed 
more accurately as idiomatic uses of language. When binding is allowed [...] the 
bound complex demonstrative may often be interpreted as a definite description. 
In that case, ‘that’ can be understood as a different word – as a pragmatic tool 
that allows one to emphasize the description. It is something like an emphatic use 
of the determiner ‘the’ [...] My understanding of sentences like these is that they 
constitute the exception rather than the norm.” (Corazza 2003: 272).  
In fact, the idea that complex demonstratives are ambiguous expressions has been 
explicitly defended by Geoff Georgi (2012), who captures deictic and non-deictic uses of 
complex demonstratives by providing two distinct lexical entries. Other authors, while not 
explicitly endorsing ambiguity hypotheses, have dismissed some of the problematic uses as 
something that their theory was never meant to account for in the first place (cf. Braun 2008c: 
244-246). Arguably, this idea has an important precedent in Kaplan’s remarks that pronouns 
and other indexicals have “homonyms in which I am not interested” (Kaplan 1977: 489).  
The dual thesis that I have embraced in the foregoing section is also an ambiguity 
theory, insofar as it posits two distinct lexical entries, one for pronominal “this” and “that” 
and another one for their determiner counterparts. Such ambiguity, I have argued, is 
motivated insofar as these two uses of “this” and “that” translate differently into other 
languages (either as morphological variants of the same word or, simply, as different words). 
However, I believe that the very same type of arguments that I put forward against the 
pronominal and the adnominal theses can be employed for arguing against ambiguity theories 
in the sense of Braun, Corazza, Dever, Georgi and Salmon. Thus, even though I favor an 
approach to complex demonstratives in the spirit of these authors (and, more concretely, an 
account pretty much like the ones developed by Braun and Salmon, as well as Borg), I differ 
from these authors in an important respect: I believe that the counterevidence is too 
systematic, and too crosslinguistically well-supported, to be put aside as a case of ambiguity. 
Let us see why. 
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The discussion here follows, essentially, Nowak (2014), although I will also make use 
of King’s (2001) arguments against ambiguity approaches. In the first place, QI uses of 
complex demonstratives are widespread and common in many languages besides English. 
The examples Nowak provides come from Russian and Italian:45 
(128) [Kazhdy]1 poshël k tomu metro kotoroe k nemu1 bylo blyže vsego 
[Each (person)]1 went to that subway station that was closest to him1 
(129) [Ogni padre]1 ricorda con nostalgia quel periodo della sua1 vita in cui [pro1] 
non aveva ancora la responsabilità dei figli 
[Every father]1 remembers with nostalgia that period of his1 life in which he1 did 
not have yet the responsibility of his children 
If complex demonstratives were ambiguous expressions, then other languages should 
lexicalize QI-uses differently, i.e., the fact that the very same word is used in deictic and QI-
uses should be an idiosyncrasy of English. But, as the above examples show, the very same 
phenomenon is attested across many languages. In fact, as far as I can tell every Romance 
language displays QI-uses. This evidence makes a strong case against ambiguity theories: if 
English contains two distinct words “that”, pretty much like it contains two distinct “bank”, 
how come that these words do not translate differently into other languages?  This, Nowak 
argues, shows, contra the above authors (and pace the Oxford English Dictionary), that 
English does not contain two different determiners realized as “that” – although, as I explain 
below in footnote 87, English complex demonstratives do display a certain idiosyncrasy that 
Nowak does not consider, one that, in fact, constitutes good evidence for both the theory I 
defend here and the one he himself presents (Nowak 2019a; see section 3.3.1.3).  
Another source of evidence against ambiguity theories, and more concretely against 
Salmon’s idea that QI-uses involve a stylistic variant of “the”, comes from substitution tests 
carried out in English. If “that” could work as a stylistic variant of “the”, we should be able 
                                                          
45 In the Italian example, “pro” (pronounced “little pro” or “baby pro”, as opposed to big PRO) stands for the 
elided subject of the relative clause (“he” in the English translation). English lacks “pro”, which usually only 
appears in languages displaying a rich verbal morphology agreement system, such as Italian. See Carnie (2013, 
§15).   
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to substitute one word for the other salva veritate and salva felicitate in all linguistic contexts. 
But this idea does not cope well with the following contrast (Wolter 2006; Nowak 2014, 
2019a; see also King 2001, §5): 
(130a) *That author of Waverley also wrote Ivanhoe 
(130b) OKThe author of Waverley also wrote Ivanhoe 
Sentence (130a), while not ungrammatical, does not sound felicitous, or at least not as 
good as (130b). But the “stylistic variant”-theorist predicts that it should be possible to use 
them interchangeably. Further examples include the contrast between the self-contradictory 
(131a) and the perfectly felicitous (131b), and that between (83)-(83a) (Roberts 2002, 2003): 
(131a) The bottle is on the table but the bottle is not on the table 
(131b) That bottle is on the table but that bottle is not on the table 
(83) [A student]1 was sitting in the library. [Another student]2 was sitting across 
from her1. [That student]2 had a logic book 
(83a) [A student]1 was sitting in the library. [Another student]2 was sitting across 
from her1. [The student]2 had a logic book 
Sentence (131a) is self-contradictory because it presupposes or asserts that a unique 
bottle is contextually available; by contrast, (131b) shows that things are different with 
complex demonstratives, which never (or rarely) trigger that kind of presupposition (although 
Roberts (2002, 2003) has argued that they actually do; her account is briefly discussed in the 
next subsection). The very same fact can be illustrated by means of (83)-(83a): in the latter 
there is more than one student available, and for this reason it is not appropriate to use a 
definite description; by contrast, the one with the demonstrative is perfectly fine.46 These 
                                                          
46 The self-contradictory nature of this sentence requires several – on the other hand not too controversial – 
assumptions, such as the idea that the domain of quantification does not change in the middle of the utterance 
in (131b), as required by the standard Kaplan-inspired understanding of contexts (Kaplan 1977, 1989; see the 
discussion in 2.2.1.3). Another mechanism that could turn this sentence into a non-contradictory one is the idea 
that quantifiers include variables at some level of representation, either contributed by the determiner (von 
Fintel 1994) or by the noun (Stanley & Szabó 2000). But, even if we were willing to concede one of these things 
(see Cappelen & Lepore 2005a, 2005b for severe criticism on similar ideas), there is still an important contrast 
between (131a-b): namely, a non-contradictory reading of (131b) still requires that a context-change takes place 
or that the two definite descriptions be assigned different domains of quantification, whereas there is no such 
requirement for the appropriateness of (131a). All that it requires in order not to sound contradictory is a very 
reasonable assumption: that contexts may contain more than one demonstrated object.  
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examples seem to undermine the possibility that complex demonstratives can work as 
stylistically altered definite descriptions. And, on the other hand, the very same contrast is 
also attested crosslinguistically. Of course, as Nowak (2014, 2019a) acknowledges, these 
facts are also problematic for other proposals that treat complex demonstratives as a special 
type of definite description, such as Kaplan’s (1977) first “dthat” and the theories by Neale 
(1993), King (1999, 2001) and Elbourne (2008). I will come back to the contrast between 
complex demonstratives and definite descriptions in section 3.3.1.3. 
There is, however, another possible way to understand the proposal that complex 
demonstratives may sometimes function as stylistically altered definite descriptions: it may 
be understood as a pragmatic proposal. An argument found in Braun (2008a), and also 
tentatively suggested by Nowak (2014) as a possible reading of Salmon’s suggestion, goes 
like this: the truth-conditions predicted by directly referential theories for QI-uses are, in fact, 
right, but they are so unlikely to hold, and therefore so counterintuitive, that speakers have a 
tendency to systematically infer a different meaning, namely the kind of meaning usually 
associated with definite descriptions. Recall the truth-conditions of (77), repeated below: 
(77) Every queen cherishes that cleric who crowned her 
The standard advocate of direct reference predicts that this sentence is true iff the 
demonstratum dc of the context is cherished by every queen, under the presupposition that dc 
crowned them all. These truth-conditions are so unlikely that any kind of Gricean reasoning 
should lead to the conclusion that the utterer of (77) intended to convey something very 
different, plausibly the very same content that she would have literally asserted had she 
employed “the” instead of “that”. In fact, as Braun (2008a) notes, QI-uses are sometimes 
noted by speakers to sound sort of awkward, and the pragmatic hypothesis has a tentative 
explanation for this oddness: 
“Some speakers encounter QI sentences more often than others, and some 
speakers are more sensitive to literal content than others. Those who have 
encountered fewer QI-uses, or who are more sensitive to literal content, may judge 
(77) to be odd. They may realize that a speaker is unlikely to demonstrate a 
particular cleric while uttering (77), and also realize that in the absence of a 
demonstrated cleric, (77) cannot be true. They may feel an urge to substitute ‘the’ 
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for ‘that’. Those who have encountered more uses of QI sentences to communicate 
descriptive propositions, or who are less sensitive to literal content than the 
preceding speakers, may find (77) fine.” (Braun 2008a: 85; I altered the text in 
order to fit the examples) 
For these reasons, the pragmatic hypothesis strikes me as more plausible than the 
appeals to semantic ambiguity. The argument may be understood in parallelism to Kripke’s 
(1977) response to Donnellan (1966): the fact that speakers may use definite descriptions for 
conveying singular thoughts does not entail that the truth-conditions of a sentence containing 
a definite description may sometimes be those of a singular proposition. Similarly, it should 
be possible to use a directly referential term for implicitly conveying descriptive propositions. 
And the latter may in fact be inferred on the basis that the singular proposition literally 
expressed by the utterance is highly unlikely to hold. On some occasions, however, this 
proposition is perfectly available; consider the following example by Lepore and Ludwig 
(2000): 
(132) [Every woman]1 in this room admires that man she1 sees at the podium 
Imagine that there is only one man at the relevant podium, i.e., all the women in the 
room are seeing the very same man. In that case, the truth-conditions predicted by advocates 
of direct reference (and those predicted by Lepore and Ludwig’s theory) are 
straightforwardly right: it is true iff a certain man, dc, is admired by every woman in the room, 
under the presupposition that he is seen at the podium by all of them (in Lepore and Ludwig’s 
system, it is true iff the x such that x is a man seen by every woman and x = dc is admired by 
every woman). These truth-conditions, however, are only appropriate in a very limited set of 
occasions, which explains that the use of QI sentences will normally result in the participants 
of a conversation engaging in Gricean reasoning that will lead them to infer a very different 
content.  
But, as Nowak (2014) notes, this response is unconvincing for the same reasons as the 
theory that postulates semantic ambiguity. If an error theory along those lines were right – 
i.e., if participants in a conversation were systematically mistaken about the truth conditions 
of sentences like (77) but were nevertheless able to employ them for conveying the kind of 
thoughts normally associated with definite descriptions –, then a sentence like (133a) below 
should not sound infelicitous, or at least as felicitous as (133b): 
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(133a) *Scott was that author of Waverley 
(133b) OKScott was the author of Waverley 
Similar remarks could be stated concerning pairs like (130a-b), (131a-b) and (83a-b). 
Unlike Nowak, I do not think these data fatally undermine pragmatic accounts of the non-
deictic readings of complex demonstratives, but I do think that they provide good reasons to 
try to seek the right answer elsewhere.  
This is not the end of the story, however. The pragmatic approach could be 
implemented differently: instead of saying that sentences containing complex demonstratives 
may be used for conveying thoughts that would normally be expressed by sentences whose 
semantics needs not incorporate any directly referential term, one could try to construct the 
referential-attributive distinction somewhere else. For example, Corazza (2003), Elbourne 
(2008) and Georgi (2012) embrace the idea that the referent of complex demonstratives – 
and indexicals in general – may sometimes be determined through what Quine (1969: 194) 
labeled “deferred ostension”, i.e., through an ostensive gesture towards an object that is 
different from, but suitably related to, the object that ultimately serves as the referent of the 
term. A typical example for illustrating this phenomenon is the following: I may point at a 
book and utter “That’s my favorite author” (see Borg 2002 for extensive discussion on the 
notion).  
The phenomenon of deferred ostension was largely explored by Geoffrey Nunberg 
(1993), on whose system the above-mentioned authors build. Once we embrace the idea that 
the semantic value of an indexical can be obtained in this indirect way, we do not even have 
the need to say that this value is an individual: the object selected by the demonstrative might 
as well be a property, such as being the student who scored one hundred. And attributive uses 
could arise whenever the selected value is some individuating property – this is roughly the 
proposal put forward by the aforementioned authors for dealing with NDNS-uses. Whatever 
one may think about the Nunberg-style machinery for deferred ostension, these approaches 
show, at the very least, that referential theories have not yet exhausted their resources.  
On the other hand, directly referential theories do get a lot of things right, as the data 
in section 2.1 show. For this reason, I believe that it is worth trying to develop a version of 
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these theories able to deal with the problematic data. However, as the discussion in this 
section made clear, I do not think that these counterexamples can be put aside as cases of 
ambiguity, and explanations in pragmatic terms are likely to encounter an important amount 
of problems. This leads me to the main aim of this dissertation: I intend to vindicate a version 
of c-theories able to handle all problematic counterexamples in semantic terms. This is what 
I set out to do in section 3.  
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3 Complex demonstratives as singular terms 
In section 2 I have argued that, in spite of the several problems they are faced with, directly 
referential theories have a good deal of virtues. They straightforwardly accommodate the 
facts about ellipsis, anaphora and opacity to modal and temporal quantification and, 
additionally, c-theories are also able to explain the data about analyticity and entailment. In 
this respect they have proved much superior to quantificational theories, which need to go 
through a lot of trouble – and more than a few ad hoc principles – in order to accommodate 
the very same data.  On the other hand, we have good reasons for thinking that the syntactic 
evidence alluded to in favor of quantificational theories is, at most, inconclusive. Thus, the 
only obstacle directly referential theories are left with is the semantic counterevidence from 
2.2.1.2.  The complications with QI-uses look particularly troubling, for they are unlikely to 
be explained away by appealing to pragmatic principles.  
The current section is the core of this dissertation, for my aim here is to tackle all the 
problematic data. In particular, I intend to show that c-theories are able to accommodate all 
the counterexamples that King and others have posed to them, as long as they are willing to 
make a couple of adjustments, in turn required by independently motivated and fairly 
standard assumptions. More exactly, there are three background assumptions that we need to 
acknowledge: a) that natural language contains operators on character (Kaplan’s (1977) 
monsters), b) that natural language has the expressive power of full object-language 
quantification over times and worlds (Cresswell 1990) and c) that there is a well-defined 
subset of anaphoric relations that do not fit the standard bound variable paradigm and require 
special treatment. Let me appropriate Gareth Evans’s (1977a, 1977b) label “E-type 
anaphora” for referring to anaphoric relations of the latter kind, although this use should not 
be understood as an endorsement of Evans’s positive proposal, but rather as just a general 
label encompassing the broad phenomenon of co-variation without c-commanding, which 
includes the so-called “donkey anaphora” (Geach 1962) and “discourse anaphora” (see King 
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& Lewis (2018), particularly section 2, for an overview of these two phenomena47). I shall 
argue for each of these three points in sections 3.3.2.1, 3.3.1.2 and 3.3.4, respectively. 
Acknowledging these facts requires implementing several changes into one’s semantic 
system; for example, embracing monsters requires the adoption of a combination rule like 
HFA above, and the facts about natural language expressivity recommend enriching the 
syntax of the object language with explicit world and time variables. I intend to show that 
these modifications are all that the classical theories need in order to accommodate the 
problematic counterevidence from section 2.2.1.2. In particular, any c-theorist willing to 
implement these adjustments into her theory will find herself in position to regard the 
troubling examples as special cases of more general phenomena: each of the problematic 
cases can be reduced to either a case of E-type anaphora, an instance of monstrous 
quantification over character, or a combination of both. And, importantly, monsters and E-
type anaphora generate non-deictic (i.e., non-referential) uses of any indexical, not just 
complex demonstratives. In other words, the c-theorist is in a position to explain the non-
deictic readings of complex demonstratives by means of the very same mechanisms that 
account for the non-deictic readings of any other indexical. Thus, one of the main tenets of 
c-theories, namely that the semantics of complex demonstratives is pretty much like that of 
pronouns like “he” or “she”, can be vindicated (see in particular Braun 2008c: 244-246 for 
an explicit endorsement of this claim). 
There are yet two more tenets of c-theories that I would like to argue for: that complex 
demonstratives are singular terms, and that the semantic contribution of the nominal takes 
place at the level of character, not content. The former will turn out indispensable for 
accounting for the data about anaphora and ellipsis, whereas the latter, as we have already 
seen, explains the data about opacity. I nevertheless depart from standard c-theories in an 
important respect. As the discussion in 2.1.2 made clear, c-theorists think of contexts as 
privileging a demonstratum parameter. For this reason, they are unable to get rid of rigidity, 
a fact that proves fatal when it comes to QI-uses. But, as we shall see right in the next sub-
section, we have good reasons for thinking that this idea should be rejected. Before stating 
my own version of c-theories, let me discuss a problem that is common to most of the above-
                                                          
47 King and Lewis coin the term “problematic anaphora” for referring to what I have called “E-type anaphora”. 
In view of the massive amount of literature on the topic, their terminology is indeed quite fitting. 
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mentioned theories, either quantificational or directly referential: the idea that a lexical entry 
for complex demonstratives should include instructions for selecting a demonstratum. This 
idea has been deemed responsible for several wrong predictions about entailment and logical 
validity (Predelli 2012b, 2013) and, in addition, it has been regarded as psychologically 
unrealistic (Nowak 2019b). I find myself in full agreement with these claims, so let me 
expand on them just in order to see what an appropriate lexical entry for complex 
demonstratives should look like.   
 
3.1 Some problems common to most theories of complex demonstratives 
In this section I will review the arguments that have been put forward against certain kind of 
requirements that some lexical entries impose on complex demonstratives. These criticisms 
are often formulated against the lexical entry typical of c-theories, although, as we shall see, 
they can be posed against approaches of any kind. Recall the generic lexical entry that we 
stated above for c-theories: 
(27) For any context c, “that F” refers in c to an object α iff: 
i) α is the demonstratum of c and 
ii) α satisfies F in wc and tc 
This lexical entry is not problematic as it stands, but some authors have introduced 
further constraints. I am particularly concerned with the restrictions that have been 
established for condition (27i) to obtain, i.e., for an object α to count as a demonstratum. For 
example, Braun (1996) requires that the demonstratum be the object selected by a 
demonstration taking place in the circumstance of the context, Borg (2000) includes into her 
lexical entry the idea that the object selected by a complex demonstrative should be 
demonstrated by the speaker, and Salmon (2002) imposes a similar requirement to the effect 
that, for each context c, the referent of a complex demonstrative as interpreted in c is the 
unique demonstrated target in wc. Thus, these authors impose constraints on what can count 
as a demonstratum. This kind of requirements are not exclusive from c-theories, however. 
Lepore and Ludwig (2000: 232) constrain their lexical entry in a very similar manner: 
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(134) For all speakers s, times t, speech acts u, and objects x, if s demonstrates x at 
t using “that” in u, then the referent of “that” as used by s at t = x 
The idea that whatever is picked out in a context must be demonstrated by the speaker 
at the world of the context is an old one. Donald Davidson (1967: 319-320) tentatively 
suggests the following lexical as a promising starting point for the semantics of complex 
demonstratives: 
(135) “That book was stolen” is true as (potentially) spoken by p at t iff the book 
demonstrated by p at t is stolen prior to t 
All these ideas are probably fine when it comes to developing a theory of language 
use,48 but, if we are talking about meaning proper, two problems arise: they yield wrong 
predictions when it comes to basic phenomena that every semantic theory should be able to 
model correctly, such as analyticity and entailment (Predelli 2012b, 2013), and the conditions 
they impose on grasping the meaning of a word are psychologically unrealistic, for they are 
redundant (Nowak 2019b). In the next two subsections I will review the main reasons we 
have for rejecting the incorporation of this kind of conditions into the lexical entry of 
demonstratives (and any word in general). However, I shall go one step further, for my aim 
is not just to argue that c-theorists should get rid of these constraints imposed on condition 
(27i); rather, the version of c-theories I will ultimately end up defending will lead me to the 
rejection of condition (27i) altogether. Thus, the following discussion may be seen as an 
inquiry into how a proper lexical entry should look like.  
 
3.1.1 Truth in virtue of character 
The first argument I wish to consider is the criticism put forward by Predelli (2012b, 2013) 
against the idea that the demonstrata of a context should satisfy requirements like those 
mentioned above, such as being demonstrated by the speaker.49 Predelli shows that 
conditions of this kind, paired with a Kaplanian understanding of logical truth, end up 
                                                          
48 Lexical entries like (134)-(135) suggest that the primary bearers of truth-conditions are not sentences but 
speech acts. In fact, Davidson acknowledges the influence of John Langshaw Austin (1950) in this treatment of 
demonstratives.  
49 Predelli (2001) presents yet another argument against c-theories concerning anaphora. I discuss and reject it 
in section 3.4.2. 
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validating inferences that shouldn’t be licensed. In other words, it overgenerates when it 
comes to validity (analyticity) and logical consequence (entailment). Let us see why. For 
simplicity’s sake, I will formulate the critique in terms of bare demonstratives, but these 
arguments straightforwardly apply to the complex ones.  As above, assume that a sentence p 
is logically valid iff it is true in all contexts, where being true in a context means being true 
when interpreted in the pair <c, ic>. Similarly, p is a consequence of q iff it the former is true 
in every context in which the latter is. 
The argument may be formulated in a very simple way if we assume that contexts are 
composed of the usual parameters plus a demonstrative, as in the toy version of c-theories I 
presented above in section 2.1.2, but let me slightly alter the composition of contexts in order 
to fit Braun (1996) and Salmon’s (2002) lengthy arguments to the effect that demonstrata 
should not be included as part of the context. Although Braun’s contexts do include a 
demonstratum parameter in the essays where he presents his version of c-theories (Braun 
1994, 2008a), his official position is one in which the extension of a sentence containing a 
demonstrative is relative to three parameters: a context c, a circumstance i and a 
demonstration d. Predelli (2012a: 550) renders his lexical entry thus:  
(136) ⟦that⟧d, c, i = the unique x demonstrated by d in ic 
Notice one thing: insofar as character is conceived as a function from contexts to 
contents, Braun’s “that”, by itself, lacks a character. It is the combination of a demonstration 
plus “that” that yields a character, which, together with a context, can return a content. 
Instead, what “that” is endowed with is a demonstration-invariant meaning; more accurately, 
(136a) ⟦that⟧ = λd. λc. λi. the unique x demonstrated by d in ic 
This demonstration-invariant meaning combines with a demonstration in order to 
return a context-invariant meaning or character. For some demonstration e (say, my pointing 
towards the bottle in front of me), the character of “that” under e may be rendered thus: 
(136b) ⟦that⟧e = λc. λi. the unique x demonstrated by e in ic 
Finally, this character returns a content once a context is supplied. For these reasons, 
Braun calls his approach the “Three Meaning Theory”. Salmon’s theory is very similar, for 
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he also relativizes the semantic value of “that” to a demonstration, but, unlike Braun’s, his 
“that” does have a character, since demonstrations d are part of the context: 
(137) ⟦that⟧c, i = the unique x demonstrated by dc in ic 
Of course, these two theories are just terminological variants of each other. For each of 
Braun’s combinations of a context c and a demonstration d, Salmon’s theory contains a 
context k = <ac, wc, tc, d>; on the other hand, for each of the contexts q = <aq, wq , tq, dq> in 
Salmon’s theory, Braun’s contains a combination <d, k> such that k = <aq, wq , tq> and d = 
dq. And, of course, for each context c and demonstration d in Braun’s theory, ⟦that⟧d, c is 
identical to Salmon’s ⟦that⟧<ac, wc, tc, d> – and mutatis mutandis the other way around. Borg 
(2000: 242), on the other hand, provides a very similar lexical entry, although the semi-
technical vocabulary in which she states it does not make it clear whether the demonstration 
should or should not be part of the context; at any rate she also requires the referent of a 
complex demonstrative to be demonstrated in the world of the context.50 For the sake of 
discussion, let me adopt Salmon’s theory as representative of all three approaches, which I 
shall call “restricted c-theories”. 
Insofar as demonstrations are assumed to determine a unique demonstratum, one might 
suspect that restricted c-theories are equivalent to the generic c-theory I presented in section 
2.1.2 or, for that matter, Braun’s (1994, 2008a) simplified theory – let me dub these 
“unrestricted c-theories”. But they are not equivalent, for the biconditional only holds in one 
of the two directions. Let d(i) be the demonstratum selected by the demonstration d in 
circumstance i. Then, for each of the contexts c = <ac, wc, tc, dc> from restricted c-theories, 
the unrestricted ones contain a corresponding context k = <ac, wc, tc, dc(ic)>, where, of course, 
the restricted ⟦that⟧c = the unrestricted ⟦that⟧k. The converse, however, is not true. Let <w6, 
t4> be a circumstance where no demonstration ever occurs. In principle, unrestricted theories 
allow there to be a context like, say, q = <Marcus, w6, t7, Kripke>, where Marcus and Kripke 
are, respectively, the agent and the demonstratum of q. But, given that <w6, t7> is a 
circumstance where nothing is demonstrated, there is no demonstration d in restricted 
theories such that d(<w6, t7>) = Kripke. In more general terms, for any demonstration d, the 
                                                          
50 In a later essay, Borg (2002) employs (and explicitly argues for) a technical notion of demonstration that 
suggests that perhaps her theory belongs to what I am calling “unrestricted c-theories”. See below.  
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unrestricted ⟦that⟧q ≠ the restricted ⟦that⟧<Marcus, w6, t7, d>, for former picks out Kripke, whereas 
the latter is, simply, uninterpretable – it selects nothing. That means that the theory as I 
presented it in 2.1.2 and Braun’s simplified theory allow more contexts than Borg’s, 
Salmon’s or Braun’s official theory.51 Predelli’s (2012a, 2013) criticism of (restricted) c-
theories concerns, precisely, the lack of such contexts.  
The main problem with disallowing the existence of contexts of that kind is, simply, 
that these theories end up overgenerating when it comes to logical truth. Let us see why. The 
above requirement that the content of “that” in a context should be the object selected by the 
demonstration in the relevant circumstance may be put thus (again, I shall put this in terms 
of Salmon’s theory, but it can be easily adapted to Braun’s or Borg’s): 
(138) For all x, ⟦that⟧c = x iff ⟦demonstrate⟧c (ic, dc, x) = 1, 
where “demonstrate” is a three-place predicate between circumstances, demonstrations 
and their associated demonstrata that yields truth just in case the former picks out the latter 
in the selected circumstance. This means that the character of “that”, in restricted c-theories, 
is given by a proper subfunction of the character of “that” in the unrestricted ones. Namely, 
the former kind of theories only include contexts satisfying condition (138), which are a 
proper subset of the ones allowed by theories of the latter kind (hence the appropriateness of 
calling them “restricted” and “unrestricted”, respectively). And, because of this, restricted c-
theories end up validating truths like the following: 
(139) If that is green, then something is being demonstrated 
Let c be a context in which the premise is true (i.e., true when assessed in the pair <c, 
ic>). If so, the premise is interpretable, and therefore ⟦demonstrate⟧c (ic, dc, ⟦that⟧c) = 1. This, 
in turn, entails that ic contains an object that is being demonstrated (i.e., there is some object 
x and a demonstration y such that ⟦demonstrate⟧c (ic, y, x) = 1). This makes the conclusion 
true in <c, ic>. Of course, this point generalizes: for example, “demonstrations exist” turns 
                                                          
51 The non-equivalence, of course, does not only affect contexts without demonstrations. Let <w8, t2> be a 
circumstance in which only one demonstration occurs, one that, in fact, picks out Anscombe. Then unrestricted 
theories allow there to be two contexts like <Geach, w8, t2, Anscombe> and <Geach, w8, t2, Hypatia>, whereas 
a context like the latter is ruled out by the restricted ones.  
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out to be a consequence of “that is blue” on every theory abiding by a principle like (138). 
This is of course wrong.  
Predelli’s diagnosis is clear: the existence of demonstrations or demonstrating gestures 
should be left out of the truth-conditional contribution of a demonstrative. This applies not 
just to c-theories, of course. For example, Kaplan’s suggestion that “dthat (the demonstrated 
object)” may be regarded as the formal counterpart of “that” also yields undesirable results, 
for it also validates (139). Arguably, (134)-(135) are wrong for the very same reasons, 
although perhaps these authors would simply dismiss the criticism, for they present their 
lexical entries as something belonging to a theory of speech acts, and they are therefore not 
primarily concerned with properties of sentence-types such as analyticity and entailment. Be 
it as it may, our theory should, for the sake of logical accuracy, include contexts that Borg, 
Braun and Salmon would probably regard as improper. 
Let us now examine a possible criticism towards Predelli’s argument. One might argue 
thus: isn’t this reasoning mixing things up? After all, it presupposes that some technical terms 
from the metalanguage, such as “demonstration”, “demonstrate” and “demonstratum”, are 
equivalent to their object-language counterparts. I.e., perhaps (138) is just mistaken: maybe 
the property “being demonstrated”, which we attribute to many things in the metalanguage 
(cf. (136a-c) and (137)), is not obtained by means of disquotation; in more formal terms, 
perhaps ⟦demonstrate⟧c ≠ λi. λx. λy. x demonstrates y in i. After all, there is no need for our 
lexical entries to be Davidsonian.52 The notion of demonstration is a technical one, one that 
need not correspond to any sort of pointing, intention, gesture and the like. In other words, it 
is something ordinary speakers need not have access to, and that therefore need not 
correspond to any word in their language, not even the word “demonstrate”. This wider 
notion of demonstration is found, for example, in Borg (2002: 508), whose discussion seems 
to suggest that she would reject (138). This means that c-theorists may formulate their 
restriction on contexts in some other way: they can simply assume that demonstrations are 
functions from contexts to objects, one that need not abide by condition (138). In other words, 
they can allow improper contexts in their theory without thereby overgenerating logical truth.  
                                                          
52 See Glanzberg (2014), and especially Yalcin (2018), for a thorough critique of Davidsonian theories, and in 
particular of the idea that words in the object language should be translated as homonyms in the metalanguage. 
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If this is so, however, I do not see any reason these authors could have for adopting a 
theory on which the demonstratum is not incorporated directly into the context but obtained 
in an indirect way through a demonstration. Any theory willing to give up on condition (138) 
can avoid the overgeneration problem as much as the unrestricted theory does; it is therefore 
natural to assume, simply, that what contexts contain is not a demonstration but a 
demonstratum that serves as the value for the character of demonstratives. How this 
demonstratum is in fact selected is something that need not be encoded in the meaning of 
“that” – it is something extrasemantic, something that belongs to pragmatics, or perhaps to 
the theory of perception or general psychology (a point endorsed by Borg 2002). Be it as it 
may, the only semantic role of “that” should be to select an object from the context.53  
Let me now come back to complex demonstratives, for they raise further issues. Recall 
that, according to standard c-theories, whatever is picked out by a complex demonstrative of 
the form “that F” in a context c should satisfy two requirements: it should be the 
demonstratum of the context, and it should satisfy the descriptive meaning “F” of the 
demonstrative. But, arguably, these two requirements are not on a par. As we have already 
seen, any requirement we want to impose on demonstrata should be left out of the truth-
conditional profile of the demonstrative, i.e., it should be “extra-linguistic and thus off-the-
record”, to use Kaplan’s (1989: 572) phrase. But the descriptive meaning contributed by the 
nominal is a bit different; recall (28) and (29): 
(28) That spy is a spy 
(29) a. All dentists are paid more than all doctors 
b. Therefore, that dentist is payed more than all doctors 
                                                          
53 This way of conceiving character is not uncontroversial. Georgi (2019) argues that this conception of 
character threatens to trivialize semantic theory: if no significant restrictions are imposed as to what is required 
in order to count as an agent, an addressee or a demonstratum, then the theory fails in providing a way of 
distinguishing the meaning of any two indexicals, for they all are assigned exactly the same role, namely to 
pick out a parameter from the context. To be sure, “I”, “you” and “that” are devised, respectively, to pick out 
agents, addressees and demonstrata, but the problem is that, on this conception of character, these labels are 
empty, devoid of any significant content. We could exchange the characters of “I” and “you” and the theory 
would still make exactly the same predictions. A similar point was put forward by Derek Ball (2017): this way 
of conceiving character, in which it has nothing to say about why expressions receive this or that content in this 
or that context, renders semantic theory explanatorily incomplete. 
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(28) is analytic and (29) strikes us as a valid inference. These examples show that there 
is a disanalogy between the descriptive meaning contributed by the nominal and whatever 
requirements we may want to impose on what counts as a demonstratum, for the former, 
unlike the latter, does have a semantic role to play (although see footnote 11). What the above 
examples show is that the descriptive meaning of the nominal part of a demonstrative does 
seem able to impose restrictions on interpretability: it is right to prevent the character of “that 
dentist” from taking a value in contexts in which the demonstratum is not a dentist, but it is 
illegitimate to restrict contexts in the same manner on the basis of principles like (138). Any 
theory treating these two kinds of restrictions on a par will either overgenerate or 
undergenerate when it comes to logical validity. The problem of restricted c-theories is 
precisely this: they treat both requirements on a par. But, arguably, they should not. 
This kind of criticisms are not exclusive for c-theories, and in fact they can be posed 
for theories not primarily concerned with validity and entailment. Let me consider one such 
theory: the dynamic approach by Craige Roberts (2002, 2003). The framework she works 
with is a version of Stalnaker’s (1978) context-change semantics, in which the meaning of a 
sentence lies in its potential to change the common ground, i.e., the set of assumptions shared 
by the participants in the conversation. In this kind of frameworks, the common ground is 
usually modeled as a set of possible worlds, and asserting consists in eliminating worlds from 
this context, namely those incompatible with the content of the assertion – so far this is rather 
well-known.  Roberts’s theory in particular is meant as an improvement of the framework by 
Irene Heim (1982), in which the common ground is not understood as a set of worlds, but 
rather as a set of pairs consisting of an assignment and a world. The idea that both Heim and 
Roberts assume is that noun phrases contribute what they call “discourse referents”, which 
are modeled as (numerical) variables with associated presuppositions. Consider, for the sake 
of illustration, the following fragment of discourse: 
(140) [The king of France]1 entered the room. He1 was carrying a pie. 
How does this sentence contribute to eliminating material from the common ground? 
As stated above, noun phrases contribute variables with associated presuppositions – let me 
remain neutral about what (140) presupposes, for Heim and Roberts differ. Presuppositions 
aside, this discourse is true in exactly those pairs <g, w> of an assignment function and a 
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world such that g(1) enters the room in w and g(1) carries a pie in w. Or, in other words, 
(140) eliminates from the common ground those pairs <g, w> in which g(1) does not enter 
the room carrying a pie in w. Just as in any other Stalnaker-style framework, the semantic 
contribution made by asserting a sentence may vary depending on the common ground – say, 
if our shared assumptions agree in that the current king of France is Donald Trump, then 
(140) will eliminate those pairs in which g(1) ≠ Donald Trump, as well as those in which 
Trump does not enter the room carrying a pie. Indefinite noun phrases make similar 
contributions: 
(141) [A woman]2 entered the stage. She2 was carrying a basket 
As above, this fragment eliminates from the common ground those pairs <g, w> such 
that g(2) does not enter the stage carrying a basket. Of course, the indefinite “a woman” 
carries a different kind of presuppositional information – namely, that of not having been 
previously introduced in the discourse –, which explains the difference with (140). 
Roberts’s theory, in particular, is concerned with offering a unified treatment for all 
definite noun phrases, including pronouns, complex demonstratives, definite descriptions and 
indexicals, among others. Namely, she argues that what makes them definite is that they 
trigger (at least) two presuppositions: one of familiarity and one of uniqueness. The former 
presupposition is satisfied by belonging to the set of familiar referents (i.e., those already 
introduced or those whose existence is implied by the context). Let us call this set “Dom”, 
and let it consist of variables. The idea that a definite presupposes familiarity amounts to 
saying its associated numerical variable should already belong to Dom at the time of 
utterance – or that it might be made salient by the utterance itself. Of course, this need not be 
the case of indefinites: my use of “a chair” does not presuppose familiarity with any chair. 
Additionally, definites also trigger a uniqueness presupposition; for example, a definite 
description like “[The king of France]1” presupposes a content that can be modeled as the set 
of pairs <g, w> such that, for any n ∈ Dom, if g(n) has the property of being a king of France 
in w, then g(1) = g(n). 
Pronouns are also definites on Roberts’s theory, which means that they also trigger 
uniqueness and familiarity presuppositions. One might wonder how uniqueness can ever be 
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satisfied in the case of sentences containing two pronouns with the same descriptive content, 
like “he is taller than him”, but Roberts claims that this can be achieved by requiring pronouns 
satisfy an extra presupposition. She claims that Dom contains a subset of partially ordered 
salient discourse referents. And pronouns pick out the unique most salient entity satisfying 
the descriptive content of the pronoun (say, being a female in case of “she”). Let us see an 
example: 
(141a) A woman entered from the left of the stage. Another woman entered from 
the right. She was carrying a basket. 
Exophoric uses aside, the pronoun “she” in this example is, by default, interpreted as 
referring to the second woman. A reading in which it refers to the first one is very hard to 
achieve, if available at all, and at any rate infelicitous. Roberts explains this fact thus: 
pronouns presuppose reference to the most salient entity satisfying their descriptive meaning. 
The second woman in the discourse was mentioned in the last place, so she is more salient 
than the first one. Therefore a co-indexing like the one below would result in presupposition 
failure, for the pronoun would not pick out the most salient female: 
(141a) #[A woman]1 entered from the left of the stage. [Another woman]2 entered 
from the right. She1 was carrying a basket. 
Similarly, a demonstration (say, a pointing gesture) may raise to salience some entities. 
A use of “he is taller than him” is felicitous only in case the referent of the latter pronoun is 
somehow ostended, rendering him more salient than the first one. Complex demonstratives 
(Roberts 2002) are similar: “that table” should refer to the most salient table, and saliency 
may change midway by means of a demonstration. It also predicts that in a sentence like (83), 
repeated below, the only NP that can be co-indexed with “that student” is “another student”, 
for the same reasons as the pronoun in (141): 
(83) [A student]1 was sitting in the library. [Another student]2 was sitting by her 
side. [That student]2 had a logic book. 
Since “another student” introduces a discourse referent, this co-indexing ensures that 
“that student” will always receive the right interpretation: whoever is selected by the variable 
2. So far, so good.  
133 
  
Roberts’s framework has a lot of virtues and is importantly different from the theories 
considered so far, but it is subject to a version of the same type of criticisms, for it also 
incorporates into the lexical meaning of a pronoun the idea that it should select something 
salient. Her theory is in principle not primarily concerned with philosophical notions such as 
analyticity and apriority, for it is a dynamic approach conceived rather as a model of the 
updating of information during a conversation, but it still yields undesirable results: for 
example, “that is salient” turns out to be always uninformative.54 In fact, her theory renders 
sentences like “that table is a table” and “that table is salient” on a par: as long as salience is 
incorporated into the lexical meaning of a demonstrative, the latter will be as tautological as 
the former. In her own words, “the sensitivity of pronominal reference to relative salience 
[...] is more direct, in fact a part of the conventional meaning of pronouns” (Roberts 2003: 
325, my emphasis). This kind of ideas always end up overgenerating when it comes to 
analyticity and informativeness.  
The moral of the story is clear: no matter which kind theory you advocate, you should 
never incorporate into the lexical entry of pronouns nor any other word the idea that it should 
select something salient, demonstrated, intended or ostended in some other manner. 
Requirements of this kind, while important, are not a matter of semantics, and they will 
always turn out to be problematic in terms of logical truth and informativeness. 
It is of course always possible to cast doubts about the very notions of analyticity and 
informativeness employed in this section. For example, it could be argued that perhaps the 
idea that (139) can be an analytic truth, or that it can be noninformative, is not so misguided. 
A very similar argument was sketched by García-Carpintero (2006: 201-202) against David 
Chalmer’s (2006) criticism of Reichenbachian interpretations of two-dimensional 
frameworks. Chalmers claimed that this kind of approaches, while perhaps appropriate for 
modelling the dynamics of a conversation, are nevertheless unfit for capturing the 
philosophical notion of apriority, for they will always end up counting sentences like 
“language exist” as a priori truths. García-Carpintero, who advocates for a token-reflexive 
framework, responds as follows: 
                                                          
54 Assuming, as it is rather reasonable to do, that metalinguistic facts are kept fixed. See footnote 14. 
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“The concepts of apriority and epistemic possibility are philosophical, highly 
theoretical ones. I do not dispute that, after long exposure to philosophical 
discussions, one can develop the sort of intuitions whose existence Chalmers 
asserts. The question is what methodological relevance appeal to them has in 
philosophical discussions such as this. […] Whether or not a philosophically 
useful concept of apriority will make claims like ‘there is thinking going on’ a 
priori is up for grabs: it is not the sort of issue to be decided by an appeal to 
intuition.” (García-Carpintero 2006: 202).  
Substitute “apriority” for the closely related notions of “analyticity” or 
“informativeness” and you already have an argument: perhaps the idea that “language exists” 
or “that is being demonstrated” are analytic truths is not so misguided. Analyticity is a 
philosophically loaded notion, and, although at first sight the truth of sentences like (139) 
strikes us as something that cannot be settled only in semantic terms, it is also possible that 
our best philosophical theory would count them as analytic. 
However, these responses just lead us to the next set of problems that can be put 
forward to the idea that salience, demonstrations and the like should be incorporated into the 
lexical meaning of demonstrative. The arguments of the next section purport to show that it 
is psychologically implausible to assume that demonstratives, or words of any kind, should 
incorporate, as part of their meaning, any instructions for finding a referent.  
 
3.1.2 Redundancy 
Good semantic theories deal with meaning-related issues such as analyticity and entailment, 
as well as phenomena on the interface between syntax and semantics, such as ellipsis, 
anaphora and compositionality. It is nevertheless possible to take a skeptic stance towards all 
these issues. Some authors might regard semantic models as too abstracted away from actual 
speech, and consequently they may find themselves more comfortable with a theory of 
language use, one that could leave logic aside for the most part, and that therefore would find 
itself in a much better position to incorporate salience, ostension and the like in the lexical 
entries of demonstratives. We have seen that a version of Predelli’s arguments can be 
constructed for theories of the latter kind too, for such authors would probably find 
themselves in trouble when accounting for the informativeness of sentences like “this is 
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salient” or “that is being demonstrated”. But, admittedly, the argument seems to have lost 
some of its strength in this case, for some authors might be willing to embrace a highly 
context-dependent notion of informativeness, one that might count these as tautologies in 
most contexts of utterance. There is nevertheless an additional reason that has been put 
forward against the idea that the lexical meaning of demonstratives should include 
instructions for selecting a referent: namely, that such requirements are psychologically 
redundant.  
Ethan Nowak (2019b) has argued that it is unlikely that reference-fixing rules like those 
in (27i) should belong to the lexical entry of a demonstrative. To this effect he provides three 
arguments: that this condition is at odds with the standard treatment of pronouns as variables, 
that it conflicts with the parsimony that is to be expected from any linguistic theory, and that 
it is superfluous, for the ability to follow instructions of that kind is prior to the acquisition 
of semantic competence. The former argument is a semantic one, whereas the latter two rely 
not just on semantics but also on pragmatics and psycholinguistics, and therefore they may 
be happily employed against incorporating something like condition (27i) even in a theory 
concerned only about language use.  Let us briefly touch on each of these arguments. 
Nowak’s first argument against (27i) has to do with the desirability of treating 
demonstratives on a par with personal pronouns. I believe it is flawed, but let me briefly 
review it anyway, for the arguments mentioned here will be employed later on, in section 
3.3.3. Pronouns are usually modeled as variables in semantics (cf. Heim & Kratzer 1998), 
for they display both free and bound uses: 
(142a) She is happy 
(142b) Every girl thinks that she is happy 
The similarity of “this” and “that” with other pronouns suggests that they should be 
dealt with in the same terms. But, arguably, variables do not have any kind of lexical meaning 
incorporating instructions for selecting a referent, so a condition like (27i) precludes a 
variabilist semantics for demonstratives. Insofar as the functioning of demonstratives is best 
modelled by employing the usual machinery for variable binding in the case of 
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demonstratives, instructions for selecting a referent should be excluded from the lexical 
meaning of these expressions, for variables do not include restrictions of this kind. 
A possible response on behalf of advocates of (27i) is that perhaps bound and free 
variables involve different lexical items, i.e., that (142a-b) involve two different words “she” 
– this is arguably what Kaplan’s (1989) had in mind in his remarks to the effect that bound 
and free pronouns may be regarded as homonyms.55 This idea, however, sounds implausible: 
if sentences (142a-b) contained two different lexical items, we would expect these two words 
to translate differently into other languages, but they do not (see Rabern 2013, del Prete & 
Zucchi 2017 and Gimeno-Simó (manuscript) for discussion). Another possible response in 
favor of (27i), advanced by Nowak himself, may be formulated thus: bare demonstratives 
resist binding, which is a good reason for thinking that they are not variables after all. If they 
were so, we would expect the demonstrative in (143b) to display a bound reading pretty much 
like the pronoun in (143a), but it does not: 
(143a) OK[Every IKEA kit]1 comes with instructions for assembling it1 
(143b) #[Every IKEA kit]1 comes with instructions for assembling that1. 
If “that” were a variable, it should be possible for the higher quantifier in (143b) to 
bind it, but it seems that this sentence cannot have such reading. In spite of this, Nowak 
argues that the fact that “that” resists binding does not preclude a variabilist treatment of 
demonstratives. In the first place, complex demonstratives do display bound variables uses, 
as we have seen in section 2.2.1.2. But additionally, the same argument could be used for 
showing that a pronoun like “it” is not a variable either, for it resists free uses: 
(144a) (Gesturing towards an object) Do you see that? 
(144b) (Gesturing towards an object) *Do you see it? 
Just like (143b), the anomaly of (144b) is due to a missing reading: variables can be 
either free or bound, but the pronoun in (144b) seems to resist free readings. Does this show 
that “it” is not a variable? It does not: rather, what the evidence from (143) and (144) suggests 
is that “it” and “that” are in complementary distribution. Two elements of the same linguistic 
                                                          
55 This could also be the idea behind the distinction between real (free) and apparent (bound) variables found 
in Principia Mathematica (Whitehead & Russell 1927).  
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category are in complementary distribution when the environments they can appear in are 
non-intersecting (in plain English, that each of them can only be used in those occasions in 
which the other one is not licensed). For example, the English determiners “a” and “an” are 
in complementary distribution, which can be used as evidence that they are morphological 
variants of the same word.56 Nowak tentatively suggests that perhaps the same thing is going 
on with “it” and “that”: they “might be distinguished as the bound and free versions of the 
same basic element” (2019b: 10). 
I basically agree with a variabilist semantics for demonstratives, and the suggestion 
that “it” is in complementary distribution with “that” sounds worth exploring, yet I think the 
argument does not show what it purports to: the fact that demonstratives are best modeled as 
variables does not entail that a condition like (27i) cannot be built into the lexical entry of 
these expressions. Personal pronouns are an example of variables that nevertheless are 
required to meet similar constraints; for example, Heim and Kratzer (1998: 244) build into 
the lexical entry of “she” the idea that it should pick out a female: 
(145) For any n ∈ ℕ, ⟦Shen⟧ = λg: g(n) is a female. g(n) 
I.e., “she” is modeled as a variable whose value depends on the assignment, yet its 
referent is presupposed to be a female, for it ranges only over assignments whose value for 
the variable n is a female. Incorporating a condition like (27i) into the lexical meaning of 
“that” should not be any different from a technical point of view. We could have a lexical 
entry like the following: 
(146) For any n ∈ ℕ, ⟦Thatn⟧ = λg: g(n) is demonstrated by the speaker. g(n) 
This lexical entry treats “that” as a variable whose use presupposes that the speaker is 
demonstrating the required referent. Of course, binding this variable should not be a problem: 
the same mechanism employed for bound uses of “she” is suited for binding the variables 
                                                          
56 Phonetics is perhaps the field in which complementary distribution has been more widely discussed. It is 
usual, for example, to regard two sounds as allophones (i.e., different ways to articulate the same phoneme) iff 
they are in complementary distribution. English [p] and [ph] both correspond to the phoneme /p/, which is 
pronounced differently depending on the environment; namely, the latter only occurs at the beginning of a word, 
as in “pig”, whereas the former is found in words like “spin”, “compliment” or “space”.  
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associated with demonstratives.57 So the fact that “this” and “that” are better modeled as 
variables can hardly tell against incorporating (27i) into the meaning of a demonstrative. It 
strikes me, at most, as a terminological problem. 
I find the other two arguments offered by Nowak more compelling. They are closely 
related, for both of them attempt to show one thing: building something like (27i) into the 
meaning of a demonstrative is redundant, for the instructions it encodes are something that 
any reasonable speaker would deploy in trying to find the referent of any term, not just 
demonstratives. Parsimony demands that these conditions be left out of the character of these 
terms and to be sought elsewhere – most likely, in the pragmatics. Let us see the first of these 
arguments. 
Assume that the meaning of “that” in English is given by something like (146), i.e., a 
lexical entry incorporating instructions for selecting a referent. And consider a language, 
English*, which is just like English except that “that” works as a variable with no associated 
conditions like (27i): its only role is to select a referent, but the lexical meaning of the term 
would give us no clue as to which object we should select. Now imagine an utterance of “that 
is large” in English*. One might wonder what strategy we should carry out in order to 
determine which proposition has been expressed. Arguably, what we would do is, simply, to 
try to find the object demonstrated by the speaker, the one she intended to talk about, the one 
she pointed at, etc. In other words, we would carry out the same procedures that we would 
have performed had we encountered an utterance of “that is large” in English. This means 
that both English and English* would require hearers to engage in the very same kind of 
reasoning. What this entails, of course, is that speakers of English do not need the instructions 
encoded in (146): they are already capable of arriving at the required proposition. Their 
pragmatic capabilities would allow them to secure the appropriate referent regardless of 
whether the instructions for finding it are encoded in the lexical meaning of the word.  
Nowak’s conclusion is clear: instructions for finding a referent given an occasion of 
use are already in the pragmatics, so their presence in the semantics of a word is redundant. 
In fact, this kind of principles are required not just for settling the referent of demonstratives, 
                                                          
57 An option is to modify FA as Heim & Kratzer (1998: 125) do, and another one is to adopt a mechanism of 
feature transmission (Heim 2008, von Stechow 2003, 2004) that prevents the presuppositions in these pronouns 
to be passed on to their bound counterparts. See sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.5.2. 
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but for any other word; for example, it is reasonable to assume that intentions, demonstrations 
and ostensive gestures feature prominently in the kind of reasoning we engage in when we 
are trying to determine whether a token of “bank” is being used for talking about a financial 
institution, a storing place or the side of a river. Since they are necessary for communication 
in general, there is no point in building them into the semantics too. Theoretical parsimony 
suggests that they should be left out of the character of demonstratives. 
The second argument is closely related, and it is based on empirical work. Concretely, 
the data Nowak relies on were obtained by Gillette et al. (1999) in a series of influential 
experiments on language acquisition. The hypothesis advanced by Gilette et al. was that the 
reason why children display a relatively impoverished inventory of verbs is not due to their 
conceptual resources being underdeveloped, but simply because the acquisition of common 
nouns is helped directly by the extra-linguistic context, whereas verbs (and abstract nouns) 
require greater support from an already established linguistic background. In order to show 
this, they asked adults to watch videos of parents speaking to their toddlers. In each of the 
videos, a word had been replaced for a beep or for a non-sense word, and the task of the 
participants was to find what the missing word was – to “fill in the blank”, so to put it. The 
results of the experiment showed the blanks that speakers were best at filling in were those 
associated with concrete nouns, i.e., nouns that refer to a physical object. Thus, one need not 
hear the word “lion” (and need not decode the semantic information associated with it) in 
order to know that the topic of the conversation involves lions: that information can be 
quickly recovered from the context.  
This, Gilette et al. argue, suggests that the first step in learning the meaning of nouns – 
and the first step in acquiring a language –  is to try to find out which are the objects around 
which the conversation revolves. And, arguably, the strategy that the child would adopt for 
carrying out this task is the same one that (27i) instructs the hearer to deploy: finding what is 
being demonstrated, what the speaker intends to talk about, what is being pointed at, what is 
contextually salient, etc. The ability to recognize referents appears to be a basic skill, one that 
is prior to the acquisition of nouns and one that, in fact, aids the child in the whole process 
of acquiring a language. Lexicalizing the instructions that need to be followed in order to 
find a referent is therefore pointless. And, of course, it is so not just from the point of view 
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of c-theorists, but also from the perspective of authors concerned with language use who just 
do not see logical accuracy as a relevant constraint on the predictions a semantic theory 
should make. No matter what you think of semantics, rules for fixing a referent should be 
part of your pragmatic theory and of your account of language acquisition. This means that 
no particular expression, not even demonstratives, needs to incorporate such instructions as 
part of its lexical meaning.  
I think the arguments by Predelli and Nowak suffice for rejecting the idea that the 
lexical entry of a demonstrative should incorporate any sort of reference-fixing rule. These 
constraints, while important, fall outside the lexicon: they are general skills that therefore 
deserve a place in the pragmatic domain. Any semantic clause stating them is doomed to be 
redundant, and, additionally, it will end up overgenerating logical truth. All these arguments 
point towards an important conclusion: the process of selecting an appropriate demonstratum 
for a demonstrative is a purely pragmatic one.58 But, more importantly, they also render (27i) 
vacuous: if demonstratives encode no substantial constraints for selecting a demonstratum, 
then rendering their meaning as a function from contexts to demonstrata is something trivial. 
For this reason, I advocate for a more radical position: I believe we should dispose not just 
of the constraints on selecting a demonstratum, but also of the idea that each context 
privileges a demonstratum that serves as the argument for the character of the demonstrative. 
This is the main modification that I intend to implement into the lexical entry of c-theories. I 
set out to do it in the next section.  
 
3.2 A new lexical entry 
In this section I propose amending the lexical entry of c-theories by dropping condition (27i). 
The arguments of the previous section have shown that the semantic contribution of this 
condition is dispensable: if (27i) is unconstrained, it is vacuous, whereas constraining it some 
way or another is psychologically implausible and, additionally, overgenerates logical truth. 
In this section I shall go one step further: I argue that this condition is, in fact, one of the 
                                                          
58 Just to make it clear, I don’t mean to say that c-theorists regard the selection of the referent of a demonstrative 
as a purely semantic process – arguably, they all would acknowledge an important role to general abilities in 
properly carrying out the task. All I mean is that the constraints imposed into the selection of a referent should 
play no role whatsoever in the semantics.  
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main reasons why standard c-theories cannot accommodate the semantic counterevidence 
from section 2.2.1.2.  
Let me remind the reader of the reasons why standard c-theories yield such deviant 
predictions about the truth-conditions of QI uses of complex demonstratives. Here are the 
precise and imprecise versions of the generic lexical entries I provided for complex 
demonstratives: 
(27) For every context c, “that F” refers in c to an object α iff 
i) α is the demonstratum of c and 
ii) α satisfies F in wc and tc 
(79) ⟦that⟧ = λc: λi. λP: P(ic)(dc) = 1. dc (where dc is the demonstratum of context c; 
do not confuse it with the demonstration parameter posited in the former section) 
As you may recall, the truth-conditions that (27) and (79) predict for a regular QI-
sentence like (77) are highly deviant: 
(77) Every queen cherishes that cleric who crowned her 
In a random context c, the prediction is that (77) expresses the proposition that dc is 
cherished by every queen, under the presupposition that dc crowned them all. These truth-
conditions are plainly wrong, and I have already argued that an account in semantic terms is 
preferable to one that deals with these problems in the pragmatics. But notice that the problem 
here is, precisely, the idea that each context should privilege a certain individual as its 
demonstratum. Informally speaking, we want the demonstrative to pick out a different 
individual for each queen, but this is impossible as long as (27i) is upheld. In other words, 
this condition is the main responsible for the deviant truth-conditions predicted by standard 
c-theories. But we have already seen that (27i) is unmotivated. Since we have no reason to 
preserve it, let me just dispose of it.  
Instead, let me conceive the character of complex demonstratives a bit differently. I 
will be focusing on the problem of QI, for on my view this is the hardest challenge directly 
referential theorists have to face. Intuitively, what we need in order to solve this problem is 
that the complex demonstrative not be anchored to a unique individual: in (77), we want it to 
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select a different cleric for each queen. This amounts to saying that it should select different 
individuals as long as they satisfy different properties: for each queen x, we need the complex 
demonstrative to select an individual satisfying the property of crowning x. This is precisely 
the view of complex demonstratives I am going to defend here: their semantic role is, simply, 
to select a certain individual satisfying a certain property. Informally put, a complex 
demonstrative like “that man” should go to a context c, see which individuals satisfy “being 
a man” in c, and select one of them, one that need not coincide with any demonstratum. 
Let me, then, make a small amendment to contexts. Instead of demonstrata or 
demonstrations, each context c should contain a function δc ranging over properties and 
returning an individual satisfying that property in the circumstance of the context. In more 
formal terms, each context c should contain a function δc: Π→E, where Π is the set of 
functions of type <s, <e, t>>> and E the set of all individuals (type e), such that, for each 
P∈Π, P(ic)(δc(P)) = 1. And the role of a complex demonstrative of the form “that F” should 
be, simply, to select the individual that δ assigns to the property ⟦F⟧ in that context.59 Namely, 
(147) ⟦that⟧ = λc. λi. λP<s, <e, t>>. δc(P) 
This means that the semantic value of, say, “that man” in context k is as singular as it 
can be, i.e., simply an individual, δk(⟦man⟧k), with the additional requirement that δk(⟦man⟧k) 
be a man in circumstance ik. Let q be a context such that δq(⟦man⟧q) = Boris Johnson. In that 
case, the content expressed by “that man is bald” in q is given by (148a) (or by its structured 
counterpart in (148b)): 
(148a) λi. Boris Johnson is bald in i 
(148b) <Boris Johnson, being bald> 
Of course, these propositions can only be expressed in contexts in which Boris Johnson 
is a man; thus, this theory meets the desideratum that the nominal should play a semantic 
role. But, importantly, this role is restricted to the level of character. Namely, the only task 
that (147) attributes to complex demonstratives is to pick out an object from the context, i.e., 
a singular content that remains opaque to modal quantification. Thus, this theory 
                                                          
59 This means that the δ function is, simply, what in semantic theorizing is usually called a “choice function”. 
Choice functions are not particularly common in the literature, but they have nevertheless been employed for a 
number of purposes (cf. Reinhart 1997, Winter 1997, Kratzer 1998b).  
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straightforwardly qualifies as a variant of c-theories. The rest of this dissertation is devoted 
to showing that this theory can accommodate all the counterevidence from section 2.2.1.2, 
i.e., that any c-theorist willing to embrace (147) or a variant thereof will find herself in a 
position to deal with all the counterexamples to c-theories in semantic terms – although, as 
we shall see, we still need to implement some additional but independently motivated 
adjustments to the syntax and semantics of verbal morphology. But, before discussing the 
problematic counterevidence, let me mention some issues related to this lexical entry. In 
particular, I shall address ten possible worries that may be raised concerning (147). 
The first worry is probably the most straightforward complaint that can be raised 
against my account: isn’t there some degree of randomness as to which object is selected in 
each context? Dropping requirements such as, e.g., having to be demonstrated by the speaker 
may lead to an unsatisfactory result: I may be aware of all the objective features of the context 
of utterance (who is speaking, who is listening, where we are located, etc.) and yet not know 
what the referent of the demonstrative is. This is a fair worry, so let me briefly address it.  
The discussion in the previous section should have made it clear that these concerns do 
not pertain to semantics. Semantic constraints in the selection of a suitable referent for a 
demonstrative lead to undesirable results, so these principles should better be built into the 
pragmatics. My function δ is part of the context, but it is not something that can be determined 
just by looking at the physical setting in which an utterance takes place. This means that, 
given a certain utterance (understood as an actual event taking place in a physical 
environment), there is still no semantic rule able to univocally guide speakers and hearers in 
selecting the referent of a complex demonstrative. Is this a problem? It is, but not greater 
than, say, the problem of selecting the appropriate assignment function. Formal contexts are 
composed of parameters that need to be drawn from the actual speech situations they purport 
to represent, but the relationship between the former and the latter is far from transparent. 
Let me expand a bit on this.  
Demonstrative pronouns like “he” or “she” are usually modeled as variables, i.e., their 
value is fixed by the assignment. Insofar as this function is just another parameter of the 
context, these words are not different from expressions like “I”, “here” or “now”: both 
categories of words are, simply, directly referential terms with a non-constant character.  
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However, indexicals like “I”, “here” or “now” are often thought to be essentially different 
from demonstratives. Namely, Kaplan called the former “pure indexicals” because their 
referent could be automatically determined just by looking at the objective features of a 
physical setting; this is, of course, not the case of demonstratives in general. King (2013, 
2014a, 2014b, 2020), for example, uses the label “supplementives” for referring to 
demonstratives and other context-dependent terms whose “context invariant meanings don’t 
by themselves suffice to secure semantic values for them in context” (King 2020: 56). Many 
other authors have endorsed a distinction along these lines (cf. Perry 2001, 2017; Georgi 
2015, 2020; King & Glanzberg 2020).  
Arguably, the constraints on reference-fixing rules for demonstratives that we 
discussed in the previous section were meant to counter the lack of objective rules for settling 
the referent of a demonstrative. They were intended, so to put it, as a way to make 
demonstratives behave more like pure indexicals, i.e., as terms whose reference can be 
automatically determined. I do not think, however, that these attempts are on the right track. 
For one thing: it is not clear that the distinction between pure indexicals and demonstratives 
(or supplementives) is even grounded. Several authors (Vision 1985, Sidelle 1991; Predelli 
1998a, 1998b, 2005a; Corazza et al. 2002; Romdenh-Romluc 2002, 2006) have put forward 
important reasons for thinking that the value of so-called “pure indexicals” cannot be settled 
just by paying attention to allegedly objective features of the context. Namely, there are uses 
of indexicals that cannot be captured by the naïve semantic rules usually attributed to pure 
indexicals (“I” refers to the utterer, “now” to the moment of utterance and so on). Consider 
(149)-(151): 
(149) I am not here now (written on a note attached to my office door) 
(150) Now the French are invading England (as uttered by a historian) 
(151) Never put off until tomorrow what you can do today 
These uses of pure indexicals are, at the very least, puzzling from the perspective of 
someone willing to maintain the above distinction between two main classes of context-
dependent expressions. In spite of being pure indexicals, it is rather clear that they cannot be 
taken to refer to something easily determinable by objective features of the context of 
utterance. The indexicals in these examples require the appeal to different mechanisms, such 
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as deferred utterances (Sidelle 1991), speaker intentions (Predelli 1998a, 1998b, 2004, 
2005a), conventions (Corazza et al. 2002) or features that can be determined in the context 
of utterance but that nevertheless do not coincide with any utterance parameter (Vicente & 
Zeman 2020). It might also be argued that a plethora of these factors may conspire together 
in order to obtain the right value (cf. Glanzberg 2020).60 In a nutshell: determining the value 
of a pure indexical can be as complex and subjective as determining the referent of a 
demonstrative. This complexity undermines the idea that there is a principled distinction 
between these two categories of words.  
What I intended to show by discussing this distinction is that the randomness in (147) 
is inescapable. Admittedly, my function δ cannot be determined just by looking at the 
physical setting in which an utterance takes place. This does not mean that it should not be 
part of the context, or that it should be qualified some way or another so that it should pick 
out some demonstrated object: all it means is that the relationship between utterances and the 
technical notion of sentence-in-a-context is far from trivial. Even if contexts contained only 
the parameters required for pure indexicals, their relationship to actual utterances would not 
be straightforward, and, at any rate, such relation is not a semantic one.61 Contexts may be 
thought of as a formal representation of the values required for indexicals, but the manner in 
which these values are to be determined is something pre-semantic – something that, as I 
mentioned above, should not be incorporated into the lexical meaning of any term. I will 
remain neutral as to which kind of principles determine the value of “he”, “she”, “that” or 
“that man”; perhaps they depend on intentions, perhaps on conventions, perhaps on a mixture 
of factors. But, for the record, this just stresses a crucial feature of my account: complex 
demonstratives are to be understood on the model of pronouns.62 And establishing how the 
reference of a pronoun is to be fixed is a problem for me as much as it is for everyone.  
                                                          
60 Glanzberg’s theory is in principle meant to hold only for what King calls “supplementives”, but it could 
arguably be extended to pure indexicals.  
61 Arguably, the work by Sidelle (1991), Predelli (1998a, 1998b, 2004, 2005a), Corazza et al. (2002) and 
Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2006) may be seen as an attempt to find the right way to link sentences in a context 
to actual utterances. Gauker (2010) states this assumption formally. See Georgi (2019) for criticisms towards 
these authors; on his view, these attempts threaten to trivialize the notion of character.   
62 Just to make it clear, this is in no way in conflict with what I argued for at length in section 2.2.2, namely that 
the “that” occurring in a complex demonstrative is not a pronoun but a determiner, pace Lepore & Ludwig 
(2000). When I say that complex demonstratives should be understood on the model of pronouns, what I mean 
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The second worry is closely related to the first one, and it concerns the relationship 
between complex demonstratives and definite descriptions. Recall how I defined my δ 
function: given a context c and a property P, δc selects a random object satisfying P in ic. One 
might wonder, however, why δ should select an object satisfying P rather that the object 
satisfying P. If character is supposed to pick out a unique salient individual given a context, 
it seems reasonable to just regard complex demonstratives as the natural language counterpart 
of Kaplan’s ‘dthat’ operator, i.e., as a rigidified definite description63 – Neale’s (1993) 
position is a clear representative of this idea.  
Here is the answer: reasonable though as it might seem, assimilating complex 
demonstratives to rigidified definite descriptions is incorrect and, in fact, unnecessary. The 
reason of its incorrectness is, simply, that it gets things wrong; recall the above contrast 
between (131a-b): 
(131a) The bottle is on the table and the bottle is not on the table 
(131b) That bottle is on the table but that bottle is not on the table 
(131a) comes out as self-contradictory because a unique bottle is presupposed (or 
asserted) to exist, but (131b) is perfectly felicitous. What this means is that we need each of 
the two occurrences of “that bottle” to pick out a different object, meaning that there cannot 
be a unique salient bottle per context. The uniqueness requirement typical of definite 
descriptions is therefore incorrect. More accurately, demonstratives are an instance of what 
                                                          
is that the combination of the determiner “that” plus a nominal results in something, a complex demonstrative, 
whose semantics is analogous to that of pronouns (and that may therefore be regarded as a kind of pronoun 
(Swanson 2005)). This is very different from saying that the “that” whose meaning is given by (147) is a 
pronoun. Only the combination of this “that” and an N´ results in something that may be considered as such.  
Although for different reasons, a similar idea was put forward by Dorothy Grover, in the context of her 
prosentential theory of truth (1972), regarding sentences like “this is true”. On her view, this sentence is a 
semantically indivisible whole standing for the content of another sentence – its antecedent. This means that 
the sentence itself works pretty much as a pronoun. Thanks to Jordi Valor for suggesting this comparison.  
63 There is, in fact, a straightforward way to convert (147) into a lexical entry for Kaplan’s “dthat”. All we need 
is to constrain the character of “that” so that it ranges only over singletons: 
(147*) ⟦dthat⟧ = λc. λi. λP: |{x | P(ic)(x) = 1}| = 1. δc(P) (where the first “1” stands for the truth 
value, the second one for the natural number, and, for any set Q, |Q| is the cardinality of Q) 
This lexical entry meets many of the desiderata Kaplan wants for “dthat”; namely, each expression of the form 
“dthat F” will be a singular term and, in fact, directly referential. Of course, it does not abide by the Mirroring 
Thesis. I do not see this as a problem.  
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Georgi (2015, 2020) calls “referentially promiscuous expressions”,64 i.e., terms able to refer 
to different things in a single context. Here is his official definition of referential promiscuity: 
REFERENTIAL PROMISCUITY 
An expression e of a language L is referentially promiscuous if and 
only if there are distinct free occurrences O1 and O2 of e in a sentence 
s, and some context c, such that the content of O1 relative to c is 
distinct from the content of O2 relative to c. (Georgi 2020: 129) 
It is an open empirical question which expressions are referentially promiscuous in this 
sense. Demonstratives and variables are obvious candidates for fitting the definition, but 
some may also want to include time adverbials like “now” (cf. Iacona 2009, 2010), or even 
any expression including variables at some level of representation, such as quantifiers (cf. 
von Fintel 1994) or common nouns (cf. Stanley & Szabó 2000). But, even assuming that 
quantifiers or common nouns may include variables for implicitly restricting their domains, 
the straightforward validity of inferences like “if the king of France is bald, then the king of 
France is bald” should be enough to rule out the possibility that definite descriptions are 
referentially promiscuous expressions (although see footnote 46 above). This also suffices 
for rejecting the idea that complex demonstratives can be definite descriptions of a special 
kind. 
This leads me to the third concern: how to deal with referential promiscuity. The usual 
way to do it, and the one that I will be using throughout this dissertation, is, simply, syntactic 
co-indexing. This is a very common way to deal with the phenomenon (cf. Lewis 1970, Burge 
1974, Kaplan 1977, Larson & Segal 1995, Lepore & Ludwig 2000), and it can be 
implemented in a straightforward manner: let each phrase of the form “that F” be subscripted 
a number n ∈ ℕ, let each context c contain not just a function δc but indefinitely many δc1… 
δc
n…, and let me modify (147) accordingly:  
(147a) For each n ∈ ℕ,  ⟦[that F]n⟧ = λc. λi. δcn(⟦F⟧c) 
                                                          
64 As Georgi acknowledges, his use of the term “referential promiscuity” differs from that of Arthur Sullivan’s 
(2013: §4.4), who uses it as a label for context-dependent expressions in general.  
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Many authors, however, would express their reservations towards this approach. One 
of the main points behind the essays by Braun (1996) and Salmon (2002) is that the idea that 
contexts contain sequences of parameters such that “thatn” refers to the nth parameter of the 
sequence is not a philosophically promising approach to referential promiscuity. For one 
thing: what (147a) is interpreting is not a fragment of English, but rather of a regimented 
language enriched with subscripts. In the worst scenario, (147a) can be seen as a theory that 
postulates ubiquitous ambiguity: English contains infinitely many words pronounced “that”. 
And, arguably, keeping the lexicon at a minimum is a desideratum of any semantic theory. 
Disconformity with co-indexing has led many authors to develop alternative accounts of 
referential promiscuity; for example, Elia Zardini (2014) and Mark McCullagh (2020) set out 
to develop logics that allow contexts to change in the middle of an argument, and Georgi 
(2015, 2020) supplies contexts with an occurrence-tracking parameter.65 These ideas were 
already present in Braun (1996), and they have an important antecedent in Groenendijk & 
Stokhof’s (1991) Dynamic Predicate Logic. 
Regardless of the merits of these approaches, I will stick to syntactic indexing for 
simplicity’s sake. I feel particularly attracted to the idea of incorporating an occurrence 
tracking device, but to a great extent the differences are terminological and the system 
defended here could be easily adapted to any of the options mentioned above. In fact, and 
just for the purposes of the exposition, I will be abstracting away from these problems and, 
unless otherwise noted, I will assume at most one occurrence of a demonstrative per sentence 
throughout the rest of this dissertation. This makes indexing unnecessary, although it will be 
re-introduced when required for discussing some particular examples. Let me just add one 
final word on the topic: the fact that complex demonstratives require mechanisms for 
distinguishing various occurrences in a sentence is revelatory about one of the main features 
                                                          
65 Georgi’s approach is more ambitious, for it makes room for notions like “validity at a context” and “logical 
consequence at a context”. On his approach, a sentence like “that is that” may be valid with respect to some 
contexts but not with respect to others, depending on whether the two occurrences of “that” are coordinated in 
the context in question (the term “coordination” is taken from Kit Fine (2003, 2007)). This marks a substantial 
difference with systems employing syntactic co-indexing, for these approaches usually count sentences like 
“that1 is that1” and “that1 is that2” respectively as valid and non-valid simpliciter, although these frameworks 
could be also adapted in order to fit such notions. As far as I can see, the semantics I defend can easily dispose 
of indexing and be adapted into a system incorporating Georgi’s device, and it is also compatible with a notion 
like “validity at a context”.  
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of my account, namely, that complex demonstratives are to be understood on the model of 
pronouns. Sentences like (131b) resemble (131c-d) rather than (131a): 
(131c) He is on the table but he is not on the table 
(131d) You are on the table but you are not on the table 
It is reasonable, in fact, to assume that the functioning of the descriptive meaning of a 
complex demonstrative is just analogous to that of Φ-features: the nominal plays the very 
same role as the feminine and masculine features of pronouns like “she” or “he”, respectively. 
I will come back to these issues in section 3.3.3. 
Let me now move on and discuss two closely related worries. These concern “these” 
and “those”, on the one hand, and “this” and “these”, on the other. In other words, let me 
discuss how to implement plurality and distality features into the current theory. The most 
natural way to modify (147) in order to deal with plural versions of “that” is, simply, to add 
another function in the context: let each context c contain, in addition to δc, a function Δc that 
takes properties as arguments and returns, as values, subsets of the objects satisfying those 
properties in the circumstance of the context. Formally, each context k should be supplied 
with a function Δk: Π→ ℘(E) such that, for each P ∈ Π, Δk(P) ⸦ P(ik). And the semantics for 
“those” is straightforward: 
(147b) ⟦those⟧ = λc. λi. λP. Δc(P)  
Thus, the role of “those men” is to go to a context, see which individuals satisfy “being 
a man” in the circumstance of the context, and return a subset of those individuals. This 
proposal is merely tentative, for plural complex demonstratives are not my primary concern 
in this dissertation, but this is the natural way to extend (147) in order to accommodate 
plurality. Namely, (147b) is as context-dependent as (147), it incorporates the very same 
restrictions, and the set of referents is obtained in exactly the same manner. Arguably, (147b) 
yields the result that the relation between “that” and “those” is analogous to that between “I” 
and “we”, i.e., it renders each phrase of the form “those F” semantically analogous to a plural 
pronoun – an idea I am very happy to embrace. The semantics of plural pronouns has its own 
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problems66 (one could, for example, wonder whether Δ should rather map properties to strict 
subsets of the individuals satisfying them), but we can abstract away from them in this 
dissertation.  
The other worry concerning Φ-features (or something similar) has to do with distality 
and proximality features. “This” and “that” are obviously not interchangeable in all speech 
situations, for they presuppose (in a pre-theoretical sense of “presuppose”) that the object 
referred to is close and distant, respectively. A naïve way to implement this difference is to 
lexicalize it as a semantic presupposition triggered by the demonstratives: 
(147c) ⟦that⟧ = λc. λi. λP: δc(P) is distant from ac in ic. δc(P) 
(147d) ⟦this⟧ = λc. λi. λP: δc(P) is close to ac in ic. δc(P) 
However, the discussion in 3.1.1 should have taught us to view this kind of lexical 
entries with suspicion. We do not want to count (152a-b) as valid: 
(152a) If that1 exists, that1 is distant from me 
(152b) If this1 exists, this1 is close to me 
For these reasons, I am inclined to think that distality features play a merely pragmatic 
role in aiding the hearer to choose the intended referent. I am not entirely satisfied with this 
idea, for it entails that “this” and “that” have exactly the same meaning in spite of their 
markedly distinct morphology, i.e., that there are morphosyntactic differences that have no 
reflection in the semantics. But, at any rate, I think it is clear that distality and proximality 
should be left out of the truth-conditional contribution of a demonstrative.67 Whether their 
contribution is merely pragmatic or whether it plays a semantic but non truth-conditional role 
is something I leave as an open question for other work. For the moment, these concerns, just 
like those above, can be left aside. 
                                                          
66 See, e.g., Schlenker (2003b, 2009) for plural pronouns. 
67 Or perhaps not. It could be argued that (152a-b) are analytic after all. In fact, they do not seem too different 
from (l): 
(l) She is a female 
Arguably, it is much easier to see (l) as analytic, and a lexical entry like (145) above predicts that it is. Perhaps 
(152a-b) are pretty much like (l). There is a reason for thinking so: nothing in the syntax or morphology of 
“this” and “that” entails that the object referred to should be demonstrated, but these words do incorporate a 
morphological mark to the effect that the relevant object should be at a certain distance. In this sense, distality 
is like gender and importantly different from demonstrations and other instructions for finding a referent.  
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Let us address the sixth worry. One might wonder what happens when no object 
satisfies the descriptive content of the demonstrative. (147) predicts that an utterance of “that 
unicorn” or “that square root of minus 2” in the actual world will be uninterpretable, for the 
δ function is defined only over non-empty properties. Intuitively, this is right – this is the 
option chosen, for instance, by Borg (2000), Salmon (2002) and Glanzberg & Siegel (2006). 
Other authors, however, may feel more attracted to other options. For example, Braun 
(2008a) insists that, when the complex demonstrative has an empty extension, sentences 
containing it still express propositions, only that these contents are gappy, i.e., neither true 
nor false. Yet another option is to argue that sentences containing empty demonstratives 
always express false propositions. I do not mean to adjudicate between all these options. 
They yield slightly different predictions, for example, when it comes to the interaction of 
empty complex demonstratives and attitude reports,68 but facts are too fuzzy and too 
theoretically loaded to empirically rule out any of these alternatives. Since the most popular 
option seems to be uninterpretability, I will stick with this one. But it is possible to modify 
the δ function so as to deal with empty terms. For example, it could be defined thus: 
(153) For each context c, there is a function δc: Π→E, such that, for every P∈Π, 
(i) If {x | P(ic)(x) = 1} ≠ Ø, then P(ic)(δc(P)) = 1 
(ii) If {x | P(ic)(x) = 1} = Ø, then δc(P) = †, where † is an object not in E 
Then there could be a semantic clause specifying that sentences containing † express 
gappy or false propositions, depending on one’s favorite choice. Yet another option is to 
modify clause (153ii) so as to make δ assign a random object from E to the empty property. 
As stated above, I do not mean to adjudicate between all these options – I am just mentioning 
them so as to make the reader aware of their existence and to ensure that my system is 
compatible with them. 
                                                          
68 Take a sentence like (m): 
(m) Jean believes that that square root of minus 2 is a cool number 
Proponents of uninterpretability are committed to saying that (m) is uninterpretable. However, advocates of 
gappy contents can say that Jean believes a gappy proposition, and those advocating for falsity can state she 
believes a false one. The latter two can even count (m) as true. 
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Seventh worry: is it possible to deal with bare demonstratives in terms of (147)? It 
should be clear from the discussion in 2.2.2 that I do not endorse treating bare demonstratives 
as a special case of the complex ones. What I called “the adnominal thesis” is attractive, but, 
on my view, we have no reasons to regard it as more accurate than the dual one, i.e., the idea 
that the two “that”’s that English contains – the pronoun and the determiner – are different 
lexical items (alternatively, the dual thesis may also hold that they are variants of the same 
word, although this variation should be not just syntactic but also semantic). Since I do not 
seek a unified treatment of both kinds of expressions, I am happy to deal with bare 
demonstratives pretty much like (nonrestricted) c-theorists do, i.e., by positing a sequence of 
demonstrata dc
1... dc
n... for each context c. The meaning of the pronoun can be captured by a 
lexical entry like the following: 
(154) For any n ∈ ℕ ⟦thatPRONn⟧ = λc. λi. dcn 
Of course, these demonstrata need not be anyhow demonstrated in the context: they are 
just a purely formal parameter. Alternatively, bare demonstratives can be treated as variables 
– the difference is mostly terminological.  
However, there might be advocates of the adnominal thesis who would like to adapt 
(147) for bare demonstratives. Since I do not regard the evidence from  2.2.2 as a knockdown 
argument against their position, let me just mention a couple of options for adjusting this 
lexical entry. A possible option is to posit a hidden variable for properties in the syntax of 
“that”. If no nominal fills this slot (i.e., if the demonstrative turns out to be bare), then it 
should be assigned a contextually determined property. Another possibility is, simply, to 
regard bare “that” as a shortened form of “that thing”, pretty much like Taylor (1980) or 
Barwise and Cooper (1981) do. Thus, (147) predicts that bare “that” will be assigned any 
object of the domain.  
Relatedly, one might want to adapt (147) for adjectival “that”. This is the eighth 
concern so far and, although it is relevant only insofar as we want to deal with languages 
other than English, let me say that no adaptation is actually needed. Recall that adjectival 
complex demonstratives usually display the form of a determiner phrase: 
(155) The man that 
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This string is interpretable in many languages, but, as I argued by the end of section 
2.2.2, we have good reasons to think that the determiner “the” is added only on the basis of 
syntactic constraints, i.e., that it is a dummy determiner with no semantic relevance. Thus, 
the only interpretable elements of this string are “man” and “that”. And, as long as their 
respective nodes are sisters, this should yield no problems of interpretability. Namely, “that” 
can be given exactly the semantics in (147), and functional application will ensure that it 
combines with “man” in the right manner for selecting an object.  
One might also wonder whether this lexical entry is exclusive for c-theories or it can 
be adapted to other approaches treating complex demonstratives as singular terms. Multiple 
proposition theories are more heterogeneous than c-theories, so it is not clear that the lexical 
entry is easily adaptable in all cases – this is particularly problematic for the case of mp-
theorists endorsing a Stalnakerian conception of contexts. However, (147) can be easily 
formulated in a way that suits multiple proposition theories as long as these are willing to 
acknowledge that the content of a sentence in a context may depend on something like the δ 
function. In that case, all the mp-theorist needs is, simply, something along these lines: 
(156) For every context c, any sentence of the form “That F is G” expresses in c the 
following two propositions:  
i) λi. δc(⟦F⟧c) is G in i 
ii) λi. δc(⟦F⟧c) is F in i.  
The results are pretty much the same c-theories would obtain, but I still think that the 
latter are preferable. The reason is that any proposition defined by means of the clause in 
(156ii) seems completely unnecessary, for it is contextually vacuous given the definition of 
the δ function. Thus, any modification of (147) along the lines of (156) seems redundant. The 
adjustments that I proposed in this section are therefore better suited for c-theories than they 
are for multiple proposition theories, for the extra proposition the latter need to invoke is 
vacuous. This discussion should make clear, however, that these adjustments can also be 
easily embraced by most multiple proposition theorists.  
The tenth and final worry will be addressed in section 3.3.3, but it deserves at least a 
brief mention. One might wonder whether there are formal alternatives to (147). In particular, 
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some theorists may still want to call the referent of a complex demonstrative a 
“demonstratum”, others perhaps would argue that the δ function does not fit with a normal 
understanding of Kaplanian contexts, and others might like to treat complex demonstratives 
as if they were variables. Let me just say that the particular formalism in which this lexical 
entry is stated is far from essential to my theory, and that all the options just mentioned are 
compatible with this particular way of understanding complex demonstratives. But, before 
providing some alternatives in the aforementioned section, it is better to try to convince the 
reader that (147) is the best way to understand these expressions. In the next section I address 
all the counterevidence raised by King and others. Any modification of c-theories along the 
lines of (147) can tackle every problematic counterexample, as long as a couple of additional 
and independently motivated adjustments are implemented.  
 
3.3 Responses to the semantic counterevidence 
Recall from the discussion in 2.2.1.2 that the c-theorist was faced with five types of 
problematic counterexamples: QI-uses (including NS-readings), NDNS-readings, variants of 
Bach-Peters sentences, anaphoric uses and bound variable readings. In this section I argue 
that all these types of counterevidence boil down to just two: they may be either a case of E-
type anaphora or the result of the interaction of the demonstrative with a monster operator. 
These two mechanisms generate non-deictic readings of any indexical, so it is no surprise 
that they render the demonstrative non directly referential. Importantly, these facts allow the 
c-theorist to maintain her two main tenets: complex demonstratives are singular terms, and 
the descriptive meaning of a complex demonstrative contributes to the character, and not the 
content, of the term. In turn, this means that quantificational theories are unnecessary.  
The first complication I set out to solve is the problem of QI, which probably constitutes 
the most important source of counterevidence against standard c-theories. As I explain below 
in 3.3.1.1, Kaplanians willing to make their systems more flexible may think that the answer 
is straightforward: if the character of the term is given by the nominal, and this nominal is 
being quantified into by an external binder, then the latter is operating on the character of the 
term. Operators on character result in the impossibility of referential uses of any indexical 
under their scope, so it is no surprise that complex demonstratives subject to QI do not pick 
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out any particular individual. This argument, however, is not enough for establishing the 
plausibility of c-theories, as arguments in King (2008c) made clear, for the truth-conditions 
predicted by c-theories employing (147) are still mistaken.  
The solution, however, is also independently motivated. As I explain in 3.3.1.2, we 
have good reasons for adopting a system with explicit representation of time and world 
variables in the object language. As I shall argue, the changes that we need in order to 
implement such system are enough for responding to the objection by King (2008c). In fact, 
these changes allow us to deal with many NDNS-uses as a special case of QI-readings, as I 
explain in 3.3.1.3. In that very section I also provide two possible ways to implement these 
changes into c-theories: either through the adoption of an extensional system that disposes of 
intensions, or by means of a slightly more complex system that allows the c-theorist to 
preserve them. I call these two solutions the “extensional solution” and the “circumstance-
binding” solution, respectively. This way of accounting for QI-uses will lead me to a 
philosophical discussion on the notion of monster in section 3.3.2, where I explain the 
motivation for embracing this kind of operators and their relationship with two central 
notions in semantics, namely compositionality and assertoric content (section 3.3.2.1). I also 
say a word on the right way to conceive the difference between notions like direct reference, 
Millianism and singularity (3.3.2.1). 
As I explain in 3.3.4, not all the counterevidence can be reduced to a case of quantifying 
in. Many anaphoric and NDNS-uses, for example, involve no binding into the demonstrative, 
and Bach-Peters sentences require something besides mere binding. However, all these 
problems can be regarded as instances of E-type anaphora – either discourse anaphora or 
donkey anaphora. Virtually every pronoun displays this kind of uses, so complex 
demonstratives (which, I maintain, are to be understood on the model of pronouns) need not 
be treated any differently. Building on proposals that have been previously put forward for 
pronouns in general, I offer several possible treatments for E-type anaphoric complex 
demonstratives. 
In section 3.3.5 I provide different ways to deal with NDNS-uses. We will see that c-
theorists embracing what I called the “circumstance-binding solution” may straightforwardly 
count these cases as instances of QI, whereas advocates of the extensional solution, in spite 
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of not being able to resort to monsters in this case, can still very plausibly appeal to 
pragmatics (3.3.5.1). Importantly, both solutions are able to treat NDNS attitude reports as 
instances of QI-uses, a treatment that is very natural once a system with overt world and time 
variables has been embraced (3.3.5.2). I also offer some (tentative) crosslinguistic evidence 
in favor of this analysis; namely, I suggest that the use of subjunctive in Romance languages 
suggests that complex demonstratives only display non-deictic uses when they are subject to 
QI (3.3.5.3) – an idea that strongly favors c-theorists. I also argue that these ideas fit very 
nicely with a certain contrast, first noticed by Lindsey Wolter (2006; see also Nowak 2019a), 
between complex demonstratives containing a relative clause and those containing simply a 
nominal.  
The last bit of counterevidence, bound variable uses, is discussed in 3.3.3. As the 
discussion from 3.3.2 will make clear, these also qualify, rather straightforwardly, as cases 
of monstrous quantification into the character of the demonstrative – albeit the mechanism is 
different from QI. As a corollary of this discussion, I tentatively suggest that we should better 
drop the notion of context and to treat all indexicals, including complex demonstratives, as 
variables, i.e., as expressions whose value depends on the assignment function. I suggest 
many possible solutions for dealing with bound variable readings. If these claims are right, 
by the end of this section we will have certified that c-theories are able to accommodate all 
the counterexamples that have been put forward against them. It will then be the time to move 
on and discuss why they are superior to their competitors, as I do in 3.4. 
 
3.3.1 Monsters 
Monsters are usually thought of as context-shifters (Israel & Perry 1996, von Stechow 2004, 
Anand & Nevins 2004). It is also usual to regard as a monster any operator responsible for 
indexical shift (Schlenker 2003, Santorio 2012, Jaszczolt & Huang 2017). Another usual 
conception of “monsters” defines them as operators on character or hyperintensional 
operators. Kaplan himself was not entirely clear in his definition, for he provided at least 
three non-equivalent ways to understand them (Predelli 2014): context shifters, character 
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shifters and a third category that Predelli dubs “global shifters”.69 But, actually, all the above 
notions overlap to a great extent. Recent philosophical discussions have set out to clarify the 
notion of monster (Rabern 2014, forthcoming; Teixeira & Basso 2014; McCullagh 2018; 
Rabern & Ball 2019; Santorio 2019; Yalcin 2019), and a consensus has been apparently 
reached: each of the usual definitions is nothing but a particular instance of an operator on 
character – or, equivalently, a hyperintensional operator. 
Kaplan’s primary example of a monster was the artificial “in some contexts” that he 
devised, repeated below:  
⟦In some contexts⟧ = λc ∈ C. λi ∈ I. λh ∈ H. Ǝk ∈ C (h(k)(i)=1) 
Allowing operators of this kind may result in attributing to sentences like (21b) 
readings that they do not actually display; namely, they would mean something like (21e) 
(or, alternatively, (21d)), which has nothing to do with the agent of the actual context: 
(21b) In some contexts I am tired 
(21e) λc. λi. Ǝk ∈ C (ak is tired in i) 
(21d) <<the agent, being tired>, being true in some contexts> 
I.e., context-shifters result in indexical shift – which is, on the other hand, 
straightforward, given that context is the parameter on which the value of indexicals depends. 
Additionally, Kaplanian contexts are the argument to character, meaning that any operator 
shifting that parameter is an operator on character. And, since content and character are, 
respectively, intension and hyperintension, monsters are hyperintensional. This means that, 
on Kaplan’s system, all these notions coincide. 
Consequently, discussions on monsters were initially framed mostly as an empirical 
question. The studies by Philippe Schlenker (2003a) on Amharic,70 and Pranav Anand and 
                                                          
69 A global shifter is an operator that does not just shift the context, but also the circumstance in which it is 
being assessed. For example, a globalized version of “in some contexts” may be rendered thus: 
⟦In some contextsGL⟧ = λc. λi. λh ϵ H. Ǝk ϵ C (h(k)(ik)=1) 
This is, in fact, an operator that is both intensional and hyperintensional. Adding these operators into a language 
could have important consequences when it comes to logical truth, given Kaplan’s understanding of the notion.  




Andrew Nevins (2004) on Slave71 and Zazaki,72 are examples of this kind of reasoning: I find 
a language where indexicals appear to be shiftable, I thereby posit operations on context as 
the mechanism responsible for such phenomenon and, since my system counts contexts as 
the argument of character, I therefore infer that hyperintensional operators exist in natural 
language. Other discussions are framed in more conceptual terms, but they are nevertheless 
aimed at showing that certain empirically attested phenomena are better accommodated by 
acknowledging the presence of monsters. For example, Israel & Perry (1996), Santorio 
(2012) and Gimeno-Simó (2018, 2020b) argue that natural languages need monsters in order 
to tackle the phenomenon of essential indexicality as first formulated by David Lewis (1979) 
and John Perry (1979), whereas Jaszczolt & Huang (2017) argue that a proper treatment of 
mixed quotation requires a monstrous system. These phenomena suggest that perhaps our 
semantic systems should be made more flexible by lifting Kaplan’s ban.  
As we shall see in 3.3.2, the problem is actually much less empirical than it might prima 
facie seem. Ultimately, whether an operator counts as a monster is strictly dependent on one’s 
theoretical commitments to notions like assertoric content – Kaplan’s what is said. Shifting 
the context, qua operation, is monstrous only insofar as the role of context is understood in 
the same way Kaplan does, and mutatis mutandis for the phenomenon of indexical shift. At 
any rate, one thing is clear: in a Kaplan-style framework, hyperintensional operators shift the 
context, and therefore they shift the semantic contribution of indexicals. This provides what 
appears to be a straightforward response to the problem of QI. Namely, the current system, 
paired with a rejection of the monster prohibition, yields the prediction that QI uses of 
complex demonstratives are not directly referential.  
 
3.3.1.1 A straightforward response? 
It is very tempting to say that the problem of QI is easily accommodated simply by assuming 
the presence of monsters. Notice that QI-sentences like (77) or (78), repeated below, involve 
quantifying into the complex demonstrative: 
                                                          
71 Slave is an Athabaskan language from the Canadian Northwest Territories, where it is spoken by 
approximately 2,000 people.  
72 Zazaki is an Indo-European language spoken by an estimate of 2-4 million ethnic Kurds in Eastern Turkey. 
159 
  
(77) [Every queen]1 cherishes that cleric who crowned her1 
(78) [Every skier]1 remembers that first black diamond run they1 attempted to ski 
In c-theories, operating on the nominal of the complex demonstrative is equivalent to 
operating on its character. In (77), the descriptive material “cleric who crowned her” is 
supposed to provide the character of the whole expression, but this material is being 
quantified into by an external operator, i.e., the binder of “her” – and mutatis mutandis for 
the case of (78). This means that the external binder is a monster. Character is supposed to 
pick out an individual given a context, but the semantic value of “that cleric who crowned 
her1” in (77) is not just a function of contexts, but rather of contexts and individuals. It is 
therefore no surprise that, given a context, the term is still unable to pick out a unique object.   
This appears to be the straightforward solution to the problem of QI. My lexical entry 
(147) predicts that (77) should receive the following truth-conditions (the semantic 
contribution of the complex demonstrative is underlined): 
(77d) λc. λi. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → x cherishes δc(λj. λy. y is a cleric in j and y 
crowned x in j) in i) 
These truth-conditions correctly predict that the complex demonstrative in (77) can be 
employed non-deictically. Loosely speaking, each of the queens x determines a different 
property (namely, the property of being a cleric who crowned x), with the result that the 
function δ picks out a different individual for each queen. Let us make this sure by providing 
a stepwise calculation of the truth-conditions of (77). Assume the following simplified 
logical form for the sentence: 
(77d) [Every queen] λ1. t1 cherishes that cleric who crowned her1 
Let me introduce some terminology in order to adapt the usual mechanism for variable 
binding for the current theory. Namely, “c(x/n)” should represent, for each context c, the 
context that is just like c except that gc(x/n) assigns the object x to the variable n. For 
simplicity’s sake, assume that “cleric who crowned” is a syntactic unit  with the following 
160 
 
semantics: λc. λi. λx. λy. y is a cleric and y crowned x in i.73 Let me also simplify the matter 
by abstracting away from the tense of “crowned”, i.e., pretend that its tense is just present. 
The truth-conditions that the current theory predicts for (77) in some random context c and 
circumstance i are the following: 
1. ⟦[Every queen] λ1. t1 cherishes that cleric who crowned her1⟧c, i = 1 iff (by the lexical 
entry of “every”, the definition of the λ abstractor and the lexical entry for “queen”) 
2. λP<e, t>. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → Px) (λy. ⟦t1 cherishes that cleric who crowned 
her1⟧c(y/1), i) = 1 iff (by the lexical entry of “cherish” and the semantics for variables) 
3. λP<e, t>. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → Px) (λy. y cherishes ⟦that cleric who crowned 
her1⟧c(y/1), i in i) = 1 iff (by (147)) 
4. λP<e, t>. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → Px) (λy. y cherishes δc(y/1)(⟦cleric who crowned 
her1⟧c(y/1), i) in i) = 1 iff (by the lexical entry of “cleric who crowned”, IFA and the 
semantics for variables) 
5. λP<e, t>. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → Px) (λy. y cherishes δc(λj. λz. z is a cleric in j and z 
crowned y in j) in i) = 1 iff (by λ instantiation) 
6. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → x cherishes δc(λj. λy. y is a cleric in j and y crowned x in j) 
in i 
The λ abstractor shifts the assignment function, and therefore the context in which we 
are assessing everything under its scope. Thus, the complex demonstrative is not assessed 
with respect to the function δc; rather, each queen x determines a different function, δc(x/1), 
with the result that the demonstrative picks out a different object for each of them. This 
suffices for accounting for the non-deictic nature of this complex demonstrative. These facts 
should come as no surprise, as shifting the assignment function is a monstrous operation 
(Rabern 2013). 
The current system therefore correctly predicts that complex demonstratives subject to 
QI will always fail to pick out an individual. However, this is yet not enough, for we still get 
the wrong result once we take intensionality into account: (77d) is true in a context c and a 
                                                          




circumstance i iff every x such that x is a queen in i cherishes in i a certain object, δc(λj. λy. 
y is a cleric in j and y crowned x in j), with the condition that this object be a cleric who 
crowned her not at i, but at ic. Thus, the cleric is required to have performed the crowning at 
the world and time of the context, instead of the circumstance of evaluation. Of course, this 
is wrong: (77) should be true in any circumstance j such that every queen in j cherishes an 
object that is a cleric and crowned her in j. In other words, it should not be context-dependent. 
King (2008b: 103-104, footnotes 9, 21 and 24) raises the very same problem for any theory 
dealing with complex demonstratives as a formal counterpart of Kaplan’s “dthat”. Let me 
dub this “the problem of intensional mismatch”.  
Let me illustrate what exactly is at stake by briefly discussing King’s version of the 
problem. The difficulty lies in the fact that both my (147) and Kaplan’s “dthat” remain 
anchored to the context of utterance. Assume that  (77) is translated into Kaplan’s system as  
(77e) below. Its truth-conditions, given in (77f), suffer from exactly the same problem:  
(77e) [Ɐx: x is a queen] (x cherishes dthat (the cleric who crowned x)) 
(77f) λc. λi. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → x cherishes dthat (the unique y such that y is a 
cleric in ic and y crowned x in ic) in i) 
Take a random world w7 which is just like the actual world except that queen Victoria 
was not crowned by William Howley but by some other cleric – say, Tomás de Torquemada. 
Assume, too, that she is the only queen in w7, and that she despises Torquemada but cherishes 
William Howley. Then (77f) – or, for that matter, (77d) – is true when assessed in the pair 
consisting of the actual context and w7. It is therefore clear that these lexical entries do not 
capture the right truth-conditions of the sentence, for it should be false in w7 regardless of the 
context in which it is being interpreted. Other theories, such as King’s K1, are also subject 
to the very same problem. 
Here is a possible response that could be sketched. Perhaps this is not a problem, for 
intensions are, after all, a technical device introduced for philosophical purposes. When it 
comes to assessing whether assertions made by average speakers in a random context c are 
true or false, all we usually need is to evaluate their content with respect to c and ic. And it is 
clear that both (77d) and (77f) yield the right results if we restrict the evaluation of a sentence 
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in this manner. For any context k, assessing (77d) and (77f) in k and ik will yield truth if and 
only if every queen in ik cherishes the cleric that crowned her in ik. And this is intuitively 
right. 
This response, however, neglects many of the reasons why intensions were introduced 
in the first place. Intensions are artificial constructs, yet their purpose is to model concrete 
phenomena. More precisely, these constructs are supposed to model content, i.e., the object 
of assertion, what is said by a sentence in a context, the thought conveyed in a particular 
utterance. In our abstract models, intensions are what is asserted, believed, presupposed, 
asked and wondered about. This, in turn, means that they are also the object of intensional 
operators, such as attitude verbs. The above response therefore fails. Consider the following 
sentence: 
(77g) John believes that every queen cherishes that cleric who crowned her 
If we try assessing the truth of (77g) in a context c and a circumstance ic, the result is 
still wrong: it will yield truth if and only if, in all circumstances j compatible with what John 
believes in ic, every queen x in j cherishes δc(λs. λy. y is a cleric in s and y crowned x in s) 
(where “s” is another variable for circumstances). For each queen x, the property λs. λy. y is 
a cleric in s and y crowned x in s is taken as argument by δc, which in turn returns an 
individual that is a cleric and crowned x in the world and time of the context. But it is clear 
that John’s belief should not involve just actual clerics. The above response disregarded the 
wrong predictions about intensionality on the basis that they are a mere technicality, but, 
insofar as we are working in a language with intensional operators, it ultimately fails. Similar 
problems occur with operators like the following: 
(77h) It could have been the case that every queen cherished that cleric who crowned 
her 
(77i) In the 18th century, every queen cherished that cleric who crowned her  
Pretty much like the sentences above, (77h) will yield truth iff there is a possible world 
w such that every queen in w cherishes the cleric who crowned her in the actual world. (77i), 
on the other hand, is probably the clearest counterexample: assuming that “In the 18th 
century” shifts the time of evaluation to that period of time, this sentence will be true iff every 
queen in from the 18th century cherishes the current cleric who crowned her. These facts 
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show that the problem of intensional mismatch cannot be solved by always assessing 
sentences in the circumstance privileged by the context of utterance. On the contrary, they 
suggest that we should allow some occurrences of complex demonstratives to be 
circumstance-dependent rather than context-dependent. This idea is further reinforced by our 
intuitions towards NDNS-uses. The fact that c-theories and other Kaplan-inspired approaches 
are unable to count complex demonstratives as circumstance-dependent has been regarded 
as “the real limitation of the orthodox view” (Georgi 2012: 369).   
The remainder of section 3.3 is devoted to solving the problem of intensional mismatch. 
The solution I will propose is a bit radical, but independently motivated and, in fact, 
standardly accepted ever since Cresswell’s (1990) work on the expressive power of natural 
language: we need an explicit representation of worlds and times in the logical form of the 
sentences of our object language. This is what I set out to do in the following section, where, 
after briefly explaining the reasons usually adduced for this modification, I sketch a generic 
theory of verbal morphology and show how it solves the problem. 
 
3.3.1.2 Natural language expressivity and quantification over times and worlds 
The idea that we need a system with full object-language quantification over worlds and 
times is assumed by all standard theories of verbal morphology, notably the theories of tense 
(cf. Ogihara 1989, 1995, 1996; Enç 1987; Musan 1995; Kusumoto 1999; von Stechow 2003; 
Heim & von Fintel 2011, §8; Ogihara & Sharvit 2015). The reasons for this can be traced 
back to Cresswell’s work and they are rather well-known among semanticists, but let me 
state them here just in order to remind the reader about them. Similar summaries can be found 
in Schlenker (2003a, section 3) and Rabern (2012b). 
Classical intensional systems relativize the extension of expressions to just an 
intensional parameter. In standard possible world semantics, for example, expressions are 
assigned an extension relative to just one world (leaving aside irrelevant parameters such as 
models or assignments). Similarly, Arthur Prior’s tense logic only requires an instant of time 
for determining the extension of an expression. It is clear, however, that these systems cannot 
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capture what is usually expressed by means of operators like “actually” and “now”. Consider 
sentences like (19)-(20), repeated below: 
(19) It is possible for everything that is actually red to be shiny 
(20) Someday everyone now alive will be dead 
Let me provide first-order translations of (19)-(20) in order to show this. For the sake 
of simplicity, let us momentarily leave aside GQ and treat quantification in the classical 
manner, by means of the Tarskian quantifiers “Ǝ” and “Ɐ”. Additionally, let us adopt the 
necessity and possibility operators “□” and “◊” typical of modal logic, and let us capture 
(approximately) the meaning of “someday” by supplying our first-order version of tense logic 
with an operator “S” roughly analogous to the possibility operator: for every formula p, every 
time t and every assignment g, ⟦Sp⟧g, t = 1 iff [Ǝt2: t2 > t] (⟦p⟧g, t2 = 1). Even after the adoption 
of these operators, (19) and (20) are not yet translatable into first-order modal and temporal 
logic, for we still need to find some way to express the meaning of “actually” and “now”. 
One could try to do so, simply, by means of scoping: the predicates “red” and “alive” are 
supposed to be interpreted respectively as actual and current, and a natural way to try to 
achieve this is by letting these predicates take wide scope so that they are assessed in the 
initial world or time at which we are evaluating the whole sentence: 
(19a) Ɐx (Rx → ◊Sx) (where “R” and “S” stand, respectively, for “red” and “shiny”) 
(20a) Ɐx (Ax → SDx) (where “A” and “D” stand, respectively, for “alive” and 
“dead”) 
However, neither of these logical forms captures the meaning of the sentences they are 
intended to translate. Let us calculate the truth-conditions of (19) in an assignment g and 
possible world w which we may assume to be the actual one: 
1. ⟦Ɐx (Rx → ◊Sx)⟧g, w = 1 iff 
2. [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (⟦Rx → ◊Sx⟧g(a/x), w =1) (where U is the domain of quantification and 
g(a/x) is the assignment function that is just like g except that it assigns a to “x”) iff 
3. [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (either ⟦Rx⟧g(a/x), w = 0 or ⟦◊Sx⟧g(a/x), w =1) iff 
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4. [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (either a is not red in w or there is a possible world w2 accessible from 
w such that ⟦Sx⟧g(a/x), w2 =1) iff 
5. [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (either a is not red in w or there is a possible world w2 accessible from 
w such that a is shiny in w2)  
The truth-conditions arrived at in step 5 are wrong. Namely, they require that each of 
the things that are red in the initial world w be shiny in some possible world. But what (19) 
means is different: it should be true in case there is a possible world in which all the actual 
red things are collectively shiny. That is, we want to assign truth just in case all the objects 
that are red in the actual world are shiny together in a single world. Things are entirely 
analogous in the temporal domain: the logical form in (20a) is true just in case, for each 
person x currently alive, there is a time t such that x is dead, but, even though (20) can have 
such reading, its more straightforward meaning urges us to find a certain moment of time t’ 
such that all the current living beings are collectively dead in t’.  
Different scopings won’t do either. For example, (19b)-(20b) and (19c)-(20c) are 
clearly wrong too: 
(19b) ◊Ɐx (Rx → Sx)  
(20b) SⱯx (Ax → Dx)  
(19c) Ɐx ◊(Rx → Sx)   
(20c) Ɐx S(Ax → Dx)  
(19b) requires there to be a possible world w such that everything that is red in w is 
shiny in w, i.e., it says nothing about the actual red things. (19c) makes a similar claim and, 
even though it may come closer to the meaning of (19) by restricting the claim to things that 
exist in the actual world, none of the things that are shiny in the second world are required to 
be red in the actual one.  Analogous remarks hold for (20b-c). More generally, mere scoping 
is unable to capture the intended readings: we need “red” to be assessed according to the 
initial world of evaluation, meaning that it should take wide scope over the modal operator 
“it is possible”, but at the same time “red” should be under the scope of the quantifier 
“everything”, which in turn should be under the scope of “it is possible” in order for all the 
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actual red things to be collectively shiny at a single world. The required scoping differences 
are therefore incompatible. Similarly, (20) needs “alive” to take wide scope over the 
“someday” so that it can assessed at the initial time of evaluation, but it also needs “alive” to 
fall under the scope of “everyone”. And the latter should, in turn, be under the scope of 
“someday” in order to capture the idea that all the current living beings are dead at a unique 
time. These requirements are mutually exclusive.  
The usual solution to the problems in (19)-(20) is to translate “actually” and “now” as 
operators on their own (Prior 1968, Kamp 1971, Crossley & Humberstone 1977). Let “A” 
and “N” be such operators, and let (19)-(20) be translated thus:  
(19d) ◊Ɐx (ARx → Sx)  
(20d) SⱯx (NAx → Dx)  
But, of course, this solution is not just a matter of syntax. There is an important change 
we need to implement into the semantics: if we want A and N to be accurately interpreted, 
one of the possible worlds and one of the instants of time need to be designated, respectively, 
as the actual world and the current time. In other words, we need double indexing. Instead of 
assessing the truth of (19d) in a single world, we need to evaluate it in at least a pair of worlds 
<w1, w2> such that the first member of the pair is designated as actual. The role of A is, 
simply, to equate the two parameters by replacing the second one with the first: for any p, g 
and <w1, w2>, ⟦Ap⟧g, w1, w2 = 1 iff ⟦p⟧g, w1, w1 = 1. It is easy to check that the truth-conditions 
of (19d) are accurate: 
1. ⟦◊Ɐx (ARx → Sx)⟧g, w1, w2 = 1 iff 
2. There is a possible world w3 accessible from w2 such that ⟦Ɐx (ARx → Sx)⟧g, w1, 
w3 = 1 iff 
3. There is a possible world w3 accessible from w2 such that [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (⟦(ARx → 
Sx)⟧g(a/x), w1, w3 = 1 iff  
4. There is a possible world w3 accessible from w2 such that [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (either 
⟦ARx⟧g(a/x), w1, w3 = 0 or ⟦Sx⟧g(a/x), w1, w3 =1) iff 
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5. There is a possible world w3 accessible from w2 such that [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (either 
⟦Rx⟧ g(a/x), w1, w1 = 0 or a is shiny in w3) iff 
6. There is a possible world w3 accessible from w2 such that [Ɐa: a ∈ U] (either a is 
not red in w1 or a is shiny in w3) 
The functioning of “now” is entirely analogous. Of course, this machinery should be 
familiar to anyone who has worked with Kaplan’s system, for the first world and time 
parameters are just playing the role of Kaplan’s contexts: their only use is to provide the 
values for the indexical expressions “actually” and “now”. The second parameter, in turn, 
can be equated with Kaplan’s circumstances, for it is the parameter that the modal and 
temporal operators shift. By the same time Kaplan developed his LD, other authors were 
starting to explore the properties of doubly-indexed systems (cf. Kamp 1971, Segerberg 
1973, Vlach 1973), which eventually became generalized and gave rise to what nowadays is 
known as “two-dimensional semantics”.74  
So far this is all compatible with the current framework. But the point of this section is 
to prove that this classical two-level picture is also insufficient. The main obstacle is that the 
very same problems of expressivity can be further reproduced by increasing sentential 
complexity. Take the following sentence (a slight variation of an example by Rabern 
(2012b)): 
(157) If all the people who actually died on the maiden voyage of the Titanic had 
survived, it would still have been possible for everyone who would then have 
survived the maiden voyage to be severely harmed on the maiden voyage 
In order to show that two worlds are insufficient for assessing this sentence, let me 
introduce a bit of vocabulary. (157) is a subjunctive conditional, i.e., its interpretation 
requires some sort of quantification over possible worlds. This is standardly tackled by means 
of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals (Stalnaker 1968, Lewis 1973), which 
introduces a connective “□→” that is meant to translate subjunctive conditionals thus: any 
sentence of the form “if it were the case that p, then q” is translated into the formal language 
                                                          
74 See the volume by García-Carpintero and Macià (2006) for an overview.  
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as “p□→q”. The semantics for “□→” is a bit complex, but let me state it here, for it will be 
useful in the next section when I discuss sentences like (89). Essentially, any formula of the 
form “p□→q” is true in a random world w iff, for every world w’ such that w’ is among the 
worlds closest to w in which p holds, q is true in w’. The notion of “being among the worlds 
closest to w” deserves an explanation, and I provide it in the next paragraph. 
Some possible worlds are more similar to ours than others. We can certainly assume 
that a world which is just like ours except that I am one centimeter shorter is more similar to 
the actual world than one in which the Roman Empire never existed. We can also imagine 
cases in which two worlds seem prima facie equally distant from the actual one; for example, 
it is unclear whether a world in which I am one centimeter taller is closer or farther from the 
actual world than one in which I am one centimeter shorter. In lack of a serious account of 
similarity we can assume, in general, that each world w determines a similarity relation, 
namely a partial ordering over a subset of all possible worlds. For example, given a certain 
world w1, we could define the following relation R
w1: 
w1 
w2 w3 w4 w5 ... 
w6 w7 w8 w9 w10 w11 w12 ... 
w13 w14 w15 w16 w17 w18 w19 w20 w21 w22 ... 
... 
Of course, this is a totally random distribution of arrows. Rw1 can be understood as a 
reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric relation such that, for any two w, w’, <w, w’> ∈ Rw1 
iff either w is more similar to w1 than w’ or w = w’. For example, <w1, w2>, <w2, w14>, <w1, 
w14>, <w1, w1> and <w1, w4> all belong to R
w1, but <w9, w1>, <w3, w4>, <w4, w13> and <w7, 
w2> do not. Once a relation like R
w1 has been defined, it is possible to evaluate counterfactual 
claims in w1. As stated above, “p□→q” is true in a world w iff, in all the worlds closest to w 
in which p is true, q is true. This means that this subjunctive conditional instructs us to 
construct a certain set of possible worlds, namely the set of worlds w’ such that p is true in 
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w’ and, for any w’’ different from w or w’ such that <w’’, w’> ∈ Rw, p is not true in w’’.75 
Call this set Cw(p). The formula “p□→q” is true in w iff q is true in every world belonging 
to Cw(p). In order to see how this works, consider the subjunctive conditional in (158a) and 
its translation into a suitable formula as in (158b) (where “R” means raining, “F” means 
playing football and “d” stands for Diego): 
(158a) If it hadn’t rained, Diego would have played football 
(158b) ¬R □→ Fd  
Let us assess (158b) in a pair of worlds <w, w1>, where the similarity relation for w1 is 
given in the above figure (w is irrelevant here, for (158b) does not contain any actuality 
operator). Assume, too, that the only worlds in which it is not raining are w2, w5, w6, w9, w12 
and w17; in that case, C
w1(¬R) = {w2, w5, w9}. Applying the above definition, we 
straightforwardly arrive at the right results: (158b) is true in the pair <w, w1> iff the formula 
“Fd” is true in w2, w5 and w9. Informally speaking, this semantics ensures that, if the 
conditional is true, every world in which it does not rain and yet Diego does not play football 
will be farther away from w1 than those in which it does not rain and Diego does play. It is 
for this reason that the facts in other worlds in which it is also not raining, such as w6, w12, 
w17, are irrelevant for the truth of the conditional.
76 
                                                          
75 Thanks to Jordi Valor for suggesting this formulation and for extensive discussion of certain inaccuracies 
that a previous version of this chapter contained. This way to characterize subjunctive conditionals is similar to 
Lewis’s, but differs from it in important respects (see the next footnote). I chose to employ this simplified 
version for the sake of exposition.  
76 This is not exactly the way Lewis presents his semantics for counterfactuals. In his framework, each world w 
comes equipped with a system of spheres $w, which is a set of sets of possible worlds linearly ordered by the 
inclusion relation (i.e., for any two sets S1 and S2 in $w, either S1 ⸦ S2 or S2 ⸦ S1). Each sphere S ∈ $w may be 
thought of as a degree in a scale of similarity, for it is a set containing all the worlds that are similar to w to at 
least certain extent. This means that each of the worlds within a sphere are more similar to w than those outside 
it: the smaller the sphere, the more similar to w it requires the worlds it contains to be. In his semantics, a 
formula like p□→q is true in w iff the material conditional p→q is true throughout all the worlds in the smallest 
sphere S ∈ $w containing worlds in which p is true. 
This is not exactly equivalent to the semantics I presented. Imagine, for instance, that the world w1 in above 
example determines the following system of spheres: S1 contains w1, S2 contains w1, w2, w3, and w4 and w5, S3 
contains w1 … w12, and S4 contains all possible worlds. Given that the smallest sphere containing worlds in 
which it is raining is S2, the world w9 becomes irrelevant for assessing the truth of (158b): it will be true iff 
¬R→Fd is true in all the worlds in S2, i.e., if Diego plays football in w2 and w5. I opted for a simplified semantics 
just for the sake of exposition.  
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We are now in a position to show that double-indexing is not sufficient for capturing 
the truth-conditions of (157). Let us first translate it into a suitable formula. The predicates 
“surviving the maiden voyage” and “dying on the maiden voyage” are mutually exclusive, 
so they may be translated as “S” and “¬S”, respectively. Let also “H” stand for “being 
severely harmed”. We may now attempt to translate (157) as one of the following: 
(157a) Ɐx (A¬Sx → Sx) □→ ◊Ɐx (Sx → Hx)) 
(157b) Ɐx (A¬Sx → Sx) □→ Ɐx (Sx → ◊Hx)) 
But, as above, none of these captures the intuitive meaning of (157). Given a pair of 
possible worlds <w0, w2> in which to assess these sentences, the first part of the conditional 
is interpreted in the same way in both (157a) and (157b): it instructs us to construct the set 
Cw2(Ɐx (A¬Sx → Sx)), i.e., the set of worlds w3 such that w3 is among the closest-to-w2 
worlds such that all those who die in w0 survive in w3. The whole conditional is true iff the 
formula on the right side of the arrow is true in every world w3 ∈ Cw2(Ɐx (A¬Sx → Sx)). 
And this is, of course, the problematic part. For every world w3 ∈ Cw2(Ɐx (A¬Sx → Sx)), 
(157a) is true iff there is a world w4 accessible from w3 such that every survivor in w4 is 
severely harmed in w4 – i.e., it says nothing about the survivors in w3. On the other hand, the 
truth of (157b) requires that, for every w3 ∈ Cw2(Ɐx (A¬Sx → Sx)), and for each of the 
survivors x in w3, there is a possible world w5 such that x is severely harmed in w5. Thus, it 
only requires each of the survivors to be severely harmed in a possible world, but it says 
nothing about their collective fate – they need not be severely harmed together in a unique 
world. And, for the same reasons as above, scoping won’t help. 
The solution is to make “then” in (157)  be translated as an operator whose behavior is 
very similar to “actually”. Namely, this operator should be devised for selecting the worlds 
in the set Cw2(Ɐx (A¬Sx → Sx)) and to assess “survive” in these worlds. But, again, this is 
not just a matter of syntax: in order to make it work, we need to relativize the truth of the 
sentence to at least three possible worlds. Things are not different in the temporal domain; 
for example, a correct assessment of the truth of (159) requires relativization to at least three 
instants of time (Cresswell 1990: 20): 
(159) There will be times such that all persons now alive will be happy at the first 
or miserable at the second 
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Just as in the case of (157), double indexing is insufficient for assessing the truth of 
(159): we need there to be two times t1 and t2 occurring after the present time t0 such that all 
those alive in t2 are collectively happy in t1 and collectively miserable in t2. This means that 
we need triple indexing for both times and worlds. But, of course, this is not the end of the 
story: as sentential complexity increases, we need to relativize the semantic value of 
sentences to more and more parameters, eventually reaching an infinite number of times and 
worlds. The classical Kaplanian picture in which the semantic value of a sentence depends 
on just two possible worlds proved insufficient for sentences like (157) or (159), and a system 
with three levels is still not enough for capturing the whole expressive power of natural 
language.  
Once these facts are acknowledged, there are two options at hand: either relativize the 
semantic value of sentences to an eventually infinite number of parameters, or to adopt a 
system with explicit world and time variables, i.e., to represent worlds and times directly into 
the logical form of sentences, instead of talking about them indirectly by means of operators. 
The differences between these two systems are mostly cosmetic,77 but the second one is far 
more intuitive and simple; I shall therefore settle for it during the rest of this dissertation. In 
a system like this this one, world and time variables refer directly to possible worlds and 
instants of time, and they can be bound by quantifiers and lambda abstractors. Their 
functioning is, so to say, analogous to personal pronouns – which, as we have already 
mentioned, are usually modelled as variables in order to capture both their free and bound 
readings. Such system is indeed very reasonable, for, as arguments by Partee (1973) and 
Kratzer (1998a) made clear, verbal tense and mood behave, in important respects, just like 
other indexicals. The rest of this section is devoted to introducing the system I will be 
employing throughout the rest of this dissertation, in which tense and mood as understood as 
indexicals that contribute world and time variables to the sentences they appear in.  
This dissertation is primarily concerned with complex demonstratives, so this is not the 
place to defend any particular approach to the semantics of tense and mood in general. 
Instead, let me sketch a very simple and fairly neutral theory of how these items work. In the 
                                                          
77 It was Cresswell (1990) himself who proved the equivalence of these two systems.  
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first place, the syntax: let our language be equipped with infinitely many world variables w0 
… wn …, and let it contain, too, infinitely many time variables t0 … tn … Each of these is 
contributed to LF by some verbal morpheme (for the temporal and modal dependence of 
adjectives and common nouns, see below), and each sentence is fronted by a pair consisting 
of a world and a time variable. For instance, the LF of a sentence like (160) should look like 
(160a), where “TP” stands for “tensed phrase” and the variables “w0” and “t1” are 
contributed, respectively, by the indicative mood and present tense of the main verb, “walks”: 
(160) Mary walks 
(160a) 
 
An LF like this one is oversimplified and it sets aside a good deal of details, but these 
are not relevant for our present purposes, so let me adopt this model; in fact, and for 
typographical reasons, I will often be representing sentences by means of strings occupying 
a single line, thus: 
(160a) <w0, t1> Mary walk 
Let us now provide a semantics for (160a). In the first place, let me state the lexical 
entry for the world and time variables, which should be just like any other variable: 
(161a) ⟦wn⟧ = λc. gc(wn), where n is any natural number 
(161b) ⟦tn⟧ = λc. gc(tn), where n is any natural number 
Of course, it should be a requirement that, for any natural number m, assignment g and 
variable of the form wm, the value of wm under g should be a world, and mutatis mutandis for 
time variables. On the other hand, the fact that this system represents world and time variables 
directly into the logical form of the sentences means that it is simpler to adopt a new type for 
predicates, namely <h, <e, <s, t>>>. Given a certain context, “walk” should combine first 
with “Mary” (type e) in order to return an intension, namely the proposition that Mary walks 
(of type <s, t>). This proposition, in turn, combines with the upper node containing the time 
 TP 
<w0, t1> T’ 




and world variables, i.e., with a circumstance of type s, with the result that (160a) is true 
under an assignment function g iff Mary walks at the circumstance <g(w0), g(t1)>.  
This, in turn, requires some further adjustments. Notice in the first place that, in a 
setting like the one I just sketched, relativization to circumstances is entirely vacuous, for 
sentences already incorporate reference to a possible world and an instant of time in their 
logical forms. The semantic value of sentences depends, among others, on a circumstance, 
but this circumstance is already mentioned in the syntax and it is therefore entirely 
unnecessary to include another one among the evaluation parameters. Once we adopt a 
system with explicit world and time variables, the natural and common option is to drop 
circumstances and to relativize the extension of sentences to just a context – as the lexical 
entries for variables in (161) already do. And, of course, we need to work with a new version 
of FA ensuring that the combination described in the previous paragraph can go through:  
FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (FA): If α is a branching node and {β, γ} the 
set of its daughters, then α is in the domain of ⟦ ⟧c if both β and γ are and ⟦β⟧c is 
a function whose domain contains ⟦γ⟧c. In that case, ⟦α⟧c = ⟦β⟧c (⟦γ⟧c). 
In turn, this entails slightly modifying our lexical entries in general, because they are 
now simpler. Here is, for example, the lexical entry for “I”: 
⟦I⟧ = λc. ac 
Most of our lexical entries, however, remain almost unaltered. For example, an 
adjective like “green” still requires filling by a circumstance, although its type should be 
modified in the same fashion as the verb “walk”: 
⟦green⟧ = λc. λx. λi. x is green in i 
The main difference is, of course, that the circumstance is explicitly mentioned in the 
LF of the sentence “green” appears in, instead of being placed among the evaluation 
parameters. Lexical items such as common nouns or tenseless verbs receive exactly the same 
type of denotation as adjectives. On the other hand, notice that our lexical entry for complex 
demonstratives, (147), is devised for predicates of the old type. Adopting a new type means 
that (147) should be modified accordingly. Here is the straightforward modification: 
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(147e) λc. λP<e, <s, t>>. δc(P)  
Of course, this in turn requires slightly altering the requirement that the δ function is 
supposed to meet. Namely, for each context c, δc should be defined as a function δc: Π→E 
such that, for any P ∈ Π, P(δc(P))(ic) = 1. This is so because the properties in Π now combine 
first with individuals and only later with circumstances. Another adjustment that we need is, 
of course, a new type for determiners other than “that”. The type they need given this system 
is a very complex one: <h, <<e, <s, t>>, <<e, <s, t>>, <s, t>>>>. I.e., given a context they 
combine with two predicates, then with a circumstance and finally they return a truth-value. 
Let us provide a semantics for a simple determiner, “a”: 
(162) λc. λP<e, <s, t>>. λQ<e, <s, t>>. λi. Ǝx (P(x)(i) = 1 & Q(x)(i) = 1) 
Let me show how it works by means of an example:  
(163a) A cat whistles  
(163b)  
 
Given a certain context c, (163b) receives the following interpretation. The predicate 
“cat”, of type <h, <e, <s, t>>>, fills the first slot of “a”, yielding the quantifier “a cat”. This 
quantifier combines with “whistle”, also of type <h, <e, <s, t>>>, and it returns a function 
from circumstances to truth values: namely, the function λi. Ǝx (x is a cat in i & x whistles 
in i). Then the circumstance slot is filled with the above variables, thus returning truth under 
an assignment g just in case Ǝx (x is a cat in <g(w2), g(t3)> & x whistles in <g(w2), g(t3)>). 
Other determiners should be treated in an analogous way.  
Further adjustments are required. Notice, in the first place, that the semantics in (161a-
b) is still not enough for capturing all the semantically relevant properties of tense and mood. 
These variables are contributed by verbs, and each of them picks out a world or a time, but 
 TP 
<w2, t3> T’ 
DP  whistles 





the lexical entries in (161a-b) are still silent about which kind of worlds and which kind of 
times should be picked out by each variable. Namely, those entries are still unable to 
distinguish between, say, past and present, or subjunctive and indicative. The usual way to 
do this is to define a semantics for present and indicative, and then define the other tenses 
and moods in relation to it – say, to define the future as an existential quantifier ranging over 
tenses occurring after the present tense. Since I am modelling indicative and present as 
indexicals, these two should pick out, respectively, wc and tc, for every context c. This can 
be achieved in the following manner. Syntactically, indicative mood and present tense should 
contribute to LF, respectively, the variables “wn
ind” and “tm
pres”, for some natural numbers n 
and m. This means that their contribution is not just a variable, but rather a variable marked 
with some features (cf. von Stechow 2003, 2004). And then these features can be given the 
following presuppositional semantics: 
(161c) ⟦wnind⟧ = λc: gc(wn) = wc. gc(wn), where n is any natural number  
(161d) ⟦tnpres⟧ = λc: gc(tn) = tc. gc(tn), where n is any natural number  
For the record, this is analogous to the way “he” or “she” are defined. The features of 
these pronouns restrict the set of assignments that can be used for giving a value to the 
variables that they contribute, thus ensuring that they will be respectively assigned a male 
and a female. The features of present and indicative, in turn, restrict the assignments in a 
similar fashion, thus ensuring that their associated variables will always pick out the time and 
world of the context. In particular, the following two sentences mean exactly the same in any 
context: 
(164a) I am tired 
(164b) I am actually tired now 
If you are worried that this semantics is in conflict with many of the basic tenets of 
Kaplanian frameworks, wait for the discussion in section 3.3.5.2. As we shall see, there is an 
elegant and intuitive way to compatibilize this semantics with the idea that (164a), but not 
(164b), should be affected by intensional operators.    
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As stated above, all the other tenses and moods are usually defined in relation to the 
two basic ones. For example, it is usual to treat past tense as expressing a relation to present 
tense: a sentence like “Mary walked” is true in a context c iff there is a time t such that t 
occurs before tc and Mary walks at t. This means that past morphemes can be modeled as 
object-language existential quantifiers whose domain of quantification is restricted to times 
occurring before the present tense; for example, the LF of “Mary walked” should look like 
this: 
(160c) [Ǝt1: t1 < t0
pres] (<w2
ind, t1> Mary walk) 
Giving their obvious semantics to newly introduced the lexical items in (160c) yields 
the right results: (160c) is true in any context c such that there is a time t occurring before tc 
and Mary walks at <wc, t>. Things are similar for other tenses. For example, “will” is defined 
in exactly the same way, but with an opposite presupposition: namely, the domain of 
quantification of the existential quantifier should be restricted to times taking place after the 
time of the context. An important consequence of this semantics is that, regardless of the 
tense of the main verb, every sentence will contain a variable with the present feature 
explicitly represented at LF. This will be important for stating some important tenets of my 
semantics.  
This, in turn, means that there is an important disanalogy between present, on the one 
hand, and present and past, on the other. Namely, present is referential, whereas the other 
two tenses are quantificational. But some authors, most notably Partee (1973), have 
questioned this disanalogy. The most famous example in this discussion concerns past, and 
it is due to Partee herself: 
(165) I didn’t turn off the stove 
The idea that the past tense in (165) is quantificational is in conflict with the intuitive 
truth-conditions of this sentence. If it were quantificational, then (165) should mean either 
there is a moment t such that I did not turn off the stove in t (which is trivially true) or that 
no past moment t’ is such that I turned off the stove in t’ (i.e., that never in my life have I 
turned it off). But (165) seems to state something different: rather, it is saying that, at a 
specific moment t’’, I did not turn off the stove. I.e., the past tense in this sentence appears 
to be referential. Namely, the anteriority with respect to the present tense seems to be 
177 
  
presupposed, rather than asserted, and this suggests that its meaning is probably more 
accurately captured by the following LF and truth conditions (omitting modal dependence 
for simplicity’s sake):  
(165a) t0
past [t0 < t1
pres] ¬ (I turn off the stove) 
(165b) λc: gc(t0) < gc(t1) & gc(t1) = tc. ac turns off the stove in gc(t0) 
These subtleties, however, are orthogonal to our purposes. As the above logical form 
shows, having a referential semantics for past tense does not entail that logical forms need 
not represent the present tense; rather, this is required in order to ensure that the 
presuppositional material receives the right interpretation. Let me therefore ignore the facts 
about (165) and work, simply, with (161c-d), i.e., let me treat any tense and mood different 
from present and indicative as quantificational rather than referential.  
Up until now we have been talking about world and time variables contributed by 
verbs. However, verbs denote properties, so one might wonder whether adjectives should be 
paired with circumstance variables too. After all, their extension also depends on 
circumstances: the set of individuals satisfying “green” varies depending on the world and 
time in which we are assessing the predicate. In fact, pairing adjectives with circumstance 
variables is a very common solution for some classic puzzles in semantics, notably the so-
called “Fodor readings”.78 Systems in which adjectives and verbs are on a par have been 
developed, for example by Mürvet Enç (1987). I do not think, however, that this is an 
appropriate solution. English adjectives have no overt tense nor mood, and therefore they 
                                                          
78 The name is due to Janet Fodor (1970). Her paradigmatic example concerns the following sentence: 
(m) Mary wants to buy a hat just like mine 
Sentence (m) displays the usual scope ambiguities. If read de re, it means that there is a certain hat that Mary 
intends to buy and that happens to be identical to mine, a fact Mary may be unaware of; the de dicto reading, 
on the other hand, means that Mary wants to buy any hat as long as it is just like mine. There is nevertheless 
yet another possible reading, which Fodor dubs “non-specific de re”: Mary wants to buy any hat whatsoever, 
as long as it satisfies a certain condition (say, being a fedora hat). Unbeknownst to Mary, my hat satisfies that 
very same condition. In other words, the property attributed to the hat, “being just like mine”, is read de re (my 
hat need not be like Mary’s in each of the circumstances compatible with her wish), but on the other hand the 
quantifier “a hat” also takes narrow scope, for Mary’s wish is not about any particular hat.  
A common solution to the problem is to posit overt world variables for “mine” (in all the circumstances 
compatible with Mary’s wish, she buys a hat that it just like my actual hat), although other authors have resorted 
to scoping with higher-order variables. See Heim & von Fintel (2011, §8) for an overview. I am sympathetic to 
the idea of trying to solve the problem by means of scoping.  
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make no explicit reference to worlds and times. This means that any variable contributed by 
them would have the status of a hidden argument, i.e., one that needs an important amount 
of justification in order not to count as ad hoc. By adding these variables into the LF of 
sentences, we lose the correspondence between what we superficially hear and see and what 
we semantically interpret (Kusumoto 1999). But, additionally, arguments by Renate Musan 
(1995) and Kiyomi Kusumoto (1999) made clear that such systems often overgenerate when 
it comes to the possible readings of sentences containing both verbs and adjectives. I will 
therefore not be including any variables that are not contributed by some explicit element of 
the sentence. Instead, the required readings should be obtained differently. Let us see how.  
As I mentioned above, the variables contributed by the verbs are not in a node that is 
sister to the verb itself. This is clearly shown in (160a), where the sister to the variables is 
not “walk”, but “Mary walk” – this is also a consequence of adopting our new type for 
predicates. World and time variables are sisters to clauses, and this means that adjectives will 
normally be interpreted according to the tense of the verb of the clause they are inserted in. 
Consider the following sentence and its LF: 
(163c) A black cat whistled 
(163d) [Ǝt1: t1 < t0
pres] (<w2
ind, t1> [A black cat] whistle) 
As it is standard (Heim & Kratzer 1998: §4), “black” and “cat” combine together in 
order to obtain a complex predicate “black cat”. This is achieved by means of the Predicate 
Modification Rule (Heim & Kratzer 1998: 65), which should be added to our inventory of 
rules of semantic combination together with FA. Disregarding context-dependence, it may 
be stated thus: 
PREDICATE MODIFICATION (PM):  
If α is a branching node and β and γ its daughters, and β denotes a function f of 
type <e, <s, t>> and γ a function g of type <e, <s, t>>, then α denotes a function 
h of type <e, <s, t>> such that for all <w, t> ∈ S and x ∈ E, h(x)(<w, t>) = 1 iff 
f(x)(<w, t>) = 1 and g(x)(<w, t>) = 1 (where S and E are, respectively, the set of 
all circumstances and the set of all individuals). 
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This rule allows any two predicates of the same type, like “black” and “cat”, to combine 
into a single predicate of the same type, “black cat”, whose denotation is a combination of 
both predicates. Thus, if “black” denotes the function λx. λi. x is black in i, and “cat” denotes 
λx. λi. x is a cat in i, then the node “black cat” will denote λx. λi. x is a cat in i and x is black 
in i. This means that “black cat” in (163c) has exactly the same status as “cat” in (163a): it 
is, simply, a predicate. It is straightforward that, given the semantics that we have provided 
for the determiner in (162), “black cat” (and therefore “black”) will be interpreted according 
to the tense contributed by the verb “whistle”. In other words, the cat will have to be black 
while it whistles. Other readings may be obtained by means of scoping. 
This leads me to the final adjustment, which concerns mainly relative clauses. This 
kind of clauses are usually formed by means of relative pronouns like “who”, “that” or 
“which”, and these are normally interpreted as object-language lambda abstractors that turn 
sentences into predicates by binding a trace internal to the clause. For example, the relative 
clause “who wears glasses” in the DP “a woman who wears glasses” would receive a logical 
form like the following (a final notational remark: it is usual to represent movement traces 
by means of the letter “t”, but in order to avoid confusion with time variables I will be using 
r1 … rn … instead): 
(166) who1 <w2, t3> r1 wears glasses 
As stated above, “who1” has the same semantics as a lambda abstractor like “λ1”. This 
means that, when interpreted under an assignment g, (166) denotes the function λx. x wears 
glasses in <g(w2), g(t3)>. Now consider sentence (167) and its LF (167a): 
(167) Mary loves a woman who wears glasses 
(167a) <w0
ind, t1
pres> [A woman who2 <w3
ind, t4
pres> r2 wears glasses] λ5. Mary loves 
r5 
In systems with no world and time variables in the object-language, relative clauses 
combine with adjectives by means of PM: since “woman” and “who wears glasses” are of 
the same type, their combination would denote the function λx. x is a woman and x wears 
glasses. However, this is not possible in (167a), for, in our system, “woman” and “who wears 
glasses” do not have the same type: the former is <e, <s, t>>, whereas the latter is already 
180 
 
tensed, meaning that it is of type <e, t>. This means that we need an additional rule. Following 
Kusumoto (1999), who in turn follows Kratzer 1994a, 1994b), we may state it thus (setting 
context-dependence aside): 
INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION: 
If α is a branching node and β and γ its daughters, and β denotes a function f 
of type <e, <s, t>> and γ a function g of type <e, t>, then α denotes a function 
h of type <e, <s, t>> such that, for all <w, t> ∈ S and x ∈ E, h(x)(<w, t>) = 1 
iff f(x)(<w, t>) = 1 and g(x) = 1. 
This principle will ensure that adjectives and common nouns will be able to combine 
with tensed predicates. So far the basics of a theory of tense and mood; this approach is 
incomplete, oversimplified and most probably inaccurate in many respects, but it follows the 
standard fairly well, and as I stated above this is not the place to defend any particular theory. 
What matters now is that we already have the tools for solving the problem of QI.  
 
3.3.1.3 Two solutions to the problem of intensional mismatch 
The changes implemented in the above section were radical, but I hope to have convinced 
the reader that they were independently justified, required in order to account for the whole 
expressive power of natural language. What matters now is that, after having implemented 
these changes, which were anyway necessary, we are finally in a position to make the right 
predictions concerning QI-uses, and to solve what I called “the problem of intensional 
mismatch”. Namely, I discuss two possible solutions to the problem, which I shall dub the 
“extensional solution” and the “circumstance-binding solution”. Let us see what they consist 
of. 
The extensional solution was already strongly implied in the discussion from the last 
section. As already mentioned, relativization to circumstances is entirely vacuous in a system 
like the one just sketched. Once we have dropped circumstances from the parameters of 
evaluation, the problem of intensional mismatch simply vanishes: it makes no sense to 
wonder whether the intension expressed by (77) would have been true at some other 
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circumstance, for it is not relative to circumstances, only to contexts. Namely, (77) should 
receive the (simplified) LF in (77j) below, and the truth-conditions in (77k): 
(77j) <w0
ind, t1
pres> [Every queen] λ2. r2 cherishes that cleric who6 [Ǝt5: t5 < t4
pres] 
(<w3
ind, t5> r6 crown her2) 
(77k) λc: gc(w0) = wc & gc(t1) = tc & gc(w3) = wc & gc(t4) = tc. Ɐx (x is a queen in 
<gc(w0), gc(t1)> → x cherishes δc(λz. λi. z is a cleric in i & Ǝt (t < gc(t4) & z 
crowns x in <gc(w3), t>)) in <gc(w0), gc(t1)>) 
Of course, (77k) requires, for each queen x, that δc(λz. λi. z is a cleric in i & Ǝt (t < 
gc(t4) & z crowns x in <gc(w3), t>)) instantiates the properties of being a cleric in wc and tc 
and having crowned x at wc and an instant of time t occurring before tc. The problem is now 
solved: (77k) treats the complex demonstrative as a context-dependent singular term (type e) 
that nevertheless fails to pick out a unique individual, for it determines a different one for 
each queen. In addition, there is no possibility that the properties “queen” and “cleric who 
crowned her” be assessed at different worlds or times: for any assignment g, the extension of 
these two predicates will have to be calculated, respectively, in the circumstances <g(w0), 
g(t1)> and <g(w3), g(t4)>, under the presupposition that, at any context c in which (77k) is 
interpretable, gc(w0) = gc(w3) = wc and gc(t1) = g(t4) = tc. Since these two predicates cannot 
fall apart intensionally, the problem of intensional mismatch is solved. Let’s call this the 
‘extensional solution’. This also applies to (78)-(81); I shall discuss each of these below (for 
those of you concerned about how the extensional solution handles attitude reports, do not 
be impatient: I address these worries in section 3.3.5.2). 
The extensional solution is my favorite option for handling the problem of QI. 
However, those willing to preserve intensions might not be entirely happy with this solution. 
Since I am confronting directly many authors who advocate intensions or, almost 
equivalently, structured propositions, I will adapt my solution to an intensional setting79 and, 
                                                          
79 One might worry that re-introducing intensions might be in conflict with the above discussion on the 
expressive power of natural language, for it seems incompatible with adopting a Kaplan-style system that 
relativizes extensions to just two parameters. However, such concern is actually just a matter of formalism: all 
it means is, simply, that sentences are much more context-dependent than in Kaplan’s system, i.e., that the 
context should settle the value of far more variables than Kaplan thought. In the current system, all that is 
required is that the assignment function provides values to an infinity of world and time variables.   
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once the two solutions have been explicitly stated, I will be apply them case by case to all 
the counterexamples from section 2.2.1.2.  There are many ways to preserve intensions in a 
system with explicit world and time variables. One option is to let the variables marked with 
“ind” and “pres” pick out the time and world of the circumstance instead of the one of the 
context. Another possibility is to let every sentence be fronted by a lambda binding the 
indicative and present variables in it, as in Heim and von Fintel’s (2011) handbook. This is 
the option I will be adopting throughout the rest of this dissertation.  
Let us see an example. If we want (167) to express an intension and yet have an LF 
where tense and mood are explicitly represented, we need two things. First, every world 
variable contributed by indicative mood should be co-indexed,80 and mutatis mutandis for 
the time variables contributed by present tense. In addition, it should be a syntactic 
requirement of sentences that they should be fronted by a lambda binding these variables, as 
in (167b) below. Of course, the presuppositional semantics for “pres” and “ind” that we stated 
above becomes unnecessary in this system, so we may just omit these features: 
(167b) λ<w1, t2>. <w1, t2> [A woman who4 <w1, t2> r4 wears glasses] λ3. Mary 
loves r3 
Thus, the idea is to see whether there is a woman who wears glasses in g(w1) and g(t2) 
and who is loved by Mary in the very same world and time, and then to abstract over these 
two parameters. Since these become irrelevant, what we get is something that can be true or 
false depending on different circumstances. In other words, a sentence like (167b) expresses 
an intension, and more concretely a proposition. This proposition, of course, needs to be feed 
with a possible world and a time in order to get a truth-value, and this means that our system 
needs to re-introduce circumstances of evaluation: ⟦(167b)⟧c, i = 1 iff there is an x in i such 
that x is a woman in i, x wears glasses in i and Mary loves x in i. Let us see the predictions 
that this system makes about QI sentences. 
                                                          
80 Co-indexing is necessary in this system, for otherwise we could end up attributing to (167) a reading it does 
not have. There are alternatives, however. For example, the same results can be achieved by fronting every 
sentence with two variables ‘w0, t0’ which always pick out the parameters of the circumstance, and by letting 
any variable marked with the indicative have the following presuppositional semantics: 
⟦wnind⟧ = λc: gc(wn) = gc(w0). λi. gc(wn), where n is any natural number  
⟦tnpres⟧ = λc: gc(tn) = gc(t0). λi. gc(tn), where n is any natural number  
I will resort to co-indexing for simplicity’s sake.  
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Notice that, in a system like this one, the complex demonstrative in (77) is an indexical 
singular term, but nevertheless it comes out as circumstance-dependent. Namely, the 
quantification into the complex demonstrative is threefold: it contains a bound pronoun 
(“her”) and two extra variables, one for times and another one for worlds, that are also 
externally bound. This is the new LF: 
(77l) λ<w0, t1>. <w0, t1> [Every queen] λ2. r2 cherishes that cleric who4 [Ǝt3: t3 < 
t1] (<w0, t3> r4 crown her2) 
This yields an interesting result: no matter what context you provide for interpreting 
(77l), the extension of the complex demonstrative still depends on the circumstance. More 
generally, any complex demonstrative containing a tensed verb will come out as 
circumstance-dependent. Namely, this is the intension expressed by (77l) in context c: 
(77m) λi. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → x cherishes δc(λy. λj. y is a cleric in j and there 
is a time t such that t occurs before ti and y crowns x in <wi, t>) in i) 
These truth-conditions require whoever is selected by the complex demonstrative to 
perform the crowning at the world of the circumstance of evaluation and a time previous to 
that of the circumstance. These are, too, the parameters at which we assess “queen”. Thus, 
this system makes a curious prediction: whenever the complex demonstrative contains a 
tensed verb, its extension will depend on the world and time of the circumstance of 
evaluation. By contrast, complex demonstratives without any explicit reference to worlds and 
times, like “that woman”, will always pick out a referent from the context. This prediction 
may look strange, but actually it fits very nicely with a pattern of use of complex 
demonstratives noted by Wolter (2006) and further expanded on by Nowak (2019a), which I 
shall discuss by the end of this section. But notice, first, that (77m) is still not entirely 
accurate. 
The trouble with (77m) is that it reproduces a version of the problem of intensional 
mismatch: it is true in a context c and circumstance i iff every queen in i cherishes a certain 
object that crowned her in i and is a cleric in ic. The problem of intensional mismatch persists, 
for “cleric” still depends on the context. We should be able to coordinate it with the world 
and time variables contributed by “crowned”. Let us see how this can be done. Notice that 
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this problem is not unique to complex demonstratives: the combination of nouns and relative 
clauses is often tricky. Consider (168): 
(168) Julia is married to a fellow classmate who used to wear glasses 
This sentence has two readings. On one of them, Julia and her wife are currently 
classmates, and the latter used to wear glasses in the past, perhaps when they had not even 
met. On the other, Julia is married to a former classmate who wore glasses back when they 
were students, but not anymore.81 Thus, “classmate” can be simultaneous either with the 
marriage, in which case it should be interpreted according to the time of the main clause, or 
with the wearing of the glasses, in which case it must be saturated with the tense of the 
relative clause. If we can find a way to achieve the latter reading, the very same solution can 
be employed for solving this version of the problem of intensional mismatch.  
There are many possible ways to predict the two readings that (168), or for that matter 
(77m), displays, although none of them are devoid of problems. The first solution to come to 
one’s mind is to say that the time and world variables contributed by the embedded verb can 
optionally raise over the adjective, thus: 
(168a) 
 
                                                          
81 Admittedly, the latter reading is harder to achieve, but it can be made perfectly felicitous, and even preferred 
to the former one, if some context is provided. Imagine you and me have been classmates to Julia, and we are 
having a conversation remembering past times. If I utter (168) in this context, the second reading is more salient.  
 
λ<w0, t1>  TP 
<w0, t1> S 
DP  λ2  S 
A [Ǝt3: t3<t1] TP  Julia is married to r2 
<w0, t3> AP 
classmate S 
who4  S 
r4  VP 




Assume that “used to” is translated as an existential quantifier over past times, as above. 
As the tree shows, the tense is moved outside the relative clause and attached as a sister of 
the adjectival phrase containing the predicate “classmate”. Thus, the latter falls under the 
scope of the existential quantifier, and therefore the required reading is obtained: (168a) 
requires “classmate” and “wearing glasses” to be coordinated. These two predicates are in 
sister nodes, and they are of the same type, and they can therefore combine together by 
PREDICATE MODIFICATION to generate the complex predicate “classmate who wears 
glasses”, which in turn can be saturated by the tense and mood above them. The same solution 
could in principle be applied to the predicates “cleric” and “who crowned her” in (77l). One 
could simply extract the tense and mood from the relative clause and move them in front of 
the adjective so that the latter can be interpreted appropriately. 
This solution could prima facie work, but it is at odds with an important idea in 
contemporary linguistics. It is well-known since the work of John Ross (1967) that relative 
clauses are movement islands, i.e., syntactic structures that, in terms of movement, are 
isolated from the rest of the sentence they are embedded in. This means that, if we are to 
apply movement rules to elements within a relative clause, movement is limited to the clause 
itself. For example, wh-movement, usually a perfectly felicitous operation, results in 
ungrammaticality when it involves moving an element outside a relative clause: 
(169) John eats what → OK What does John eat  ? 
(168b) Julia is married to a fellow classmate who wears what → #What is Julia 
married to a fellow classmate who wears  ? 
The above solution involves extracting tenses and moods from a relative clause, which 
should in principle be disallowed by Ross’s constraints. The idea is therefore not entirely 
satisfactory. Besides, it does not fit the new types that we posited for predicates.  
It is also possible to adopt the opposite option: perhaps it could be argued that the tense 
and mood of the verb remain where they are but the predicate “classmate” is lowered into the 
relative clause. This idea could find some support on May’s (1977, 1985) ideas on quantifier 
186 
 
raising, which, he argued, could also occur in a downward fashion.82 This idea, however, is 
not as uncontroversial as QR; Chomsky, for example, found it dubious (1995/2015: 300-
301).  
A third possibility is to adopt explicit world and time variables not just for verbs but 
also for adjectives and common nouns. We could give to (168) an LF like the following, in 
which the variables are not attached to the sentence but rather to each of the predicates: 
(168c) [A classmate(w3
ind, t1) who4 (r4 wear(w7
ind, t2
past) glasses)] λ6. Julia is married 
(w9
ind, t5
pres) to r6 
And then we could specify a clause to the effect that the variables contributed by 
adjectives and common nouns must be co-referential with some variable contributed by a 
verb; thus, for example, the variable contributed by “classmate” should be coordinated with 
either the one attached to “is married” or the one contributed by “wears”. The problem of this 
solution is that, unless we find some independent justification for it, it seems entirely ad hoc, 
for these variables have no reflection on the superficial form of the sentences of our language. 
Besides, as we have already mentioned, these systems often overgenerate. Notice, for 
example, that not all predicates in (168c) have a variable attached; “glasses” still lacks one. 
And, in principle, nothing could prevent this variable from being coordinated with “is 
married” instead of “wears”. This would predict that (168c) has a reading according to which 
Julia’s wife used to wear an x such that x are glasses by the time of the marriage but perhaps 
not when she wore x. For these reasons, I believe we should prefer theories that only allow 
variables that are explicitly mentioned in the sentence. 
There are many other possible solutions. We could, for example, try to implement a 
system like Musan’s (1995), in which the temporal interpretation of a DP depends on the 
determiner itself. Thus, “that” could perform some kind of quantification over times and 
worlds that would account for the temporal dependence of the predicates it combines with.  
A fifth possibility is to come up with some syntactic story according to which “that cleric” 
                                                          
82 This is, in fact, what prima facie appears to be going on in sentences like (3)-(4), repeated below: 
(3) The first man in space could have been American 
(4) The president of China will visit Japan 
In these examples, the quantifier is superficially higher than the intensional operators “could” and “will”. It 
seems, then, that the superficial form reflects the de re reading, whereas the de dicto one could be obtained by 
lowering the quantifier.  
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or “a fellow classmate” start out as the respective subjects of the relative clauses they are 
modified by and they are moved later on, leaving a trace within the embedded clause that 
would combine with the tenses above it.  
I do not intend to vindicate any of these solutions; all of them could work pretty well 
in most cases, and all of them surely have their own problems. I will be adopting a different 
and simpler approach throughout this dissertation, although any of the ones above could be 
adapted to my system. My solution yields the right predictions about both (77) and (168), 
and it has to do with the relative pronoun “who”. As we mentioned above, this expression is 
usually treated as an object-language lambda abstractor that binds an e type variable within 
the relative clause;83 namely, it binds a trace generated by movement.  I see no obstacle to 
saying that this variable can optionally be of a different type; in particular, the type I wish to 
attribute to this trace is that of predicates: <e, <s, t>>. This means that “who” should able to 
bind variables for properties. Here is the tree I am proposing, and that I explain below (every 
node has its type annotated): 
(170)  
 
And here is the explanation of how (170) works. “R1” is a trace that is interpreted as a 
predicate variable, and its node is a sister to “crown her5”. Since both of them are of the same 
type, they can combine by PREDICATE MODIFICATION to obtain a complex predicate 
with the meaning λx. λi. g(R1)(x)(i) = 1 & x crowns g(5) in i, for some assignment g. This is 
the function denoted by the lowest “NP” node. This node, in turn, is sister to the one 
containing the time and world variables, and this is quite inconvenient, for predicates require 
                                                          
83 Other authors prefer to treat it as a semantically vacuous expression and to add the lambda as a covert element 
within the relative clause itself. I see no real difference between these two approaches, and my proposal is 
compatible with both of them.  
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a sister containing an individual. This is something that could be straightforwardly solved if 
we adopted our previous type <s, <e, t>> for predicates, although this would entail 
complicating our semantics in general. Instead, let me adopt the following fairly reasonable 
combination principle:84 
CIRCUMSTANCE SPECIFICATION: 
If α is a branching node and β and γ its daughters, and β denotes a function f of 
type <e, <s, t>> and γ a circumstance i (type s), then α denotes a function h of type 
<e, <s, t>> such that for all <w, t> ∈ Ds and x ∈ De, h(x)(<w, t>) = 1 iff f(x)(i) = 1 
This principle allows the lowest NP in (170) to be saturated by its sister node: for some 
assignment g, the combination of λx. λi. g(R1)(x)(i) = 1 & x crowns g(5) in i and the 
circumstance <g(w2), g(t4)> yields, as a result, the following tensed predicate: λx. λi. 
g(R1)(x)(<g(w2), g(t4)>) = 1 & x crowns g(5) in <g(w2), g(t4)>. This predicate is also of type 
<e, <s, t>>, but it is not actually sensitive to circumstances: it denotes, for any assignment g, 
the set of individuals x such that x crowned g(5) at the circumstance <g(w2), g(t4)> and x has 
the property g(R1) at the very same circumstance. In the next step, the existential quantifier 
contributed by the past tense binds the time variable g(t4).
85 
The following step is the most important one, for here the modified tensed predicate 
combines with “who1”, which binds the predicate variable “R1”, resulting in a function from 
predicates to predicates: λP. λx. λi. Ǝt (t occurs before g(t3) & P(x)(<g(w2), t>) = 1 & x 
crowns g(5) in <g(w2), t>.  This function, in turn, combines with the predicate “cleric”, 
yielding the desired result: the top-most node denotes the function λx. λi. Ǝt (t occurs before 
g(t4) & x is a cleric in <g(w2), t> & x crowns g(5) in <g(w2), t>).  The latter function is also 
of type <e, <s, t>>, but, as above, it is not sensitive to circumstances. This means that (170) 
                                                          
84 Some philosophers may be reluctant to adopting yet another composition principle. Notice, however, 
CIRCUMSTANCE SPECIFICATION is complementary to INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION above, 
meaning that it does not come at a greater conceptual cost. Namely, the latter principle allows expressions of 
type <e, <s, t>> to combine with others of type <e, t>, whereas the former allows combinations of <e, <s, t>> 
and s-type expressions. Additionally, the only reason why this principle has been introduced is in order to 
preserve the overall simplicity derived from adopting type <e, <s, t>> for predicates – which is, after all, a far 
less common type in intensional settings. 
85 Of course, the functioning of this existential quantifier is a bit different, because it does not combine with an 
open formula, but rather with an open predicate. There is in principle no obstacle for thinking of the meaning 
of the existential quantifier as a function whose domain does not only include formulae but also predicates of 
this kind, but, even if this shall be a problem, recall that it is still possible to treat past tense as referential.  
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can combine with “that” in order to obtain a referent, one that, in virtue of the definition of 
the δ function, will need to satisfy, for some instant of time t occurring before g(t4), being a 
cleric in <g(w2), t> and crowning g(5) in <g(w2), t>. But, importantly, this demonstrative will 
eventually be quantified into: the variable 5 will be bound by a higher lambda, and, more 
relevantly, the time and world variables w2 and t3 contained in this demonstrative will end 
up bound by the lambda fronting the whole sentence. The latter kind of binding will render 
the demonstrative circumstance-dependent rather than context-dependent.  
I am not claiming that this is entirely accurate nor that it does not require further 
justification (see e.g. footnote 84). Recall, however, that this departure from a standard theory 
of tense is something that I adopted for simplicity’s sake, and that many of the solutions listed 
above could be adjusted in order to achieve similar results. Here is, however, some initial 
plausibility to this idea: this does not just solve our problem with (77), it also accounts for 
the two readings of (168). Consider the two possible LF’s that the current system predicts 
this sentence can have: 
(168d) λ<w0, t1>. <w0, t1> [A fellow student who2 [Ǝt3: t3< t1] (<w0, t3> r2 wears 
glasses)] λ4. Julia is married to r4 
(168e) λ<w0, t1>. <w0, t1> [A fellow student who2 [Ǝt3: t3< t1] (<w0, t3> R2 wears 
glasses)] λ4. Julia is married to r4 
The only difference between these two is the type of the movement trace. In (168d), 
the property “fellow student” combines with “who wears glasses” by INDIVIDUAL 
IDENTIFICATION and it is passed up and saturated with the tense of the main clause, just 
like “married”. Thus, (168d) is true just in a circumstance i just in case Mary is married to an 
x such that x is a fellow student of hers in i and x used to wear glasses in wi and a time before 
ti. But (168b), on the other hand, follows the pattern of (170): “wears glasses” and the variable 
“R2” are both of the same type, and thus they can combine by PREDICATE 
MODIFICATION to obtain the predicate λx. λi. g(R2)(x)(i) = 1 & x wears glasses in i, for 
some assignment g. In virtue of CIRCUMSTANCE SPECIFICATION, this complex 
predicate can be saturated by the tense and mood just above it, thus resulting in λx. λi. 
g(R2)(x)(<g(w0), g(t3)>) = 1 & x wears glasses in <g(w0), g(t3)>, which is in turn modified 
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by the existential quantifier over times. The resulting tensed predicate is taken as argument 
by “who”, yielding a function from predicates to predicates. Combining the latter with 
“fellow classmates” yields the intended result: λx. λi. there is a time t occurring before g(t3) 
such that x is a fellow classmate (of Julia) in <g(w0), t> & x wears glasses in <g(w0), t>, 
i.e., their being classmates must be simultaneous with the wearing of the glasses. Applying 
the usual semantic operations, and binding the variables within this predicate, we obtain the 
required result: (168e) is true in a circumstance i just in case there is an x such that that, for 
some time occurring before ti, x wears glasses in <wi, t>, x is a fellow classmate of Julia in 
<wi, t>, and Julia is married to x in i. This provides a bit of independent justification for 
CIRCUMSTANCE SPECIFICATION. 
Let us see how it deals with the variant of the problem of intensional mismatch that 
(77l)-(77m) above were subject to. Here is the new tree and its truth-conditions (the letter 
“S” indicates an intension): 
(77n)  
 
(77o) λc. λi. Ɐx (x is a queen in i → x cherishes δc(λy. λj. there is a time t such 
that t occurs before ti and y is a cleric in <wi, t> and y crowns x in <wi, t>) in i) 
This is the result we intended to achieve: (77o) is true at any circumstance i such that 
every queen in i cherishes an individual that, for some time t occurring before ti, that 
individual is a cleric in <wi, t> and crowned her in <wi, t>. Of course, in the function λy. λj. 
there is a time t such that t occurs before ti, y is a cleric in <wi, t> and y crowns x in <wi, t>, 
the circumstance argument j is entirely idle: the function assigns truth, simply, to any 
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individual y that satisfies the relevant properties in the circumstance i. The value of this 
function does not vary across circumstances, only across individuals. This means that the δ 
function, when fed with λy. λj. there is a time t such that t occurs before ti, y is a cleric in 
<wi, t> and y crowns x in <wi, t>, will select an individual having the relevant properties in 
i, regardless of her deeds in the circumstance of the context. Of course, i is eventually bound, 
thus rendering the whole demonstrative circumstance-dependent. 
The problem of intensional mismatch is thus solved: even if we reject the extensional 
solution and decide to preserve intensions, it is possible for the c-theorist to predict the right 
truth-conditions for (77) and for any other complex demonstrative containing a verb. All she 
needs is to find a way to saturate the time and world slots of the noun attached to the 
demonstrative with the time and world contributed by verbal morphology. This is an 
adjustment we needed for independent reasons anyway, and it does not matter whether it is 
achieved by means of the account just sketched or in some other way. Let’s dub this the 
“circumstance binding solution”. This is my intensionalized alternative to the extensional 
solution I presented above. As we shall see later, the machinery employed in this solution, 
including principles like CIRCUMSTANCE SPECIFICATION, can also be useful for the 
extensional solution. 
Before applying these two solutions to the counterevidence from section 2.2.1.2, I 
would like to discuss an important feature of the circumstance-binding approach. As I have 
already mentioned, this way of understanding complex demonstratives yields an interesting 
prediction: whenever the demonstrative contains a verb, its extension will depend on the 
circumstance, instead of the context. This may seem prima facie strange, but it fits nicely 
with a pattern noted by Wolter (2006) and further expanded on by Nowak (2019a). These 
authors point out an important contrast between complex demonstratives containing relative 
clauses and those containing simply a non-verbal predicate. We have already mentioned an 
example of this contrast: 
(130a) *That author of Waverley also wrote Ivanhoe 
(130b) OKThe author of Waverley also wrote Ivanhoe 
(130c) OKThat author who wrote Waverley also wrote Ivanhoe 
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Unless some background is provided,86 (130a) is infelicitous, as stated above; by 
contrast, (130c), which also contains a complex demonstrative, is perfectly fine whenever 
uttered, just like (130b), which contains a definite description. In general, complex 
demonstratives containing a relative clause, like the one in (130c), can be employed non-
deictically (i.e., with no intention to refer to anyone in particular), much like if they were 
definite descriptions, whereas the simpler ones containing just a noun phrase, like the one in 
(130a), are much more likely to be used referentially, and they are often infelicitous in case 
there is only one object satisfying the descriptive meaning of the demonstrative (e.g., “author 
of Waverley”). Thus, the former category covers most of the counterevidence from section 
2.2.1.2, including (78), (80), (82), (84), (85), (88a-b) and (89), whereas the latter includes the 
most favorable cases for the directly referential view, namely those discussed in section 2.1.2 
when presenting the main tenets of c-theories.  
The circumstance binding solution predicts a contrast between these two categories of 
complex demonstratives: namely, those containing a relative clause come out as 
circumstance-dependent, whereas the simpler ones are context-dependent. Thus, it fits the 
pattern fairly well, for it predicts that complex demonstratives containing a relative clause, 
like the one in (130c), have roughly the truth-conditions of a definite description. Here is the 
LF and truth-conditions predicted for this sentence: 
(130d) λ<w0, t1>. [Ǝt2: t2 < t1] (<w0, t2> [That author who3 [Ǝt4 : t4 < t1] (<w0, t4> 
R3 writes Waverley)] also writes Ivanhoe) 
(130e) λc. λi. There is a time t occurring after ti such that δc(λy. λj. there is a time 
t’ such that t’ occurs before ti and y is an author in <wi, t’> and y writes Waverley 
in <wi, t’>) writes Ivanhoe in <wi, t>) 
I.e., (130d) is as circumstance-dependent as a definite description: it will be true in a 
random circumstance i iff a certain individual who authored Waverley in i also authored 
Ivanhoe in i. Thus, a prima facie positive feature of my account is that it predicts that (130c) 
                                                          
86 Sentence (130a) may be made felicitous under some assumptions. If we supposed, for example, that Waverley 
had been co-authored, (130a) would sound much better. Nowak (2019a) himself provides an example of a 
felicitous utterance of a sentence much like (130a): 
(n) That author of Principia Mathematica looks friendly, but I wouldn’t try to get an autograph from 
that one 
Thus, the appropriateness of this kind of constructions seems to be highly context-dependent.  
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patterns together with the perfectly acceptable (130b) instead of the infelicitous (130a). 
Definite descriptions are circumstance-dependent, and they can be employed non-deictically. 
In fact, all that needs to be done in order to fix the infelicity of (130a) is to substitute “that” 
for “the”, as in (130b), in order to make it circumstance-dependent. Interestingly, (130c), 
which is also circumstance-dependent, is perfectly felicitous too.  
I do not intend to provide a full explanation of what generates this contrast; for the 
purposes of this dissertation, I am happy simply with acknowledging that my account 
conforms to the appropriate pattern. Let me, however, briefly discuss one attempt to explain 
the contrast. Nowak’s (2019a) account appeals to the classical NP-S syntactic configuration 
in which NP’s are generated by combining a determiner with two arguments (Bach & Cooper 
1978), instead of the standard configuration in which it combines with just one (Partee 1975). 
On the former configuration, noun phrases have the following syntactic structure:  
(171)  
 
For example, “the man I saw yesterday is bald” is obtained by combining “the” with 
“man” into the N´ “the man”, which in turn combines with the relative clause “I saw 
yesterday” in order to generate an NP. This, in turn, combines with the VP “is bald” in order 
to arrive at a full sentence. Partee (1975) famously suggested that the following configuration 
was semantically more appropriate: 
(172) 
 
Here, the N´ can, of course, be in turn composed of another N´ and a relative clause. 
The problem with (171), according to Partee, is that it makes it impossible to arrive at the 
S 
NP   VP 
N’  (S) 
D  N’ 
 
S<s, t> 
NP<<e, <s, t>>, <s, t>>   VP<e, <s, t>> 




correct denotation of the noun phrase. If “the” combines first with “man”, the resulting N’ 
denotes the unique man in the domain of discourse. But this is wrong: we want to talk about 
the unique man that I saw yesterday, regardless of how many other men the domain may 
contain (see Chomsky 1975 for discussion). Emmon Bach and Robin Cooper suggested that 
(171) could still be retained, simply, if we raise the type of the determiner, thus: 
(171a) 
 
On this classical, non-standard analysis, determiners combine first with a noun phrase 
and then with a relative clause, if there is one. Bach and Cooper cite evidence from Hittite to 
argue that this configuration is preferable, and Nowak appropriates a version of this analysis 
for his account. On his view, the determiner “that” triggers a syntactic configuration like the 
one in (171), i.e., it combines with two arguments: an N’ and a relative clause. Semantically, 
however, the resulting combination is a singular term pretty much like a Strawsonian definite 
description: “that” is of type <<e, <s, t>>, <<e, <s, t>>, <s, e>>>. This means that it combines 
with the two arguments and returns an object satisfying both predicates in a certain 
circumstance. Nowak’s main innovation comes from the presuppositions he associates with 
“that”: it triggers a non-uniqueness presupposition for the N’ and a uniqueness presupposition 
for the combination of both arguments. Thus, any NP of the form “that F which Gs” will 
select an object under the presupposition that it is not the only one in the extension of F but 
it is the only one to satisfy both F and G. If there is no second argument (i.e., no relative 
clause), then the demonstrative combines with a contextually determined property – say, the 
property of being identical to Walter Scott. These presuppositions are, according to Nowak, 
what explains the above-mentioned contrast: the “that”-term (130c) selects an object a under 
the presuppositions that a is not the unique author in the world and that a is the only author 
who wrote Waverley, whereas the complex demonstrative in (130a), on the contrary, picks 
out an object under the presupposition that there is more than one author of Waverley – hence 
its infelicity.  
S<s, t> 
NP<<e, <s, t>>, <s, t>>    VP<e, <s, t>> 
N`<<e, <s, t>>, <<e, <s, t>>, <s, t>>>  (S<e, <s, t>>) 




This is a very elegant way to account for the data, although some counterexamples 
could be raised against the non-uniqueness presupposition triggered by the first argument. 
For example, a sentence like (173) can be uttered felicitously, and even truly, in some sort of 
post-apocalyptic situation, but Nowak’s semantics predicts that it can never be used 
felicitously and truly, for it presupposes that there is more than one dog:  
(173) That dog is the last mammal on Earth 
Other, more direct counterexamples to the non-uniqueness presupposition include the 
complex demonstratives in the following examples: 
(174) On every team there is one player who is not as strong as the rest. That weakest 
member is the one to play hardest against (Maclaran 1982) 
(175) This first Christmas Night (title of a book by Laura Godwin & William Low, 
2016, MacMillan) 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that, in languages such as German, Spanish or 
French, demonstratives of the form as “this first F” or “that last P”, which contradict the non-
uniqueness presupposition triggered by the noun phrase, sound much more felicitous than 
their English counterparts, and they are more likely to be found. English is no exception, 
however, for, although saying “this first F” or “that last F” is not as usual as it is in other 
languages, complex demonstratives of this form are often perfectly felicitous: 
(176) This last response on the part of the coordination account brings up an 
important point (fragment of a paper by King 2020: 66) 
All of this could be fixed by qualifying the non-uniqueness presupposition some way 
or another (Nowak himself discusses similar cases in 2019a, sections 6.1 and 6.2). However, 
the uniqueness presupposition triggered by the combination of the noun phrase and the 
relative clause can also be problematic, for it is easily cancellable: 
(177) That man who is following us seems unaware that there is yet another man 
following us  




If the appropriateness of (177) requires a unique man to be following the participants 
in the conversation, then it should be self-contradictory, yet it seems perfectly fine. Similarly, 
(178) shows that it is possible to employ the same complex demonstrative for picking out 
different objects even if it contains a relative clause – it is admittedly a bit wordy, but 
nevertheless perfectly grammatical. None of these counterexamples constitute knock-down 
arguments against Nowak’s elegant system, but they certainly suggest that the explanation 
may lie elsewhere. 
The hypothesis I am inclined to defend is that the infelicity of (130a) can be accounted 
for on Gricean principles; namely, my conjecture is that the non-uniqueness it communicates 
is implicated, and not presupposed. The availability of (130b), which does presuppose (or 
assert) that the author of Waverley is unique, has a role to play in the explanation: if a speaker 
chooses to utter (130a) instead of the more informative (130b), she may be taken to imply 
that the uniqueness presupposition triggered by the definite description does not hold. Other 
possible factors explaining the infelicity of (130a) taken in isolation may include the lack of 
a referent which can be easily retrieved from the context, whereas this should not be 
problematic for its non-context-dependent counterparts (130b) and (130c). This is still very 
sketchy as an explanation, but a full account of the above contrast lies beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. For the moment, it suffices to acknowledge that my account conforms to the 
appropriate pattern, i.e., that it predicts that (130c) is more similar to (130b) than to (130a). 
Let us now move on and see the predictions that both the extensional and the 
circumstance-binding solutions make about all the other counterexamples to c-theories. NS-
readings, for instance, are straightforwardly accommodated insofar as they are just a variant 
of QI-uses. The extensional solution, for example, predicts that (80) should receive the LF 
and truth-conditions in (80a) and (80b), whereas the circumstance-binding solution predicts 
that these should be (80c) and (80d), respectively. As mentioned above, “will” is treated as 
an existential quantifier over times in these examples: 
(80a) [Ǝt2: t2 > t1
pres] (<w0
ind, t2> [Each division] λ3. that professor who4 [Ǝt8: t8 
< t7
pres] (<w6
ind, t8> r4 brings in the biggest grant in r3) is honored) 
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(80b) λc. [Ǝt: t > tc] (Ɐx (x is a division in <wc, t> → δc(λy. λj. y is a professor 
in j and there is a time t’ such that t’ occurs before tc and y brings in the biggest 
grant in x in <wc, t’>) is honored in <wc, t>) 
(80c) λ<w0, t1>. [Ǝt2: t2 > t1] (<w0, t2> [Each division] λ3. that professor who4 
[Ǝt5: t5 < t1] (<w0, t5> R4 bring in the biggest grant in r3) is honored) 
(80d) λc. λi. [Ǝt: t > ti] Ɐx (x is a division in <wi, t> → δc(λy. λj. there is a time 
t’ such that t’ occurs before ti and y is a professor in <wi, t’> and y brings in the 
biggest grant in x in <wi, t’>) is honored in <wi, t>) 
Let me briefly explain each of these. The presuppositional material in (80a) ensures 
that, for any context c in which the sentence is interpretable, gc(t1) = gc(t7) = tc, and gc(w0) = 
gc(w6) = wc. At the same time, the definition of the δ function ensures that “professor” will 
be assessed in the circumstance of the context, i.e., ic = <wc, tc>. This suffices for ensuring 
that all the predicates in the sentence will be coordinated: all of them will be assessed either 
at ic or in a circumstance suitably related to ic. In particular, the bringing in of the biggest 
grant is required to take place in a time t’ occurring before tc, and the honoring has to take 
place after tc. This is intuitively right. As a result, (80a) is true in any context in which, for 
each division x, a certain individual is honored in a time occurring after tc, namely an 
individual that is required to have brought in the biggest grant in x in a time occurring before 
tc. Of course, the demonstrative contains a bound variable, which accounts for its non-directly 
referential nature: the external binder is quantifying into the character of the complex 
demonstrative. 
(80c), on the other hand, is not too different. All the time and world variables 
contributed by present and indicative are co-indexed, and they are bound by the upper 
lambda. This ensures that they all will be assessed in the same circumstance, namely the 
circumstance of evaluation; in fact, the circumstance privileged by the context is irrelevant. 
The use of the variable for predicates R4 and the combination by CIRCUMSTANCE 
SPECIFICATION ensures that this sentence won’t be subject to the version of intensional 
mismatch that (77l) was subject to: “professor” will end up interpreted according to the 
circumstance in which we are assessing the whole sentence. In general terms, any QI-
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sentence in which the complex demonstrative contains a verb can avoid the problem of 
intensional mismatch.87 
                                                          
87 Here is a possible complication that can be raised agains the circumstance-binding solution: there might be 
QI-sentences in which the complex demonstrative does not contain any verbal morphology. This is, for 
example, the case of sentence like (o) and the already-mentioned (81): 
(o) Every professor cherishes that first publication of hers (King 2001) 
(81) That senator with the most seniority on each committee is to be consulted 
Without further adjustments, my circumstance-binding solution is unable to handle the problem of intensional 
mismatch for these two sentences, for it predicts that the descriptive material “first publication of hers” and 
“senator with the most seniority” will have to be assessed in the circumstance of the context, whereas 
“professor”, “cherish”, “committee” and “consulted” will still be circumstance-dependent. These sentences are 
not problematic just for my account; Nowak (2019a), for example, acknowledges that these examples may be 
problematic for his too, for the complex demonstratives here are used non-deictically in spite of the fact that 
they contain no relative clause. 
I do not think, however, that these examples constitute a knockdown argument against my circumstance-binding 
solution. In the first place, an important thing to have in mind is that, unlike the other sentences we’ve been 
discussing, neither (81) nor (o) enjoy crosslinguistic support. As Corazza (2003) pointed out, the literal 
translation of (o) into  French or Italian is not entirely ungrammatical, but a bound reading is impossible (i.e., 
it can only be employed for referring to a particular object; see the discussion in Corazza (2003: 272-273)): 
(p) #[Chaque professeur]1 estime sa1 première publication 
(q) #[Ogni professore]1 valorizza quella sua1 prima pubblicazione 
Other Romance languages follow the same pattern. The literal translations of (o) into Catalan and Spanish also 
result in ungrammaticality: 
(r) #[Tot professor]1 s’estima aquella primera publicació seua1 
(s) #[Todo profesor]1 aprecia aquella primera publicación suya1 
These data are still preliminary, but they point towards the idea that examples like (81) and (o) do seem to be 
an indiosyncrasy of English. In fact, let me examine the literature in order to gain support for this idea. When 
Nowak (2014) gathers crosslinguistic evidence for the idea that QI is not exclusive to English, all his examples 
involve complex demonstratives containing a tensed verb. On the other hand, the discussions on analogous 
examples in Higgingbottam (1988), Neale (1993: 107), Lepore & Ludwig (2000) and Georgi (2012: 383, 
footnote 18) suggest that even some English speakers judge examples like (81) and (o) to be ungrammatical, or 
at least highly unnatural. Interestingly, each of the examples that these authors regard as odd in the above papers 
are QI-uses in which the complex demonstrative contains no relative clause. 
These facts suggest that QI-uses with no relative clause are sort of unnatural and, in fact, indiosyncratic to 
English. Consequently, I believe that these counterexamples do not constitute knockdown evidence against the 
circumstance-binding solution, for, contrary to the rest of counterexamples, they can be safely put aside or 
disregarded as exceptions. For example, the pragmatic arguments presented in Braun (2008a), who maintains 
an “error theory” with respect to the truth-conditions of complex demonstratives, are much more likely to hold 
for QI-uses with no relative clause. Indeed, the fact that these uses are not crosslinguistically supported renders 
support to Salmon’s idea that complex demonstratives may sometimes work as “stylistically altered definite 
descriptions” (Salmon 2002, 2006a, 2006b) (see the discussion in 2.3).  
But, even if further research should disconfirm the idea that felicitous uses of these examples are indiosyncratic, 
the c-theorist willing to preserve intensions still has many other options at hand. One could, for example, borrow 
the idea that “that”, qua determiner, can yield hidden variables for implicitly restricting the domain of objects 
that can serve as the value of the demonstrative (cf. von Fintel 1994). I.e., it is possible to make (o) mean (t) in 
a context: 
(t) λ<w1, t2>. Every professor cherishes in <w1, t2> [that first publication of hers in <w1, t2>], 
where the material in italics is added by means of a context-dependent hidden variable (for some criticism 
towards similar ideas, see Cappelen & Lepore 2002, 2005). Another, more plausible idea is to try to achieve 
the required reading by means of scoping. Namely, we could try to move the predicate outside the demonstrative 
and leave a trace there: 




The adoption of a system employing explicit object-language quantification over 
worlds and times also shows that many of the sentences apparently involving no binding may 
turn out to be cases of QI, too. Consider, e.g., sentence (89), repeated below: 
(89) If Gore had won the election, he would definitely have embraced that elector 
who cast the deciding vote 
This sentence is a subjunctive conditional, just like (158) above. As stated in section 
3.3.1.2, these sentences are usually dealt with by means of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for 
counterfactuals, but it is clear that our current system cannot treat “□→” as an intensional 
operator: it should be a quantifier on its own. Let me therefore find a suitable translation for 
it.  
My translation of “□→” into a system with explicit time and world variables follows, 
essentially, the one proposed by Rabern (2012b). For simplicity’s sake, let me momentarily 
disregard time variables and focus just on quantification over worlds. Additionally, let me 
focus on the circumstance-binding solution rather than the extensional one, for the latter 
involves some minor complications that I discuss below. The functioning of the operator 
“□→” can be adapted to our system by letting each sentence of the form “if it were the case 
that p, then q” be given an LF like “λw. [Ɐw1: w1 ∈ Cw(p)] (w1 q)”, where “Cw(p)” is, as 
above, the set of worlds closest to w in which p holds (assume that this set is represented in 
the same manner no matter whether we are in the object-language or the metalanguage). 
Thus, the LF of (89) can be rendered as (89a): 
(89a) λw. [Ɐw1: w1 ∈ Cw(Gore wins the election)] (w1 Gore embraces that elector 
who2. w1 R2 cast the deciding vote) 
Of course, the complex demonstrative contains a world variable, w1, that is bound by 
an external operator, meaning that its character is being operated on. This means that, in this 
                                                          
The latter option ensures that the predicate “being a first publication of hers” will receive the right interpretation, 
for it will be filled with the circumstance of the matrix clause, i.e., <g(w1,) g(t2)>. Thus, the complex 
demonstrative will end up taking as argument a property that is not sensitive to circumstances, and will therefore 
pick out a referent that need not have any particular property in the circumstance of the context. Of course, the 
upper lambda will bind the circumstance, thus rendering the demonstrative circumstance-dependent and, more 
relevantly, will make the predicates “professor” and “cherish” be intensionally coordinated. Similar options are 
explored, although for different reasons, in Heim & von Fintel (2011: 93-98).  
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case too, the non-deictic nature of this demonstrative is due to QI. The truth-conditions of 
this sentence are a bit messy, but they yield the right result: 
(89b) λc. λw. [Ɐw’: w’ is among the worlds closest to w such that Gore wins the 
election in w’] (Gore embraces δc(λy. λw’’. y is an elector in w’ and y casts the 
deciding vote in w’) in w’) 
This is true in a context c and world w iff, for each of the worlds w’ such that w’ is 
among the closest to w and Gore wins the election in w’, it is also the case that Gore embraces 
in w’ a certain individual, namely one satisfying λy. λw’’. y is an elector in w’ and y casts the 
deciding vote in w’. Of course, the world argument w’’ in this function is idle, just as the 
circumstance argument in (77o); this means that it is insensitive to the circumstance of the 
context: the δ function only takes into account facts occurring in w’. But, on the other hand, 
the latter variable is bound by an external operator, and this accounts for the idea that the 
complex demonstrative will take different values in each of the worlds in the set Cw (Gore 
wins the election). This sentence is presented by Nowak (2014) as a case of modal anchoring 
without anaphora, but this diagnosis is not entirely accurate if we adopt a system like the one 
advocated here: insofar as binding is a type of anaphora, the complex demonstrative in this 
sentence does contain anaphoric dependence – although not of the kind Nowak had in mind 
in his discussion.  
 The extensional solution, on the other hand, raises some difficulties. If we attempt 
translating (89) in the most conservative manner, i.e., without resorting to 
CIRCUMSTANCE SPECIFICATION nor any non-orthodox treatment of the relative 
pronoun, we arrive at the following LF and truth-conditions: 
(89c) [Ɐw1: w1 ∈ Cwind (Gore wins the election)] (w1 Gore embraces that elector 
who2 w1 r2 cast the deciding vote) 
(89d) λc. [Ɐw’: w’ is among the worlds closest to wc such that Gore wins the election 
in w’] (Gore embraces δc(λy. λw’’. y is an elector in w’’ and y casts the deciding 
vote in w’) in w’) 
The problem here is that the world argument w’’ in the function λy. λw’’. y is an elector 
in w’’ and y casts the deciding vote in w’) is not idle. This means that the δ function will 
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select an individual satisfying the property of casting the deciding vote in w’ and being an 
elector in the world of the context – the problem of intensional mismatch strikes back. There 
are two possible responses to this problem. One of them is, simply, to adopt the idea that 
“who” can bind property variables and to incorporate CIRCUMSTANCE SPECIFICATION 
into our inventory of rules. Then we can provide the following LF and truth-conditions: 
(89e) [Ɐw1: w1 ∈ Cwind (Gore wins the election)] (w1 Gore embraces that elector 
who2 w1 R2 cast the deciding vote) 
(89f) λc. [Ɐw’: w’ is among the worlds closest to wc such that Gore wins the election 
in w’] (Gore embraces δc(λy. λw’’. y is an elector in w’ and y casts the deciding vote 
in w’) in w’) 
This is right, but the drawback is that our system is not as conservative as we would 
like it to be. There is nevertheless still a second possible answer, one that could be formulated 
in metaphysical terms and that would allow us to preserve (89c-d). Recall that (89d) assigns 
truth to any context c such that, for each of the worlds w’ such that w’ is among the closest 
to wc and Gore wins the election in w’, it is also the case that Gore embraces in w’ an 
individual y satisfying being an elector in wc and casting the deciding vote in w’. It could be 
argued (and this is not an uncontroversial premise) that, if y is an elector in wc, she will also 
be so in all the worlds w’ ∈ Cwc (Gore wins the election). That is, any world in which Gore 
wins the election but the electors are different individuals (say, because the population of the 
United States has increased or decreased, because a law changing the minimum legal age for 
voting has been passed, etc.) could be argued to be further away from the actual world than 
one in which he wins but the set of electors is the same. Under this controversial premise, 
(89d) is just equivalent to (89f). I am not entirely sure about this response, and I am afraid 
that the debate itself is hard to settle in these terms, for the notion of similarity it relies on is 
far from well-established.  
At any rate, this discussion points toward an important conclusion: most non-deictic 
uses of complex demonstratives can be explained away as instances of monstrous 
quantification into the character of the term. King’s QI-uses are a paradigmatic example of 
this phenomenon, but this very analysis can be applied to many other cases. Adopting explicit 
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world and time variables yields the result that many instances of modal anchoring turn out to 
be special cases of QI; (89) is one such case. In this sentence, the variable contributed by the 
verb’s morphology is bound by an operator that is external to the complex demonstrative, 
and this is what explains that its value may vary from world to world, just like the value of 
the demonstrative in (77) varies across individuals. The intervention of monsters always 
generates non-deictic readings of indexicals, and complex demonstratives are not an 
exception. It is now the time to momentarily interrupt the discussion and examine the 
philosophical significance of the notion of monster and its relationship with other concepts 
like direct reference or compositionality.  
  
3.3.2 Excursus: Singular terms, rigid designation and direct reference  
The discussion in the last section attempted to show that the most important set of 
counterexamples presented by King, QI-uses, can be easily handled by c-theories as long as 
some independently motivated changes are implemented into the theory. These include the 
rejection of condition (27i) on the basis of facts about analyticity and psychological 
plausibility, and the adoption of a system with full object-language quantification over times 
and worlds, grounded on issues pertaining to the expressive power of natural language.  The 
current framework, however, faces an important objection: it makes extensive use of 
Kaplanian monsters. Thus, it achieves the right predictions, but only at the price or not 
upholding the prohibition to operate on character. And, although the “no monsters thesis” is 
often seen as an empirical claim, it seems clear that Kaplan intended it as a normative one, 
i.e., as a desideratum that any semantic theory should meet. In his own words, “I am not 
saying that we could not construct a language with such operators, just that English is not 
one. And such operators could not be added to it” (Kaplan 1977: 510; original emphasis).  
If Kaplan’s point is not just that English does not contain monsters but rather that 
monsters should be avoided, as the last sentence from the former paragraph suggests, then it 
is clear that our current framework does not abide by this principle. One might now wonder 
what is the motivation for banning this kind of operators, and whether our system can 




3.3.2.1 Monsters, compositionality and what is said 
Kaplan’s prohibition of monster operators is sometimes seen as necessary for maintaining 
that indexicals are directly referential. The assumption that contexts cannot be shifted, paired 
with the idea that the sole contribution of an indexical given a context is an object, lay the 
ground for this model: once their value has been fixed, all we need to take into account is the 
individual they select. This explains all the facts about opacity and singularity, trademarks of 
direct reference. But, if monsters exist, then there is a kind of operators that indexicals are 
not opaque to. More accurately, there are some environments in which we cannot rest content 
just with the object selected by the indexical: we must take its character into account. This is 
in conflict with the way Kaplan characterizes direct reference in his “Principle 2”: 
“When what was said in using a pure indexical in a context c is to be evaluated 
with respect to an arbitrary circumstance, the relevant object is always the referent 
of the indexical with respect to the context c.” (Kaplan 1977: 500) 
Allowing monsters conflicts with this principle, for it would entail that the object 
selected by an indexical in a circumstance may sometimes turn out to be irrelevant for 
assessing the value of the whole sentence. Although it is not clear whether this is actually in 
conflict with the notion of direct reference (see the next section and the debate between 
Salmon (2006b, 2008) and King (2008b)), it is worth discussing the notions at stake.  
At first sight, a prohibition of context-shifting operators does not seem to have much 
of a point. Whether natural language happens to have such devices looks like an empirical 
claim – a claim challenged, for example, by the work of Schlenker (2003) and Anand and 
Nevins (2004). The motivation behind Kaplan’s prohibition bears more philosophical import: 
as we shall see, it is what allows him to maintain compositionality at the level of assertoric 
content. It is, informally speaking, what allows indexicals to always make the same 
contribution (their content instead of their character) to what is said by larger expressions 
containing them. Let us see why. 
The first thing to be done is to clarify the notion of compositionality and its role within 
semantics. Informally, compositionality is most often understood as the idea that the meaning 
of a complex expression should be determined by the meaning of its component parts. This 
is supposed to explain many important features of natural language, such as productivity, 
204 
 
systematicity and learnability, and to account for phenomena such as synonymy, analyticity 
and intersubjective communication.88 It is therefore a central notion in semantic theorizing; 
in fact, it is often seen as a methodological assumption (Lewis 1970, Yalcin 2014). From a 
formal point of view, compositionality can be understood as the idea that the meaning of a 
complex expression is a function of the meaning of its subexpressions. There is also an 
alternative formulation, first due to Frege (1892), that says that substitution of substrings with 
the same meaning should have no effect on the meaning of the whole. The first to explicitly 
state both versions of the principle was Rudolf Carnap (1947), and in this dissertation I will 
be working with the standard formulations by Peter Pagin and Dag Westerståhl (2010a: 254). 
Let me state them formally.  
Compositionality is a property of a semantics with respect to a syntax; it is usual to 
think of the latter as an algebra <E, A, Σ> consisting of the set E of expressions of the 
language, a set A of primitive symbols (lexical items) and a set Σ of syntactic operations such 
that E is generated from A through Σ. A semantics µ, in turn, is a function that maps every 
meaningful expression in E to its semantic value. Once we have this, we can formulate both 
versions of compositionality as follows: 
Functional version of compositionality (FC): a semantics µ is compositional iff for 
every syntactic rule α ∈ Σ there is a function fα such that µ(α(u1 … un)) = fα(µ(u1) … 
µ(un)). 
Substitutional version of compositionality (SC): a semantics µ is compositional iff for 
any two meaningful terms α(u1 … un) ∈ E and α(t1 … tn) ∈ E, if µ(u1) =  µ(t1) … µ(un) 
= µ(tn), then µ(α(u1 … un)) = µ(α(t1 … tn)). 
FC presupposes the idea that subterms of meaningful terms are meaningful – what 
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010a) call the domain principle (DP). Under DP, both versions are 
equivalent, and, since this principle holds in any standard semantic system,89 let me use them 
interchangeably.  
Many semanticists distinguish more than one level of meaning, in which case it is 
possible that compositionality holds at certain levels but not at others. In the terminology just 
                                                          
88 See Pagin & Westerståhl (2010b) for an overview of how these and other issues have been used as evidence 
that compositionality is a feature of natural language. 
89 See Gimeno-Simó (manuscript) for discussion. 
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stated, whether compositionality holds depends on which level of meaning the variable μ 
stands for. For example, it could happen that Frege’s system were compositional at the level 
of sense but not reference; in fact, most semantic systems are not compositional when μ is 
understood as the extension of the expressions.90 In a system like Kaplan’s, in which 
expressions are endowed with character, content and extension, the question whether 
compositionality holds can be asked regarding all three kinds of meaning. More concretely, 
the level of compositionality we are primarily concerned with is content-compositionality. 
As we shall see now, this appears to be the main motivation behind Kaplan’s ban on monsters.  
Content, unlike character, is not a property of bare expressions, but of expressions in a 
context, so prima facie the idea of compositionality may seem difficult to implement in this 
case. But, from a technical point of view, there is no difficulty whatsoever. Westerståhl (2012) 
has shown that the notion of compositionality generalizes to expressions in a context: all we 
have to do is to modify our definitions by adding the contextual item along with the syntactic 
string. Let µcont(e, c) be the content of expression e in context c. In that case,  
Functional version of content-compositionality (FCC): LD is content-compositional 
iff for every context c and every syntactic rule α ∈ Σ there is a function fα such that 
µcont(α(u1 … un), c) = fα(µcont(u1, c) … µcont(un, c)). 
                                                          
90 Frege’s system is compositional at both levels of meaning. Consider his own example: 
(u) Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is bright in the evening 
(v) Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is bright in the evening 
The system is reference-compositional iff the reference of a complex expressions is a function of the reference 
of its subexpressions and their syntactic ordering, and it is sense-compositional iff the sense of complex 
expressions is a function of the sense of their subexpressions and their syntactic ordering. At first glance it 
might seem that reference-compositionality does not hold, for, in principle, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” have 
the same referent and yet the references of (u) and (v) differ (the former is true and the latter is false).  
But there is no such failure: the principle of context ensures that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” do receive 
different referents in this linguistic context – namely, their referent in this environment is their customary sense. 
Therefore it is possible to define a function f such that a) f yields truth when it takes the referents of all the 
subexpressions in (u) and b) it yields falsity when it takes all the referents of the subexpressions of (v). This 
means that Frege’s system is compositional at the level of reference, and not just at the level of sense.  
Things might get complicated, however, once we acknowledge Frege’s hierarchy of senses (cf. Carnap 1947, 
Dummett 1973). Thanks to Jordi Valor for pointing this out. 
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Substitutional version of content-compositionality (SCC): LD is content-
compositional iff for any context c and any two meaningful terms α(u1 … un) ∈ E and 
α(t1 … tn) ∈ E, if µcont(u1, c) = µcont(t1, c) … µcont(un, c) = µcont(tn, c), then µcont(α(u1 … 
un), c) = µcont(α(t1 … tn), c). 
With these definitions, it is not hard to see why allowing monsters is in conflict with 
maintaining content-compositionality. In a nutshell: monsters shift the context in which an 
expression is being assessed, and context is a parameter that generates content. This means 
that the semantic rule associated with the addition of the monster must operate on a level of 
meaning previous to content – namely, character. This is why adding monsters to LD would 
doom content-compositionality: the meaning of a monster cannot be given by a function of 
content. Let me expand a bit on this.  
This point can be seen more clearly by means of an example. Recall our discussion 
with sentence (21) above. If c is a context having Theresa May as its agent, (21a) and (21f) 
have the same content at c:  
(21a) I am tired 
(21f) Theresa May is tired 
Allowing monsters entails that there are linguistic environments in which these two 
sentences embed differently. For example, (21b) and (21g), which result from embedding 
(21a) and (21f) under our artificial “in some contexts”, mean different things: 
(21b) In some contexts I am tired 
(21g) In some contexts Theresa May is tired 
As always, structured propositions might be of some help here. (21b) and (21g) express, 
respectively, (21d) and (21h): 
(21d) <<the agent, being tired>, being true in some contexts>  
(21h) <<Theresa May, being tired>, being true in some contexts> 
These examples make it clear that the semantic rule associated with the addition of the 
monster cannot be a function of content. Let k be a context such that ak = Theresa May, and 
let β be the syntactic rule such that, for any formula Φ, β(Φ) yields the sentence “In some 
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contexts Φ” as a result. It is very easy to check that SCC does not hold: µcont ((21a), k) =  
µcont((21f), k), but µcont(β((21a), k)) ≠ µcont (β((21f), k)).
91 In other words, (21a) and (21f) 
mean the same thing, but they embed differently: Frege’s substitution test fails. FCC yields 
the same result: given that (21a) and (21f) have the same content in k, the semantic rule fβ 
associated with the addition of “In some contexts” should yield the same result no matter 
whether it is applied to the former or the latter. But this contradicts the fact that fβ((21a), k) 
≠ fβ((21f), k). In other words, the content of (21b) in k cannot be given as a function of the 
content of its immediate subcomponent (21a) in the same context.  
This should come as no surprise, for, after all, what is characteristic of monsters is that 
they do not operate on content but on character. It is now possible to state more clearly the 
philosophical relevance of this sort of operators. There are many passages of Kaplan’s work 
in which he identifies his technical notion of content with “what is said” and “the objects of 
assertion and thought”. On his view, a person uttering “Yesterday was Monday” on two 
different days isn’t asserting the same thing, whereas two utterances of “I am bald” and 
“Julius Caesar is bald” made by Caesar himself do assert (or say) the very same thing. 
Maintaining compositionality at the level of content amounts to maintaining it at the level of 
what is asserted. Monsters would prevent LD from being compositional at both levels of 
meaning, and this is relevant insofar as it entails that there are meaning operations that cannot 
be given as a function of what is said. 
Brian Rabern (2013) has developed an argument that shows that LD does after all 
contain monsters, though of a special kind: they are not to be found at context-shifting but at 
variable binding. He goes on to show that variable binders, such as quantifiers and lambda 
abstractors, deserve the label “monsters”. Consider an open formula like (179a): 
(179a) Px   
The content of (179a) must be determined according to an assignment function that 
determines which object is the extension of x in every circumstance. This means that, as we 
already mentioned in section 2.1.1, assignment functions are content-generating parameters 
                                                          
91 Just to make it sure, the content of (21g) in k is the function λi. Ǝc. ⟦tired (May)⟧c, i, whereas the content of 
(21b) in k is a different one: λi. Ǝc. ⟦tired (I)⟧c, i. Of course, the content of both (21a) and (21f) in k is given by 
the same function: λi. Theresa May is tired in i.  
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as much as contexts are – this is the reason why I followed the later Kaplan and added them 
as another parameter of context. It should be clear that in a framework like the current one 
variable binders come out as context-shifters. Consider (179b) and its truth-conditions: 
(179b) Ǝx (Px) 
⟦Ǝx (Px)⟧c, i = 1 iff there is some a ∈ E such that ⟦Px⟧c(a/x), i = 1, where c(a/x) is the 
context that is just like c except that gc(a/x) assigns a to “x” 
I.e., in the current framework, and the one endorsed by Kaplan in Afterthoughts, 
quantifiers shift the context parameter, and therefore straightforwardly qualify as monsters. 
One might wonder why this problem cannot be solved simply by placing assignment 
functions as a separate parameter, but this will not do. As Rabern and Derek Ball (2019) point 
out, the question is not just a matter of whether a theory allows context-shifting operators: 
even if we stick to the formalism of Demonstratives and place assignments outside contexts, 
these are still arguments to character. Formally, shifting assignments is on a par with shifting 
contexts: both of them are arguments that character needs to take in order to return content. 
Thus, even if variable binders did not qualify as context-shifters, they would still deserve 
being called “monsters”, for they shift a content-generating parameter. And this means that 
the addition of a variable binder still results in a failure of content-compositionality.  
Let us momentarily place assignments outside contexts. In that case, the content of 
(179a) in a context c and an assignment g is a function that assigns truth to every circumstance 
in which the image of “x” under g has the property designated by “P”: λi. ⟦P⟧c, g, i (g(x)) = 1. 
But, clearly, the content of (179b) in g cannot be given by a function of the content of (179a) 
in g. Compare (179a-b) with (179c-d): 
(179c) Py 
(179d) Ǝx (Py) 
Assume, for the argument’s sake, that g(x) = g(y). In this case, (179a) and (179c) have 
exactly the same content under g. But, clearly, the content of (179b) and (179d) in g differs: 
the latter is still about g(y), but the former, on the contrary, is not about g(x) nor about any 
individual in particular. If the semantic rule associated with the addition of the quantifier 
were a function of contents, then it should yield the same result no matter whether we apply 
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it to (179a) or to (179c), for these two have the same content under g. But it is clear that this 
is not the case; the reasoning is entirely analogous to the one we carried out with (21a-h). 
Content does not depend only on context, it also depends on assignment functions. 
Since quantifiers shift the latter, their occurrence has the same effect as context-shifters: 
whatever the referent of x in (179a) may be, it does not appear within the assertoric content 
of (179b), within what is said by it. This is so because the quantifier does not operate on the 
content of the variable, but on its character. Kaplan did not reject context-shifters per se, but 
only on the basis that contexts are tuples of content-generating parameters; if assignments 
generate content and quantifiers are assignment-shifters, there is no reason not to think of 
them as monsters. The notion of context-shifters is, as such, relatively uninteresting for 
philosophical purposes; a far more interesting notion of monster is what Rabern and Ball call 
“content monsters”: operators that shift a parameter on which what is said depends (Rabern 
& Ball 2019: 401). In practice, this amounts to shifting the contribution that an expression 
makes to assertoric content. Such kind of operators prevent expressions from being 
compositional at the level of what is said. 
If we identify the objects of assertion – or of thought – with Kaplanesque content, and 
quantified sentences fail to be compositional at the level of content, then LD fails in 
identifying compositional value and assertoric content. Now, pronouns are standardly 
analogized to variables, which means that the contribution that “she” makes to what is said 
gets shifted in its bound reading:  
(180a) She is happy 
(180b) Every girl thinks that she is happy 
In other words, the quantifier “every girl” is a monster.92 The case is completely 
analogous to the one above: compare (180a-b) and (180c-d): 
(180c) Angela Merkel is happy 
(180d) Every girl thinks that Angela Merkel is happy 
                                                          
92 Strictly speaking, the monster is not the quantifier itself, but the lambda abstractor that it yields to LF when 
it is raised. 
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Under a certain assignment, (180a) and (180c) have the same content: the set of 
circumstances in which Angela Merkel is happy. However, (180d) and the bound reading of 
(180b) do not say the same thing. This is so, of course, because the quantifier operates on the 
character, and not the content, of the embedded sentence.  
As Rabern (2013) notes, it may be argued that, while it is true that Kaplan’s LD does 
contain monsters, they might be regarded as inessential, for they are due to Kaplan’s use of 
the mechanism of variable binding typical of first-order logic. Current semantic theorizing 
has long abandoned the old Tarskian quantifiers and adopted GQ instead; on this theory, 
natural language quantifiers are standardly modeled not as variable-binding operators but as 
higher-order predicates that leave the assignment function untouched. Since there is no need 
to mention the assignment function in giving a truth-clause for a generalized quantifier, it 
could be argued that monsters are inessential to Kaplan’s framework: he could simply get rid 
of them by resorting to the standard theory of quantification in natural language.  
This solution, however, will not do either, for there is yet another kind of assignment-
shifters semantic theory cannot do away with that easily: lambda binders are thoroughly used 
in any semantic frameworks, more often in combination with GQ. And lambdas have the 
following semantics:  
⟦λi. Φ⟧g = λx. ⟦Φ⟧g(x/i) (Heim & Kratzer 1998: 196; Rabern 2013: 399).  
In other words, lambdas bind variables, and they do so by shifting a content-generating 
parameter: the assignment function. For example, an open formula like “Mary read x” can, 
under a certain assignment, have the same content as “Mary read Hamlet”. But clearly the 
content of “λx. Mary read x” cannot be the same as the content of “λx. Mary read Hamlet”, 
no matter which assignment you are assessing them in. Lambdas are essential for a proper 
treatment of quantification in natural language, so monsters appear to be inevitable. They 
are, in fact, the mechanism responsible for shifting the content of complex demonstratives in 
QI-uses.   
There is, of course, a possible solution to this puzzle: one could simply add assignments 
as another parameter of the circumstance of evaluation (cf. del Prete & Zucchi 2017, Nowak 
2019b). Kaplan conceives contents as functions from times and worlds to extensions, but in 
principle there is no reason not to think of them as something more complex – say, a function 
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from worlds, times and assignments to extensions. If we take this path, then assignment 
shifters are on a par with modal and temporal operators: they simply shift one of the 
parameters of evaluation. This means that lambdas and variable binders can be modelled as 
functions of content. Thus, by adopting a more complex notion of content our system can 
incorporate the devices that we need to handle quantifications without thereby compromising 
content-compositionality.93 This is the general moral that seems to follow from this 
discussion: “Given that compositionality of content is desirable, monsters are not. If you 
discover a monstrous contextual feature, relegate it to the circumstances.” (Westerståhl 
2012: 22; see also Stanley 2005).  
This solution, however, is at odds with Kaplan’s commitment to direct reference. 
Variables, on his view, are paradigmatic examples of directly referential expressions (1989: 
571-573): their content depends on the assignment, but once it has been fixed it is established 
once and forever and it does not differ from that of a proper name. This is of course 
impossible to achieve if the assignment function is included as another parameter of the 
circumstance of evaluation alongside worlds and times, for then the extension of variables 
will change from circumstance to circumstance. No matter in which context you assess a 
sentence like (180a): its content could never be about Merkel nor about any other individual. 
This is the exact opposite of direct reference. 
Perhaps giving up direct reference for variables is not that bad. Adding the assignment 
to the circumstance would affect expressions standardly modelled as variables such as third-
person pronouns and certain demonstratives, but we can nonetheless retain a number of 
expressions that still fit the paradigm of direct reference – for example, first or second person 
pronouns. But notice, in fact, that the argument is more generalized than it might at first 
glance seem, for it does not only affect variables: it concerns any shiftable expression. And, 
in fact, every pronoun displays shifted readings. Consider the following examples, originally 
due to Heim (2008; see also von Stechow 2003, 2004 and Kratzer 2009):  
                                                          
93 This also seems to be the reason why Kaplan departs from a classical understanding of propositions as 
functions from possible worlds to extensions and thinks of them as timeless entities that require a time argument. 
If contents incorporated time, then temporal operators would be content monsters too. See Richard (1982), 
Salmon (1989) and Rabern (2012a) for related discussion. 
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(181) Only I did my homework 
(182) Few men brought their children 
(183) We brought our children 
(181) is ambiguous between a strict and a sloppy reading: if uttered by Mary, it may 
say either that Mary is the only x that did Mary’s homework or that Mary is the only x that 
did x’s homework. This difference is far from being idle: if Jean does Mary’s homework, the 
strict reading turns out false, but this needn’t falsify the sloppy one. On the other hand, if 
Jean does her own homework, the sloppy reading turns out false, but the strict one may 
remain true. Things are similar with the other two sentences: (182)-(183) display both bound 
and free readings. Namely, (182) can be read either as a claim to the effect that, for few men 
x, x brought x’s child, or as stating that there are a few men that brought the children of 
whoever “they” refers to; similarly, (183) may mean either that each of us x is such that x 
brought her own child, or that we all together brought the children we have in common. These 
data suggest that all pronouns can be shifted; in fact, they strongly recommend that all 
pronouns be modelled as variables. If we add the assignment function as part of the 
circumstance of evaluation, the whole point of Demonstratives is rejected: the value of 
indexicals would shift from circumstance to circumstance. They would therefore be unfit for 
conveying singular propositions. If, in order to avoid monsters, one packages into 
circumstances any parameter that can be shifted by an operator, then we end up with a view 
of indexicals that does not fit Kaplan’s central tenet. 
There is, however, a way out: we could, simply, embrace monsters. The monster 
prohibition was grounded on the idea that a single entity, content, was able to play two very 
different roles within a semantic theory: it can serve as the object of assertion and, at the 
same time, the level of meaning at which semantic operations take place. But, as Lewis 
(1980) puts it, we have no reason to think that that this is so: 
“It would be a convenience, nothing more, if we could take the propositional 
content of a sentence in context as its semantic value. But we cannot. The 
propositional contents of sentences do not obey the compositional principle, 
therefore they are not semantic values.” (Lewis 1980) 
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Here, “semantic value” means the object on which meaning operations are defined. 
What Lewis is advocating for in this passage is a separation of both roles, an idea already 
endorsed by Dummett (1973): the semantic contribution that an expression makes to the 
complex expressions containing it need not coincide with its assertoric content, i.e., with the 
information it communicates. We may want to say, for example,  that the assertoric content 
of the pronoun in (180a) is an individual, but, in order to be able to compositionally determine 
the meaning of (180b), we must take into account something different altogether. This has 
led many authors (Lewis 1980; Rabern 2012, 2013; Yalcin 2014; Rabern & Ball 2019) to 
regard assertoric content (i.e., explicitly communicated content) as a postsemantic notion. 
A good way to summarize the main point of this section is to define monsters as 
operators that shift the contribution of an expression to what is said (Rabern & Ball, 2019: 
401). By conceiving monsters this way, we can retain a notion of content according to which 
what is said by an expression in a context is simply a function of worlds and times to 
extensions, but, at the same time, we can account for the shiftiness of the relevant 
expressions. Informally speaking, allowing monsters means that the contribution of 
indexicals to what is said will depend on the linguistic environment they are found in: 
sometimes they will contribute their character, and sometimes their content. (21d) and (21h) 
are examples of this: the first-person pronoun contributes its customary content to the former, 
but in the latter a monster intervenes, meaning that in order to arrive at the assertoric content 
of the whole sentence we must take into account the character of the pronoun.94  
This is something that holds of pronouns in general, as long as they display bound 
readings. Applying these ideas to the concrete case of complex demonstratives, this means 
                                                          
94 This is turn, may serve as a response against Dever’s criticism towards c-theories on the basis that these do 
not respect semantic innocence (cf. section 2.1.3). His argument, recall, was that c-theories predict that the 
contribution of an expression may vary depending on the linguistic environment in which it is embedded. For 
example, the word “man” contributes its customary content to what is said by (40), but this content is nowhere 
to be seen in what (1) asserts: 
(1) That man with a hat is bald 
(40) A man with a hat came home 
This idea can hardly constitute a criticism once the presence of monsters has been acknowledged: the whole 
point of section 3.3.2.1 is that the lack of semantic innocence is a generalized phenomenon. It means, for 
example, that a variable will contribute its customary content to what is said by (179a) and its character to 
(179b). The lack of semantic innocence that Dever attributes to c-theories is something that we already needed 
to acknowledge if we wanted to make room for the idea that (179a) expresses a singular proposition.  
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that sometimes we will have to take into account their descriptive meaning – the nominal – 
in order to determine the assertoric value of the sentences containing them. This is what 
happens in QI-uses, in which the character of the demonstrative is being quantified into. 
When there are no monsters around, however, it is possible to retain the idea that the 
assertoric content of a sentence containing a complex demonstrative can be given by a 
singular proposition. This is what explains their opacity to modal and temporal operators. 
The question now is: is this picture compatible with the idea that complex demonstratives 
are, or can work as, devices of direct reference? Let me briefly discuss this in the next section. 
 
3.3.2.2 Millianism and direct reference 
Salmon (2006a, 2006b, 2008) complains, contra King (1999, 2001, 2008b) that the existence 
of QI-uses hardly constitutes an argument against the idea that complex demonstratives, qua 
expressions, are directly referential. His main criticism is that King fails to distinguish 
between expression types and their particular occurrences: from the fact that there exist non-
referential occurrences of demonstratives, King infers a property of these expressions qua 
types, namely that they are not referential. Salmon reconstructs King’s argument as a variant 
of the one Benson Mates (1973: 415) raised against the idea that definite descriptions were 
singular terms. He calls it the “QI-objection”: 
(K1) Any sentence Φβ containing a directly referential occurrence of singular 
term β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational 
operator95 expresses as its semantic content a singular proposition in which 
the designatum of that same occurrence of β occurs as a component. 
(K2) If a singular term β is directly referential, then every occurrence of β 
not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator is a 
directly referential occurrence. 
                                                          
95 The phrase “singular term β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator” is 
originally put by Salmon as “singular term β in extensional position”. The two formulations are used 
interchangeably in the original discussion. 
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(K3) Sentence (77) does not express a singular proposition in which the 
designatum of the occurrence of the complex demonstrative in it (‘that queen 
who crowned her’) occurs as a component. 
(K4) Hence by premises K1 and K3, the occurrence of ‘that queen who 
crowned her’  in (77) is not a directly referential occurrence. 
(K5) Hence by K4 and K2, ‘that queen who crowned her’ is not directly 
referential. 
Although King claims that this is not exactly the argument he intended to provide in 
his work, he also admits that he is in full agreement with it (King 2008b: 106-108). Salmon 
objection is addressed, fundamentally, against premise K2. This is interesting, for what 
Salmon calls “Mates semantic theorem K” follows from K1 and K2: 
(K) Any sentence Φβ containing an occurrence of a directly referential 
singular term β in extensional position, expresses as its semantic content a 
singular proposition in which the designatum of that same occurrence of β 
occurs as a component. 
 In a nutshell (and setting aside a great deal of the details of the original discussion), 
Salmon argues that K2 – and, for that matter, K – sets the standard for counting as a directly 
referential expressions too high, to the point of excluding the possibility that variables might 
be so. The reasons should be clear already. Try applying the very same argument to a formula 
like (179b): 
K1 and K2 as above 
(X3) Sentence (179b) does not express a singular proposition in which the 
designatum of the occurrence of the variable (‘x’) occurs as a component. 
(X4) Hence by premises K1 and X3, the occurrence of ‘x’ in (179b) is not a 
directly referential occurrence. 
(X5) Hence by X4 and K2, ‘x’ is not directly referential. 
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Thus, the premises K1 and K2, paired with uncontroversial facts about the semantics 
of quantified phrases, entail that variables are not directly referential expressions. Salmon 
rejects premise K2 on the basis that it entails this undesirable conclusion. 
King (2008b: 108-110) regards this as a terminological issue about how to use the term 
“direct reference”. On his view, K2 is fine as it is: it is “true by stipulation” that an expression 
is directly referential iff all of its occurrences are (King 2008b: 108). This, of course, prevents 
us from applying the label “directly referential” to expressions like variables, complex 
demonstratives and pronouns, but he also notes an important point: K2 in no way conflicts 
with the possibility of directly referential occurrences of variables, pronouns and even 
complex demonstratives. This kind of expressions display both referential and non-
referential occurrences, and this is consistent with K2, i.e., with their not being directly 
referential qua expressions.  
I essentially agree with King’s claim that this is a terminological issue with nothing at 
stake: regardless of the way we choose to employ the term “direct reference”, our theories 
are still going to make the very same predictions. In fact, I am more inclined to agree with 
him in regarding K2 as true. This seems to be in full agreement with Kaplan’s 
characterization of direct reference by means Principle 2, repeated below:  
“When what was said in using a pure indexical in a context c is to be evaluated 
with respect to an arbitrary circumstance, the relevant object is always the referent 
of the indexical with respect to the context c.” (Kaplan 1977: 500; my emphasis) 
The use of the word “always” in this fragment suggests that Kaplan had in mind 
something like K2. On the other hand, Salmon’s rejection of the principle also seems to enjoy 
some exegetical support, for it is grounded on the idea that variables are paradigms of direct 
reference. Be it as it may, exegetical accuracy is not that important, for, although Kaplan 
coined the term, it is also true that it has taken on a life of its own. Our current usage need 
not coincide with Kaplan’s, and, more importantly, perhaps the term is best used in another 
way. 
For the purposes of the current discussion, the consequences are also terminological. 
The acceptance of K2, paired with the existence of monsters, has the consequence that only 
proper names count as directly referential – QI-uses suffice for excluding the possibility that 
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complex demonstratives are so, although they may have directly referential occurrences. If, 
on the contrary, the best way to use the term “direct reference” turned out to be Salmon’s, 
then complex demonstratives, pronouns and variables can count as directly referential even 
if some of their occurrences are not. Perhaps the latter view could face what many would 
regard as a problem: it sort of entails relegating the notion of direct reference to the 
postsemantics, for it is clear that it plays no role whatsoever in the compositional 
determination of the semantic values of complex expressions.96  
As Georgi (2012) notes, nothing so far excludes the possibility that complex 
demonstratives are singular terms, or even Millian expressions. In other words: accepting K2 
does not mean that complex demonstratives should be understood as quantifiers. He defines 
“Millianism” stipulatively as follows: a term e is Millian iff every totally free occurrence of 
e is directly referential (Georgi 2012: 386), where “totally free” means “not within the scope 
of any quantifier”.97 Of course, the argument K1-K5 does not follow if we substitute “directly 
referential” for “Millian”, for then K2 is clearly false. Variables are Millian under this 
definition, and so might complex demonstratives be.  
If we define “Millianism” as Georgi does,98 an important conclusion follows: the 
existence of non-referential occurrences of complex demonstratives is hardly an objection 
                                                          
96 This is something Salmon sets out to solve by means of his “theory of bondage” (2006a, 2006b), which 
advances an occurrence-based account of binding – a similar proposal is developed by King & Glanzberg 
(2020). See Pickel & Rabern (2020) for criticisms.  
97 In fact, Salmon ends up characterizing direct reference by incorporating this condition into K2:  
(K2*) If a singular term β is directly referential, then every totally free occurrence of β not within 
the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator is a directly referential occurrence 
(Salmon 2006a, 2008; my emphasis). 
This simply means that quantifiers are on a par with indirect, intensional and quotational operators. The idea 
seems essentially right (cf. Neale 2006). 
98 It is unclear whether this is an accurate characterization of Millianism. Under this definition, indexicals are 
also Millian expressions, but arguably they should not be so, for, even though their contribution to the 
proposition expressed is just an object, they are also endowed with a descriptive meaning, namely character. 
Salmon (1998: 311) characterizes the Millian view about an expression e as the idea that e’s only semantic 
contribution is a referent, a view that, he claims, is not incompatible with acknowledging that e may also have 
connotational and intensional features, as long as these are not semantic. Monsters perform semantic operations 
on the character of indexicals and variables, and this entails recognizing some sort of semantic role to character 
– it cannot be conceived, simply, as a rule of use that need not belong to a semantic theory. So perhaps Georgi’s 
characterization of “Millianism” is mistaken. 
The discussion is nevertheless interesting. Corazza (2002a), for example, uses the label “Millian” for an account 
of proper names that is entirely analogous to his theory of complex demonstratives (2002b, 2003); it seems, 
then, that he would agree that his proposal, and arguably all the approaches presented in 2.1, qualify as Millian. 
There is nevertheless an important difference between his account of complex demonstratives and other directly 
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against treating them on the model usually endorsed by c-theorists and mp-theorists. These 
approaches model complex demonstratives on a par with other indexicals, i.e., as context-
dependent expressions whose extension, a referent, can be determined just by looking at the 
context – unless, of course, a monster intervenes. The theory presented in this dissertation 
undoubtedly fits the definition of Millianism given above, and so do the directly referential 
theories from section 2.1.99 Insofar as Millian theories treat complex demonstratives on a par 
with variables and other pronouns, they can predict that these expressions may have non-
referential readings. But there is an important difference between Millian and quantificational 
approaches: the former, unlike the latter, predict that non-deictic readings are licensed only 
in case the demonstrative is under the scope of a monster. This prediction, I shall claim, is 
what makes Millian theories superior; its relevance shall become clearer in section 3.3.5.2.  
Regardless of the question whether my theory counts complex demonstratives as 
directly referential, it is clear that it does treat them as Millian terms in Georgi’s sense. It 
therefore retains the central virtues of c-theories: it offers a very simple semantics able to 
account for the facts about opacity and entailment in a straightforward manner by relegating 
the semantic role of the nominal to character. And each of the uses that do not fit this model 
are explained as cases in which an operator of character intervenes. Insofar as we are justified 
in lifting Kaplan’s ban (and the evidence from the examples in (180)-(183) suggests we are), 
this traditional model can be vindicated as the best explanation of the behavior of complex 
demonstratives in different linguistic environments. 
 
                                                          
referential approaches, particularly Borg’s (2000) and Dever’s (2001): on his view, the descriptive meaning 
associated with a complex demonstrative does not play any logical role – an idea that the later Braun (2008a) 
seems to agree with (see footnote 11). This idea is importantly Millian. See also García-Carpintero (2000, 2018) 
and Predelli (2016). 
99 Since my circumstance-binding solution (and, in some cases, even the extensional one) counts some complex 
demonstratives as circumstance-dependent, counting my theory as Millian might seem like a mistake – it is for 
this reason that I provide a new definition of the term by the end of section 3.3.5.2. At any rate, recall that what 
makes complex demonstratives circumstance-dependent is that they are being quantified into by an external 
operator. Their content in a context, when they are outside the scope of monsters, is still an object. For the 
record, this just stresses an important feature of my framework and, more generally, of theories that allow 
object-language quantification over times and worlds: the so-called “intensional operators” are actually 
hyperintensional in such system. This point will be central in the discussion of attitude reports in section 3.3.5.2. 
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3.3.3 Bound variable uses 
The discussion in the last section points towards a conclusion: complex demonstratives are 
better understood on the model of pronouns, i.e., as context-dependent singular terms whose 
only role is to pick out an object from the context. If context gets shifted, it is no surprise that 
they fail to single out a unique object. The analogy with personal pronouns provides a 
straightforward way to deal with one of the problematic counterexamples pointed out by 
King: complex demonstratives that function as bound variables. Recall the above example: 
(90) [Every student]1 has a professor who thinks [that student]1 is smart 
I do not see the necessity to devote much space to this kind of uses. The first thing to 
be noted is that, while it is true that the complex demonstrative as it occurs in (90) is not 
directly referential, bound variable uses are perfectly consistent – and very naturally fitting 
– with an understanding of complex demonstratives on the model of pronouns. After all, 
every personal pronoun, even first-personal ones, displays bound readings, as the data in 
(180)-(183) show. These examples motivated the standard variabilist semantics for pronouns, 
which includes not just “he” and “she” but also first and second-personal ones. Recall the 
standard lexical entry for third-person pronouns that we stated above (conveniently modified 
so as to take into account the idea that assignments are a part of contexts):  
(145) For any n ∈ ℕ, ⟦Shen⟧ = λc: gc(n) is a female. gc(n) 
Giving a variabilist semantics for other pronouns is not difficult. A pronoun like “I” 
can be modelled in the same manner (cf. Kratzer 2009; Santorio 2010, 2012; Yalcin 2019):  
(184) For any n ∈ ℕ, ⟦In⟧ = λc: gc(n) = ac. gc(n) 
This semantics allows the lambdas to shift the value of “I” in a context, as required by 
sentences like (181). Since variable binders operate on the assignment function, they bear 
effects on the character of the pronouns under their scope, so it is no surprise that these fail 
to single out a unique individual. Of course, the semantics of lambdas should be slightly 
modified in order to accommodate Φ-featural agreement, or, in other words, in order to deal 
with the descriptive part of the meaning of the pronoun (being a female in the case of 
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“she”).100 If we understand complex demonstratives on the model of pronouns (i.e., as 
variables of some sort) and their descriptive material as analogous to Φ-features, our semantic 
theory already has the resources to handle bound variable uses. Here I discuss several ways 
to achieve the right results. 
The easiest and most conservative option is to modify the semantics for object-
language lambdas in order to make them operate on the δ functions too. In section 3.1.2 I 
introduced syntactic indexing for complex demonstratives, a feature that I have been omitting 
throughout the whole discussion on QI for simplicity’s sake. It is now the time to re-introduce 
it into our semantics: let each context c be supplied with indefinitely many δ functions δc
1 … 
δc
n …, and let complex demonstratives have the semantics in (147a), repeated below: 
(147a) For each n ∈ ℕ,  ⟦[that F]n⟧ = λc. δcn(⟦F⟧c) 
Binding can be achieved, simply, by letting lambdas operate on the δ functions. The 
following syncategorematic lexical entry will do: 
(185) For any natural number n and context c, ⟦λn. Φ⟧c = λx. ⟦Φ⟧c(x/n), where 
“c(x/n)” is the context that is just like c except that gc(x/n) assigns x to n and, for any 
complex demonstrative “[that F]n” occurring free in Φ, δc(x/n)
n assigns x to ⟦F⟧.  
Let us see how (185) deals with (90). Its (simplified) logical form should look like this 
(setting aside, for simplicity’s sake, temporal and modal dependence): 
(90a) [Every student] λ1. [a professor who thinks [that student]1 is smart] λ2. r1 has 
r2  
Here is the calculation:   
                                                          
100 Although the case of “I” is a complex one (see Kratzer 2009, Santorio 2012, Yalcin 2019 for some 
difficulties), the case of “she” can be easily handled. Heim and Kratzer (1998: 125) achieve this by 
implementing the following modification into the rule for object-language lambdas: 
If α is a branching node whose daughters are βn and γ, where β is a relative pronoun or “such”, 
and n ∈ ℕ, then for any variable assignment g, ⟦α⟧g = λa: a ∈ E and γ is in the domain of ⟦ ⟧g(x/n). 
⟦γ⟧g(x/n). 
This principle ensures that the presuppositional material from the right node γ will be passed on to the upper 
node α: if γ = “she1 is happy”, then the domain of “λ1. she1 is happy” will be restricted to females. This system 
does not yield the right results for first-person pronouns, and at some point I shall abandon it in favor of another, 
currently more widely accepted way to achieve these results: Heim’s (2008) principle of Feature Transmission 
Under Binding (or, alternatively, Arnim von Stechow’s (2003, 2004) Feature Deletion Under Binding). I shall 
discuss this principle in section 3.3.5.2. 
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1. ⟦(90a)⟧c = 1 iff  
2. Ɐx (x is a student → λy. ⟦[a professor who thinks [that student]1 is smart] λ2. r1 
has r2⟧c(y/1) (x) =1) iff 
3. Ɐx (x is a student → λy. Ǝz (⟦professor who thinks [that student]1 is smart⟧c(y/1) 
(z) = 1 & λa. ⟦r1 has r2⟧c(y/1)(a/2) (z) = 1) (x) = 1) iff 
4. Ɐx (x is a student → λy. Ǝz (⟦professor who thinks [that student]1 is smart⟧c(y/1) 
(z) = 1 & y has z) (x) = 1) iff 
5. Ɐx (x is a student → λy. Ǝz (z is a professor and z thinks δc(y/1)
1 (⟦student⟧c(y/1)) 
is smart & y has z) (x) = 1) iff 
6. Ɐx (x is a student → λy. Ǝz (z is a professor & z thinks y is smart & y has z) (x) 
= 1) iff 
7. Ɐx (x is a student → Ǝz (z is a professor & z thinks x is smart & x has z)) 
Of course, this way of meddling with the character of the demonstrative is different 
form the way we handled QI. In QI-uses we operated on the character of the demonstrative 
by modifying the property that the δ function had to combine with; here, it is δ itself that is 
being shifted. The mechanism is different, yet the results are (unsurprisingly) similar: in both 
cases we get a non-deictic reading.  
There are, of course, formal alternatives to the above syncategorematic entry. A less 
conservative option is, simply, to treat δ functions as part of the assignment. This can be 
achieved by letting each assignment function range not just from natural numbers to 
individuals but, additionally, from pairs consisting of a property and a natural number to 
individuals satisfying that property. I.e., each assignment g should be defined as a function 
ℕ ∪ ℕxΠ → E, under the condition that, for each context c and pair <n, P> in the domain of 
gc (where n ∈ ℕ and P ∈ Π), P(gc(<n, P>))(ic) = 1. Now all we have to do is to make each 
occurrence of a complex demonstrative “[that F]n” in c pick out gc(<n, ⟦F⟧>), thus: 
(147f) For each n ∈ ℕ,  ⟦[that F]n⟧ = λc. gc(<n, ⟦F⟧c>) 
And here is a non-syncategorematic version of (147f): 
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(147g) ⟦that⟧ = λc. λP. λn: n ∈ ℕ. g(<n, P>) 
The latter is, in fact, my favorite way to formulate the lexical entry for complex 
demonstratives. Now the semantics for object-language lambdas can be simplified: 
For any natural number n and context c, ⟦λn. Φ⟧c = λx. ⟦Φ⟧c(x/n), where “c(x/n)” 
is the context that is just like c except that gc(x/n) assigns x to n and, for any 
property P, gc(x/n) assigns x to <n, P>. 
I believe that placing the referents of complex demonstratives in the assignment 
function is a step in the right direction. On my view, contexts, qua formal parameter, are 
redundant: if pronouns, tenses and moods can all be modelled as variables that can be handled 
by means of an assignment function, it is unclear what theoretical work contexts are doing. 
Surely, context is supposed to represent some features of the setting in which an utterance 
takes place, but the determination of the contextual parameters pertaining to a certain speech 
situation is far from straightforward and, at any rate, not a matter of semantics proper (see 
Predelli 2005, Stalnaker 2014, Ball 2017, Rabern & Ball 2019 and Yalcin 2019 for some 
discussion on the notion of context its role within semantic theory). This means that perhaps 
semantics would better do away with the notion of context, a label has induced a great deal 
of confusion on the aims and scope of semantic theorizing (Predelli 2005), and adopt a 
context-free semantics (Santorio 2019).  
But context is, after all, just a formal parameter for generating content, and this means 
that it is still possible to retain this notion and achieve the right results. For example, another 
formal alternative is to retain the old sequences of demonstrata that Braun (1996) and Salmon 
(2002) so thoroughly criticized. We could, for each property P, build into each context c a 
sequence ScP = <dcP1 … d
cP
n …>, with the condition that each of the members of S
cP should 
satisfy P.  Then we could make “that” combine with a property Q and a natural number m 
and pick out, for each context k, the mth member of SkQ, i.e., dkQm. Then lambdas should be 
defined to operate on sequences of demonstrata. The difference with the above options is 
merely terminological.  
Before moving on to discuss further counterevidence, let me discuss a closely related 
point, one that bears on ideas already presented by Corazza (2002b). Understanding complex 
demonstratives on the model of pronouns, as I have been advocating throughout this 
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dissertation, has an interesting consequence: it allows us to simplify our lexical inventory of 
indexicals by treating the latter as a particular case of the former. For example, “he” and 
“she” could be understood as a shortened form of “[that male]” and “[that female]”, 
respectively; similarly, we can regard “now” and “here” as shortenings of “[this moment]” 
and “[this place]”. And the mechanism for binding pronouns could be, simply, the same one 
that we might want to choose in order to bind complex demonstratives. 
This would allow us to reduce our lexicon and would therefore make room for a simpler 
semantics, although it also has its drawbacks. For example, treating “she” as a shortened form 
of “that female” would straightforwardly make sentences like (186) valid, but the idea that it 
expresses an analytic truth is not uncontroversial (see footnote 67):  
(186) She is a female 
Additionally, this idea could be harder to implement for other indexicals like “I” or 
“you”, for the descriptive meaning of these seems to differ from that of “he” and “she” in 
important ways. But, on the other hand, the idea of treating indexicals in this manner enjoys 
some etymological plausibility, since, from a diachronic point of view, many indexicals 
developed from shortened forms of complex demonstratives – this is true particularly in the 
domain of temporal adverbials. Let me just mention some examples, most of which come 
from Romance philology. The word “now” in Portuguese and Spanish, “agora” and “ahora” 
respectively, derives from the Latin complex demonstrative “hac hora”, meaning “this time”. 
Similarly, the word “today” in most Romance languages (“hoy” in Spanish, “hoje” in 
Portuguese, “avui” or “hui” in Catalan, “oggi” in Italian,) is a contraction of the Latin 
complex demonstrative “hoc die”, which just means “this day”. Catalan and Occitan contain 
indexicals for referring to the current year, “enguany” and “ogan” respectively, and they 
derive from the Latin locution for “this year” (“hoc anno”). Other similar etymologies 
include the German word for “today”, “heute”, which presumably derives from Old German 
“hiu tagu” (“this day”), and one of the Japanese words for “then”, “sonotōki”, literally “that 
time”. 
Of course, this is just a suggestion yet to be explored. For the moment, I hope to have 
convinced the reader that the classical treatment of complex demonstratives in no way 
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conflicts with the fact that they display bound variable readings. On the contrary, it reveals 
that complex demonstratives are to be understood as variables, i.e., as context-dependent 
singular terms whose character is analogous to that of other indexicals.  
 
3.3.4 E-type anaphora  
The results in sections 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.3 suggest that the classical model of complex 
demonstratives has the resources for dealing with many of the counterexamples presented by 
its critics. Complex demonstratives can be understood just like any other indexical, i.e., as 
context-dependent singular terms whose only role is to pick out an object; non-deictic 
readings can, for the most part, be regarded as instances of monstrous quantification into their 
character. This idea, however, seems hard to implement for anaphoric uses of complex 
demonstratives like the one in (83), in which the term lies outside the scope of any quantifier, 
or by Bach-Peters sentences like (82a-b), in which QI is present but clearly cannot be the 
whole story: 
(82a) Every friend of yours who studied for it passed that exam she was dreading 
(82b) That friend of yours who studied for it passed some exam she was dreading 
(83) A student1 was sitting in the library. Another student2 was sitting across from 
her1. That student2 had a logic book. 
These are tough cases, but, as we shall see, they are as problematic for complex 
demonstratives as they are for any other pronoun. In a nutshell, my argument is this: they are 
instances of E-type anaphora, and they can be dealt with by means of Evans’s (1977a, 1977b) 
classical analysis or some variant of it. For the purposes of discussion, I will be using the 
terms “Millian” and “directly referential” interchangeably, neglecting the considerations in 
section 3.3.2 and the idea that these labels may not be straightforwardly applicable to my 
theory. 
Let me illustrate the phenomenon of E-type anaphora by discussing (83). King’s 
objection, recall, goes as follows: if “that student” were a directly referential term, it should 
refer to someone; let us say it is Bob. In that case, this succession of sentences would be true 
in a world in which Bob has a logic book, a student is sitting in the library and another student, 
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different from Bob, is sitting across from her. It seems, then, that a theory that treats complex 
demonstratives as directly referential terms gets the truth conditions of (83) wrong.  
This objection is tricky. A good way to see why it fails to show what it purports to is 
to focus on the first two sentences: 
(83a) A student1 was sitting in the library. Another student was sitting across from 
her1. 
Focus on the pronoun “her”, almost uncontroversially considered as a directly 
referential term. Who is the referent of “her” on this occasion? Let’s say it’s Laura. In that 
case, these two sentences are true at a world in which a student other than Laura is sitting in 
the library and another student is sitting across from Laura in, say, a coffee shop. This is 
wrong for the very same reasons as above. Yet very few would reject treating “her” as a 
directly referential term. Notice, in fact, that the very same argument could be constructed 
using only pronouns (Swanson 2005, Braun 2008c): 
(83b) A student1 was sitting in the library. Another student2 was sitting across 
from her1. He2 had a logic book. 
What went wrong here? In fact, the parallelism between all these examples just 
highlights the close semantic similarity between pronouns and complex demonstratives: both 
kinds of expressions can display what Evans (1977a, 1977b) would have called an “E-type 
anaphoric reading”. As stated above, I will appropriate Evans’s label for referring to this kind 
of problematic anaphora, but this need not be understood as an endorsement of his positive 
proposal. Essentially, E-type pronouns are pronouns anaphoric on a quantifier that for 
syntactic reasons cannot be treated as bound variables, but nevertheless display co-variation 
with their antecedent. This phenomenon is paradigmatically exemplified by so-called 
“donkey anaphora”: 
(187) Every farmer who owns [some donkeys]1 vaccinates them1 
(188) If Jean owns [a donkey]1, she vaccinates it1 
These examples were already problematic for the logicians of the Middle Ages (cf. 
Burleigh 1328/1955), and they were presented by Peter Geach (1962) as an argument against 
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Montagovian semantics. Evans originally formulated his proposal as a response to Geach. 
Examples like (83), on the other hand, are sometimes called “discourse anaphora”, and they 
are often discussed in conjunction with donkey anaphora, for both seem to be instances of 
the same general phenomenon, E-type anaphora, which can be identified by means of a very 
simple syntactic criterion. Namely, it occurs whenever there is a pronoun π such that 
1) π is anaphoric on a quantifier Q 
2) Q does not c-command π 
3) π does not c-command Q 
As for the semantics of this kind of pronouns, the matter is more controversial.101 The 
so-called “E-type analysis”, pioneered by Evans himself, treats them as referential pronouns 
whose reference is fixed by a definite description obtained from their antecedent; let me call 
this analysis “Evans approach”, in order to avoid confusion with E-type anaphora in general. 
Other authors, most notably Neale (1990a, 1990b) and Heim (1990), prefer to say that these 
pronouns go proxy for that very definite description – i.e., they are not referential. 
Accordingly, analyses of the latter kind are usually called “D-type”. Since both Evans’s 
approach and D-type analyses attribute a central role to definite descriptions in dealing with 
problematic anaphora, they are often grouped together under the label “description-theoretic 
approaches”. Other authors remain skeptical towards the idea that pronouns can sometimes 
function as definite descriptions, for such idea entails implicitly acknowledging that 
pronouns (all pronouns in all languages) are ambiguous expressions. Instead, they have 
developed alternative theories, such as Groenendijk and Stokhof’s (1991) Dynamic Predicate 
Logic (DPL) or several approaches within the framework of Discourse Representation 
Theory (DRT), like those by Kamp (1981) or Heim (1982). These proposals often go by the 
name “dynamic approaches”.  
 I am not sure which of these strategies is the right one and, in spite of my use of the 
label “E-type”, I shall remain neutral about them throughout this dissertation – E-type 
anaphora is one of the most discussed topics in contemporary semantics, and taking sides for 
one theory or the other would require examining a vast amount of evidence that falls far 
beyond the scope of the current work. All I intend to show here is that the problems raised 
                                                          
101 See Elbourne (2005: §1) for an overview of all the different proposals. 
227 
  
by E-type anaphora are not harder when it comes to complex demonstratives than they are 
for personal pronouns. Let me briefly review the way that each of the theories would deal 
with E-type complex demonstratives.  
Description-theoretic approaches assume that sentences containing E-type pronouns 
are roughly equivalent to the result of substituting the relevant pronoun for a (perhaps 
referential) definite description. Of course, not any description will do; we must restrict the 
analysis some way or another in order not to overgenerate. The usual assumption is that the 
appropriate description is to be obtained by identifying the smallest clause in which the 
quantifier antecedent is inserted and converting it into a definite description (see Neale 
1990a: 182-183 and footnote 102 below for details). Applying this analysis to the above 
examples, we obtain the following: 
(187a) Every farmer who owns some donkeys vaccinates the donkeys she owns 
(188a) If Jean owns a donkey, she vaccinates the donkey Jean owns 
As stated above, it is not clear what this equivalence amounts to. This descriptive 
content may either fix the reference or be directly incorporated into the truth-conditions of 
the sentence. Whatever the details, this treatment of pronouns accounts for the right truth-
conditions of a sentence like (83a), containing discourse anaphora. The prediction is that the 
semantic value of “she” can be arrived at by means of a description like the one in (83c): 
(83c) A student was sitting in the library. Another student was sitting across from 
the student who was sitting in the library. 
C-theories understand complex demonstratives on the model of pronouns, so they 
predict that they may also be subject to this kind of readings. If this is so, then the complex 
demonstrative “that student” in (83) is a candidate for such reading, for it has a quantifier 
antecedent that neither c-commands it nor is c-commanded by it: 
(83d) A student was sitting in the library. Another student was sitting across from 
the student who was sitting in the library. The student who was sitting across 
from the student who was sitting in the library had a logic book. 
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If E-type pronouns go proxy for their associated descriptions, as in the D-type analysis, 
then (83) is just equivalent to (83d). Evans’s approach, on the other hand, would have “that 
student” be a singular term whose reference is fixed by the description. Both analyses are 
compatible with acknowledging some sort of semantic role for the nominal “student” 
attached to the demonstrative, pretty much like they acknowledge a semantic role for the Φ-
features of “her” in (83a). Just as the female features of “her” restrict the domain of 
quantification to females, it could be argued that the role of the descriptive meaning of “that 
student” is to restrict it to students.  
Now, it could be argued that Evans’s approach, which treats the personal pronoun “her” 
and the demonstrative “that student” as referring terms, is still subject to the same problems 
as above: if the former refers to Mary and the latter to Bob, then (83d) is true at any world w 
in which a student is sitting in the library, another one is sitting across from Mary and Bob 
has a logic book, regardless of the whereabouts of Mary and Bob in w. But this objection 
presupposes that the relevant description is simply the one displayed in the superficial form 
of (83d). The description is to be retrieved from the LF, and not the superficial form, of the 
smallest clause in which the quantifier antecedent of the pronoun is inserted, and this LF may 
contain explicit references to a certain world and time, as in the system I have advocated for 
in section 3.3.1.2. For example, (83a) could receive an LF like the following, where the 
underlined sentence is the smallest well-formed clause containing the quantifier antecedent 
of the pronoun “her”:   
(83e) [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1
pres] (<w0
ind, t2> A student is sitting in the library).  
[Ǝt3 : t3 < t4
pres] (<w5
ind, t3> Another student is sitting across from her).  
This means that “her” should be interpreted as a referring term whose reference is fixed 
by something like the following description: “the x such that [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1
pres] (x is a student 
sitting in the library in <w0
ind, t2>)”. And this yields the right result: 
(83f) [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1
pres] (<w0
ind, t2> A student is sitting in the library).  
[Ǝt3 : t3 < t4
pres] (<w5
ind, t3> Another student is sitting across from [the x such 
that [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1
pres] (x is a student sitting in the library in <w0
ind, t2>)]) 
I.e., this sequence of sentences will always have to be interpreted in the same world 
and time: those picked out by the indicative mood and present tense. Of course, this very 
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same analysis can be applied to the E-type complex demonstrative in the third sentence of 
(83). If we interpret the demonstrative as a referring term whose reference is fixed by the 
description obtained from the clause in which its antecedent is inserted (underlined below), 
then we can account for the right truth-conditions of (83):   
(83g) [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1
pres] (<w0
ind, t2> A student is sitting in the library).  
[Ǝt3 : t3 < t4
pres] (<w5
ind, t3> Another student is sitting across from [the x such 
that [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1
pres] (x is a student sitting in the library in <w0
ind, t2>)]) 
[The y such that [Ǝt3 : t3 < t4
pres] (y is a student sitting across from [the x such 
that [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1
pres] (x is a student sitting in the library in <w0
ind, t2>)] in 
<w5
ind, t3>) had a logic book 
Although a bit unwieldy, this system correctly predicts that “that student” and “her” 
will have to pick out a referent in the same circumstance, namely that of the context, and that 
their value will depend on the quantifier that serves as their antecedent. Of course, this system 
can also be made compatible with the idea that the E-type pronouns have to pick out a 
different object in each circumstance of evaluation; all we need to do is to make the same 
manoeuvre by means of which we implemented the circumstance-binding solution, i.e., to 
add lambdas binding the indicative and present variables within each sentence. This would 
include the variables within the description, and it would turn the E-type pronouns 
circumstance-dependent. Discourse anaphora should therefore be no more problematic for 
complex demonstratives than it is for any other pronoun.  
It is of course also possible to devise donkey anaphoric complex demonstratives: 
(189) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats that donkey 
Applying the usual analysis to (189) should not constitute any problem: it would yield 
(189a) as a result: 
(189a) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey she owns 
This shows that donkey anaphora, just like discourse anaphora, is not more problematic 
for complex demonstratives than it is for pronouns. There is, in fact, yet another puzzle for 
which description-theoretic approaches to E-type anaphora have proven successful: Bach-
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Peters sentences (cf. Jacobson 1979, Neale 1990a, Heim & Kratzer 1998: §11). Consider the 
following classical examples: 
(190) Every boy who deserved it got the prize he wanted  
(191) The pilot who shot at it hit the MiG that chased her  
The problem with Bach-Peters sentences, recall, is that it is impossible to achieve a 
reading in which both pronouns are c-commanded (and therefore bound) by the quantifiers 
that serve as their antecedent. The usual solution is to interpret one of these pronouns as 
bound and the other one as E-type; in the above examples, the latter analysis should be 
applied to “it”. Omitting time and world variables for simplicity’s sake, here is the 
(simplified) LF we arrive at (as above, it is unclear whether the bold material should be 
interpreted as an actual definite description or as a reference-fixing description that is 
ultimately not incorporated into the truth-conditions of the sentence): 102 
(190a) [Every boy who1 r1 deserved the price he1 wanted] λ2. r2 got the price he2 
wanted 
(191a) [The pilot who1 r1 shot at the MiG that chased her1] λ2. r2 hit the MiG that 
chased her2  
The truth-conditions of these LF’s are rather transparent and need no further 
explanation. The situation is not different when complex demonstratives come into play: 
(82a) Every friend of yours who studied for it passed that exam she was dreading 
(82b) That friend of yours who studied for it passed some exam she was dreading 
In (82a), “it” is anaphoric on “that exam she was dreading”, and none of these terms c-
command each other; this means that “it” is a candidate for an E-type interpretation. Now, it 
may in principle seem a bit unhappy on my part to suggest that we can interpret “it” as E-
                                                          
102 Notice that the resolution of the E-type anaphora in (190a)-(191a) differs from the other sentences above. In 
general, it is common to assume a distinction like the following (Neale 1990a: 182-183): if a pronoun π is 
anaphoric but not c-commanded by a quantifier “DF” resulting from the concatenation of a determiner “D” and 
a predicate “F”, and the smallest clause containing “DF” is “DF is G”, then π is interpreted either as “the F 
which is G” in case “D” is a nonmaximal determiner or as “the F” in case “D” is maximal. A determiner “D” is 
maximal just in case “DF is G” entails “all F’s are G”, and nonmaximal otherwise; for example, “the”, “every”, 
“each” and “all” are maximal, whereas “some”, “most” and “a” are not. This means that determiners of the 
former kind trigger a simpler interpretation when it comes to donkey anaphora. The pronoun “it” in (190a)-
(191a) follows this simpler pattern, for its anaphoric antecedent is a quantifier introduced by “the”.  
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type, for that would require the pronoun to be anaphoric on a quantifier, and I have been 
arguing that complex demonstratives are singular terms. I believe nevertheless that an E-type 
interpretation for “it” should be licensed in this case, for, although I disagree with King and 
other authors on the idea that complex demonstratives should be semantically interpreted as 
quantifiers, I do find myself in full agreement with the (on the other hand uncontroversial) 
idea that, from a purely syntactic point of view, they are determiner phrases. And, 
importantly, the criterion for identifying an E-type pronoun and carrying out the appropriate 
analysis is syntactic, and not semantic (if you are dissatisfied with this answer, I suggest an 
alternative below). Here is the LF we obtain once E-type anaphora has been resolved:  
(82c) [Every friend of yours who1 r1 studied for the exam she1 was dreading] λ2. 
r2 passed that exam she2 was dreading. 
This LF should make it clear that the non-rigidity of this demonstrative is once again 
due to monstrous quantification into its nominal. This means that Bach-Peters sentences can 
be reduced to a combination of E-type anaphora and QI. The case of (82b) is a bit more 
complex, but it is essentially another instance of the same phenomenon. Notice first that 
“some exam she was dreading” must be raised for type reasons, which means that the 
problematic pronoun here is not “it” but rather “she”: 
(82d) [Some exam which1 she was dreading g1] λ2. That friend of yours who 
studied for it2 passed r2 
And interpreting “she” in the right manner yields the right truth-conditions: 
(82e) [Some exam which1 [the friend of yours who studied for it1] was dreading 
r1] λ2. that friend of yours who studied for it2 passed r2 
Or, in plain (although cumbersome) English, “some exam which the friend of yours 
who studied for it was dreading is such that that friend of yours who studied for it passed it”. 
So this is a case of QI too.  
Now, it is possible to object to this analysis on the basis that, if the demonstrative is 
not a quantifier, then the E-type analysis cannot be applied. This is a fair worry, but I have 
an alternative. Geach (1962) suggested that some pronouns could simply go proxy for their 
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anaphoric antecedent – for this reason, he called them “pronouns of laziness”. This works 
paradigmatically well in the case of proper names: 
(192) Some friend of yours who was looking for her managed to find Mary 
Substituting “her” for its antecedent “Mary” straightforwardly yields the right 
interpretation: 
(192a) Some friend of yours who was looking for Mary managed to find Mary 
Sentences (192) and (192a) show that pronouns anaphoric on referential expressions 
can be understood as pronouns of laziness that simply go proxy for their antecedents.103 If 
this is the case, then the pronoun “it” in (82a) can go proxy for the complex demonstrative; 
thus, what we end up with is another case of QI:  
(82f) [Every friend of yours who1 r1 studied for that exam she1 was dreading] λ2. 
r2 passed that exam she2 was dreading. 
The fact that we can quantify into this particular pronoun of laziness is unsurprising, 
since, unlike the one in (192a), it is anaphoric on a syntactically complex expression. This is 
the alternative analysis I can provide in case you are not satisfied with the idea that a pronoun 
anaphoric on a complex demonstrative can receive an E-type interpretation.  
This was just a rough and very preliminary sketch of how description-theoretic 
approaches can deal with discourse anaphoric and donkey anaphoric complex 
demonstratives. Although I provided several alternatives, I did not intend this overview as an 
exhaustive one; any account E-type anaphoric complex demonstratives should be made in 
connection with a more general account of this kind of anaphora, one that should also include 
                                                          
103 In fact, this kind of sentences are often used as evidence for the idea that definite descriptions are singular 
terms instead of quantifiers; consider the following contrast, in which (192’) apparently patterns with (192) 
instead of (192’’): 
(192’) OK Some friend of yours who was looking for him1 managed to find [the man who murdered 
Smith]1 
(192’’) ? Some friend of yours who was looking for him1 managed to find [every man who murdered 
Smith]1 
I believe, with Neale (1990a: 211-213), that this contrast shows nothing. Consider the following sentence, 
containing an uncontroversial quantifier: 
 (192’’’) OK Some friend of yours who was looking for him1 managed to find [a man who murdered 
Smith]1 
This simple example shows that the acceptability of (192’) has nothing to do with the alleged non-
quantificational status of the definite description.  
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pronouns in general. All I wish to show is that treating complex demonstratives as another 
type of pronoun can accommodate all the counterevidence presented by King and other 
authors. And this treatment, of course, includes both the possibility of operating on the 
character of the pronouns and that of giving them an E-type interpretation.  
Dynamic accounts of E-type anaphora, such as those developed in the context of DPL 
or DRT, avoid resorting to descriptions, for that would imply treating pronouns as ambiguous 
expressions – a very systematic ambiguity, but ambiguity after all. They nevertheless would 
count (83) as true in roughly the same situations as (83d). One account I am particularly 
attracted to is DPL, which models all pronouns as variables but allows quantifiers to bind 
items outside their syntactic scope. If we treat complex demonstratives as variables, as 
suggested in section 3.3.3, then DPL can account for E-type anaphoric complex 
demonstratives. Consider the discourse anaphora in the following sentence:104 
(193) A woman was walking in the park. She whistled.  
The meaning of (193) can be captured by the following first-order logic formula: 
(194) Ǝx (Wx & Px & Hx),  
where “W”, “P” and “H” stand, respectively, for “being a woman”, “walking in the 
park” and “whistling”. The problem with (194) is that it clearly does not capture the syntax 
of its natural-language counterpart. The syntactic makeup of (193) resembles more that of 
the following formula, in which the third occurrence of x lies beyond the scope of the 
quantifier: 
(194a) Ǝx (Wx & Px) & Hx 
But fixing the syntax in this manner leaves us with the opposite problem, for, of course, 
(194a) does not capture the meaning of (193). DPL is devised to solve this mismatch; as we 
shall see, it allows the third occurrence of x in (194a) to be bound. This is achieved thanks to 
two semantic innovations from DPL: it conceives the meaning of formulae as pairs of 
assignments and it attributes a very peculiar to role logical connectives, namely that of, very 
                                                          
104 A nice summary of the main tenets of DPL can be found in Elbourne (2005: 13-19). 
234 
 
roughly, passing to the formula on the right the set of assignments determined by the one on 
the left. Let us see this in more detail. 
DPL shares the syntax of first-order logic, but conceives the meaning of formulae as 
pairs of assignments, where assignments can be thought of as if they were contexts of 
utterance. The idea behind this semantics is a Stalnakerian one: the meaning of a sentence is 
to be modelled as the effects it induces on the context. More formally, the meaning of a 
formula Φ is modelled in DPL as the set of pairs <g, h> such that an occurrence of Φ in g 
would leave an assignment h as a possible representation of how things are. For example, the 
meaning of an atomic formula can be modelled as follows: 
(195) ⟦Rt1 … tn⟧ = {<g, h> | g = h & <⟦t1⟧h, … ⟦tn⟧h> ∈ I(R)}, 
where I(R) is the interpretation of the predicate “R”. Intuitively speaking, an atomic 
formula leaves the assignment untouched, but it eliminates those assignments that fail to 
satisfy the formula. The meaning of “Fx”, for example, will consist of every pair of 
assignments <g, h> such that g = h and g(x) has the property denoted by “F”; in other words, 
it eliminates any assignment k such that k(x) does not satisfy the relevant property. So far 
nothing too new. The dynamic effects are achieved thanks to the behavior of quantifiers and, 
more importantly, logical connectives: 
(196) ⟦Ǝx Φ⟧ = {<g, h> | Ǝk (k differs from g in at most the value that it assigns to 
x & <k, h> ∈ ⟦Φ⟧)}  
(197) ⟦Φ & Ψ⟧ = {<g, h> | Ǝk (<g, k> ∈ ⟦Φ⟧ & <k, h> ∈ ⟦Φ⟧)} 
Informally, the idea is that an existentially quantified formula takes as input an 
assignment g and returns the assignments h such that 1) h differs from g except for the object 
they assign to the bound variable, and 2) h satisfies the embedded formula. On the other hand, 
the role of a conjunction linking any two formulae Φ and Ψ is to take the set of assignments 
that Φ leaves as output and to pass them on so that they can serve, in turn, as inputs for Ψ. 
This has the effect that, when co-joining a quantified formula with an open one, any quantifier 
in the former will be able to bind free variables within the latter. It is easy to check that, with 
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the semantics just provided, (194) and (194a) are equivalent105 (see Groenendijk & Stokhof 
1991: 47-48 for a fuller explanation). Switching back to natural language, DPL predicts that 
the following sentences are synonyms: 
(193) A woman was walking in the park. She whistled 
(193a) A woman was walking in the park and whistling 
This analysis is devised mostly for personal pronouns, but it is not hard to extend it to 
complex demonstratives, whose behavior I have been analogizing to pronouns in general. As 
I pointed out in the previous section, my account is compatible, and very naturally fitting, 
with treating (193) and (193b) as synonymous: 
(193) A woman was walking in the park. She whistled 
(193b) A woman was walking in the park. That woman whistled 
If “that woman” can be understood as a variable, as I suggested in the previous section, 
there should be no obstacle to analyze (193b) as synonymous with (193) and (193a). In turn, 
DPL could acknowledge some role to the Φ-features of “she”, and the very same role could 
                                                          
105 I did not want to disturb the reader with the details of the calculation, but, just in case you want to check it, 
here it is. Let us first calculate the semantic value of (194a) (essentially the same calculation as the one in 
Elbourne 2005: 14-15): 
1. ⟦Ǝx (Wx & Px) & Hx⟧ = {<g, h> | Ǝk (<g, k> ∈ ⟦Ǝx (Wx & Px)⟧ & <k, h> ∈ ⟦Hx⟧)} (by (197)) 
2. = {<g, h> | Ǝk (<g, k> ∈ {<g’, k’> | Ǝk’’ (k’’ differs from g’ in at most the value it assigns to x & 
<k’’, k’> ∈ ⟦Wx & Px⟧)} & <k, h> ∈ ⟦Hx⟧)} (by (196)) 
3. = {<g, h> | Ǝk Ǝk’ (k’ differs from g in at most the value it assigns to x & <k’, k> ∈ ⟦Wx & Px⟧ & 
<k, h> ∈ ⟦Hx⟧)} (by reduction) 
4. = {<g, h> | Ǝk Ǝk’ (k’ differs from g in at most the value it assigns to x & Ǝj (<k’, j> ∈ ⟦Wx⟧ & <j, 
k> ∈ ⟦Px⟧ & <k, h> ∈ ⟦Hx⟧))} (by (197) and reduction) 
5. = {<g, h> | Ǝk Ǝk’ (k’ differs from g in at most the value it assigns to x & Ǝj (k’ = j & j(x) ∈ I(W) & 
j = k & k(x) ∈ I(P) & k = h & h(x) ∈ I(H)))} (by (195)) 
6. = {<g, h> | h differs from g in at most the value it assigns to x & h(x) ∈ I(W) & h(x) ∈ I(P) & h(x) ∈ 
I(H)} (by reduction and the definition of “=”) 
 It is easy to check that we arrive at the same results with (194):  
1. ⟦Ǝx (Wx & Px & Hx)⟧ = {<g, h> | Ǝk (k differs from g in at most the value that it assigns to x & <k, 
h> ∈ ⟦Wx & Px & Hx⟧)} (by (196)) 
2. = {<g, h> | Ǝk (k differs from g in at most the value that it assigns to x & <k, h> ∈ {<k’, h’>| Ǝk’’ 
Ǝk’’’ (<k’, k’’> ∈ ⟦Wx⟧ & <k’’, k’’’> ∈ ⟦Px⟧  & <k’’’, h’> ∈ ⟦Hx⟧)})} (by (197)) 
3. = {<g, h> | Ǝk (k differs from g in at most the value that it assigns to x & Ǝk’ Ǝk’’ (<k, k’> ∈ ⟦Wx⟧ 
& <k’, k’’> ∈ ⟦Px⟧ & <k’’, h> ∈ ⟦Hx⟧))} (by reduction) 
4. = {<g, h> | Ǝk (k differs from g in at most the value that it assigns to x & Ǝk’ Ǝk’’ (k = k’ & k’(x) ∈  
I(W) & k’ = k’’& k’’(x) ∈ I(P) & k’’ = h & h(x) ∈ I(H)))} (by (195) and reduction) 
5. = {<g, h> | h differs from g in at most the value it assigns to x & h(x) ∈ I(W) & h(x) ∈ I(P) & h(x) ∈ 
I(H)} (by reduction and the definition of “=”) 
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be attributed to the nominal of a demonstrative. Notice, in fact, that it is not necessary to buy 
the whole pack of DPL in order to carry out this sort of analysis: the whole framework that I 
have been employing throughout this dissertation (a combination of Kaplan’s (1977) and 
Heim and Kratzer’s (1998)) could be made dynamic in exactly the same way simply by 
adapting the lexical entries for lambdas, quantifiers and connectives in an appropriate manner 
and by treating every indexical as assignment-dependent rather than context-dependent. The 
use of first-order logic is inessential to a DPL-style approach. There is, of course, something 
profoundly anti-Kaplanian in this idea: the connectives employed by DPL operate on 
assignments, and therefore on the character of expressions; they would therefore count as 
monsters if incorporated into the current framework. But this shouldn’t be a big deal once all 
the facts about monsters that I discussed in the three previous sections have been 
acknowledged. 
I hope to have been able to convince the reader that the existence of E-type anaphora 
poses no threat to the classical analysis of complex demonstratives – at least no greater that 
the challenge it poses for the traditional treatment of pronouns in general. The phenomena 
discussed in this section are in fact perfectly compatible with Millianism in Georgi’s sense 
and perhaps with direct reference (see the discussion in 3.3.2.2), for none of them prevent us 
from modelling the problematic demonstratives as referential terms or, alternatively, as 
variables – unless, of course, the right analysis turned out to be the D-type approach, which 
models them as definite descriptions in disguise.  
Before moving on to the refutation of the next piece of counterevidence against c-
theories, let me briefly discuss some data that suggest that the best way to conceive complex 
demonstratives is as variables. As Borg (2000: 248, footnote 14) pointed out, donkey 
readings are often unavailable for bare demonstratives but perfectly acceptable for complex 
ones: 
(198a) OKI bought [a donkey]1 and had [that donkey]1 vaccinated. 
(198b) #I bought [a donkey]1 and had [that]1 vaccinated 
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This is interesting, for the very same pattern is found in bound variable readings. 
Namely, bare demonstratives, unlike the complex ones, often resist binding106 (Nowak 
2019b; the numbering of these examples is slightly altered): 
(143a) OK[Every IKEA kit]1 comes with instructions for assembling [that kit]1. 
(143b) #[Every IKEA kit]1 comes with instructions for assembling that1. 
These two contrasts highlight the great similarity of complex demonstratives and 
pronouns, for the latter also display both E-type anaphoric and bound readings: 
(143c) OK[Every IKEA kit]1 comes with instructions for assembling it1. 
(198c) OKI bought [a donkey]1 and had it1 vaccinated 
In short, here is my argument: the facts in (143a-c) suggest that complex 
demonstratives and pronouns, but not bare demonstratives, display the behavior typical of 
variables. If we examine the facts in (198a-c) under the light of those in (143a-c), a hypothesis 
suggests itself: perhaps E-type anaphora can only occur when variables are involved. If this 
were so, we would have a straightforward explanation for the infelicity of (198b): E-type 
anaphora can be considered as a special case of binding, as in the DPL approach, and the fact 
that bare “that” cannot be bound is, simply, because it is not a variable. Alternatively, we 
could argue that bare “that” is also a variable that for some reason resists binding (see the 
discussion in 3.1.2), and still maintain E-type anaphoric pronouns are nothing but bound 
pronouns. This is all still very speculative, but, if it turned out to be right, it would yield 
support to the DPL approach. The Evans-style approach, on the other hand, is also compatible 
with these ideas: being a referring term whose reference is fixed by description is not 
incompatible with being a variable.  
The data analyzed up until now suggests that all the counterevidence can be reduced to 
either a case of monstrous quantification into the character of the pronoun (either by means 
of QI or through a bound variable reading) or an instance of E-type anaphora; in fact, notice 
                                                          
106 For some reason, it is much easier to get an anaphoric reading when the bare demonstrative is plural 
(Maclaran 1982, Roberts 2002): 
 (w) The Russians had allowed [few pieces from their collection]1 to go on show, but these1 were the 
highpoint of the exhibition 
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that, if we treat E-type anaphora as proponents of DPL suggest, then it turns out that all types 
of counterevidence are due to the presence of monsters. None of these two categories of non-
deictic readings pose a greater threat to c-theories of complex demonstratives than they do to 
the traditional analysis of pronouns. There is, however, another type of counterevidence yet 
to be discussed: NDNS-readings. In the next section I set out to show that these also be seen 
as special cases of one the two unproblematic categories of counterevidence.  
 
3.3.5 Two possible ways to account for NDNS 
NDNS-readings of complex demonstratives occur when the speaker does not have any 
particular object in mind nor performs any sort of ostensive gesture that could guide us in 
finding the intended referent. At first sight, these data do not seem as conclusive as QI-uses 
or anaphoric readings, for two reasons: on the one hand, they rely on epistemological 
intuitions that not everybody needs to share and, on the other, many of these cases fail to 
distinguish whether the intuitions are generated by the semantics of the term or by some kind 
of pragmatic phenomena – King (2001) does provide some arguments against pragmatic 
accounts of NDNS, but I shall argue below that they are ultimately defective. Let us 
nevertheless assume, for the argument’s sake, that our intuitions towards these examples are 
stable and, in fact, a reliable source of evidence for their semantics;107 even if it were so, it 
still does not follow that they cannot be accounted for by traditional approaches.  
C-theories, I have been arguing, are compatible with the idea that complex 
demonstratives display non-deictic uses, as long as these are due to the presence of monsters 
or E-type anaphora. And it is plausible to assume that many NDNS-uses can be reduced to 
particular instances of these two phenomena. By the end of section 3.3.1.3 we saw that (89) 
can be seen as an instance of QI; similarly, there should be no obstacle in analyzing (86) as 
a case of discourse anaphora:   
(86) Although it’s clear that we need [someone]1 to dig us out of the hole we are in, 
I doubt Dany is [that hero]1 
                                                          
107 Arguably they are not. See the arguments by Hermann Cappelen (2012). 
239 
  
“That hero” is not c-commanded by its anaphoric antecedent “someone”, and therefore 
it is a candidate for being subject to some of the analyses we reviewed in the former section. 
For example, this sentence could be understood as (86a) below, perhaps restricting the range 
of x to just heroes: 
(86a) Although it’s clear that we need [someone]1 to dig us out of the hole we are 
in, I doubt Dany is [the x such that x digs us out of the whole we are in]1 
Notice, in fact, that the circumstance-binding solution has the required resources for 
counting (84)-(85), repeated below, as cases of QI: 
(84) That student who scored one hundred on the exam is a genius 
(85) That hominid who discovered how to start fire is a genius 
On this account, a sentence like (84) should be given the following LF and truth-
conditions (for simplicity’s sake, let me treat “scoring one hundred on the exam” as if it were 
a syntactic unit, just as I have been doing throughout the whole dissertation): 
(84g) λ<w0, t1>. <w0, t1> That student who3 [Ǝt2 : t2 < t1] (<w0, t2> R3 scores one 
hundred on the exam) is a genius 
(84h) λc. λi. δc(λx. λj. there is a time t occurring before ti such that x is a student in 
<wi, t> and x scores one hundred on the exam in <wi, t>) is a genius in i) 
Here, of course, the circumstance argument j taken by the δ function is vacuous, and 
therefore the demonstrative is not sensitive to the circumstance of the context. As (84h) 
makes clear, the whole sentence will be true in a world w if a certain individual is a genius 
in w , where of course that individual is required to be a student in w and to score one hundred 
on the exam in the very same world. Analogous facts hold for (85). In other words, these two 
sentences are as circumstance-dependent as they would have been had we used “the” instead 
of “that”.108 King’s intuitions towards NDNS-uses should therefore pose no threat to the 
circumstance-binding solution, for most of them come out as another case of QI.  
                                                          
108 Notice, in fact, one fundamental difference between my account and King’s. Imagine a world w’ in which 
two students, Mary and Bob, scored one hundred on the exam, and both of them are geniuses there. King K3 
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The extensional solution is not able to handle NDNS in semantic terms, but it is 
nevertheless far from resourceless, for the possibility of resorting to pragmatics in order to 
explain why the demonstratives in these examples strike us as non-rigid is always open (cf. 
Braun 2008). As mentioned above, intuitions are not entirely reliable and it is perfectly 
possible to claim that, even though (84)-(85) have the truth-conditions of a singular 
proposition, they can nevertheless be employed for implicitly communicating general 
propositions. Pragmatic accounts are rejected by King on the basis of the way NDNS-
sentences embed under the scope of attitude verbs and other modal operators, but, as we shall 
see in the next section, his arguments ultimately fail. Thus, pragmatics is the first possible 
way to account for NDNS, as I argue in section 3.3.5.1. And, in fact, I have yet a second 
possible solution to the problem of NDNS, just in case one rests dissatisfied with an appeal 
to pragmatics: in spite of what it might prima facie seem, the extensional solution is able to 
predict the right embedding of NDNS-uses under modals. Finally, I devote another section 
to presenting some preliminary crosslinguistic evidence in favor of analyzing NDNS-uses in 
these terms.  
 
3.3.5.1 Pragmatics and Frege cases  
The very name “no demonstration, no speaker reference” for which “NDNS” stands suggests 
that the solution is to be sought in the pragmatics. Bearing in mind Kripke’s (1977) 
distinction between semantic reference and speaker reference, it is perfectly plausible to 
                                                          
predicts that (84) is false in w’, for it expresses (84f), repeated below (I am omitting time-dependence for 
simplicity’s sake):  
(84f) λw. Ǝx (x is a student who scored one hundred in w & x is a student who scored one hundred 
in w & Ɐy (y is a student who scored one hundred in w & y is a student who scored one hundred in 
w) → x=y) & x is a genius in w) 
The truth of (84f) requires there to be a unique student who scored one hundred, and this excludes the possibility 
that it be true in w’. My account, on the other hand, predicts that it is. Given any context c, δc(λx. λw. x is a 
student in w’ and x scored one hundred on the exam in w’) can only take either Mary or Bob as values and, 
since both of them are geniuses in w’, the whole sentence will be true there. Now consider a world w’’ in which 
both Bob and Mary scored one hundred but only Mary is a genius. King predicts, again, that (84f) is false in 
w’’, for the same reasons as above. My account, on the other hand, predicts that the truth-value of (84) is 
context-dependent: it will be true in a context c if δc(λx. λw. x is a student in w’’ and x scored one hundred on 
the exam in w’’) picks out Mary and false if it picks out Bob. I take this to be a reflection of the idea that the 
truth of this sentence depends on several contextually-determined facts: our degree of accuracy, our will to take 
certain individuals and not others into account, etc.  
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assume that NDNS cases may arise in spite of the fact that complex demonstratives are 
referring expressions – a similar argument might be found in Corazza (2003: 267-272). This 
can be brought to light by constructing scenarios similar to the ones King presents, but using 
different singular terms. Consider the exchange in (199): 
(199) Teacher: “You performed very poorly on this exam, Greg. It was not so 
difficult: there is a student who scored one hundred on it.” 
Greg: “She must be a genius.” 
Arguably, Greg did not demonstrate or intend to refer to any particular individual when 
he employed the pronoun highlighted in bold. The latter is a singular term, and any sentence 
containing it expresses a singular proposition, yet Greg seems to be conveying something on 
purely general grounds. Of course, he could have uttered “that student is a genius” instead. 
We would not take this scenario as evidence that “she” is not a singular term, and it is 
therefore dubious that our intuitions regarding this kind of examples can be conclusive about 
the alleged non-referential status of complex demonstratives or any other expression. Now, 
it is possible to argue that this example is tricky: the pronoun, as used by Greg, seems to 
involve discourse anaphora. Namely, it is anaphoric on the quantifier “a student who scored 
one hundred” and can therefore be given an E-type analysis, which would account for the 
non-rigidity of the term. But King’s original example seems to involve no E-type anaphora. 
He presents it thus: 
SITUATION A: Two days after a very complicated exam, Greg overhears 
his teacher telling to a fellow workmate that a student scored one hundred 
on it. Later on (perhaps several days later), Greg, who still has no clue who 
that student might be, is reflecting in solitude about the difficulty of the 
exam. He thinks (84) to himself. 
Excluding the possibility of very long-distance discourse anaphora,109 it seems that the 
complex demonstrative in this example cannot be interpreted as E-type, yet Greg manages to 
                                                          
109 It is possible to argue that even examples like (84) and (85) do involve some sort of anaphoric dependence. 
This is, in fact, the way Elbourne (2008) deals with these examples: on his view, these are cases in which the 
speaker does demonstrate something, namely the very utterance announcing the existence of a student who 
scored one hundred. He goes on to develop a theory of indexicality pretty much like the one developed by 
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convey to himself a non-singular thought. Notice, in fact, that substituting (84) in this 
situation for another sentence containing a pronoun (say, “she must be a genius”) would 
completely alter the example, for nothing would ensure that Greg manages to convey what 
he intends to. In SITUATION A, Greg performs no ostensive gesture, does not intend to 
speak about anybody in particular and has no anaphoric antecedent at hand, and yet manages 
to convey to himself a general thought by means of a complex demonstrative. This is not the 
case of the conversation in (199), where anaphora does seem to occur. 
It is nevertheless possible to construct scenarios in which speakers manage to convey 
general thoughts by uttering sentences containing non-anaphoric singular terms 
unaccompanied by any gesture nor referential intention. Suppose that Greg is looking at a 
sheet displaying the percentages of scores of the students – how many of them scored 
between 10 and 20, how many of them scored between 80 and 90, etc. No names are 
displayed.110 From that document, Greg may infer that there is exactly one student who 
scored one hundred, and he may express his admiration by uttering (200): 
(200) She must be genius 
In this scenario Greg does not have any particular individual in mind, and, unless we 
employ very loose notions of demonstration or anaphora, it seems clear that neither of these 
occurs. Yet he is able to use a singular term for conveying a purely general thought. This 
                                                          
Nunberg (1993), devised for dealing with deferred reference (Quine 1969: 194; see also Borg 2002). On these 
theories, the referent of an indexical need not coincide with the demonstratum (“index” in their terminology); 
rather, the role of the demonstratum is to help settle what the actual referent is by means of a contextually 
determined relation – I am using the term “referent” loosely here, for strictly speaking demonstratives never 
refer to an object in Elbourne’s system. Thus, (84) can be analyzed as a case of deferred ostension in which the 
demonstrated object is the original utterance itself and the ultimate value is settled by selecting an individual 
suitably related to that utterance. Demonstrating the utterance, in turn, can be regarded as a kind of anaphora.  
I basically accept Elbourne’s idea that NDNS-uses may be analyzable in a manner analogous to cases of 
deferred reference. Other analyses along these lines may be found in Georgi (2012) and Corazza (2003), the 
latter without resorting to Nunberg-style machinery. Reasons of space prevent me from discussing these 
theories at length, but I am in general lines sympathetic to their main tenets.  
Elbourne argues that, in fact, there is an important source of evidence in favor of this kind of analyses: distal 
features. For example, a sentence like (84*) sounds acceptable in case the utterer heard the relevant sentence 
just a few seconds ago: 
(84*) This student who scored one hundred on the exam is a genius 
This fits nicely with Elbourne’s idea that the speaker’s intended demonstratum is an utterance. When the 
relevant utterance has just happened, it is perfectly felicitous to employ (84*), whereas in a scenario like the 
one in SITUATION A, in which the utterance happened long ago, only (84) is acceptable. 
110 I am grateful to Jordi Valor for suggesting this formulation of the scenario. The original example involved 
elements that could be taken to be equivalent to proper names for each student.  
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kind of examples would not lead us to see pronouns as non-referring expressions, and 
SITUATION A should not lead us to conclude that complex demonstratives are not to be 
understood on the traditional model. 
King, however, does not treat SITUATION A as conclusive. On his view, the most 
decisive case against direct reference is the evidence from attitude reports. Consider the 
following contrast: 
(84a) Greg believes that that student who scored one hundred on the exam is a genius 
(84b) Greg believes that Mary is a genius 
In principle, the directly referential theorist predicts that, if Mary is the student who got 
the maximum score, these two sentences should express the very same proposition (see the 
next section, though). This idea may enjoy some initial plausibility, for, if I know about 
Mary’s performance, I may employ (84b) for reporting Greg’s belief, even if he knows 
nothing about her. However, so the argument goes, our intuitions regarding these two 
sentences are not quite the same, for (84b), unlike (84a), is not uncontroversially true: 
whether it counts as true or false depends on our interests, the degree of accuracy required 
by the context, etc. Consider the following scenario: 
SITUATION B: Mary is in fact the student who scored one hundred on the 
exam, and Bob knows it. He also knows that Greg does not hold Mary in 
high regard. When Bob is in his way back home, he accidentally overhears 
Greg’s utterance of (84) when he was talking to himself in SITUATION 
A. Later on, Jean and Bob are talking about how good Mary is at doing 
everything, and he utters (84b). 
It is not clear whether Bob’s utterance should count as true or false, for it will depend 
on a plethora of factors. But things are different with (84a), for this sentence is always true 
in the situation described, regardless of our interests or degree of accuracy. On King’s view, 
this is a fact that is straightforwardly explained if the proposition contributed by the 
embedded sentence is general, instead of singular. 
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As above, the problem with King’s argument is that it is always possible to reproduce 
this kind of scenarios employing only singular terms. Consider the following situation: 
SITUATION C: Mary’s life has just been saved by Spider-Man. She is 
back home reflecting on her own about Spider-Man’s deeds, and she 
exclaims to herself “Spider-Man is the best superhero!”. Unbeknownst to 
her, Gwen, who knows that Spider-Man is in fact Peter Parker, overhears 
Mary’s utterance.  
Gwen may choose to report Mary’s belief by means of one of these two utterances: 
(201a) Mary believes that Spider-Man is the best superhero 
(201b) Mary believes that Peter Parker is the best superhero 
Just as in SITUATION B, (201a) is an uncontroversially correct way to report Mary’s 
beliefs, whereas (201b), although perfectly appropriate in some situations, may also be 
misleading in others. Consider now a slight variation of this scenario in which Mary did not 
utter “Spider-Man is the best superhero” but, rather, “that superhero is the best superhero” 
while pointing at a photograph of Spider-Man. Even though she has employed a complex 
demonstrative, Gwen’s utterance of (201a) is still uncontroversially accurate. These 
examples suggest that SITUATION A, just like SITUATION B, is nothing but a variant of 
the classic Frege problem concerning the interchangeability of “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” 
(Frege 1892/1981b).  
It is nevertheless still possible to doubt that situations B and C are entirely analogous. 
After all, there is an important difference between Greg and Mary: the latter may not know 
that Spider-Man is Peter Parker, but she nevertheless has singular thoughts about Spider-
Man. Nothing in Greg’s example should lead us to suppose that he has singular thoughts 
about anybody; if Greg has not introduced any singular term in his language of thought, then 
it is no surprise that (84a), but not (84b), is uncontroversially true in SITUATION A. And 
the explanation we can provide of its truth is different from the one we can offer for the 
appropriateness of (201a) in SITUATION B.  
The problem with this kind of scenarios is, of course, that it is always possible to come 
up with another example in which we reproduce the very same intuitions. Let us come back 
245 
  
to the scenario in which Greg learns that exactly one student scored one hundred by looking 
at an anonymized sheet in which the percentages of the scores are displayed. Suppose that 
Gwen overhears Greg uttering (200). Later, while she and Fred are taking a look at the very 
same sheet, the following exchange takes place: 
(199a) Fred (pointing at the percentage of students who scored one hundred): “Have 
you seen this?” 
Gwen: “Yes. Greg thinks that she is a genius.” 
Just as in SITUATION A, we have no reason to think that any of the characters in this 
story have any singular thoughts whatsoever about any particular individual. Yet Gwen may 
perfectly employ a singular term, “she”, for reporting Greg’s attitudes. The situation is 
entirely analogous to King’s example, and it does not show that “she” should be treated any 
differently than most theories do. Notice, in fact, that the very same intuitions can be 
reproduced even for proper names. I personally have intuitions of non-rigidity regarding 
sentences with descriptive names (Evans 1979): 
(202) Inspector Lestrade wants to arrest Jack the Ripper 
Arguably, inspector Lestrade’s wish is not about any individual in particular; this 
particular report is compatible even with Lestrade being the only person in London who 
thinks that the infamous murders were the work of more than one person – thus excluding 
the possibility that he may have singular thoughts about the criminal. Yet we may use an 
uncontroversial rigid designator, a proper name, for reporting such attitude. If Lestrade’s case 
does not show that proper names are not rigid designators, Greg’s scenarios should not show 
anything about complex demonstratives either.  As I see it, this should teach us to view with 
suspicion the idea that our intuitions in this kind of scenarios should constitute evidence about 
the semantics of our terms. Taking these examples too seriously would ultimately lead us to 
revise well-established semantic paradigms on the basis of non-conclusive intuitions. Rather, 
what they show is that our intuitions fail to tell semantic facts apart from appropriateness at 
a pragmatic level. 
I have nevertheless yet another answer against King’s challenges. Even if his claims 
about indirect speech were right, the theory defended here is compatible with the idea that 
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the complex demonstratives in his examples are transparent to attitude verbs. This is, in fact, 
something very natural on any theory employing explicit quantification over worlds and 
times. I explain why in the next section. 
 
3.3.5.2 Fregeanism regained: von Stechow’s theory of verbal quantifiers 
Consider the following LF, to be revised, for (84a): 
(84c) <w0
ind, t1
pres> Greg believes <w2
ind, t3
pres> that student who4 [Ǝt6: t6 < t5
pres] 
(<w7
ind, t6 > R4 score one hundred on the exam) is a genius  
The verb “believe” is an intensional operator, meaning that it should combine with the 
intension of a sentence. The problem with the current system is that it is extensional and, 
unless some further adjustments are made, the embedded sentence in (84c) does not denote 
an intension, but rather a truth-value: given a context c, it denotes truth if δc(λx. λj. there is a 
time t occurring before tc such that x is a student in <wc, t> and x scored one hundred on the 
exam in <wc, t>) is a genius in ic, and falsity otherwise. The verb “believe” does not combine 
with truth values, but with intensions, and this means that (84c) is still uninterpretable. The 
natural way to achieve the right results in this kind of systems is to model attitude verbs as 
contributing an object-language lambda abstractor that binds the world and time variables of 
the sentences under their scope: “believe”, for example should be translated into LF “believe 
λ<wn, tm>”, where n and m are natural numbers (cf. von Stechow 2003, 2004). This lambda 
may bind the circumstance variables under its scope, and this means that, when it combines 
with the sentence it operates on, the whole construct denotes an intension. This intension can 
already combine with the verb “believe”. That is why attitude verbs are often referred to as 
“verbal quantifiers” in the framework of these theories. Here is the revised LF: 
(84d) <w0
ind, t1
pres> Greg believes λ<w2, t3>. <w2
ind, t3
pres> that student who4 [Ǝt6: t6 
< t5
pres] (<w7
ind, t6 > R4 score one hundred on the exam) is a genius 
Notice, however, that this cannot yet be the whole story. As long as the variables w2 
and t3 are marked with the indicative and present features, we are still stuck: the combination 
of the lambda and the sentence will yield an intension, but this intension is still constant 
across circumstances, for this sentence is equivalent to saying “Greg believes that that student 
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who actually now scored one hundred on the exam is actually now a genius”. We therefore 
need a way to make the world and time variables in the embedded clause range over the 
whole set of circumstances without thereby abandoning the idea that verbs in indicative and 
present contribute variables suitably related to the actual circumstance. The standard way to 
achieve this is by means of an important principle first postulated by Heim (2008) under the 
name “Feature Transmission Under Binding” (“FTUB” from now on) and later renamed 
“Feature Deletion Under Binding” by von Stechow (2003, 2004). Let us see what this 
principle consists in.  
Essentially, this principle states that, regardless of their morphological shape, bound 
variables are always semantically unrestricted, i.e., they never have Φ-features at LF. This 
means that, semantically, a bound “she” is not different from a bound “he”. Their different 
phonetic realization is the result of feature transmission:  at the level of phonetic form (PF), 
bound pronouns inherit the Φ-features of their associated quantifiers. Recall the examples 
(181)-(183), and consider the closely related sentence (203): 
(181) Only I did my homework 
(182) Few men brought their children 
(183) We brought our children 
(203) The boys each think that they are alone in the room  
As stated above, (181) displays both strict and sloppy readings: it may mean either that 
ac is the only x that did ac homework or that ac is the only x that did x’s homework. On the 
latter reading, “my” is not first-personal at all: it does not pick out the agent of any context – 
it is not even a referring expression –, and this means that it should not be restricted to ranging 
over agents. The pronoun “their”, as it occurs in (182), is morphologically plural, but it is 
nevertheless supposed to range over each of the men individually, instead of as a collectivity. 
(183) has two readings: on one of them, each of us individually brings her own children; on 
the other, we bring children we have in common. The former of these readings seems to be 
in conflict with the fact that “their” is plural. The very same phenomenon can be observed in 
(203), where “they” is supposed to be a bound variable ranging over each of the boys 
individually in spite of being plural from a morphological point of view. In all these cases 
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there is an important mismatch between the superficial form of a pronoun and its semantic 
interpretation, for they function as bare bound variables ranging over all individuals, 
regardless of the Φ-features of the pronoun (i.e. they are not restricted to ranging over 
pluralities nor the agents of some context).  
FTUB is devised to solve this mismatch. Basically, it states that, at the level of PF, 
bound variables inherit the Φ-features of their associated quantifiers, but these features are 
nowhere to be found at LF. So, for example, a variable bound by a lambda introduced by a 
plural phrase like “few men” will always be phonologically realized as a plural pronoun, like 
“they” or “their”. This means that the features of bound pronouns will always display gender, 
person, number and so on at the phonological level, but these features will never receive any 
semantic interpretation. The reason why this principle is interesting for dealing with our 
problem with (84d) is that, in a system like the current one, in which verbal morphology is 
treated as something entirely analogous to pronouns, FTUB can be applied to the variables 
contributed by verbs: if a variable is bound by a verb in present, then it will be phonologically 
realized as a present morpheme in spite of being semantically interpreted as an unrestricted 
bound variable. This is the way von Stechow (2003, 2004) deals with problems analogous to 
(84d). Consider the following (and, finally, correct) LF: 
(84f) <w0
ind, t1
pres> Greg believes λ<w2, t3>. <w2, t3> that student who4 [Ǝt6: t6 < 
t5
pres] (<w7
ind, t6 > R4 score one hundred on the exam) is a genius 
Here, the variables w2 and t3, contributed by the verb “to be”, are bound by a lambda 
contributed by “believes”, and they display no features (i.e., they are unrestricted). Since the 
latter verb is in the present tense and indicative mood, FTUB ensures that any variable it 
binds will be superficially realized as a present and indicative morpheme, regardless of its 
semantic interpretation. It is for this reason that the verb “to be” surfaces as “is”, its indicative 
and present form, in spite of not making any explicit reference to the actual world nor the 
present time at the semantic level. (84f) is true in a context c iff, for all circumstances i 
compatible with what Greg believes in ic, the referent of the complex demonstrative is a 
genius in i: 
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(84g) λc: in all circumstances i compatible with what Greg believes in ic, δc (λx. λj. 
there is a time t occurring before tc such that x is a student in <wc, t> and x scored 
one hundred on the exam in <wc, t>) is a genius in i 
We have therefore solved the problem with (84f): now the variables are not restricted 
to the actual world and present time in spite of their morphological shape. On the truth-
conditions displayed in (84g), Greg believes an intension, and more concretely a singular 
proposition about one particular individual selected by the context, namely δc (λx. λj. there is 
a time t occurring before tc such that x is a student in <wc, t> and x scored one hundred on 
the exam in <wc, t>). More concretely, his belief consists of the set of circumstances in which 
this particular individual is a genius.  
Notice, however, that this is not the only possible LF predicted in the current system. 
The complex demonstrative in (84a) contains a relative clause whose verb also displays 
morphology, and more concretely past tense and indicative mood inflection. And there are 
two possible explanations that a system incorporating FTUB may provide for such 
morphological shape: either the variables it contributes are associated with their own present 
and indicative features,111 as in (84g), or they are bound by a higher verbal quantifier in the 
relevant tense and mood, namely “believes”: 
(84h) <w0
ind, t1
pres> Greg believes λ<w2, t3>. <w2, t3> that student who4 [Ǝt6: t6 < t3] 
(<w2, t6 > R4 score one hundred on the exam) is a genius 
Thus, the current theory predicts that (84a) is ambiguous between two LF’s: (84f) and 
(84h). And the consequences of allowing the latter LF should be clear: the attitude verb is 
quantifying into the complex demonstrative. Namely, the lambda contributed by the former 
is binding a variable internal to the latter, with the result that the complex demonstrative is 
not opaque to modal quantification any more. Here are the truth-conditions obtained by 
(84h): 
                                                          
111 Recall from the discussion in 3.3.1.2 that verbs, regardless of their tense and mood, always contribute present 
and indicative variables. This is necessary in order for the other tenses and moods to be defined in relation with 
the basic ones. This means that the verb “scored” contributes a present variable regardless of the fact that it is 
in past tense. This is also true in case we treated tenses referentially (cf. von Stechow 2003, 2004). 
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(84i) λc: in all circumstances i compatible with what Greg believes in ic, δc (λx. λj. 
there is a time t occurring before ti such that x is a student in <wi, t> and x scored 
one hundred on the exam in <wi, t>) is a genius in i 
This means that the function δ will pick out a different individual in each of Greg’s 
belief circumstances. Given a context c, (84i) attributes to Greg a belief consisting in the set 
of circumstances j such that δc (λx. λi. there is a time t occurring before tj such that x is a 
student in <wj, t> and x scored one hundred on the exam in <wj, t>) is a genius in j. Of 
course, δc will have to pick out, for each circumstance j in Greg’s belief set, a student having 
scored one hundred in the world of j and a moment previous to the time of j. Thus, the 
complex demonstrative does not remain unaffected by the presence of the verbal quantifier. 
Fregeanism has been regained, and it has been reduced as a special case of QI.  
Needless to say, this accounts for the intuitive difference between (84a) and (84b) in 
SITUATION B. Even if one rejects an explanation on pragmatic grounds, it is nevertheless 
possible to treat complex demonstratives on the model of other indexicals and yet predict a 
semantic difference between those two sentences. Let k be the context of SITUATION B, 
i.e., a context in which Mary scored one hundred. It is clear that, in spite of her performance 
on the exam in ik, (84i) is not about Mary: it will be true in k iff Greg believes the set of 
circumstances i such that the individual selected by δk for the property of scoring one hundred 
in i is a genius in i. This means that the actual circumstance ik plays no role in determining 
the value taken by the demonstrative. Notice, on the other hand, that (84a) can also display a 
deictic reading, namely the one in (84f-g), in which the verbal quantifier binds no variable 
within the complex demonstrative. Given that δk (λx. λi. there is a time t occurring before tk 
such that x is a student in <wk, t> and x scored one hundred on the exam in <wk, t>) = Mary, 
when interpreting (84f) in k we do obtain a singular proposition about Mary: that Greg 
believes that Mary is a genius. Thus, the current theory predicts that (84a) is ambiguous 
between a deictic and a non-deictic reading. Obviously, a proper name like “Mary” contains 
no variables, meaning that verbal quantifiers can bear no effect on it; this entails that (84b), 
unlike (84a), is not ambiguous, for it can only be equivalent to the deictic reading of (84a) in 
k, i.e., to (84g), 
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More generally, the current theory predicts that complex demonstratives in intensional 
contexts can display both deictic and non-deictic readings. The latter typically arise in 
settings like the one described in SITUATION B, whereas the former can also be brought to 
salience in some scenarios. Consider the following setting: 
SITUATION D: Greg is not aware that there is any student who scored 
one hundred on the exam – in fact, he does not even know that an exam 
has taken place. He nevertheless believes, for independent reasons, that 
Mary is a genius. Jim knows Mary pretty well, he is aware of Greg’s 
opinion about Mary and he knows she scored one hundred on the exam, 
but for some reason he is unable to remember her name. While Jim and 
Jean are discussing the results of the exam, he utters (84a). 
As above, our intuitions regarding these examples are far from conclusive, but in 
principle it seems that this situation favors reading (84a) as expressing a singular proposition, 
namely the one in (84g). Other scenarios are more favorable to non-deictic readings.  
This means that my account is able to generate the very same differences predicted by 
King’s K3, but, unlike him, I do not need to rely to any ad hoc restriction on the set of 
contexts, and I do not resort to controversial issues pertaining to the metaphysics of 
intentions, such as the idea that haecceitistic properties are always accompanied with the 
higher-order property J1. My account, on the contrary, predicts that the non-deictic readings 
are licensed only if a set of well-defined linguistic criteria are met. In other words, this 
concession to Fregeanism does not mean that non-deictic readings are ubiquitous – this is 
another fundamental difference between my account and King’s. Recall the following 
example:  
(11) Mary believes that that bald man has hair 
As stated above, this sentence is not ambiguous, for it is not possible to read it as 
attributing a contradictory reading to Mary (cf. Braun 1994 for discussion of very similar 
examples). My account is able to accurately predict this lack of ambiguity; here are the only 





pres> Mary believes λ<w2, t3>. <w2, t3> that bald man has hair 
(11d) λc: in all circumstances i compatible with what Mary believes in ic, δc (λx. λj. 
x is a man in j and x is bald in j) has hair in i 
This time, the complex demonstrative contains no variables whatsoever, and therefore 
cannot be quantified into by any external quantifier: in a context k such that δk (λx. λj. x is a 
man in j and x is bald in j) = John, this sentence will attribute to Mary belief in a singular 
proposition, namely the set of circumstances in which John has hair (which, of course, does 
not include the actual circumstance, in which he is bald). Fregeanism is therefore not 
unrestricted, for it only concerns complex demonstratives containing a relative clause – a fact 
that fits very naturally with the contrast first noted by Wolter (2006) and Nowak (2019a) and 
discussed in section 3.3.1.3. This also means that my theory is not subject to the modal 
problems that Braun (2008b, 2008c) raises against King’s (2001) account (see the end of 
section 2.2.1.3). Just for the sake of illustration, consider the contrast between the following 
sentences (Nowak 2014): 
(88b) Every girl is looking for that boy who makes her heart beat faster, her stomach 
flutter and her mind wander  
(88c) Every girl is looking for that boy  
The default reading of (88b) is de dicto: none of the girls need to have any particular 
boy in mind. Of course, it may also be read de re, say, in a scenario in which each of the girls 
is playing hide and seek with her own actual current boyfriend. The verb “look for” does not 
combine with propositions, but at any rate it does require intensions as its argument, and this 
means that it should perform some sort of quantification over worlds and times, which in turn 
means that it is able to bind the world and time variables within the complex demonstrative 
in (88b). Just as in the above examples, the de dicto and de re readings are obtained, 
respectively, by letting the variables be bound or free. But, of course, this is not possible for 
(88c), where the complex demonstrative contains no world and time variables. This accounts 
for the fact that it can only be read as expressing a de re proposition to the effect that each of 
the girls is looking for a certain individual: for some context c, if dc(λx. λj. x is a boy in j) = 
Greg, then (88c) can only mean that every girl is looking for Greg. As far as I can tell, no 
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other theory of complex demonstratives, except for Nowak’s (2019a), is able to predict a 
contrast between (88b-c). 
A possible criticism against my account is that, in spite of examples like (11) and (88b-
c), perhaps Fregeanism should nevertheless be unrestricted. King seems to have something 
like this in mind when he discusses what he calls “non-redundant NDNS uses”, i.e., NDNS-
readings in which the property determined by the speaker’s intentions differs from the 
property specified by the nominal of the demonstrative. One of King’s (2001) examples 
concerns two astronomers that have been able to determine that one night in the year 100 
A.D. the Earth passed through an asteroid belt, resulting in a very nice display of shooting 
stars visible from the shore at Carnelian Bay. Their data are nevertheless incomplete, and 
they are unable to determine the exact night of the event. Then one of the astronomers utters 
the following: 
(204) I wish I had been at Carnelian Bay that night 
Arguably, the astronomer’s wish is not about any particular night, and this is 
incompatible with the idea that “that night” is opaque to modal quantification: it should pick 
out a different night in each of the circumstances compatible with the astronomer’s wish. 
Thus, it contradicts my prediction that complex demonstratives containing no relative clause 
cannot be affected by verbal quantifiers. King’s solution is, of course, to treat “that night” as 
a quantified expression meaning roughly the same as “the unique night in which the shooting 
stars were visible”, where the property of being a night in which the shooting stars were 
visible is supplied by the referential intentions of the speaker in the context.  
I do not think this is a clear counterexample to my theory. In this situation, as in most 
of the cases of non-redundant NDNS-uses discussed by King (2001: 66-74), the problematic 
complex demonstratives seem analyzable as E-type. It is not hard to see that the astronomer 
in the above example could not have employed the demonstrative the way he did unless there 
was some anaphoric antecedent available and easily retrievable from the previous 
conversation. This analysis can be applied to virtually every non-redundant NDNS-reading 
discussed by King. These data lead to another conclusion: Fregeanism is permissible in 
complex demonstratives without a relative clause iff they can be given an E-type reading. 
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This is, in fact, a feature they share with pronouns in general, for E-type personal pronouns 
can also be affected by modal operators.  
In sum: the discussion in this section suggests that c-theories can allow there to be cases 
in which complex demonstratives are affected by modal operators, and treat them as a 
particular case of QI. Of course, this is just revelatory of one of the main features of the 
system we are employing: in the current framework, modal and temporal quantification are 
monstrous operations. Informally speaking, embedding a sentence under a verbal quantifier 
binding world and time variables is equivalent to making it fall under the scope of a monster 
that shifts the value of “actually” and “now”.112 The system could nevertheless be made 
compatible with the idea that verbal quantifiers are not monsters: all that is required is to 
make time and world variables depend on a different assignment function, one that is located 
in the circumstances of evaluation rather than the context. Then binding world and time 
variables would not count as a monstrous operation. I leave this idea for future work.  
On the other hand, this discussion should also make it clear that this system requires 
redefining Millianism and direct reference, since it does not fit the definitions provided in 
section 3.3.2.2. Georgi, for example, regarded a term e as Millian iff every occurrence of e 
not under the scope of a quantifier is directly referential. Intensional operators are modelled 
in this system as quantifiers over times and worlds, and we don’t want Millian terms to be 
affected by verbs like “believe”; a better definition for this notion is one in which a term e is 
Millian iff every occurrence of e not within the scope of a quantifier binding worlds or times 
is directly referential. Similar modifications should be implemented in Salmon’s definition 
of “direct reference”. This means that, excluding E-type readings, complex demonstratives 
containing no tensed verb, like the one in (11), are Millian and directly referential, whereas 
those like the one in (84a), which make explicit reference to time and worlds, are not. In light 
of the examples so far discussed, this is as it should be. But, as I stated above, I will not argue 
about the labels.  
                                                          
112 Von Stechow originally presented his system as a response to Schlenker’s (2003), which makes extensive 
use of quantification over contexts in order to model several phenomena about indexical shift. Von Stechow 
vindicated Kaplan’s prohibition on context-shifting on the basis that the same predictions could be achieved by 
means of a system employing only variable binding, but the discussion in 3.3.2.1 should have made it clear that 
this response is ineffective: even if the context never shifts, von Stechow’s system allows monstrous operations 
on the character of indexicals by means of manipulating the assignment function.  
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The suggested pattern should already be clear: non-deictic uses of complex 
demonstratives are licensed only if they are under the scope of a monster or subject to E-type 
interpretation. This is essentially what is going on in all the counterexamples against directly 
referential accounts presented in 2.2.1.2, and this also includes the evidence from attitude 
reports. When neither of these mechanisms is available, the complex demonstrative functions 
just like any other well-behaved indexical; the canonical deictic uses discussed throughout 
section 2.1 illustrate this idea. Of course, this pattern is not exclusive to complex 
demonstratives: it is followed by virtually any indexical. It is for this reason that the central 
idea of c-theories appears to be the right one: complex demonstratives are, just like “I”, “you” 
or “she”, context-dependent singular terms with a variable character. In the next section I 
analyze some crosslinguistic evidence that, at least prima facie, seems to render further 
support to this analysis.  
 
3.3.5.3 Crosslinguistic evidence for 3.3.5.2 
Let me now digress a bit and discuss an important source of evidence in favor of analyzing 
NDNS-uses in the terms discussed above. Although the analysis I shall carry out here is very 
preliminary and far from conclusive, I will tentatively suggest that the use of subjunctive 
mood in modern Romance languages renders further support to the idea that the non-deictic 
nature of some complex demonstratives is due to the presence of a verb. Since we still lack 
a serious account of the functioning of subjunctive,113 I shall present the discussion in 
informal terms. Notice, too, that I don’t intend the following analysis to be conclusive nor 
exhaustive; all I wish is to show that it provides compelling reasons for thinking that the 
analysis developed here is on the right track.  
Subjunctive mood in modern Spanish, French, Italian or Catalan is employed roughly 
in the same way as it was in medieval English, when its usage was much more widespread 
than nowadays. Here is an example of a previously grammatical use of subjunctive in 
English: 
                                                          
113 The analyses of subjunctive from the point of view of formal semantics are scarce. See, e.g., Quer (2001) 
and Schlenker (2005).  
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(205) I will not let thee go, except thou bless (as opposed to “blessest”) me (King 
James Bible, Genesis 32: 26). 
Modern English still retains some remnants of these archaic uses: “come what may”, 
“God save the Queen”. Its presence is nowadays far less widespread, and it indicates that a 
situation is uncertain, hypothetical, possible or even unreal. An interesting fact about modern 
English is that subjunctive can only appear under the scope of verbal quantifiers, in positions 
in which it is often interchangeable with its indicative counterpart: 
(206) Mary suggested that Greg be appointed head of department  
(207) It is important that Mary stay during the whole meeting 
Subjunctive in Romance languages works just like in these examples. The pattern they 
display is similar to that of English, although subjunctive is far more common, and it is in 
fact compulsory in certain constructions. For instance, the Spanish counterparts of (206)-
(207) require, rather than just allow, the use of subjunctive. And expressions that 
paradigmatically quantify over worlds, like “it is necessary” and “it is possible”, require 
subjunctive too. Take the following examples from French (I am glossing the translation of 
subjunctive into English as if it were the infinitive): 
(208) Il faut que la communauté comprenne les risques que ces dangers représentent  
“It is necessary that the community understand the risks that these hazards pose” 
(209) Il est possible que votre nom d'utilisateur ait déjà été choisi par une autre 
personne  
“It is possible that your username have already been chosen by another person” 
 Interestingly, verbs like “want” or “doubt” also require subjunctive in Romance 
languages. Here is an example from Italian:  
(210) Voglio che sia chiaro che dubito che questo sia conforme alla costituzione  
“I want that (it) be clear that I doubt that this be in accordance with the 
constitution”  




An interesting fact about verbs in Romance is that the world variables marked with the 
indicative seem opaque to binding by modal verbs when they appear within relative clauses. 
Consider the following contrast in Spanish: 
(211a) Debemos encontrar un secretario capaz de hablar árabe 
“We must find a secretary able to speak Arabic” 
(211b) Debemos encontrar un secretario que habla árabe 
“We must find a secretary that speaks-IND Arabic” 
(211c) Debemos encontrar un secretario que hable árabe 
“We must find a secretary that speak-SUB Arabic” 
Sentence (211a) displays the usual scope ambiguities: it may mean either that we must 
find a particular secretary who happens to be able to speak Arabic, in case the quantifier takes 
wide scope, or that we must find any secretary whatsoever as long as she speaks Arabic, in 
case it takes narrow scope. However, (211b) differs from its English translation in an 
important respect: it is not ambiguous, for it only displays the de re reading. Something 
similar occurs in (211c), where only the narrow scope reading is available. If “must”, qua 
verbal quantifier, were able to bind the variable contributed by the indicative “speaks”, we 
should expect (211b) to display the narrow scope reading, but it does not. On the other hand, 
the fact that (211c) does not display ambiguities indicates that its world variable must always 
be bound. 
Let us now go for the main point: unlike English, complex demonstratives in Romance 
languages can also contain verbs in subjunctive mood. For example, a sentence like (84) has 
two possible translations into Catalan, one with the indicative and another one with the 
subjunctive: 
(212a) Aquell estudiant que ha tret un cent a l’examen és un geni 
“That student who has-IND scored one hundred on the exam is a genius” 
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(212b) Aquell estudiant que haja tret un cent a l’examen és un geni114  
“That student who have-SUBJ scored one hundred on the exam is a genius” 
But, importantly, these two readings are not equivalent: (212b) can only be employed 
for expressing a purely general thought, whereas (212a) is inappropriate unless the speaker 
has a particular individual in mind. For example, a use of (212b) by Greg in SITUATION A 
would sound far more felicitous than an utterance of (212a). Similarly, (212a) is usually more 
appropriate in scenarios we would associate with direct reference. Consider the following 
setting: 
SITUATION E: Amy and Laura are discussing the results of the exam. Mary 
is Laura’s student, and they know each other pretty well, but for some reason 
Laura is unable to remember Mary’s name. Amy asks Laura her opinion, in 
general terms, about her own students, and Laura, who still cannot recall 
Mary’s name, responds thus: 
(213) Well, none of them are particularly brilliant. However, that student who 
scored one hundred on the exam is a genius 
When translating the underlined material into Catalan, Spanish or other Romance 
languages, (212b) would be a rather inappropriate choice, but (212a) sounds perfectly fine. 
In this example, which illustrates a canonically directly referential use of a demonstrative, 
the use of indicative is almost compulsory. Interestingly, these facts are reproduced if we 
embed (84f-g) under an attitude verb. Here are some further examples from Catalan: 
(214a) Greg creu que aquell estudiant que ha tret un cent a l’examen és un geni 
“Greg believes that that student who has-IND scored one hundred on the exam 
is a genius” 
(214b) Greg creu que aquell estudiant que haja tret un cent a l’examen és un geni 
“Greg believes that that student who have-SUB scored one hundred on the 
exam is a genius” 
                                                          
114 The subjunctive verb “haja” in this example is displaying the typical morphology of third-person subjunctive 
in the València area, namely the morpheme –a. Other Catalan-speaking territories use –i instead, thus resulting 
in “hagi”.  
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The complex demonstrative in (214b), containing subjunctive, works pretty much as if 
it were a narrow scope definite description and, in fact, its truth does not even require that 
there be any student who actually scored one hundred; the one in (214a), on the contrary, is 
canonically employed with a particular individual in mind, pretty much like a proper name 




pres> Greg believes λ<w2, t3>. <w2, t3> that student who4 [Ǝt6: t6 < 
t5
pres] (<w7
ind, t6 > R4 score one hundred on the exam) is a genius 
(84h) <w0
ind, t1
pres> Greg believes λ<w2, t3>. <w2, t3> that student who4 [Ǝt6: t6 < t3] 
(<w2, t6 > R4 score one hundred on the exam) is a genius 
In other words, (214a-b) can be taken to express, respectively, the two propositions that 
as we argued in the previous section, (84a) is able to express, namely (84g) and (84i): 
(84g) λc: in all circumstances i compatible with what Greg believes in ic, δc (λx. λj. 
there is a time t occurring before tc such that x is a student in <wc, t> and x scored 
one hundred on the exam in <wc, t>) is a genius in i 
(84i) λc: in all circumstances i compatible with what Greg believes in ic, δc (λx. λj. 
there is a time t occurring before ti such that x is a student in <wi, t> and x scored 
one hundred on the exam in <wi, t>) is a genius in i 
 Or, to put it differently, Catalan, Spanish and other Romance languages mark an 
explicit distinction between the two possible readings, de re and de dicto, of (84a). Analogous 
remarks hold for other NDNS-uses like (85) and (88b).115 The very fact that (84a) can be 
                                                          
115 Just like in the case of (84a), there are two different ways to translate (85) and (88b) into Spanish: 
(85*) Ese homínido que descubrió cómo encender fuego era un genio 
“That hominid who discovered-IND how to start fire was a genius” 
(85**) Ese homínido que descubriera cómo encender fuego era un genio 
“That hominid who discovered-SUB how to start fire was a genius” 
(88b*) Toda chica está buscando a ese chico que hace que su corazón palpite más deprisa, su estómago 
aletee y su mente dé vueltas 




translated in two different, non-equivalent ways into other languages constitutes evidence 
that, even in English, it should be considered ambiguous between two distinct readings. This 
ambiguity can, of course, be resolved at the level of LF; this is what my system attains by 
distinguishing between (84f) and (84h). Of course, this analysis is not available for sentences 
like (88c), which can only be given one reading – an accurate prediction. 
What are the implications of this? Although the semantics of subjunctive is far from 
well-established, one thing that is clear about it is that it requires quantification over possible 
worlds. English itself is an example, for sentences like (206) and (207), and in fact (89) too, 
show that subjunctive mood can only appear in combination with world variable binders. 
This means that the complex demonstrative in (214b) contains a bound world variable. But, 
importantly, the world variable in (214a), marked with an indicative feature, does not have a 
bound reading, for “believe” is unable to bind it, as the facts in (211a-c) demonstrate.  
This is all still very speculative, but prima facie it supports my analysis above: if a non-
deictic use of a complex demonstrative in Romance languages requires that the demonstrative 
contain subjunctive, as in (214b), and therefore that its world variable be externally bound, 
we have a good reason to think that its non-deictic nature is due to quantification into the 
character of the demonstrative. Whenever the world variable cannot be bound (i.e., when it 
is in the indicative mood, as in (214a)), the complex demonstrative necessarily selects an 
individual. English cannot resort to subjunctive in order to dissipate the ambiguity in 
sentences like (84), (84a), (85) and (88), but it can achieve similar results by means of 
binding: each of the two possible readings of these sentences, de re and de dicto, can be 
achieved, respectively, by leaving the world variable within the demonstrative free or by 
letting the attitude verb bind it. In other words, it is very plausible to assume that (214a-b) 
are, just as we mentioned above, the two disambiguated versions of (84a), i.e., (84f) and 
(84h), respectively. Generalizing on these cases, we can assume that, whenever the world 
variable is free, as in (84f) or (214a), the complex demonstrative can only display a referential 
                                                          
(88b**) Toda chica está buscando a ese chico que haga que su corazón palpite más deprisa, su estómago 
aletee y su mente dé vueltas 
“Every girl is looking for that boy who make-SUB her heart beat faster, her stomach flutter and her mind 
wander” 
And, as in the above cases, there is a huge difference between the two translations: (85*) and (88b*) can only 
be read de re, whereas (85**) and (88b**), on the contrary, are appropriate just in case the speaker has no 
particular individual in mind.  
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reading – leaving E-type anaphoric cases aside, of course. In other words, non-deictic uses 
of complex demonstratives only arise when they are subject to QI or, more generally, some 
monstrous operation on character.  
 
3.4 Why treating them as singular terms works better 
If the preceding discussion is right, then c-theories are not just able to accommodate all the 
problematic counterevidence that has been raised against them: they also provide the most 
parsimonious model of the semantics of complex demonstratives. The two mechanisms 
postulated in order to account for non-deictic uses of these expressions, namely monsters and 
E-type anaphora, are independently motivated, and they are not exclusive for complex 
demonstratives, for they affect the behavior of any indexical. C-theories also predict that, 
whenever these mechanisms are not available, complex demonstratives will behave pretty 
much like “he”, “she” or “I”, i.e., as a context-dependent singular term. This is essentially 
what is going on in the deictic uses of complex demonstratives by means of which we 
illustrated the main tenets of directly referential theories (section 2.1)  
Critics of direct reference paradigmatically endorse quantificational views of complex 
demonstratives. This kind of approaches often overgenerate, for they predict many readings 
complex demonstratives do not actually display; solving this problem usually requires 
appealing to extra-semantic issues, such as the nature and composition of the possible 
contexts of utterance (cf. King 2001). A more important reason for rejecting quantificational 
theories is that, unless we are willing to give up the whole current paradigm of indexicality, 
they are unmotivated: any reasons we may have for thinking that complex demonstratives 
are quantificational should lead us to regard “he” or “she” as quantifiers too.  
On my view, these facts should suffice for endorsing the traditional view of complex 
demonstratives, but, just in case you are still unconvinced, in this section I briefly present an 
important advantage of understanding complex demonstratives as singular terms: it provides 
the simplest way to deal with the evidence from anaphora and ellipsis. These data, I shall 
argue, cannot be accommodated by most quantificational views, and therefore fatally 
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undermine these approaches. Finally, I also discuss some arguments that have been put 
forward in order to cast doubts on the evidence usually employed by c-theorists. 
  
3.4.1 Singular terms, anaphora and ellipsis 
Recall the following contrast, first noticed by James Higginbotham (1988): 
(12a) Laura hates the man sitting by her side, but Julia loves him 
(12b) Laura hates that man sitting by her side, but Julia loves him 
(13a) Laura hates the man sitting by her side, and Julia does too 
(13b) Laura hates that man sitting by her side, and Julia does too 
As stated in the introduction of section 2.1, sentences (12a) and (13a) are ambiguous 
between a strict and a sloppy reading: (12a) can mean either that Julia loves the man sitting 
by Laura’s side or the man sitting by her own, and (13a) can attribute to both Julia and Laura 
hatred towards the same man or towards a different one for each of them. This is in stark 
contrast with (12b) and (13b), which only display the strict reading. Other quantifiers display 
the same pattern as definite descriptions; the following sentences are equally ambiguous:  
(215) Laura hates a man sitting by her side, but Julia loves him 
(216) Laura hates most men she knows, and Julia does too 
VP-ellipsis, as it occurs in these examples, is resolved by attributing to the subject of 
the second sentence the same property predicated from the subject of the first one. The 
different readings that can be obtained for the second sentence are, in turn, due to the 
possibility of reading the first one in different ways. Let me put this in semi-formal terms. 
The first sentence in (13a) can be taken to express one of the two following propositions:  
(217a) <Laura, λx. x hates [the y: y is a man and y sits by Laura’s side]> 
(217b) <Laura, λx. x hates [the y: y is a man and y sits by x’s side]> 
Attributing each of these properties to Julia yields the two possible readings: 
(218a) <Julia, λx. x hates [the y: y is a man and y sits by Laura’s side]> 
(218b) <Julia, λx. x hates [the y: y is a man and y sits by x’s side]> 
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But, importantly, the descriptive meaning of the demonstrative in (13b) does not enter 
into the proposition expressed by it. Given a context c, it will express the proposition that 
Laura hates a certain object, namely δc (λx. λi. x is sitting by Laura’s side in i). If δc (λx. λi. 
y is sitting by Laura’s side in i) = John, then (13b) expresses the following proposition: 
(219a) <Laura, hating John> 
And attributing to Julia the same property Laura is attributed can only yield one 
possible result: 
(219b) <Julia, hating John> 
Notice, in fact, that these facts are analogous in the case of pronouns in general. Let 
gc(1) = John. Then the proposition expressed by (220) below in c is, simply, (219a): 
(220) Laura hates him1 
And, of course, (219a) is the only reading (220) can be given; this means that it is not 
ambiguous, which in turn entails that it is unable to give rise to different readings when it is 
read in combination with elliptical sentences. For example, (220a) can only be given a strict 
reading: 
(220a) Laura hates him1, and so does Julia 
Ellipsis is a complex matter, but these data should in principle support the idea that 
complex demonstratives are better understood on the model of pronouns.116 The mechanism 
                                                          
116 Notice, in fact, that this is not the end of the story, for it could be argued that my account predicts that (13b) 
is also ambiguous between two readings: 
(13’) <Laura, λx. x hates δc(λy. y is sitting by Laura’s side)> 
(13’’) <Laura, λx. x hates δc(λy. y is sitting by x’s side)> 
And this means that a sloppy resolution should be allowed. A response to this criticism could take a whole 
paper, but I believe the answer to this question lies in the idea that it is not possible to devise an LF for (13b) in 
which a lambda binds the pronoun internal to the demonstrative. I.e., this LF, in which the complex 
demonstrative is quantified into, is not permissible: 
(13*) [Laura] λ1. r1 hates that man sitting by her1 side 
The reason for not allowing something like this is that it would require “Laura” to raise (recall that, in Heim & 
Kratzer (1998), the only way to bind a variable is by means of QR), and this requires this proper name to be 
treated as a quantifier. This is something that is usually done, and some theorists, most notably Montague (1970, 
1974) even suggested that proper names should always be given the type of quantifiers. 
This idea, however, was found to be empirically inadequate. Partee (1987) and Partee & Rooth (1983) argued 
that it was better to assign to expressions a default type and to allow them to undergo type-shifting in certain 
environments, namely those in which the sentence is uninterpretable unless some type-shift occurs. (13b) is 
perfectly interpretable as it stands, and this means that “Laura”, as it occurs in this sentence, is still of type e 
264 
 
for solving anaphora should be analogous in both cases. Of course, all this evidence is rather 
hard to explain for quantificational theories in general, for they predict that sentences 
containing complex demonstratives should be subject to sloppy readings as much as (12a), 
(13a), (215) or (216) are – Lepore and Ludwig (2000) are probably the only exception. On 
the other hand, none of this should pose any problem for directly referential approaches, be 
it c-theories or mp-theories.  
 
3.4.2 Did character theories get things wrong? 
The data about anaphora and ellipsis strongly support the idea that complex demonstratives 
should be understood on the model of pronouns. This kind of evidence, along with the facts 
about entailment, opacity and attitude reports are often perceived as the best case for directly 
referential theories. Some authors have nevertheless cast some doubts about the 
conclusiveness of these data: perhaps anaphora, entailment and the like are not so supportive 
of c-theories after all. This final section is devoted to examining, and ultimately rejecting, 
some ideas that have been put forward against the idea that complex demonstratives behave 
just like any other indexical when it comes to the aforementioned phenomena. I discuss two 
main sets of data: a series of arguments that Lepore & Ludwig (2000) and King (2001) have 
put forward for arguing that narrow scope readings of complex demonstratives are always 
available, and an argument by Predelli (2001) presenting an apparent disanalogy between 
complex demonstratives and other indexicals regarding anaphora. 
 
                                                          
and therefore unable to raise. This, in turn, means that it can yield to LF no lambda binding the pronoun “her”, 
thus preventing the sloppy reading from occurring. 
Of course, this means that the proper name in (13a) should be allowed to raise. On my view, this occurs because 
(13a), unlike (13b), contains a quantifier in object position, and is therefore uninterpretable unless it undergoes 
QR. Once QR has been allowed, it should be permissible for the proper name to raise too. This idea predicts 
two possible LF’s for (13a):  
(13**) [The man sitting by her1 side] λ2. Laura hates r2  
(13***) [Laura] λ1. [The man sitting by her1 side] λ2. r1 hates r2  
The two readings predicted, (217a-b), derive respectively from (13**) and (13***). The story is surely longer, 
but I need not go into a whole theory of ellipses here; it is enough with acknowledging that the facts about 
anaphora and ellipsis favor an understanding of complex demonstratives on the model of pronouns.  
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3.4.2.1 Opacity: attitude reports and modal operators 
My account predicts that the descriptive meaning of complex demonstratives is sometimes 
transparent to modal quantification, but this concession to Fregeanism constitutes the 
exception rather than the rule: it can only arise in case a complex demonstrative containing 
a tensed verb is embedded under a modal quantifier. As mentioned above, this idea correctly 
predicts the contrast between (88b), which is ambiguous between a de re and a de dicto 
reading, and (88c), which can only be read de re: 
(88b) Every girl is looking for that boy who makes her heart beat faster, her stomach 
flutter and her mind wander  
(88c) Every girl is looking for that boy  
Some authors, however, have argued that the ability of complex demonstratives to be 
affected by modal operators should be generalized. If this were the case, then the c-theorist 
would be in trouble, for, on her theory, most complex demonstratives are as opaque to modal 
quantification as “he” or “she” are. In this section I analyze and refute some of the arguments 
that have been put in the literature in favor of the thesis that we might dub “generalized 
transparency”.  
We have already discussed one of the examples adduced in favor of this thesis: King’s 
(2001) sentence (204) in the scenario with the two astronomers. As I mentioned there, it is 
very plausible to regard this example as a case of discourse anaphora. However, he discusses 
further cases that prima facie seem to favor generalized transparency. Consider the following 
scenario he presents: Deena and Alan are discussing whether a certain stone, b, is a diamond, 
and Alan, in order to solve the dispute, asks his geologist friend Ed about the rock. Ed does 
not believe it is a diamond, yet he does think that that stone might be valuable anyway. 
Suppose further that Ed is in fact mistaken and the rock in question is actually a diamond. 
Alan, still convinced that the rock is a diamond, reports Ed’s statement to Deena as follows: 
(221) Ed said that diamond is very valuable 
It is clear that Alan is not being sincere to Deena, a fact that would be straightforwardly 
explained in case “diamond” were to be assessed not in the context of utterance but rather 
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according to the circumstances compatible with what Ed said. If this were the case, Alan’s 
utterance of (221) would straightforwardly qualify as false. This is taken by King as evidence 
in favor of his account, which is able to count the descriptive meaning “being a diamond” as 
circumstance-dependent.  
 This explanation sounds to me unconvincing. While Alan’s insincerity is out of 
question, I am not so sure about the idea that he has lied in uttering (221), as opposed to 
having merely misled. This is an important distinction and has given rise to a large amount 
of literature;117 roughly, it is usually accepted that lying requires that the speaker believes the 
literally asserted content to be false118 (Williams 2002), whereas misleading is a broader 
notion that allows the deceptive content to be implicitly communicated – say, at the level of 
implicature or presupposition. Directly referential accounts can concede that Alan is 
insincere without thereby acknowledging that he believes the literal content of his utterance 
to be false. On the account sketched here, (221) expresses the following proposition, 
(221a) λi. For all circumstances j compatible with what Ed said in i, b is very 
valuable in j, 
where b is of course required to have been picked out by the function δ as the argument 
of “being a diamond” in the relevant context. Obviously, Alan knows that this proposition is 
true in the above context, in which Ed said of b that it is valuable. But the descriptive content 
of the demonstrative plays a role very similar to that of a presupposition, i.e., Alan is 
conveying his own belief that the rock is a diamond. And, given the fact that they are taking 
Ed to be an authoritative source about the properties of b, Alan might as well be implicating 
that the reason why he believes that b is a diamond is because Ed said so – after all, Alan is 
following Ed’s criterion. Arguably, many other alternative explanations could be construed.  
Notice, in fact, that it is possible to devise parallel examples containing only proper 
names. Consider the following scenario: Flash Thomson, who despises Peter Parker but 
deeply admires his superheroic alter ego Spider-Man, utters (222): 
                                                          
117 See Carson (2006), Saul (2012) and Stokke (2013) for overviews. 
118 It is a different question whether the content should also be false, in addition to being held false by the liar. 
Grimaltos & Rosell (2013) advocate for what they call the “falsity condition”, which is also tentatively endorsed 
by Carson (2006). Williams (2002) rejects it. See some discussion on the consequences of the falsity condition 
in Grimaltos & Rosell (2017: 11-12). 
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(222) Spider-Man surely is a nice person 
Gwen overhears Flash’s utterance and then reports it to her friends: 
(223) Flash said Peter must be a nice person 
Just as in the above example, it is unclear whether we should say that Gwen is lying or 
merely misleading. Assuming a Millian view of proper names, it is clear that, content-wise, 
she said something true: in all the circumstances compatible with what Flash said, Peter 
Parker is a nice person. This is perfectly compatible with acknowledging some kind of 
deceptive intention on Gwen’s part, taking place at a non-literal level. This example is 
entirely analogous to Alan’s, and therefore I do not think we should take the latter as 
conclusive regarding the alleged possibility that “that diamond” may be affected by modal 
operators.  
Another source of alleged transparency comes from the interaction of complex 
demonstratives with necessity and possibility operators. Richard (1993) presents the 
following sentence as a possible counterexample to his own theory: 
(224) Necessarily, if that dog with a blue collar exists, then it has a collar 
This sentence expresses a false proposition. But, given Richard’s endorsement of an 
approach in which complex demonstratives contribute their descriptive meaning to the 
proposition expressed, he predicts that “dog with the blue collar” should be transparent to 
modal quantification, and that this sentence is therefore ambiguous between two readings, 
one of which is straightforwardly true: 
(224a) □ (if α exists and α is a dog that wears a blue collar, then α wears a collar) 
(take α to be the demonstrated animal). At least prima facie, (224) does not have a true 
reading, and therefore Richard’s prediction that it can be read as (224a) constitutes a 
counterexample to his theory. He responded to his own objection by claiming that what was 
going on in this sentence was something special having to do with presence of “exists”, 
although he remained not entirely convinced by his own response. Lepore and Ludwig 
(2000), on the contrary, disputed the very claim that (224) cannot have a true reading: 
although standardly read as false, they argued that it can also be given a reading roughly 
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corresponding to (224a), one that is in fact predicted by their theory. On their view, this 
sentence should be ambiguous between (224b-c), and the latter corresponds to the narrow 
scope reading, i.e., a reading in which the sentence is true: 
(224b) [the x: x = α & x is a dog with a blue collar] (x exists → □ α wears a collar) 
(224c) □ [the x: x = α & x is a dog with a blue collar] (x exists → α wears a collar) 
All I can say against Lepore and Ludwig’s claim that (224) has a true reading is that I 
am completely unable to hear this sentence as equivalent to (224a) or (224c). And I am not 
the only one: Braun (1994) denies that this kind of sentences have any true reading, and 
Richard himself acknowledges that “sophisticated informants [including himself] tend not to 
hear any reading of this on which it is true” (1993: 220). Of course, this may be due to some 
sort of philosophical bias; after all, the unnaturalness of the example, along with the fact that 
“necessarily” could be interpreted epistemically instead of metaphysically, may have 
contributed to obscure the discussion. As I see it, the dispute can be settled by appealing to a 
more naturally formulated example. Consider, again, (9): 
(9) That bald man could have had hair 
As stated above, it seems uncontroversial that this sentence has no contradictory 
reading. Given that “could” is roughly the natural language equivalent of the possibility 
operator, I take this sentence to constitute a compelling argument against the idea that (224) 
can have the extra reading predicted by Ludwig and Lepore’s theory. These data, along with 
the above discussion regarding King’s example, should be enough for concluding that 
complex demonstratives are not generally transparent. 
 
3.4.2.2 Anaphora and the Overt Antecedent Constraint 
As the discussion in 3.4.1 should have made clear, anaphora is one of the main strengths of 
directly referential theories and, more generally, of any theory that treats complex 
demonstratives as if they were another kind of pronoun. However, Predelli (2001) pointed 
out that there is an important disanalogy between complex demonstratives and other 
indexicals when it comes to anaphoric relations: generally speaking, the descriptive meaning 
encoded in the character of indexicals is not available for anaphoric reference, but the 
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nominal of a complex demonstrative, on the contrary, can easily serve as antecedent for 
anaphora. This seems to be in conflict with one of the main tenets of c-theories, namely the 
idea that the nominal of a complex demonstrative contributes to the character of the 
expression. The data provided by Predelli are rather conclusive, but I believe it is possible to 
provide an alternative explanation. Let us first see in more detail what the problem is.  
Syntactically speaking, complex demonstratives are not different from other 
determiner phrases, and it should therefore be no surprise that their subcomponents are 
available as anaphoric antecedents for other elements in the sentence. The components of 
any determiner phrase can be referred back to by pronouns, and complex demonstratives are 
not different in this respect: 
(225) [Some men that Mary1 knows] admire her1 
(226) [That man talking to Mary1] admires her1 
But Predelli points out that this should not be possible if the c-theorist is right. The 
contribution of the nominal “men that Mary knows” to the proposition expressed by (225) is, 
simply, its customary content, which includes Mary herself among its constituents; it is for 
this reason that “her” can inherit its content from that of “Mary”. But things are different in 
(226), for, according to c-theories, the nominal “man talking to Mary” does not contribute to 
the content of the demonstrative, but rather to its character. The content contributed by the 
demonstrative is, simply, an individual, which obviously cannot have Mary as its constituent; 
for this reason, “her” should have no way to refer back to her.  
Let me put this in structured terms in order to make it clearer. The content contributed 
by “some men that Mary knows” includes Mary herself as a constituent, but the content 
expressed by “that man talking to Mary” is, simply, an individual b: 
(227) <Some, <λx. x is a man & Mary knows x>> 
(228) b 
Since anaphora is mostly a semantic phenomenon, “her” should be taken to inherit its 
referent from the content expressed by its antecedent. But the problem is that, in the case of 
(226), Mary does not appear anywhere within the previously expressed content.  
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A possible response that Predelli sketches on behalf of the c-theorist is that perhaps 
“her” is not actually inheriting its content from “Mary”, but rather is functioning like a 
demonstrative pronoun: Mary is made salient by the very fact of uttering her name, and this 
renders her easily available for demonstrative reference by means of the pronoun. However, 
this story is not entirely convincing, for the occurrence of “Mary” in the following example 
does not raise her to saliency: 
(229) “Mary”1 is my favorite name, and that is why I like her1 
The anaphora in this sentence is rather infelicitous if available at all, and this suggests 
that mentioning Mary’s name cannot be the whole story. Predelli argues that there is 
nevertheless yet an alternative way to ensure that Mary is always salient when her name 
occurs within a complex demonstrative: she is made prominent by means of character itself. 
Character provides instructions for selecting a referent, which means that, in order to obtain 
the content of the complex demonstrative in (226), one must take Mary into account: one 
needs to identify the individual satisfying the property of talking to Mary. And this, of course, 
should suffice for rendering her salient.  
Predelli, however, also rejects the latter explanation, and he does it on the basis that 
character is never available for anaphoric reference.  The character of “I” can be paraphrased 
roughly as “being the agent of the context”, and that of “tomorrow” can be given by “being 
the day after today”. The problem, on Predelli’s view, is that this descriptive content cannot 
serve as the antecedent of an anaphora: 
(230) # I1 am delighted, because it1 is just the kind of context I discussed in my latest 
paper 
(231) # Tomorrow2 will be a better day, because it2’s been one of the worst days of 
my life 
I.e., the character of “I” renders a certain context salient, pretty much like “that man 
talking to Mary” raised Mary to saliency, but this context cannot be referred back to by the 
pronoun. C-theories predict that Mary and the context that “I” makes salient should be on a 
par, but clearly they are not, for “her” can pick out the former and “it” cannot pick out the 
latter. This means that anaphoric links on character are not available, and that therefore Mary 
cannot be raised to prominence in this way.  
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As I see it, the idea that Mary is made salient by the character of the expression to this 
context is perfectly acceptable as long as it is paired with some alternative explanation of 
why reference to the character of indexicals is normally not permissible. Predelli carries out 
his discussion in purely semantic terms, which is very reasonable given that anaphora is 
mostly a semantic phenomenon, but it has been known since the work of Paul Postal (1969) 
that there also exist morphological constraints on anaphora. And this is precisely what I am 
about to argue: anaphoric reference is as admissible on character as it is on content, but, in 
the case of average indexicals like “I” or “tomorrow”, anaphora is blocked because these 
words do not meet the appropriate morphological requirements. The phenomenon I have in 
mind was first noted by Postal himself, and it was dubbed “Overt Antecedent Constraint” by 
Grosz et al. (2014). Consider the contrast between (232a-b): 
(232a) OK Every man who killed [his brother]1 despised him1 
(232b) # Every fratricide1 despised him1 
The predicate “fratricide” is equivalent to the phrase “man who killed his brother”: 
both contribute the same character and the same content, and this means that the quantifiers 
“every fratricide” and “every man who killed his brother” should be equivalent. However, 
“him” can be anaphoric on a subconstituent of the former and not on the latter. Notice that 
this phenomenon is a very generalized one, and it holds even cross-sententially: 
(233a) OK Max is a child who lost [his parents]1 and he misses them1 
(233b) # Max is an orphan1 and he misses them1 
There is a general moral we can extract from these examples: in order for anaphora to 
occur, the antecedent must be morphologically transparent (Ward et al 1991). And the 
existence of this constraint provides a very natural response to Predelli’s challenge. Anaphora 
on character is always available as much as it is for content, and it is subject to the same kind 
of constraints. The reason why the anaphoric link in (230)-(231) is not admissible is, simply, 
because the indexicals serving as antecedent fail to meet this constraint: the morphological 
shape of “I” and “tomorrow” does not suggest that they may be related to contexts or days.  




If these arguments are sound, then there should be no obstacle to treat the nominal of 
complex demonstratives on a par with the descriptive meaning of other indexicals, pretty 
much as I have been suggesting throughout this whole dissertation. This means that the main 
tenet of c-theories can be vindicated: the descriptive meaning of a complex demonstrative is 
part of its character, not its content – nor is it semantically inert. I hope to have been able to 
convince the reader that this idea, paired with the existence of Kaplanian monsters and some 
additional independently motivated adjustments, provides the most parsimonious model of 






The theory of indexicality developed by Kaplan (1977, 1989) provided an elegant model of 
context-dependence in natural language. On this traditional picture, sentences are endowed 
with a character or linguistic meaning; when assessed against a certain context, this meaning 
is able to return a truth-evaluable content. The latter, in turn, is supposed to play many roles 
within linguistic theory. Content is the argument of intensional verbs and the object that has 
to be taken into account when resolving ellipses, anaphoras and co-predicative sentences; 
arguably, it is also relevant for determining whether a certain utterance counts as a lie, a 
metaphor or a hyperbole (cf. Borg 2019). Perhaps more relevantly for the purposes of this 
dissertation, it is also supposed to be the level of meaning at which compositional operations 
apply. This is the whole idea behind Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters: every operation in 
natural language can be defined as a function of content.  
When considering the particular case of complex demonstratives, the traditional model 
of indexicality seems to run into trouble. Although their behavior in intensional contexts, 
anaphora and ellipsis (section 2.1) strongly suggests that their content in a context should be 
as simple as an object, it is also true that, on many occasions, their descriptive meaning does 
seem to enter into what is said by the sentences in which they are contained. QI-uses are 
probably the most important source of evidence against the directly referential picture: if it 
is possible to operate on the descriptive meaning of a demonstrative, and if content is 
supposed to be compositional, then it seems we have good reasons for supposing that the 
nominal should be part of the truth-conditional contribution of a complex demonstrative.  
This is arguably the idea behind many of the approaches explored in this dissertation. 
On some views (Neale 1993, King 2001; Roberts 2002, 2003; Elbourne 2008; Nowak 2019a, 
2019b), the content of a complex demonstrative is not too different from that of a definite 
description, and the rigidity displayed by most of their uses is to be explained by different 
means. To borrow Kripke’s (1972: 21, footnote 21) distinction, most complex demonstratives 
are de facto rigid but not de iure so, according to the above authors. Other approaches are 
sort of mixed, for they acknowledge that the assertoric content of complex demonstratives 
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always includes an object among its constituents, but they nevertheless treat the nominal as 
just another part of their propositional contribution (Richard 1993, Lepore & Ludwig 2000). 
On the view I have advocated in this dissertation, we have no more reasons to abandon 
the traditional treatment of complex demonstratives than we have for giving up on the 
classical picture of indexicality. The possibility of shifting the value of an indexical is a 
generalized phenomenon (section 3.3.2.1) and it affects all kinds of pronouns, from “he” and 
“she” to “I”. Complex demonstratives are of course no exception. The main difference is, of 
course, that they are syntactically complex, which makes it much easier to operate on their 
character by quantifying into them. That aside, the idea that the non-deictic uses of complex 
demonstratives can only occur when their character is being operated on appears to be 
justified in view of the evidence so far discussed. Recall the following pairs: 
(142a) She is happy 
(142b) Every girl thinks that she is happy 
(179a) Px 
(179a) Ǝx (Px) 
(181a) I did my homework 
(181b) Only I did my homework 
All these sentences involve expressions whose propositional contribution varies from 
occurrence to occurrence. Variables and pronouns can be safely seen as contributing an 
object to the proposition expressed by (142a), (179a) and (181a), but it should be clear that, 
when they are under the scope of a monster, their contribution to what is said is shifted, as in 
(142b), (179b) and (181b). The shiftiness of complex demonstratives is an instance of this 
more general phenomenon. For the most part their functioning is pretty much like that of any 
well-behaved indexical, but sometimes they may occur under the scope of a monster, which 
prevents them from contributing their customary content. The only thing that is special about 
complex demonstratives is that, in addition to the usual bound readings (section 3.3.3), they 
can also be shifted through an additional mechanism, namely QI. For example, (234a) below 
may be taken to express a singular proposition in a random context c; if δc(⟦cleric who 
crowned her1⟧) = William Howley, then it expresses the proposition in (235a). The complex 
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demonstrative in (234b), on the other hand, is under the scope of a monster, and this means 
that its contribution to what is said is shifted. As a consequence, the proposition it expresses, 
namely (235b), is not singular: 
(234a) That cleric who crowned her1 is a nice person 
(234b) [Every queen] λ1. believes that that cleric who crowned her1 is a nice person 
(235a) <Howley, being a nice person> 
(235b) Ɐx (x is a queen → x believes that δc(λy. λi. y crowned x in i) is a nice 
person) 
It is for this reason that c-theories (section 2.1.2), which treat complex demonstratives 
on a par with pronouns, can be plausibly assumed to be the most parsimonious model of the 
functioning of these expressions. On the one hand, they treat them as singular terms whose 
usual contribution to the proposition expressed is simply an object, and this explains all the 
data about opacity, ellipsis and anaphora. On the other hand, the idea that the nominal 
contributes to the character of the term accounts for the inferential pattern noted in (28)-(29) 
and, additionally, for the idea that complex demonstratives in hyperintensional contexts will 
always display non-deictic readings. And, insofar as tense and mood are treated on a par with 
pronouns (section 3.3.1.2), the very same solution can be applied to NDNS-readings too 
(section 3.3.5). Other approaches treating complex demonstratives pretty much like any other 
indexical, such as mp-theories (section 2.1.3), could also be adapted for yielding similar 
results.  
Of course, the solution advocated in this dissertation entails giving up an important role 
of content: it can no longer be regarded as the level of meaning at which compositional 
operations apply. This might be seen as an undesirable consequence, but recall from the 
discussion in 3.3.2.1 that it is something we needed anyway if we wanted to preserve the idea 
that sentences containing non-bound indexicals express singular propositions. And, on the 
other hand, lifting Kaplan’s ban also means granting character the role that pertains to the 
linguistic meaning of expressions. Prohibiting monsters somewhat downplayed the role of 
character: if all semantic operations can be defined as functions of content, then it is unclear 
why character would even qualify as “meaning”. Given that its role within the compositional 
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semantics of a language is redundant, it might as well be regarded as a set of rules for the 
correct use of indexical expressions, rather than an actual layer of meaning. This idea seems 
nevertheless inconsistent with Kaplan’s conception of notions like validity and entailment. 
Validity is often seen as the formal counterpart of analyticity, i.e., truth in virtue of meaning, 
and it is defined by Kaplan as truth in virtue of character. If character is to be regarded as a 
genuine level of meaning, there should be no obstacle in granting it a role within the 
compositional semantics of a language. This does not mean that content is not an important 
notion anymore; arguably, it still has very relevant roles to play. All it means is that we must 
allow a division of labor within semantic theory: purely meaning-related notions such as 
analyticity and compositionality pertain to character, whereas content, in turn, can be held 
responsible for anaphora, ellipsis, indirect speech and, more generally, what is asserted. As I 
see it, we have no reason to expect that a single entity can fulfill all these roles.  
There are, of course, further adjustments that c-theories need to implement in order to 
tackle the problematic counterevidence. E-type anaphora (section 3.3.4) is a problematic 
phenomenon for theorists of direct reference in general, and it must be dealt with some way 
or another. Additionally, I also advocated for dropping any requirements to the effect that the 
object picked out by a demonstrative should be demonstrated (section 3.1), and the lexical 
entry I ultimately devised disposed of the very notion of a demonstratum (section 3.2). A 
further requirement was the adoption of a system with object-language quantification over 
worlds and times (section 3.3.1.2). The latter two adjustments, together with the lift of the 
monster prohibition, point towards a certain metaphysical picture of the notion of context 
that I would like to say a word about. Namely, I believe that context should be conceived 
pretty much like the later Kaplan (1989) did: a tuple consisting of all the parameters required 
for the determination of content, regardless of how these parameters may be obtained. 
Contexts are often conceived as formal representations of real speech situations. The 
parameters contained in a context are supposed to be retrievable from the real setting it 
purports to represent, but it should be clear that this relationship is not as straightforward as 
it might prima facie appear to be. Appeal to demonstrations, for example, will be of no help: 
in order to interpret a sentence like (77), for example, we need the context (and more 
concretely the δ function) to be able to determine, for each individual x and circumstance i, 
an object satisfying the property of crowning x in i – provided that x is a queen in that 
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circumstance. It is implausible to assume that a speaker could be demonstrating all these 
objects at once, and it is therefore unlikely that these parameters can be settled by objectively 
determinable features of the relevant speech situation – say, pointings or any kind of 
ostensive gestures. The very same thing could be said about the idea that context should 
determine the value of an infinite number of variables for times and worlds, and things could 
get even more dramatic if we assumed that tenses are referential.  
Intentions or conventions are arguably more plausible candidates for determining what 
kind of formal context best represents a certain situation, but at any rate it is unlikely that 
these conditions should be lexicalized into the meaning of indexicals. Context should 
therefore be seen as a formal representation of whatever parameters are required by the 
sentence for initializing content, but the right way to relate these parameters with actual 
speech situations is a matter of pragmatics. They are not more objective than assignment 
functions have traditionally been thought to be. This idea, paired with the idea that virtually 
every parameter of context can be shifted, suggest that perhaps semantics should do away 
with the very notion of context and work, simply, with an assignment. Similarly, the 
distinction between pure indexicals and true demonstratives should be disposed of. After all, 
the idea that formal contexts are representative of actual settings out of which all the relevant 
values can be automatically retrieved has been pointed out as a source of confusion regarding 






5 Resum (summary) 
Aquesta tesi té com a objectiu tractar la semàntica dels demostratius complexos, ço és, 
expressions amb la forma “aquest home”, “eixa cadira” o “aquella dona”. Les expressions 
d’aquesta mena són el resultat de combinar un demostratiu amb un sintagma nominal i, 
malgrat llur complexitat sintàctica, han estat tradicionalment considerades com a termes 
singulars, i més concretament com a instruments de referència directa. Així, per exemple, un 
enunciat com ara (236a) expressaria una proposició singular com la que podem representar, 
en termes estructurats, a (236b): 
(236a) Aquell home amb barret és calb 
(236b) <α, ésser calb> (on α és el referent del demostratiu) 
La teoria de la dixi desenvolupada per David Kaplan (1977, 1978, 1989) va assentar 
les bases per a aquest model tradicional del funcionament dels demostratius complexos. En 
la teoria clàssica, els díctics són directament referencials: expressions com ara “jo”, “tu”, 
“demà” o “ella” disposen d’un significat descriptiu anomenat caràcter que ajuda a fixar-ne 
el referent en un context però que ja no juga cap més rol un cop aquest individu ha estat 
determinat. Saber qui és el parlant, l’oïdor, la sendemà del dia d’emissió o la dona 
assenyalada pot servir per determinar quin objecte ha estat contextualment seleccionat per 
les expressions que acabem d’esmentar, però aquesta mena de significat descriptiu no entra 
dins les condicions de veritat de la proposició expressada, i això vol dir que l’única 
contribució que els díctics fan al contingut proposicional és un individu.  Aquesta mena de 
teories van ser adaptades per al cas concret dels demostratius complexos per autors com ara 
David Braun (1994), Emma Borg (2000) o Nathan Salmon (2002). La idea central d’aquestes 
propostes és que els demostratius complexos són semànticament anàlegs a qualsevol altre 
pronom díctic: el seu significat descriptiu, donat per la part nominal, contribuïx al caràcter 
de l’expressió però no té efectes sobre el seu contingut. És per aquesta raó que se les anomena 
“teories del caràcter” o “teories-c” (Predelli 2001).  
Aquest model tradicional fa diverses prediccions que, almenys d’entrada, pareixen ben 
acurades. Per exemple, prediu que els demostratius complexos són opacs als operadors 
intensionals, i que per tant no són afectats per adverbis modals i temporals ni per verbs 
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d’actitud proposicional. Considereu el contrast entre enunciats com (237)-(239), que 
contenen descripcions definides, i (240)-(242), amb demostratius complexos: 
(237) El primer home a l’espai podria haver estat americà 
(238) L’any vinent el batlle de València visitarà Castelló 
(239) Alba creu que l’assassí de Smith és innocent  
(240) Aquesta cadira de tres potes podria haver-ne tingut quatre 
(241) Demà eixe xiquet serà adult 
(242) Dídac creu que aquell home barbut va afaitat 
Els enunciats amb descripcions definides són ambigus entre una lectura de re i una altra 
de dicto. Llegides de re, (237) i (238) són vertaderes, respectivament, si hi ha la possibilitat 
que Yuri Gararin siga americà i si Joan Ribó visita Castelló l’any vinent, independentment 
de les fites espacials del primer en la possibilitat alternativa que estem considerant i del càrrec 
que el darrer ocupe durant la seua visita. Si les llegim de dicto, en canvi, el que diu (237) és 
que els americans van avançar els soviètics a la carrera espacial, mentre que (238), per la 
seua banda, serà vertadera si l’any vinent el batlle de València, siga qui siga qui ocupe el 
càrrec en eixe moment, visita Castelló. Similarment, (239) és ambigua entre una lectura de 
re on Alba ignora que certa persona és l’assassí d’Smith, i una altra de dicto on ignora que 
tot assassí és culpable en virtut de la llei. Per als enunciats amb demostratius complexos, en 
canvi, l’única lectura disponible és la de re. Per exemple, (240) i (241) no presenten cap 
lectura contradictòria on un sol invidiu siga alhora xiquet i adult o una cadira tinga tres i 
quatre potes a la vegada; (242), per la seua banda, pot atribuir a Dídac una creença falsa, però 
no una de contradictòria. En la mesura que els demostratius complexos es comporten com a 
designadors rígids, pareix adient, i ben natural, modelar-los com a termes referencials.  
Tanmateix, al llarg de les dues darreres dècades aquest model tradicional ha estat posat 
en qüestió arran d’un seguit de dades sobre usos no-díctics dels demostratius complexos. Els 
casos de quantificació interna (QI) (King 2001) en constituïxen l’exemple més evident: 
(243) [Tota reina]1 s’estima aquell clergue que va coronar-la1 
Pareix clar que (243) no expressa cap proposició singular que continga un individu 
entre els seus constituents, i açò entra en conflicte amb la idea que el valor semàntic del 
demostratiu complex que hi apareix vinga donat per un objecte. A banda del problema de la 
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quantificació interna, hi ha almenys cinc tipus addicionals de contraexemples a la teoria 
referencial:  
Abast secundari (AS):  
(244) Aquell professor que haja dut la subvenció més gran a cada departament rebrà 
un premi 
Enunciats Bach-Peters:  
(245) [Aquella amiga teua que va estudiar-hi1]2 va aprovar [aquell examen que 
(ella2) temia]1 
Anàfora:  
(246) [Un estudiant]1 seia a la biblioteca. [Un altre estudiant]2 hi1 seia al costat. 
[Aquest estudiant]2 tenia un llibre de lògica 
Sense demostració i sense referència del parlant (SDSP):  
(247) Aquell estudiant que haja tret un deu a l’examen és un geni 
Variables lligades: 
(248) [Tot estudiant] λ1. r1 té un professor que creu que [eixe estudiant]1 és un geni 
Tots aquests contraexemples han dut molts autors a rebutjar la teoria tradicional dels 
demostratius complexos i a desenvolupar-ne d’alternatives, amb freqüència proposant 
d’entendre aquestes expressions com a un tipus especial de quantificadors (Neale 1993; King 
1999, 2001; Lepore i Ludwig 2000). Altres autors (Roberts 2002, 2003; Elbourne 2008; 
Nowak 2014, 2019a, 2019b), malgrat no defendre teories quantificacionals, també es 
deslliuren d’alguns dels principis centrals del paradigma referencial, com ara la idea que 
siguen designadors rígids o instruments de referència directa.  
L’objectiu d’aquesta tesi ha estat defendre les teories-c tot mostrant que tota l’evidència 
que se n’ha adduït en contra pot ser acomodada mitjançant alguns ajustaments 
independentment justificats. Un cop hom té en compte diversos fenòmens relacionats amb el 
poder expressiu del llenguatge natural, la noció de composicionalitat, el rol del context i la 
naturalesa de les relacions anafòriques, les teories-c poden ser fàcilment adaptades per tal de 
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fer front a tots sis tipus de contraexemples que hem esmentat a dalt. Encara més, les teories-
c són les úniques capaces de predir acuradament el comportament dels demostratius 
complexos en fenòmens com ara l’anàfora, l’el·lipsi, el discurs indirecte i la interacció amb 
operadors modals i temporals. És per aquests motius que les teories-c constituïxen el model 
més parsimoniós del funcionament d’aquesta mena d’expressions.  
La metodologia emprada al llarg d’aquesta tesi ha estat la típica de la semàntica 
composicional dins la tradició generativista, com a la teoria estàndard presentada a Heim i 
Kratzer (1998). En aquest paradigma, el significat de les expressions és entés com un objecte 
formal definit mitjançant càlcul lambda tipat. Aquests objectes poden ser d’un dels dos tipus 
bàsics (tipus e per a individus o tipus t per a valors de veritat) o d’un de derivat, que és definit 
com una funció d’elements d’un tipus a elements d’un altre. Per exemple, el tipus <e, t>, per 
a predicats, és una funció d’individus a valors de veritat, mentre que el tipus <<e, t>, <<e, t>, 
t>>, per a determinants, és una funció de parells de propietats a valors de veritat. La 
interpretació de les expressions complexes es duu a terme mitjançant la regla d’Aplicació 
Funcional: per a qualsevol sintagma α, si β i γ són els seus subcomponents immediats, i si β 
denota una funció dins el domini de la qual hi ha la denotació de γ, aleshores ⟦α⟧ = ⟦β⟧(⟦γ⟧), 
on ⟦ ⟧ és la funció que vincula cada expressió a la seua denotació o valor semàntic. Quan els 
dos subcomponents immediats d’un sintagma són del mateix tipus, com ara quan es 
combinen dos adjectius o un adjectiu i una oració de relatiu (tipus <e, t>), no hi ha possibilitat 
que la denotació de l’un es trobe en el domini de la denotació de l’altre, i en aquest cas el que 
cal aplicar és una regla per combinar-los i obtindre com a resultat una expressió del mateix 
tipus: si tenim “gos” i “gran”, tots dos de tipus <e, t>, el sintagma “gos gran” també ho serà. 
Aquesta regla s’anomena Modificació del Predicat (Heim i Kratzer 1998: 125).  
En semàntiques intensionals els valors semàntics són intensions, ço és, funcions que 
assignen a cada expressió l’extensió que els pertoca en diverses circumstàncies alternatives.  
La composició exacta d’aquestes circumstàncies és un tema de debat, i en aquesta tesi hem 
optat per dos paràmetres relativament incontrovertits: l’extensió d’una expressió depén d’un 
món possible i un instant de temps. A banda de la circumstància d’avaluació, els llenguatges 
amb díctics requerixen un paràmetre addicional, i més concretament un context. Els contexts 
s’entenen, en semàntica, com a objectes formals: són tuples d’objectes que servixen com a 
referents per als díctics. Un enunciat en un context determina un contingut, ço és, allò 
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asseverat per l’enunciat en qüestió; el contingut, al seu torn, és modelat com una funció de 
circumstàncies a extensions. A banda del context i la circumstància, hom també sol afegir 
una funció d’assignació entre els paràmetres necessaris per obtindre l’extensió d’una 
expressió, ja que aquestes funcions servixen per donar un valor a les variables lliures. 
Tanmateix, les variables lliures són, des d’un punt de vista formal, estrictament anàlogues 
als díctics (Kaplan 1989), de manera que la funció d’assignació pot ser considerada 
simplement com un altre paràmetre del context, entenent aquest com una tupla que conté tot 
allò necessari per tal de determinar el contingut de les expressions (incloent-hi les variables). 
La darrera observació metodològica que cal fer té a vore amb els principis de 
combinació necessaris dins d’aquest sistema. Un cop hom hi introduïx dependència modal i 
temporal, hi ha dues maneres de reflectir-la al sistema formal: mitjançant operadors o, 
directament, amb quantificació explícita sobre mons possibles i instants de temps al 
llenguatge objecte. El primer d’aquests sistemes és probablement el més usual a l’hora de 
tractar llenguatges amb díctics en tant que permet de simplificar-ne les formes lògiques, però 
el segon és estàndard en les teories que versen sobre morfologia verbal i adverbis temporals 
i modals, ja que, tal com se sol reconèixer d’ençà del treball de Max Cresswell (1990), 
l’adopció de variables explícites de temps i mode és la manera més senzilla de capturar tot el 
poder expressiu del llenguatge natural. Açò vol dir que les circumstàncies han de ser 
representades explícitament a la forma lògica dels enunciats, i que tenen el seu propi tipus de 
denotació, el tipus s, que cal incorporar juntament amb els dos bàsics e i t. 
Aquest ajustament és necessari i al llarg d’aquesta tesi se’n fa un ús extensiu, i és per 
això que també cal adoptar els principis de combinació que hi van emparellats. Les oracions 
de relatiu contenen un verb amb una determinada flexió (temps i mode), i és per això que, 
contràriament als adjectius o als noms comuns, fan referència explícita a un temps i un món. 
Això vol dir que la Modificació del Predicat no és suficient per interpretar combinacions de 
noms comuns i oracions de relatiu, ja que els primers tenen tipus <e, <s, t>>  i els altres, en 
canvi, són <e, t>. Per aquest motiu, cal incorporar dos principis addicionals. El primer és la 
Identificació Individual (Kusumoto 1999, tot seguint Kratzer 1994a, 1994b), que permet de 
combinar dos predicats dels tipus que tot just acabem d’esmentar donant com a resultat un 
predicat complex de tipus <e, <s, t>>. D’altra banda, també ens cal un principi addicional a 
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favor del qual hem argumentat en aquesta tesi (secció 3.3.1.2): l’Especificació de la 
Circumstància, que permet de combinar un predicat de tipus <e, <s, t>> amb una 
circumstància (tipus s). Tenint totes aquestes eines formals, ja podem escometre la defensa 
de les teories-c que durem a terme en el present treball. 
Una part important d’aquesta defensa de les teories tradicionals consistix a mostrar que 
les teories quantificacionals, i més en general qualsevol proposta que no tracte els 
demostratius complexos de la mateixa manera que la resta de díctics, genera prediccions 
errònies. Hem mostrat, per exemple, que la teoria quantificacional més coneguda, la de 
Jeffrey King (2001), està sotmesa a un seguit de problemes intensionals dels quals no se’n 
pot deslliurar amb facilitat. King tracta els demostratius complexos com a quantificadors que, 
a banda de la seua funció semàntica habitual, també es combinen amb propietats 
contextualment determinades. Aquestes propietat són fixades per les intencions del parlant i 
moltes vegades poden ser, senzillament, la propietat de ser idèntic a un individu (si assenyale 
Angela Merkel i dic “aquella dona”, el demostratiu no només es combina amb la propietat 
ésser una dona, sinó també amb la d’ésser Angela Merkel). D’acord amb King, són aquesta 
mena de propietats les que generen els usos tradicionalment considerats com a referencials; 
en la terminologia de Kripke (1977: 21, nota 21), la rigidesa d’aquests usos dels demostratius 
complexos seria de facto i no de iure. El problema d’aquesta teoria és que genera un nombre 
excessiu de possibles lectures per als demostratius complexos, degudes fonamentalment a les 
diferències d’abast de quantificació; per exemple, prediu que (240)-(242) poden tindre 
lectures de dicto. Moltes d’aquestes són blocades per King mitjançant alguns principis 
controvertits sobre la naturalesa de les intencions del parlant, els quals hem criticat com a ad 
hoc. Allò ideal és que una teoria semàntica no es recolze en principis extralingüístics. 
La segona teoria quantificacional més discutida, la de Ernst Lepore i Kirk Ludwig 
(2000) (secció 2.2.2), presenta complicacions similars a les de la proposta de King i, malgrat 
que aconseguix blocar moltes de les lectures problemàtiques gràcies a tractar “that” com a 
un terme que sempre és referencial, resulta inadequada per altres motius. Un d’ells és que 
genera prediccions errònies sobre casos de QI com (243). Un altre problema, més fonamental, 
és la sintaxi poc ortodoxa que fa servir: atés que mai no tracten “that” com a determinant sinó 
només com a pronom, han d’adoptar regles sintàctiques que generen un excés de sintagmes 
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nominals. Els calen, per exemple, regles com (249), que prediria que (250)-(251) són 
gramaticals: 
(249) NP + N´ → NP 
(250) #Ella presidenta del govern és alta 
(251) #Aristòtil filòsof fou mestre de Plató 
Lepore i Ludwig afirmen que la idea que els demostratius sempre contenen un element 
pronominal està atestada a diversos llenguatges arreu del món, però l’evidència que hi 
proporcionen pareix dubtosa. Per exemple, afirmen que la forma gramatical que necessiten, 
on un pronom demostratiu i un sintagma nominal es combinen amb un determinant vacu, 
està atestada al castellà, on hi ha demostratius complexos com ara el següent: 
(252) El hombre ese 
Tanmateix, Lepore i Ludwig obvien el fet que “ese”, en aquest exemple, funciona com 
un adjectiu i no com un pronom. El valencià mateix n’és un important contraexemple, ja que 
en aquest idioma hi ha una distinció lèxica, i no només morfològica, entre els demostratius 
amb forma pronominal (“açò”, “això”, “allò”) i els que funcionen com a adjectius o 
determinants (“aquest”, “eixe”, “aquell”). Altres contraexemples inclouen el xinés mandarí 
o el japonés. 
Tal com hem esmentat adés, hi ha teories que, malgrat no tractar els demostratius 
complexos com a quantificadors, sí que s’allunyen molt del model estàndard que els tracta 
com qualsevol altre díctic. El tret central de propostes com ara les de Mark Richard (1993), 
Craige Roberts (2002, 2003) o Ethan Nowak (2014, 2019a) és que la part descriptiva del 
demostratiu (el sintagma nominal) entra a formar part, de manera generalitzada, d’allò 
asseverat per l’expressió. Com a conseqüència, totes elles acaben predint, en major o menor 
mesura, lectures errònies on els demostratius a (240)-(242) poden acabar caient sota l’abast 
d’operadors intensionals.  
A banda d’aquesta dificultat bàsica, aquestes teories sovint patixen problemes 
específics, particularment amb el material pressuposicional que cadascuna d’elles associa als 
demostratius. A la proposta de Roberts, per exemple, el demostratiu està associat a la 
pressuposició que l’objecte que destria és el que més sobreïx, i això té com a conseqüència 
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que “això sobreïx” és una veritat analítica (o, almenys, que mai no és informativa). Pel que 
fa a Nowak (2019a), la seua teoria associa els demostratius complexos a dues 
pressuposicions: una d’unicitat i una altra de no-unicitat. Donada una expressió e amb la 
forma “aquell F que p”, on “F” és un sintagma nominal i “que p” és una oració de relatiu, e 
destria l’únic individu que satisfà les pressuposicions de no ser l’únic objecte que cau sota 
l’extensió d’“F” i ser l’únic que sí que satisfà “ser un x que p”. Si no hi ha cap oració de 
relatiu, es combina amb una propietat seleccionada contextualment, com ara la de ser idèntic 
a l’objecte assenyalat. Aquesta teoria aconseguix predir diversos contrasts importants pel que 
fa a l’acceptabilitat de molts enunciats amb demostratius complexos, i encaixa perfectament 
amb la idea que els demostratius complexos sense oració de relatiu només poden ser emprats 
referencialment (Wolter 2006), però com a contrapartida acaba predint que enunciats com el 
següent haurien de ser autocontradictoris, ja que el sintagma nominal entra en conflicte amb 
la pressuposició de no-unicitat: 
(253) Aquest primer argument ha estat ben formulat 
Finalment, un altre tipus de teories que són discutides i rebutjades són les que postulen 
que els demostratius complexos són expressions ambigües, ço és, amb dues entrades lèxiques 
distintes (secció 2.3). A banda de la manca de parsimònia que comporta el fet de complicar 
el lèxic innecessàriament, aquesta mena de teories no encaixen bé amb el fet que els 
demostratius complexos, des d’un punt de vista semàntic, es comporten gairebé de la mateixa 
manera arreu de la majoria d’idiomes.  
És per totes aquestes raons que les teories tradicionals estan millor equipades per fer 
front als usos més habituals dels demostratius complexos. El que cal trobar és, doncs, una 
manera de fer-les compatibles amb l’evidència en contra presentada a (243)-(248). La versió 
de les teories-c que desenvolupe a aquesta tesi està dissenyada per fer-hi front. Per tal de vore 
quines modificacions cal implementar, vegem, en primer lloc, com es pot formular l’entrada 
lèxica de les teories-c clàssiques: 
(254) λc. λi. λP: P(ic)(dc) = 1. dc, 
on “c”, “i” i “P” són variables per a contexts, circumstàncies i propietats, 
respectivament, i, per a qualsevol context k, dk n’és el demonstratum (l’objecte que més 
sobreïx) i ik la circumstància privilegiada, ço és, la circumstància <wk, tk> que consta del 
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món i el temps de k. Aquesta entrada lèxica té problemes, fonamentalment, per fer front al 
problema de QI, car prediu que (243) és vertadera en un context c i una circumstància i si i 
sols si un determinat objecte, dc, és estimat per totes les reines d’i, sota la pressuposició que 
dc va coronar totes i cadascuna d’elles. També resulta inapropiada per als casos d’SDSP, ja 
que en principi el demostratiu complex a (247) no hauria de comportar-se com un designador 
rígid sota l’abast d’operadors modals: 
(255) Josep creu que aquell estudiant que haja tret un deu a l’examen és un geni 
Allò atribuït a Josep en aquest enunciat no hauria de ser una creença singular sobre un 
objecte particular, sinó més aviat una de general. Açò vol dir que l’extensió del demostratiu 
complex hauria de variar de circumstància a circumstància, ja que aquest és el paràmetre 
sobre el qual el verb “creure” quantifica. El problema s’agreuja quan considerem casos de 
QI en contexts intensionals.  
Tot açò suggerix que hauríem de deslliurar-nos de la idea que el demostratiu complex 
selecciona un demonstratum contextualment destacat, ja que es aquesta la que fa que el 
demostratiu sempre reste ancorat a un individu. La idea mateixa que allò seleccionat per un 
demostratiu és l’objecte demostrat ja havia estat criticada amb anterioritat per altres motius, 
fonamentalment perquè duu a resultats erronis pel que fa a analiticitat i conseqüència lògica 
(Predelli 2012a; secció 3.1.1 d’aquesta tesi) i perquè és poc realista des d’un punt de vista 
psicològic (Nowak 2019b; secció 3.1.2 del present treball). Així doncs, pareix que ja tenim 
bons motius per a defer-nos-en. En la proposta defesa en aquesta tesi (secció 3.2), la idea que 
cada context privilegia un demonstratum és rebutjada; en el seu lloc, propose que cada 
context c continga una funció δc: Π→E, on Π és el conjunt de totes les propietats i E el 
d’individus, de manera que, per a cada P ∈ Π, P(ic)(δc(P)) = 1. Dit altrament, el que fa la 
funció δ és combinar-se amb una propietat, comprovar quins objectes la satisfan en la 
circumstància del context, i seleccionar-ne un. El valor semàntic d’un demostratiu complex 
en un context ha de ser, senzillament, el valor que la funció δ assigne a la propietat designada 
pel nominal: 
(256) ⟦aquell⟧ = λc. λP. δc(P) 
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Per exemple, el valor semàntic del demostratiu “aquell home” en un context k seria un 
individu, δk(⟦home⟧k). Si δk(⟦home⟧k) = Ximo Puig, aleshores el següent enunciat expressa 
una proposició que, en termes estructurats, podem representar com (257b): 
(257a) Aquell home és president 
(257b) <Ximo Puig, ésser president> 
Per descomptat, aquesta proposició és singular i inclou un individu entre els seus 
constituents. Aquest model del funcionament dels demostratius complexos és estrictament 
anàleg al de la resta de díctics (són termes singulars dependents del context sense cap més 
contribució al contingut que un individu), i per tant no té cap dificultat pel que fa a l’evidència 
d’usos referencials canònics com (240)-(242). Aquesta versió de les teories-c, però, també 
pot fer front als contraexemples que s’han presentat contra les teories de la referència directa. 
Pel que fa al problema principal, el de QI, aquesta entrada lèxica evita completament 
la més important de les dificultats: en aquests usos, el demostratiu complex ja no està ancorat 
a cap individu en particular. Si apliquem (254) a l’enunciat (243), el que obtenim és el 
següent: cada reina x determina una propietat diferent, la de ser un clergue que ha coronat 
l’individu x, i en conseqüència el demostratiu complex seleccionarà un individu distint per a 
cadascuna d’elles. Aquesta és la proposició expressada per (243) en un context c: 
(258) λi. Ɐx (x és reina en i → x s’estima δc (λj. λy. y va coronar x en j)) 
Per descomptat, per a cada x l’individu δc (λj. λy. y va coronar x en j) ha d’acomplir el 
requisit d’haver coronat x a la circumstància ic. Açò suposa un avenç important per a les 
teories-c, ja que aquestes condicions de veritat no són les d’una proposició singular. 
Tanmateix, el resultat encara no és del tot correcte, car encara resta una dificultat: aquesta 
proposició és vertadera en una circumstància i si i sols si tota reina a i estima un individu que 
és un clergue i va coronar-la a una circumstància distinta, ic. Malgrat no estar ancorat a un 
únic individu, el demostratiu encara depén massa del context. Aquesta idea, juntament amb 
els usos SDSP, fa pensar que alguns usos dels demostratius complexos han de dependre de 
la circumstància. 
Aquest problema és resolt de dues maneres distintes, que he anomenat la solució 
extensional i la solució de lligar la circumstància (secció 3.3.1.3). Totes dues solucions 
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requerixen un recurs tècnic independentment justificat i que ja hem esmentat adés: l’adopció 
de variables explícites per a temps i mons i la quantificació a nivell de llenguatge objecte 
sobre aquests elements. La morfologia verbal és tractada de la mateixa manera que els 
pronoms: el present i l’indicatiu són referencials i sempre seleccionen el moment present i el 
món real, respectivament, mentre que la resta de temps i modes es tracten com a 
quantificadors capaços de lligar aquestes variables. Això vol dir que la circumstància 
d’avaluació és irrellevant, ja que el temps i el món on cal avaluar un enunciat ja estan 
esmentats de forma explícita a la forma lògica dels enunciats: tot el que ens cal és un context 
que indique quin món i temps són l’actual i real. 
Si modelem la morfologia verbal d’aquesta manera, el problema que hem esmentat 
adés s’esvaïx. Aquest sistema requerix que el temps i el mode de tots els verbs de l’oració 
estiguen coordinats, i açò significa que, en totes aquelles ocasions en què el demostratiu 
complex continga una oració de relatiu, el seu contingut descriptiu haurà de ser avaluat a la 
mateixa circumstància que el verb de l’oració principal. Considereu la següent forma lògica, 
on les “t” i “w” són variables per a temps i mons, i “pres” i “ind” són propietats-Φ amb una 
semàntica pressuposicional que fa que les variables a què estan annexades destrien, 
respectivament, el temps i el món del context: 
LF de (243): <w0
ind, t1
pres> [Tota reina] λ2. r2 s’estima aquell clergue que3 [Ǝt4: t4 < 
t5
pres] (<w6
ind, t4> r3 la2 corona) 
Mentre tots dos verbs estiguen coordinats, no hi ha la possibilitat que siguen avaluats 
a circumstàncies distintes. Vet-ne ací les condicions de veritat predites (hi he subratllat la 
contribució del demostratiu): 
(259) λc. Ɐx (x és reina en ic → x s’estima δc (λy. λj. x és un clergue en j & [Ǝt: t < 
tc] (y corona x en <wc, t>))) 
El resultat és, doncs, essencialment correcte, però aquesta solució potser resulte poc 
atractiva per a alguns autors. El motiu és que, en la mesura que el temps i el mode verbals 
són tractats com qualsevol altre díctic, aquest sistema es desfà de la noció mateixa d’intensió 
–és per això que he triat l’etiqueta “extensional” per referir-me a la solució que acabe 
d’esbossar–. Hi ha, però, una manera de recuperar les intensions: lligar la circumstància 
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principal dels enunciats amb un terme lambda i requerir que totes les variables marcades amb 
les propietats de present i indicatiu estiguen coindexades. També cal tractar els rastres de 
moviment dins les oracions de relatiu com a variables per a propietats (representades com 
una “R” majúscula a la següent forma lògica):  




pres> [Tota reina] λ2. r2 
s’estima aquell clergue que3 [Ǝt4: t4 < t1
pres] (<w0
ind, t4> R3 corona r2) 
El resultat d’avaluar aquesta forma lògica en un context qualsevol és una intensió que 
representa les condicions de veritat correctes d’aquest enunciat: 
(260) λc. λi. Ɐx (x és reina en i → x s’estima δc (λy. λj. [Ǝt: t < ti] (y és un clergue 
en i & y va coronar x en <wi, t>))) 
En aquestes condicions de veritat, l’argument per a circumstàncies que la funció δ pren 
és irrellevant, i en conseqüència el demostratiu complex no és sensible a la circumstància del 
context. Siga quina siga la circumstància i proveïda per avaluar aquest enunciat, l’individu 
seleccionat per a cada reina x haurà d’haver coronat x al món d’i i en un moment anterior al 
temps d’i. Aquesta solució involucra lligar totes les circumstàncies que apareixen de forma 
explícita dins el demostratiu, i és per això que s’anomena “solució de lligar les 
circumstàncies”.  
Aquestes dues solucions mostren que qualsevol demostratiu que continga un verb 
flexionat pot perdre l’opacitat als operadors temporals i modals, fet que encaixa molt bé amb 
la idea assenyalada per Wolter (2006) i Nowak (2019a) que els únics demostratius que poden 
fer-se servir de manera no-díctica són els que contenen una oració de relatiu. El sistema, a 
més, prediu que els demostratius sense cap oració de relatiu, com ara els de (240)-(242), 
només poden ser emprats de manera referencial. Una altra virtut de la teoria és que permet 
de reduir molts dels casos d’SDSP com a instàncies especials de QI: només cal lligar les 
circumstàncies que hi apareixen (secció 3.3.5). Per exemple, (255) pot tindre una forma 
lògica com la següent, on el λ que lliga la circumstància interna al demostratiu és contribuït 
pel verb d’actitud proposicional (Cf. von Stechow 2003, 2004) (ho presente només per a la 
solució extensional, car la manera d’adaptar-ho a l’altra és òbvia): 
LF de (255): <w0
ind, t1
pres> Josep creu λ<w2, t3>. <w2, t3> aquell estudiant que4 [Ǝt5: 
t5 < t3] (<w2, t5> R4 trau un deu a l’examen) és un geni 
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Avaluant aquesta forma lògica en qualsevol context assolim el resultat desitjat: la 
creença atribuïda a Josep no és sobre cap estudiant en particular. 
(261) λc. Per a tota circumstància i compatible amb el que Josep creu a ic, δc (λy. λj. 
[Ǝt: t < ti] (y és estudiant en <wi, t> & y trau un deu a l’examen en <wi, t>)) és un 
geni en i) 
Així doncs, les teories-c tenen la possibilitat de predir usos no-díctics per als 
demostratius complexos. Aquesta resposta contrasta amb les respostes que fins ara havien 
donat altres defensors d’aquestes teories (Cf. Braun 2008a), que apel·laven a la pragmàtica 
per tal de fer front a la contraevidència. Malgrat que en aquesta tesi no es descarten les 
solucions en termes pragmàtics, sí que hi defenc la possibilitat de tractar aquests problemes 
en termes semàntics. Açò no només permet d’oferir una solució unificada als problemes de 
QI i SDSP, sinó que, a més, encaixa molt bé amb l’evidència sobre l’ús del subjuntiu a les 
llengües romàniques (secció 3.3.5.3). Hi ha, a banda, un avantatge addicional: aquesta idea 
enceta la possibilitat de tractar com a QI alguns casos d’SDSP on les solucions en termes 
pragmàtics o no pareixien anar enlloc. Considereu el següent subjuntiu condicional, on la 
noció de referència directa pareix futil, car no hi ha cap objecte que satisfaga el contingut 
descriptiu del demostratiu (Nowak 2014): 
(262a) Si Gore haguera guanyat les eleccions, hauria fet una abraçada a aquell 
elector que haguera dipositat la papereta decisiva 
Al present sistema, aquest enunciat hauria de tindre la forma lògica proposada a (262b) 
(una versió extensionalitzada de la semàntica de Lewis-Stalnaker per a aquesta classe 
d’enunciats, on “Cw (p)” denota el conjunt de mons possibles més propers a g(w) on p és 
vertadera) i les condicions de veritat a (262c). Per simplicitat, en tots dos casos estic obviant 
la dependència temporal: 
(262b) [Ɐw1: w1 ∈ Cwind (Gore guanya les eleccions)] (w1 Gore fa una abraçada a 
aquell elector que2 w1 R2 diposita la papereta decisiva)) 
(262c) λc. [Ɐw’: w’ es troba entre els mons més propers a wc tals que Gore guanya 
les eleccions a w’] (Gore fa una abraçada a δc (λy. λw’’. y és un elector a w’ & y 
diposita la papereta decisiva a w’) a w’) 
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Aquesta forma lògica i les condicions de veritat predites mostren que els demostratius 
complexos en oracions de subjuntiu condicional poden ser tractats com a instàncies 
particulars de QI. L’única diferència és que el que es lliga no és una variable per a individus, 
sinó per a mons; el resultat, però, és clar: el demostratiu seleccionarà un objecte distint en 
cada món possible. Aquestes idees, d’altra banda, també són aplicables als casos d’abast 
secundari, els quals són reconeguts per King mateix (2001: 173, nota 9) com un cas especial 
de QI.  
Pel que fa a la resta de contraevidència, que inclou els casos d’anàfora, els enunciats 
Bach-Peters i els usos de demostratius complexos com a variables lligades, val a dir que, 
malgrat que no poden ser reduïts com a casos particulars de QI, sí que són instàncies de 
fenòmens més generals que suposen un problema no només per al cas dels demostratius 
complexos sinó, en general, per a la teoria estàndard de la dixi. L’anàfora en (246), per 
exemple, és un cas d’anàfora de discurs, que afecta els pronoms en general. La raó per la 
qual King (2008a) considera aquest enunciat com un contraexemple a la teoria referencial és 
que la idea que “aquest estudiant” estiga ancorat a un únic individu entra en conflicte amb 
que el valor de l’expressió depenga del del quantificador amb què està coindexat. Tanmateix, 
açò no és exclusiu dels demostratius complexos, sinó que afecta pronoms de tota mena: 
(246a) [Un estudiant]1 seia a la biblioteca. Un altre estudiant hi1 seia al costat.  
Les raons per les quals l’“hi” d’aquest exemple no pot ser referencial són les mateixes 
per les quals, a (246), “aquell estudiant” no pot ser-ho, fet que mostra que el que ocorre a 
(246) és una instància d’un fenomen més general conegut com a covariació sense c-
comandament. Aquesta dificultat ja va ser assenyalada per Peter Geach (1962) i Gareth Evans 
(1977) com un problema a resoldre per als pronoms en general, i se n’han proposat diverses 
solucions, des de l’anàlisi dels pronoms problemàtics com a tipus-E tal com va proposar 
Evans mateix fins a les anàlisis de tipus-D (Heim 1990, Neale 1990) i diverses propostes al 
si de les semàntiques dinàmiques (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982, Groenendijk i Stokhof 1991). A 
la secció 3.3.4 examine com aplicar aquestes solucions per al cas particular dels demostratius 
complexos, i explique que els enunciats Bach-Peters poden ser explicats com una combinació 
de QI i covariació sense comandament-c. Allò important, però, és que la hipòtesi inicial de 
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les teories-c roman inalterada: els demostratius complexos han de ser entesos sota el model 
dels pronoms. 
Aquesta hipòtesi, d’altra banda, encaixa ben naturalment amb els usos d’aquests 
demostratius com a variables lligades (secció 3.3.3). Al capdavall, tots els pronoms presenten 
usos lligats: 
(263) [Tota reina] λ1. creu que algun dia ella1 arribarà a ser emperadiu  
(264) [Només jo] λ2. vaig votar per mi2 mateix 
La raó per la qual aquests usos particulars de demostratius complexos no són 
referencials és, senzillament, que cal operar-ne sobre el caràcter (Rabern 2013). L’única 
diferència entre els demostratius complexos i els pronoms díctics habituals és, senzillament, 
que hi ha dues maneres d’actuar sobre el caràcter d’un demostratiu complex: o bé lligant-lo, 
o be mitjançant QI. Açò significa, d’altra banda, que el nostre sistema ha d’incorporar 
operadors hiperintensionals, contràriament al que Kaplan (1989) va defendre. Malgrat que la 
presència d’aquests operadors no està lliure de controvèrsia, pareix nogensmenys justificada 
en la mesura que és la millor manera de conservar la idea que els pronoms poden ser utilitzats 
per expressar proposicions singulars i, tanmateix, també poden presentar usos lligats (secció 
3.3.2.1). La qüestió de si l’etiqueta “referència directa” pot ser aplicada a un sistema com 
aquest és un tema de debat, però es tracta fonamentalment d’una qüestió nominal (secció 
3.3.2.2). 
Així doncs, les teories-c només requerixen alguns ajustaments independentment 
justificats per tal de fer front a tota l’evidència que se n’ha presentat en contra. Aquests 
resultats, juntament amb la manera natural en què aquestes teories expliquen la impossibilitat 
de dobles lectures a (240)-(242), apunten cap a una important conclusió: les teories-c són la 
manera més parsimoniosa de tractar els demostratius complexos. Aquesta idea, d’altra banda, 
és reforçada pel fet que aquestes expressions es comporten com qualsevol altre díctic, i de 
forma molt diferent als quantificadors, pel que fa a fenòmens com ara l’anàfora o l’el·lipsi 
(secció 3.4). Considereu el contrast següent (Higginbotham 1988): 
(265a) Laura odia l’home que seu al seu costat, però Júlia l’estima 
(265b) Laura odia aquell home que seu al seu costat, però Júlia l’estima 
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(266a) Laura odia l’home que seu al seu costat, i Júlia també 
(266b) Laura odia aquell home que seu al seu costat, i Júlia també 
L’anàfora a (265a) genera una doble lectura: Júlia pot odiar el mateix home que Laura 
odia o el que seu al seu propi costat. Tanmateix, la que hi ha a (265b) només pot ser resolta 
atribuïnt a Júlia estima envers l’home al costat de Laura. Els fets a (266a-b) són similars: la 
primera presenta dues lectures, però l’única lectura possible per a la segona és una on Júlia i 
Laura senten odi envers la mateixa persona. Açò mostra que el funcionament dels 
demostratius complexos en anàfora i el·lipsi és estrictament anàleg al dels pronoms, que 
només poden presentar una lectura, i essencialment diferent al dels quantificadors, que 
sempre en generen més d’una: 
(267) Laura l’estima, i Júlia també 
(268) Laura odia tots els hòmens que coneix, però Júlia els estima 
Les teories-c constituïxen, per tant, la millor manera d’entendre els demostratius 
complexos: són termes singulars que depenen del context i que contribuïxen únicament un 
individu al contingut expressat, llevat dels casos on un operador hiperintensional hi intervé.  
Aquestes conclusions apunten cap a una concepció de la noció de context ben diferent 
de la que tradicionalment hom ha sostingut en semàntica. Al llarg d’aquesta tesi hem defés 
la inclusió de les funcions d’assignació com un paràmetre més del context, la idea que la 
funció δ seleccione un individu per a cada propietat, la quantificació explícita sobre mons i 
temps i la possibilitat d’operar sobre diversos paràmetres del context; a tot açò, a més, cal 
sumar-hi el rebuig de la condició que l’objecte seleccionat siga contextualment demostrat. 
Totes aquestes qüestions suggerixen que el context, com a constructe formal, ha de fixar un 
nombre de paràmetres que difícilment poden ser determinats observant aspectes objectius i 
fàcilment discernibles arran de la situació de proferiment de l’enunciat. Hi entren en joc 
factors molt més subjectius i bastant més complexos que fan pensar que el context, lluny de 
ser la representació formal d’una situació real de parla, ha de ser concebut, més aviat, com 
una col·lecció de paràmetres l’obtenció dels quals no és tan senzilla com s’havia pensat 
d’ençà que Kaplan (1977) n’introduí la noció. El procediment de posar cada context formal 
en relació amb una situació concreta de parla està lluny de ser immediata; potser paga la 
pena, doncs, deslliurar-nos de la noció mateixa de context, que tanta confusió ha generat al 
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si de la semàntica (Predelli 2005a), i fer-ne servir una altra. La funció d’assignació, per 
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